WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE UNHAPPY ABOUT HAPPINESS VIA ARISTOTLE

The functionalist account of Aristotle’s notion of *eudaimonia*

by

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Abstract

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Adviser: Professor Peter Simpson

The purpose of my dissertation is to resolve the ongoing argument in the modern Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotelianism regarding the principle of eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία; happiness). Exclusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia is one dominant or exclusive telos (end) consisting of the aretē (excellence or virtue) of theōria (contemplation of the divine). Inclusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia is an inclusive or compounded telos containing this and all other Aristotelian virtues in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by phronēsis (practical wisdom). I offer the functionalist interpretation that goes beyond the dichotomy of inclusivism and exclusivism in arguing that (1) contrary to exclusivism, theōria is functionally linked with all the other activities of the soul throughout the entire Aristotelian corpus and that (2) contrary to inclusivism, theōria is functionally superior to each and all of the other activi-
ties of the soul, making a compound model irrelevant in its incapacity to express the hierarchy within the soul.

The soul and polis are both a sustēma (systematic whole) organized by the ruler nous (intuitive reason / active intellect) with its activity (energeia) of theōria (contemplation) via formulating metron (measure). Metron in relation to us depends on metron within the object, and the latter is assumed a priori as a major premiss (the universal) in the practical and speculative syllogisms, while the practical reason is incapable of defining the universal. Eudaimonia is a perfect realization of the function of the ruler. Humans are functionally distinct from other animals precisely by this contemplative ability of a priori assuming the universal within the particular. Soul, as any sustēma, is identified not with the hierarchy of its parts, but with its ruler, and the final virtue is identified with the virtue of the ruler. The passive intellect and the active intellect are accordingly the practical reason and the contemplative reason. The first principle and end (the cause) of action is leisure spent in the disinterested and useless contemplative activity of the ruler -- the active intellect. The moral action, which does not reach this end, is not ultimately good-in-itself though outright dutiful.
## CONTENTS

**Introduction**  
1

**Chapter 1**  
Introduction of the debate on *eudaimonia* in the contemporary Aristotelian scholarship  
5

**Chapter 2**  
Finality of *eudaimonia* as isolation  
17

**Chapter 3**  
*Eudaimonia* as the perfect functioning of the active intellect

3.1 Finality of the most final good as its functional peculiarity and superiority  
28

3.2 The reconsideration of the *ergon* passage in *NE* 1, 7  
33

3.3 Textual support for the new interpretation in *NE* 1, 13  
42

3.4 Textual support for the new interpretation in *NE* 6 = *EE* 5  
46

3.5 Textual support for the new interpretation in the *De Anima* and its teleological argument for the identification of *eudaimonia* with *theōria*  
49

3.6 The hierarchical argument for the identification of *eudaimonia* with *theōria* based on the identification of any *sustēma* with its highest function  
57

3.7 Implications of the hierarchical argument for the *teleia aretê* passage in *NE* 1, 7  
62

3.8 The argument from the peculiarity of human *ergon* for the identification of *eudaimonia* with *theōria*  
65

3.9 Concluding thoughts on the functional nature of happiness  
70

**Chapter 4**  
*Eudaimonia* as incompatible with the maximization of moral virtues and unidentifiable with their compound

4.1 The requirement to limit social interactions and moral / practical virtues involved  
75

4.2 The causal priority of *eudaimonia*: self-love as self-causation and self-causation as *eudaimonia*  
95

4.3 Mutual contemplation as the only true justification of social interaction: *EE* 7, 12 on the life as knowledge  
117

4.4 Man does not need moral duty to prove himself good: *NE* 9, 9 on the life as knowledge  
123
4.5 The requirement to limit the intensity of the most close social interactions 134
4.6 EE 7, 15 on the necessity to limit both extrinsic and intrinsic goods and on theoria as the standard of human life 138

Chapter 5 The significance of the principles of pain and pleasure / leisure for eudaimonia

5.1 Pain inherent in moral virtue: the existential incompatibility between moral virtues and eudaimonia 157
5.2 The passage on the three types of life in NE 1, 5: the significance of the conflation of the moral life with the practical life 162
5.3 NE 10, 6-8 on leisure as the principle of eudaimonia, different from its conditions / additions 173
5.4 NE 10. 8 on theorētikos being the paradigmatic moral agent most capable of apprehending the facts of life / establishing measure for the sake of leisurely theoria 184
5.5 NE 10. 9 on the role of theoria in the systematization of polis 197
5.6 Politics 8 on the role of theoria in the systematization of polis 203
5.7 The difference between eudaimonia as the contemplation of the measure and the arithmetic mean of the moral virtue 209

Chapter 6 The role of pleasure in making eudaimonia final and self-sufficient. The final reconsideration of the NE 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia 214

Appendix Critical overview of the major interpretations of eudaimonia in the contemporary Aristotelian scholarship

A.1 Ackrill’s account 237
A.2 Cooper’s account 241
A.3 Kenny’s account 262
A.4 Broadie’s account 296
A.5 Kraut’s account 312
A.6 Hardie’s account 330
Introduction

The purpose of my dissertation is to resolve the ongoing argument in the modern Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotelianism regarding the principle of *eudaimonia* (εὐδαιμονία; happiness).

It is traditionally assumed that there are two major interpretations: the first one argues that the principle of *eudaimonia* is one dominant or exclusive *telos* (end) consisting of the *aretē* (excellence or virtue) of *theōria* (contemplation of the divine). The second argues that the principle of *eudaimonia* is an inclusive or compounded *telos* containing this and all other Aristotelian virtues in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by *phronēsis* (practical wisdom). Nonetheless, there is no clear-cut division between interpreters into the inclusivist and exclusivist camps.

Earlier interpreters are inclusivists regarding only some parts of the Aristotelian ethical corpus, and exclusivists regarding its other parts. They rest such an approach on their claim that the Aristotelian corpus is inconsistent. Later interpreters argue either for the consistency of the Aristotelian ethics, or else against the division of the interpretation into the inclusivist and the exclusivist. Their position can be properly called neither inclusivist, nor exclusivist, for it is representing the happy life as a mixed life throughout the entire corpus of Aristotle’s ethical writing, with “mixing” of the *energeiai* here and now going beyond the simple inclusion principle.

I offer a fourth kind of interpretation – functionalist – that goes even farther beyond the dichotomy of inclusivism and exclusivism in arguing that neither the exclusive
nor the inclusive model is correct, but that (1) contrary to exclusivism, *theōria* is functionally linked with all the other activities of the soul throughout the entire Aristotelian corpus which, thus, appears to be consistent, and that (2) contrary to inclusivism, *theōria* is functionally superior to each and all of the other activities of the soul, making a compound model irrelevant in its incapacity to express the hierarchy within the soul. I argue that so far no mixist interpretation, which is more or less close to functionalism, has been able to construct a “working” model of precisely how *theōria* functions in the soul as a whole. In the absence of a concrete working model any functionalist or mixist reading collapses into the inclusive reading: it just adds *theōria* -- as some more sophisticated activity -- to a lump of the other activities of the soul.

I suggest that *eudaimonia* in Aristotle is based on the following principles. The soul is a *sustêma* (systematic whole) organized by its intrinsic *metron* (measure). The systematicity of the soul requires a strict hierarchy between the activities of the soul – one governing, and others subordinated in a “harmonic tuning of the soul,” as Aristotle puts it in the *Politics*. Thus, there are parts of the soul – they cannot be discarded – but they are ruled by one ruler – *nous* (intuitive reason / active intellect) with its activity (*energeia*) of *theōria* (contemplation). Even more, soul, as *any* *sustêma*, is identified not with the hierarchy of its parts, but with its ruler – its superior function or standard, i.e., the active intellect. I argue that the passive intellect and the active intellect are accordingly the practical reason and the contemplative reason. Because *sustêma* is identified with its highest function, and, so, the practical reason is subdued to the ruler / the highest function as a slave or a steward, the practical reason *is* a passive function, though it is an imperative ruler of man’s appetites and emotions, and issues commands for sake of the
true ruler – the theoretical reason. The first principle and end (the cause) of action is leisure spent in the disinterested and useless contemplative activity of the ruler -- the active intellect. The moral action, which does not reach this end, is not ultimately good-in-itself though outright dutiful.

The active intellect defines the measure or standard of the soul. Eudaimonia is a perfect realization of the function of the ruler, i.e., it is in the perfect degree the formal function of a measure / proportion, a formula, a principle, that allows us to unite the contradictory parts of the soul, the divine and the human, the universal and the particular, the practical and the speculative. Just their conjunction, as it is in the inclusive model, yields a contradiction. At the same time, the exclusion of all other parts of the soul other than theoria from the systematic whole of the soul, as it is in the exclusive model, does, contrary to the core belief of exclusivists, undermine the dominant role of theoria, and is destructive not only to the moral virtues, but to the entire soul, and theoria itself. Thus, neither inclusivism nor exclusivism can achieve the formulation of the soul as a systematic whole. On one side, inclusivism undermines its own principle of inclusion, for the compounding of the contradictory elements yields a contradiction. On the other side, exclusivism undermines its own principle of the exclusive dominance of theoria, for theoria in the exclusivist rendering cannot in principle dominate the soul, which is destroyed by such domination.

Contrary to both these views, functionalism states that eudaimonia requires the final (complete) virtue not in the sense of exclusion of all other virtues, and not in the sense of inclusion (aggregation) of all other virtues, but in the more organized sense of being an actuality of a functionally structured unity – a systematic whole, where nous
with its activity of *theōria*, a thing apart (a non-imperative ruler, in Aristotle’s words), rules over a composite – *to suntheton* -- which itself is only a potentiality. Therefore, *eudaimonia* requires *theōria* to be the most final end, the dominant end, if you will, but only in this sense – that it rules the entire soul by putting it into harmony. The actuality of a *sustēma* is given in the contemplation of the ruler. Without contemplation, an animal does not realize oneself as belonging to the specific species, and one’s life as focused upon achieving the most final end of *eudaimonia*, i.e., without contemplation an animal does not intuit the universal within the particular, because the universal is given only to the contemplative reason, and is not given to the practical reason. Therefore, the final virtue is identified with the virtue of the ruler, the ruler being the function which intuits the universal within the particular. The entire *sustēma* of the soul exists for the sake of the ruler -- the active intellect and its activity of *theōria*.

If the functionalist interpretation can be shown to work along these lines, it has the potential of combining the advantages of both the inclusive view and the exclusive view, and avoiding the major disadvantages that plague them. I preserve from the inclusivist view the requirement of the full, i.e., comprehensive, development of man, if man is to attain happiness. And I preserve from the exclusivist view the requirement of one ruling or dominating activity of the soul, if man is to attain happiness, and that this activity is *theōria*, the best activity in the soul. But I assess the requirement of comprehensibility and the requirement of hierarchy as essentially, i.e., functionally, linked to each other.
Chapter 1
Introduction of the debate on *eudaimonia* in the contemporary Aristotelian scholarship

Let me introduce a bit of the chronological background, i.e., how the dispute regarding the Aristotelian notion of *eudaimonia* has progressed through the thirty years of disputation, and, especially, the issue of the overlap between the disputants belonging to two rival camps. From the mid 1970s, when the dispute emerged, being an inclusivist meant that one believes that Aristotelian *eudaimonia* includes all virtues on a par with *theôria* in a mixed life. Being an exclusivist meant that one believes that Aristotelian *eudaimonia* is *theôria* in exclusion of all other virtues. Nonetheless, it appears that there is no clear-cut distinction between the exclusivist and the inclusivist camps.

First of all, there is no clearly outlined exclusivist camp at all. John Cooper was an exclusivist only in the 1970’s, and only towards Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and he was an inclusivist, even then, towards the *Eudemian Ethics* and most of the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10 and partially Book 1. And even in the 1970’s, he believed that Book 10 is inconsistent itself, and accepts partially an inclusivist account of happiness for the secondary happy life, i.e., moral life happy in a secondary degree. Then in the 90’s, Cooper changed his position and became an inclusivist. I believe that had his early position not included the elements of inclusivism, his transition from exclusivism to inclusivism would have been impossible.

Furthermore, in its major assumptions, the inclusivist interpretation does paradoxically appear to be the mirror twin of the exclusivist interpretation. For example, Kenny can be called an exclusivist, but only towards the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus the
central Books: he argues that not only Book 10, but also Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* propounds the exclusive interpretation, but he holds a belief that the central Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics* propound a comprehensive ideal of happiness – a belief shared by all inclusivists. Moreover, he believes that because, on his interpretation, the central Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which it shares with the *Eudemian Ethics*, propound the comprehensive ideal of the happy life, they belong to the latter, not to the former. On the other side, Ackrill, who started the debate in the mid 70’s, and who believed that Aristotelian eudaimonia should be inclusive, has at the same time believed that Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* offers an exclusivist ideal of happiness, this very belief being identical with the standpoint of all exclusivists.

Here is the set of crucial assumptions shared by both inclusivists and exclusivists, as given by the major players: (1) most of the *Nicomachean Ethics* or, at least its central Books (Kenny) which it shares with the *Eudemian Ethics*, propounds the happy life to be the inclusive life consisting of the perfect exercise of all human activities, especially moral virtue and *phronēsis*, and supplied with the sufficient stock of natural goods within the complete life (Ackrill, Cooper); (2) Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* propounds an exclusive or dominant ideal of happiness with the happy life being the perfect exercise of one perfect human activity, i.e., *theōria* (Ackrill, Cooper, Kenny); (3) the *Nicomachean Ethics* has a crucial inconsistency between most of the treatise and Book 10; (4) the *Eudemian Ethics* propounds an inclusive or mixed ideal of happiness including all the final ends (Ackrill, Cooper, Kenny); (5) either the entire *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10 (Ackrill, Cooper) or the entire *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10 and Book 1 (Kenny) propounds the mixed ideal of happiness analogous to the mixed ideal of happi-
ness in the *Eudemian Ethics*; (6) there is a crucial inconsistency between the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 10 (or the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1 plus Book 10) and the *Eudemian Ethics*, the latter propounding the happy life to be the *mixed life*; (7) the *inclusive* happy life is ruled by *phronēsis*; (8) regarding the *inclusive* happy life, Aristotelian teleology is horizontal, meaning that it accepts a plurality of ultimate ends; (9) the entire Aristotelian corpus is inconsistent, and Aristotle’s position is ambiguous.

My point is that neither Ackrill nor Cooper nor Kenny can be considered consistently as being exclusivists or inclusivists, because they insist upon one part of the Aristotelian corpus having an inclusive account of happiness, and another part having, *simultaneously*, an exclusive account of happiness. Then, their own positions should *simultaneously* be a partial inclusivism and a partial exclusivism. Had they offered one overlapping interpretation, they should immediately have dropped their claim that the Aristotelian corpus is inconsistent. That is why the very division into the inclusivist and the exclusivist paradigms was dubious already in the 70’s -- the early period of the development of the debate, involving Ackrill, Cooper and Kenny as major players: so one just has to go with the self-attrtribution each interpreter makes, relying only on his conviction that there is more textual evidence towards one interpretation rather than another. But because the entire corpus of the Aristotelian ethics has been proclaimed by each of these interpreters to be inconclusive, their positions appear to be inconclusive as well: all of them accept that there is textual evidence which is, on their view, against their assumed self-attrtribution as inclusivists or exclusivists.

In addition to this ambiguity, there were other defects in the early debate. As it was pointed out by his critics, Ackrill’s inseparability requirement (to be happy is to be
practically successful here and now) was too vague in its all-inclusiveness, and could not account for the conflict between the subordinate ends, and between the most final end and the subordinate ends. Also its indiscriminate plurality of ends cut the Aristotelian ethical corpus into the segments which posited each one its own hero, different and even opposite from the hero of the other segment. Most important, Ackrill’s inseparability requirement could not explain the separable nature of nous in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, and the allegedly separable life of contemplation. Ackrill did himself realize that, in his scheme, the unifying plan was impossible, and assessed this as ‘an insurmountable chasm’ between *theōria* and practical excellences.

Cooper who started his 1975 book with the agenda of tying all the parts of the Aristotelian ethical corpus together, ended up with the same insurmountable chasm as Ackrill between the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 and the rest of the ethical corpus. Even the bi-partite model he offered as an interpretation for the mixed life in the *Eudemian Ethics* and the rest of the *Nicomachean* was self-contradictory for it posited simultaneously (1) that the bi-partite end of happiness consists of two ends in such a way that none is subordinated to the other; and (2) that *theōria* remains the dominant end even in the bi-partite end of the happy life. In addition, the relation between moral virtues and *theōria* in Cooper’s bi-partite end is not teleological proper, for *theōria* is never engaged in till all the requirements of moral virtues are fully met.

This ambiguous division into the inclusivist and the exclusivist paradigms can be traced down only till the 80’s. The later interpreters argued either for the thorough consistency of the entire Aristotelian corpus including the ethical writings, like Kraut, or denied the very relevance of the division of interpretations into the inclusivist and the exclusiv-
ist, like Hardie, or else tried to find absolution for Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency and ambiguity, like Broadie. These interpreters share the belief that any part of the Aristotelian ethical corpus does propound a *mixed ideal* of happiness or, at least, allow for the *mixed ideal* of happiness even when one activity is superior (Kraut). Thus, these later interpreters cannot possibly be classified as belonging to either the inclusivist or the exclusivist camp, and do not apply these labels to themselves.

I call this camp the *mixists* or “the mixed happy life interpretation” not only in a sense that the representatives of this camp attribute the ideal of the mixed life to the entire body of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and, thus, consistently express the principle of mixing in comparison with earlier inclusivists. Mixists (Kenny, Broadie) claim that various *energeiai* (activities) of the soul are inseparable from each other, and, so, are “mixed” in one’s life *not* like the cuts of glass in a shade of a stained glass lamp, which are united into a mosaic pattern, but still separated by copper foil. The *energeiai* of the soul are “mixed” like molten glass and metal oxides, alloyed together in a boiling furnace to produce favrile [stained] glass. The mixed life of the early stage of the debate was a life that combined all the excellences of the soul (i.e., *theoria* and practical excellences) in one composite (*bi-partite* in Cooper’s words) ultimate end of happiness (*extrinsic mixism*). According to this interpretation, all the virtuous activities of the soul are neighbouring with each other on the grid of happy life, but are existentially unmixed with each other (are experienced in different times and places, and under different circumstances). In addition to this rigid structuring of happy life, the semblance to the traditional pyramid-like structure of Aristotle’s teleology was preserved. The plurality of ends was presupposed by the comprehensive account of the most final end, but it was limited, in Ackrill’s ac-
count, by inseparability requirement (though, there are plural ends, they all do ultimately aim at happiness, and inseparably from their own realization), and, in Cooper’s account, by the two-storey outlook of the mixed life, which designs the foundation of practical excellences independently of theōria, but builds this foundation to support theōria, as the second storey.

Contrary to this interpretation of the mixed life, mixists, like Kenny and Broadie, represented the mixed happy life as not centered on one specific end at all (horizontal teleology), but dispersed in the fluidity and plurality of the practical agendas of the moment. For Kenny, the mixed happy life can equally terminate in pleasure, honour or understanding. For Broadie, any unified plan of life is impossible, for any central good functions as a constraint rather than the most final end proper. Broadie tends to substitute Aristotle’s notion of the most final end with her notion of the ultimate end, and, then, speak of the plurality of ultimate ends. This position is so pronounced that both Kenny and Broadie claim that the practical agent does not always aim at happiness (teleological minimalism), so that, in their accounts, the happy life is paradoxically different from happiness.

Though being the theoretical advancement, mixism does essentially remain within the boundaries of inclusivism, simply trying to incorporate exclusivism (the superior role of theōria), or, rather, trying to dissolve exclusivism within inclusivism so that no inconsistency in Aristotle’s text or contradiction in Aristotle’s argument remains. Consequently, mixists preserve, within one and the same interpretation, some claims from the formerly exclusivist camp and the formerly inclusivist camp. As a result of this merging of exclusivism and inclusivism, the exclusivist or the inclusivist interpretations have
lately acquired quite different meanings from the ones they have had before. When, in the early years of the debate, the assessment had been made regarding the division into the primary, i.e., theoretical, happy life and the secondary, i.e., political, happy life Aristotle makes in Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the exclusivist interpretation was customarily applied only to the primary happy life, and the inclusivist interpretation was applied only to the secondary life. Now, (1) the recent position of Kenny, Cooper and Kraut towards the secondary happy life is similar to an exclusivist interpretation because they claim that the secondary happy life lacks *sophia* with its activity of *theōria*, while (2) Cooper’s and Kraut’s position towards the primary happy life is similar to an inclusivist interpretation because they claim that the primary happy life includes both *theōria* and moral virtue (though not in a *bi-partite* most final end but as two *independent* final ends in one happy life¹), or, in other words, they argue that theorizer is necessarily moral.

Nonetheless, though lacking *theōria*, the secondary happy life on this interpretation does still remains a mixed life in the sense attributed to it by all the previous interpreters – as having an inclusive ideal of happiness: (1) it includes or mixes all the virtues of the soul (except *sophia* with its activity of *theōria*); and (2) it is ruled by *phronēsis*. As a result, none of these interpreters can be called an exclusivist towards the secondary happy life, though they exclude *theōria* from the secondary happy life. Furthermore, notwithstanding his exclusion of *theōria* from the secondary happy life, Kraut does ultimately allow for the possibility of the *mixed life* for *any* kind of life. Thus, though Kraut argues that the two modes of happiness are two incompatible, unmixable life-styles, as he says, and harshly criticizes inclusivism, he does not indeed transcend inclusivism.

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¹ They say the primary happiness consists in *theōria* alone, but the primary happy life includes *both* *theōria* and moral virtue as *two separate coexistent* final ends.
The foundation of mixism is the belief that the mixed life is governed by *phronēsis*, and is a thoroughly practical life. Though not dissolving it entirely, both Kenny and Broadie exhibit a tendency to dissolve *theōria* within practical excellences, and, so, dissolve *sophia* within *phronēsis* in a mixed happy life. The rule of *phronēsis* is all-pervasive, not only in the sense that *phronēsis* weighs ends to determine their value relative to each other and the central good, but also in the sense that *phronēsis* gets internally ‘mixed’ with every activity of the soul. Kenny says that, in a mixed life, all and every *energeiai* of the soul are *inseparable* from each other in any and all instances of their manifestations (*intrinsic mixism*), collapsing the utilitarian and the disinterested into each other. Even more categorically, Broadie says that the happy life for Aristotle is practical all through, and to such a degree that she believes that *theōria* is a *quasi-practical* activity of the soul, a *sort of practical consideration*. Not only does Broadie claim (though not consistently) that *theōria* has the same ultimate end as *phronēsis* (practical excellence is *entire* superlative, she says), and that *sophia* has *phronēsis* as the object of its contemplation, but she does make *theōria* almost identical with the deliberation of *phronēsis* – existentially. Thus, intrinsic mixism, or mixism proper, starts with the set of the soul’s activities, and ends up with the mixture in which everything is saturated with utility to such a degree that the disinterested is indistinguishable from the utilitarian, and the deliberative from the speculative.

Such an approach, mixing all the *energeiai* of the soul intrinsically, has its drawback, because it makes two *NE* 10 happy lives indistinguishable from each other. As soon as an interpreter admits that the *NE* *theōrētikos* is genuinely moral, this interpreter (notably Cooper, Kenny and Kraut) faces a challenge in defining the secondary happy life
as different from the primary happy life. Broadie has coped with this difficulty (1) by directly accepting that these two lives are indeed indistinguishable from each other, for the focus of Aristotle’s ethics, as she believes, never ceases to be practical, and (2) by making *theōria* the most excellent degree of *praxis*, or, its celebration. The tactics of the other interpreters was as follows: (1) to preserve the exclusivism of the primary happy life in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 even after admitting that its *theōretikos* is genuinely moral (recent Cooper, recent Kenny, Kraut); (2) to interpret the secondary happy life in a such a way that it remains radically different from the primary happy life, more specifically, to claim that the secondary happy life lacks *theōria* completely, and, so, consequently, (3) to preserve and cherish the alleged inconsistency between *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 (plus book 1, for Kenny) and the rest of the Aristotelian ethical corpus. This is indeed a mirror invert of the exclusivism from the initial stage of the debate. The early Cooper argued that Aristotle would never vouch for the ideal of a two-dimensional burgher. But the recent Cooper is echoed by Kraut who proclaims that it is not true that politicians speculate more than pigs.

This opposition of the *NE* 10 two happy lives goes as far as to make them into two life styles, incompatible and incomparable both functionally and existentially – implicitly, two human *erga* instead of one human *ergon* traditionally attributed to Aristotle. But ultimately, by arguing that the primary happy life is *perfect happiness* while the secondary happy life is happiness *simpliciter*, or the only mode of happiness that humans need functionally, both Kraut and the recent Cooper end up with implying that humans need no *theōria* to be happy, and so reduce the human *ergon* to the excellent *praxis*, and make *theōria* irrelevant for human happiness per se. It is a distinct feature of the late
stage of the debate that all the interpreters make *phronēsis* a functional differentia of humans (and even in the primary happy life), i.e., the function that makes humans differ from other animals. Thus, Kenny argues that, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, there is no division of the rational element of the soul into the superior and the inferior, but rather the division of the soul into the irrational element (the inferior) and the rational element (the superior). Kenny makes even more categorical statement of the predominance of *praxis* when he claims that, in the *Eudemian Ethics*, the divine in humans as the determinate factor in human lives (the ultimate criterion) belongs on the *appetitive side*, i.e., the irrational element of the soul. Finally, because of this rendering of human *ergon* in the pragmatist way, the tactics to make the secondary happy life different from the primary happy life by banishing *theōria* does not work, for, even in the primary happy life, *theōria* now appears as the alien activity which is not rooted in a human function proper, so that the primary happy life collapses into the secondary happy life.

This late tendency to look for the common denominator in Aristotle’s ethics reflects the impossibility to sustain the extremist claim of the early stage of the debate that the Aristotelian corpus is inconsistent, and that a *theōretikos* in the *Nicomachean Ethics 10* is immoral – the claim shared by both inclusivists and exclusivists of the early stage. This is true even in the case of Kenny who still argues that the ethics is inconsistent, and posits the minimalist account of a theorizer’s morality in the *Nicomachean Ethics 10*, but, at the same time, admits that it is *phronēsis* that is the ruling element of the soul in *all* the kinds of happy life, and all the parts of the Aristotelian ethical corpus. That is why Kenny cannot consistently hold his categorical claim that the *Nicomachean Ethics 1* identifies happiness *only with theōria*. He has a difficulty of linking together the *NE 1 ergon*
argument with the \textit{NE} 1 passage on the final virtue. According to Kenny, the final virtue is final in the sense of being ‘endy’, and not in the sense of combining all the virtues of the soul (the teleological finality), while he finds himself incapable of rebutting the inclusivist interpretation of the \textit{ergon} passage, according to which, the human function consists of the functioning of the entire rational element of the soul, and not simply its one part, i.e., \textit{theoretical reason}. Kenny says that the passage on the final virtue is a separate development in Aristotle’s argument, but, in this case, his account of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1 fails.

Recently, Cooper has the same difficulty of linking the crucial passages of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1 together. He interprets the \textit{NE} 1 passage on the final virtue in the exclusivist way (the final virtue is final in the sense of being ‘endy’ and not in the sense of combining all the virtues of the soul), and he interprets the \textit{NE} 1 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness in the inclusivist way. At the same time, he acknowledges that, in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1, Aristotle defined happiness as the final virtue \textit{and} as being self-sufficient. But, in this case, Cooper does both interpret happiness in the inclusivist way (as being self-sufficient) and in the exclusivist way (as being the final virtue).

Even when Cooper discerns the final virtue from the most final virtue, he is faced with the same difficulty of linking bits and pieces of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1 into one coherent whole. He argues that the final virtue can be after all interpreted in the inclusivist sense (as complete in the comprehensive sense of including all the other virtues). But, at the same time, he still sticks with his exclusivist account of the most final virtue, which is final, he believes, in the sense that it is desired only for its own sake, or, has no end outside and superior to itself. At the same time, he argues that the division into the
final and most final virtue is based on Aristotle’s division into the final and most final ends. But, in this case, the relation between the final and the most final virtue should be the same as between the final end and the most final end. But this is what Cooper denies when he argues that the secondary happiness is happiness simpliciter or a terminus, i.e., all that man functionally needs to be happy.

Hardie’s account stands apart from the rest of the interpreters because, from the start, he tried to explain away the difficulties with Aristotle’s text not as Aristotle’s inconsistencies and ambiguities, but as his alleged dualism. In the course of the debate, Hardie changed the assessment of this dualism from negative to positive. Now he defines it as an essential characteristics of Aristotle’s ethics, and his philosophy in general, which consistently, he argues, posits both the inseparable entelechy and the separable nous, the active and the passive intellects. Two happy lives in the Nicomachean Ethics 10, argues Hardie, does not represent two kinds of a happy life, but are the different modes of the same life. Nonetheless, there is a tension here. Hardie acknowledges that happiness for Aristotle is the most final end. But in this case, in virtue of definition [the definition of happiness as the mode of life], every mode of happiness (the secondary or the primary) is the most final end. Then, it appears that, in Hardie’s account, one and the same life has two most final ends – the most final end of a secondary happiness and the most final end of a primary happiness, what is logically impossible. In addition to this, Hardie’s argument that Aristotle’s statement in the Nicomachean Ethics 10 that ‘theōria alone is loved for its sake’ means ‘theōria alone is loved for its sake alone’ does not really solve the problem with the exclusive status of theōria, because, as Hardie himself adds, many trivial pleasures are loved like this.
Chapter 2

Finality of *eudaimonia* as isolation

All the interpretations of Aristotle’s *eudaimonia* do necessarily focus on its major property: finality. *Eudaimonia* is the most final (*teleion*) good. Depending on how the interpreters render finality, either inclusively or exclusively, they form two opposite camps – inclusivism and exclusivism. Let me start my second chapter with the *NE* 1, 7 passage on the finality of the good, widely discussed in the debate: “The chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking” (1097a27-31). It is taken by inclusivists (Ackrill) and some mixists (Broadie) to mean that the most final good is comprehensive and consists of the plurality of ultimate ends: “The hypothesis is that there are several final ends. When Aristotle says that if so we are seeking the most final he is surely not laying down that only one of them (*theōria*) is really a final end” (Ackrill, 1980, 23). The central good functions as a constraint rather than the most final end proper. This means that one can achieve the most final end in honour, pleasure or understanding (Kenny regarding the finality of the good in the *Eudemian Ethics*), or in any practically excellent act (Ackrill, Broadie) alongside other excellent practical acts, as final ends, in a practically perfect life. The constraint of the central good functions as a reference to the past and future practically excellent acts as a whole of the overall practical excellence in one’s life rather than a reference to some specific end which is the most final.
Nonetheless, Aristotle explicitly says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1, 4 that the chief good is “the highest of all goods” (*NE* 1095a15-16). The chief good is defined by its ultimate finality -- it is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else, underlines Aristotle in *NE* 1, 7 (1097a35-36). Here the ultimate finality is treated as teleological singularity. In virtue of definition, only one end can be the most final end, or “the highest of all goods”. Aristotle does indeed say in the 1097a27-31 passage that if there are multiple final ends, “the most final of these will be what we are seeking” (1097a24-30). These passages were traditionally interpreted as positing a pyramid-like vertical teleology. Nonetheless, the contemporary debate shows that these passages, though explicit, are not enough to prove the inclusivist or mixist interpretation wrong. On the other side, the exclusivist interpretation which supports the teleological singularity of the most final end, creates a paradox: the more theorizer achieves the highest good, the more evil he becomes, being unconcerned, they say, to help others in need, if this would disturb his *theōria*, his highest good.

Let me bring in the two sets of passages regarding the notion of finality that were not considered in the debate. In this chapter, I consider the first set of passages; and in my sixth chapter, I consider the second set passages, the reason being that the first set of passages appears at the very beginning of *NE* (in *NE* 1, 6), and the second set of passages appears at the very end of *NE* (in *NE* 10, 1-5), and it is impossible to analyze the latter before the analysis of the entire book. *NE* 1, 6 clearly shows that neither inclusivists nor exclusivists are correct in their rendering of finality. And *NE* 10, 1-5 gives the ultimate solution to the dilemma of Aristotle’s notion of finality, and, hopefully, its analysis will contribute to the resolution of the debate on the Aristotelian happiness.
In *NE* 1, 6, Aristotle is engaged in giving a definition to the goods-in-themselves or final goods. Aristotle analyzes and criticizes the Platonist concept of the good. Nonetheless, Aristotle devotes most of the chapter to the formulation of his own position, and, for this, he uses some of the points on which he agrees with Platonists. Because the context is dialectical, let me go carefully in sorting out what is the statement of Aristotle’s own beliefs, what is his restatement of Plato’s beliefs that he agrees with, and what is his criticism of Plato’s beliefs. Aristotle rejects the concept of the universal good in the Platonist sense as something universally present in all cases and single. The term ‘good’ is used, posits Aristotle, in many categories (relation, substance, quality, quantity, etc.). Had it been a Platonist good, it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. Aristotle asks: “What in the world [Platonists] mean by ‘a thing in itself’, if in ‘man himself’ and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ” (1096a34-1096b1). The point of this statement is not that Aristotle rejects the notion of the universal good, but that he places the universal within the particular (‘man himself’ in *this* particular man) as *eidos* (form) inseparable from *hyle* (matter) within one existentially specific *ousia* (substance). He says against the ‘eternal’ universal good of Platonists: “That which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day” (1096b4-5).

But this is not exactly the point that Aristotle wants to make, for this critique is too general for his discussion of ethics at the present moment. That is why he offers to discuss purely metaphysical distinctions elsewhere, but he immediately points out that there can be an objection to this too general a critique of Platonist notion of the good – the objection which is important in shaping his own position on the good. Platonists did,
in fact, recognize two kinds of good – goods-in-themselves and subordinate goods. Goods-in-themselves that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good, say Platonists, by reference to a single Form. The subordinate goods (useful things) are those which produce and preserve goods-in-themselves and are called good by reference to these.

On this classification of goods into goods-in-themselves pursued for their own sake and subordinate goods pursued for the sake of the former, Aristotle agrees with Plato here and elsewhere in his Ethics. But he disagrees with Plato on defining the quality of finality (being *teleion*), i.e., Plato’s definition of the finality of the goods as their participation in the single form of the good. In fact, on Aristotle’s view, the goods that are valued only because of their reference to the externalized superior Idea cannot be truly *teleion*, i.e., be truly desirable in themselves, intrinsically\(^2\) (only for their own sake). In Plato’s scheme, human goods-in-themselves are degraded almost to the status of the subordinate *extrinsic* goods, because, ultimately, all the human final goods are not final if taken in-themselves – without the reference to the superior extrinsic Idea of *The Good*. This is unacceptable for Aristotle with his functionalism in ethics, which requires the intrinsically functional value of the good. Now, Aristotle’s task is to give his own definition of the finality of the goods-in-themselves, i.e., what are the differentia of the intrinsic goods, or, what does it exactly mean that the goods-in-themselves are pursued for their own sake (if not in virtue of their reference to a single form of the good). It is precisely because Aristotle agrees with Plato on his classification of goods into goods-in-

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\(^2\) Aristotle has two senses of the notion of the intrinsic good: (1) “intrinsic good” is the good valued in-itself without the reference to any good that is external to it (extrinsic good); (2) “intrinsic good” is the good of the soul (intrinsic to the soul, i.e., the *energeiai* of the soul) versus the good that is not intrinsic to the soul, and, so, is called extrinsic (e.g., honour and friends). Ultimately, these two senses coincide in Aristotle’s ethics.
themselves and subordinate goods that Aristotle’s functionalism is prepared to formulate a definition of the final goods from the point of view of even a sharper difference between the final goods and the subordinate goods than the one formulated by Plato.

Aristotle starts this new section in his argument with words: “Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful; and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single idea. What sort of goods would one call good themselves?” (1096b14-17). At this point in his argument, it is clear that now he will give his own definition of the final goods alongside the critique of the one by Plato, and will explain why his definition cannot in principle be Plato’s definition. Aristotle answers his question ‘what sort of goods would one call good in themselves?’ with the next [rhetorical] question: “Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours?” (1096b16-18; emphasis added). This standpoint – the isolation criterion of the finality of goods -- cannot be the one of Plato’s, for, on this definition, the goods are still intrinsically [in-themselves] good when isolated from any other goods, including the superior goods, and the Idea of the good itself. Or, in other words, their intrinsic value cannot depend on any externalized good, even the most superior. Compare the De Anima 1, 3: “What is good by or in itself cannot owe its goodness to something external to it or to some end to which it is a means” (406b8-9). Thus, the intrinsicality of a good is its isolation.

Aristotle goes as far as to claim that the goods-in-themselves remain such, i.e., intrinsically good, even if they are pursued for the sake of something else: “Certainly if we pursue these [intelligence, sight, certain pleasures, and honours] also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves” (1096b18-
This means that the goods-in-themselves have the non-alienable quality of being intrinsically good, or final goods (good for their own sake), notwithstanding their relational properties; and this non-alienable quality is of the functional nature (on this, Aristotle will expand in the next chapter of Book 1). The most striking thing in this definition is Aristotle’s belief that the relational properties that do not bear on the intrinsicality of the goods do include not only their relations with each other but also the relation to any superior good – that is why the intrinsic goods preserve their intrinsic goodness even if they are pursued also for the sake of the superior good, and in the case when they are not pursued for the sake of the superior good. Aristotle underlines: “Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty” (1096b19-21).

Plato argues that because goods-in-themselves are good only in reference to the external superior Idea of the good, they cannot be good on the self-subsistent [self-sufficient] grounds -- when isolated from each other and the superior good. Plato does emphatically reject the criterion of isolation as the differentia of goods-in-themselves. Consequently, Plato’s is an inclusivist account of happiness as a mixed life. According to Plato, the goods should be mixed with each other within a mixed life precisely because they are not good “when isolated from others”, or, in other words, not self-sufficient to remain the goods on their own. For example, in the Philebus, Socrates argues that neither the life of reason without pleasure nor the life of pleasure without reason are satisfactory. On these grounds, Socrates concludes “reason and pleasure alike had been dismissed as being, neither of them, the good itself [goods-in-themselves], inasmuch as they came short of self-sufficiency and the quality of being satisfying and perfect” (67a4-7; emphasis added). Here, the mixed life does essentially mean that its every ingredient is NOT the
intrinsic, self-sufficient, good-in-itself, or final good (good-in-isolation). For Plato, only the monadic superior Idea of the good is self-sufficient; it is “an incorporeal ordered system for the rightful control of a corporeal subject in which dwells a soul” (64b7-10), with the “incorporeal” being extraneous to the “corporeal”.

On the contrary, Aristotle’s functionalism rejecting the Platonist concept of participation of the goods-in-themselves in some externalized superior Form (eidos) of the good and positing the universal within the particular implies that the goods-in-themselves are good on the self-subsistent [self-sufficient] grounds and do not come short of self-sufficiency both when isolated from other goods including the superior good or when subordinated to the superior good. Thus, the major difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s definition of goods-in-themselves is that Aristotle posits the criterion of isolation as the major differentia of the goods-in-themselves. Aristotle’s is an analytical definition of the goods-in-themselves or final goods: in virtue of definition, to be valuable-in-itself is to be valuable by itself, on its own self-sufficient grounds, intrinsically, or, in isolation from the other goods.

The other objection Aristotle makes to the Platonist concept of participation is the implication of his conclusion that, contrary to Platonism, “intelligence, sight, certain pleasures, and honours” are indeed the self-sufficient goods-in-themselves. If these things are good in themselves, then, if one is to follow Platonists, the account of the good must be identical in them all (like whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead). But, points out Aristotle, the accounts of the good are distinct and diverse for honour, wisdom, and pleasure. The good, concludes Aristotle, is not some common element answering to one Idea (derived from it and contributing to it), but all the aforementioned goods-in-
themselves are one by the way of *analogia* (proportion), i.e., as sight is good in relation to the body, so is reason in relation to the soul, and so on in other cases (1096b27-30). Nonetheless, as Aristotle immediately qualifies, *metron* (measure) that defines *analogia* (proportion) is *not* a “universal pattern” that is extrinsic to “some [particular] good”. On the other side, *analogia* is *not* a relational (i.e., relativistic), but the functional, intrinsic, property of the particular goods-in-themselves (1096b35-1097a14).

Let me summarize the conceptual outcome of the *NE* Book 1, 6. The good is final when it is pursued “even when isolated from other goods”. Isolation means that the good is pursued for itself, on its own grounds, in reference to its own intrinsic, self-sufficient, non-alienable functional goodness. Thus, finality, self-sufficiency and isolation are simply the three different ways of expressing what it means to be intrinsically, in-itself, good. Goodness in isolation is the functional intrinsicality of the good (explained in detail in the next, *NE* 1, 7, chapter) that comes prior to any relational properties (relations to the other goods and the superior good). The purposefulness (*telos*) of the goods-in-themselves is entirely within themselves. That is why they remain intrinsically good even if they *are* pursued for the sake of the superior good, and if they are *not* pursued for the sake of the superior good. There are different degrees of isolation and some goods are pursued for themselves, but also for sake of the most final end, argues Aristotle in *NE* 1, 7. These goods do not have the ultimate self-sufficiency in isolation, and so do not have the ultimate finality. The most final end has the ultimate self-sufficiency in the ultimate isolation, and so, the ultimate finality. In *NE* 1, 7, Aristotle calls this isolated end – “final without qualification” (1097a35), i.e., “isolated without qualification”. 
NE 1, 6 has crucial importance for the interpretation of the NE 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency (autarkeia) of happiness, because in the latter, happiness is defined as “self-sufficient”, and the self-sufficiency is defined as “isolated”: “That which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (1097a14-21). Inclusivists argue that happiness makes life desirable in isolation because it contains all the goods. On this reading, “that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” is understood as happy life supposedly isolated socially or otherwise. Nonetheless, inclusivists do not offer any textual evidence whatsoever that the criterion of isolation in the 1097a14-21 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness should be read in this way. Moreover, they do not even try specifying in exactly which sense the happy life is isolated. Indeed, the criterion of isolation is hard to explain on the inclusivist grounds, because isolation (exclusion) and inclusion are the opposites, and inclusivists cannot, without contradiction, argue at the same time that (1) happy life in (social or other) isolation is self-sufficient and that (2) any life should be not isolated (socially or otherwise) to be happy / complete / self-sufficient.

Contrary to the inclusivist standpoint, it is clear from the NE 1, 6 (definitely, 1096b16-18 statement) that Aristotle applies the criterion of isolation not to the whole of one’s life (isolated socially or otherwise), but to goods themselves one by one. Some goods are desirable when isolated from other goods (intrinsic goods), and some are not (extrinsic or subordinate goods), while the most final good is that which is most desirable even in the utmost isolation from other goods. Self-sufficiency of the good means it does not owe its goodness to something external, and, so, preserves its goodness in isolation from any and all of the other goods. In other words, the expression “happiness when iso-
lated” should be read “happiness when isolated from other goods”. The *NE* 1, 6 argument proves that the most final end cannot in principle be an aggregate of the subordinate ends simply because *it is supposed to be pursued in isolation from the other goods*. In fact, Aristotle does not delay explaining in which sense happiness is isolated from other goods. In *NE* 1, 7, where he gives the controversial definition of happiness as self-sufficient, Aristotle immediately explains that happiness is a *specific energeia* of the soul with its specific *proper* excellence different from any other human *energeia*, each one with its own *proper* excellence (1098a17). In *NE* 1, 9, he confirms the peculiar nature of the *energeia* of happiness: “[Eudaimonia is] a virtuous *energeia* of soul, *of a certain kind*” (1099b27-27; emphasis added). Earlier, in the *NE* 1, 5, Aristotle explained that the moral *energeiai* are not only different, but can be also conflicting with the *energeia* of happiness up to point of destroying the *energeia* of happiness (1095b32-1096a2). Evidently, this is simply the consequence of the fact that the most final good of happiness cannot be *in principle* constituted by the moral excellences, with their *energeiai* different from the *energeia* of happiness.

In the *NE* 1, 7, Aristotle also explains that the peculiarity of the *energeia* of happiness is of the functional nature. It is the *functionally peculiar* nature of the *energeia* of happiness that makes it different and *isolated* from any other *energeia* of a man and all of the other *energeiai* of a man taken together. Essentially, happiness is defined as one of a kind function that only humans can exercise – a function that makes man a man even when isolated from other functions. The other goods are its necessary and sufficient conditions, but, being a *peculiar* function, happiness cannot be equal to any extrinsic and intrinsic good, and any compound of these goods. Most important and controversial in the
context of the contemporary discussion, happiness is not a composite of moral excelsences, with their specific *energeiai*. There is definitely a relation between moral excelsences and the *energeia* of happiness (a happy man is a virtuous man, says Aristotle), but this relation is not the relation of inclusion. Thus, it appears to be crucial to take notice that *NE* 1, 6 prepares the grounds for the argument of *NE* 1, 7, and to consider how *NE* 1, 7 develops all the points on isolation, which are made in *NE* 1, 6. The latter is the task of my next chapter. In chapter 4, I will analyze Aristotle’s attitude to moral virtues in their relation to happiness from the point of view of finality understood as isolation.
Chapter 3

*Eudaimonia* as the perfect functioning of the active intellect

3.1 Finality of the most final good as its functional peculiarity and superiority

*NE* 1, 7 builds its argument for the isolated nature of happiness upon the major conclusion of *NE* 1, 6 that every *final good* is good in its own *peculiar* sense, in itself, in *isolation*, and not in reference to any other good, including the superior good. Now, Aristotle’s task is to prove that the same applies to *the most final good, eudaimonia*. Here is the gist of his argument. The most final good is also, and in the most perfect way, good in itself, meaning that it is *most peculiar* among other final goods. This peculiarity is a functional peculiarity, intrinsic or *non-relational, independent* from and *prior* to the relation of the most final good with any other final goods. *Eudaimonia* is peculiar-in-itself, as a specific, *one-of-a-kind, intellectual energeia* -- a special process, effort, working, that is to say, *function of nous*, which is very different and even opposite to other intellectual processes, not speaking of the non-intellectual functions of man. This intellectual function is peculiar to humans, i.e., it is what makes humans who they are -- *a priori*, aside from any other function humans exercise and share with other animals.

The priority and independence of the most final good means that though the relation of the most final good to other final goods is a sufficient condition of its functional realization, its goodness is *independent* from the goodness of other final goods, that is, when these conditions fail to apply, the most final good still preserves its goodness. Moreover, the most final good is sought for its own sake -- and for its own sake *only* -- *before* the goodness of the other goods is even determined. Even more, as I will argue
further on, Aristotle believes that the goodness of the most final good does cause the
goodness of all the final goods. Hence, because function is prior to and independent from
relation, inclusivism is wrong to define the goodness of the most final good by its relation
of inclusion to the final goods, as well as exclusivism is wrong to define the goodness of
the most final good by its relation of bare hierarchical superiority to or exclusion of the
simply final goods.

Thus, as a result of its functional priority, the most final good is \textit{most} isolated or
self-sufficient among other final goods. The most final good is self-sufficient, precisely
because it is functionally capable of sustaining its utmost goodness in the utmost isolation
from any other good and all the goods taken together, independently and prior to any re-
lation with other final goods. It is because of its functional priority that the most final
good is a cause of goodness of all other goods, even final goods – and not vice versa.
Being a peculiar function – a special intellectual \textit{energeia} -- the most final good is char-
acterized by its own \textit{peculiar excellence / virtue} – which is most final (\textit{teleia}) among
other virtues, i.e., good in-itself or in isolation. I will consider the causal nature of \textit{eu-
daimonia} in my chapter 4 of my dissertation. In this chapter, I will analyze how the \textit{NE}
1, 7 \textit{ergon} argument supports the criterion of isolation, and how the criterion of isolation
helps in interpreting away the false dilemmas of inclusivism and exclusivism regarding
\textit{ergon} passage. Also I will argue that the \textit{NE} 1, 7 passage on the final virtue is the con-
clusion of the \textit{ergon} argument, but does not posit the inclusivist definition of the final vir-
tue. Let me look at Aristotle’s argument in \textit{NE} 1, 7 closer.

Aristotle starts \textit{NE} 1, 7 by stressing the peculiar nature of every good: “[Good]
seems different in different actions and arts” (1097a16). The goodness of each good lies
in its purpose or end (*telos*) (1097a17—18). It is because every good has its own peculiar end, that goods differ from each other:

In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action (1097a20-25).

Thus, Aristotle in no way rejects the multiplicity of final ends. The multiplicity of final ends is, in fact, the implication of his isolation criterion of final goods. It is because goods are final in themselves (each has its own *telos*) or in isolation from other goods, that final goods are necessarily multiple, or not reducible to one Idea of the Good identical in all goods. At this point in his argument, Aristotle says: “So the argument has by a different course reached the same point” (1097a23). What he refers to here is his argument in *NE* 1, 6 with its conclusion that goods can be final in themselves (each final good being its own end) without reference to any other goods or the superior good, i.e., in isolation. Now, at the beginning of *NE* 1, 7, he proves the same by arguing that final goods are good intrinsically or in isolation, because each final good has its *telos peculiar* from other final goods and the superior good. “We must try”, continues Aristotle, “to state this even more clearly” (1097a24).

Because Aristotle agrees with Plato on his division of goods into final goods (good-in-themselves) and instrumental goods (good-for-the-sake-of-final-goods), he is prepared to make a finer, than Plato’s, differentiation between the final goods themselves, based on his own metaphysical view stating the inseparability of *eidos* from *hyle* or the functional intrinsicality of *eidos* in *ousia*. He divides the final goods into simply the final goods and the most final good: “Since there are evidently more than one end, and we
choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends, but the chief end is evidently something final. Therefore if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking” (1097a24-30). Ultimately, Aristotle proves in *NE* 1, 7 that, in comparison with the other species, the human species has an end in itself, or is its own end in the perfect realization of its peculiar function. He argues that the superiority of human species is defined by the fact that humans possess a superior function, peculiar to them, and, certainly, *not* by the fact that they combine the inferior functions they share with other species. At the end of *NE* 1, 7, it becomes clear that this is precisely what is at stake in the 1097a24-30 passage: if there are many functions that humans share with other animals, it is their own, peculiar and superior function that they will seek above anything else. It is this superior function of *nous* -- as the most final good -- that is functionally inseparable from and indispensable for human species, and *not* any other final good, or all final goods taken together, which human species share with other species.

The difference between final ends and the most final end does lie in the ability of the most final good to have its *telos* entirely in itself, i.e., *to be its own telos* -- to be “in itself worthy of pursuit” (1097a30-31). To argue that the most final good has its *telos* within itself is the same as to argue that the most final good is good in *isolation* from any other final good and all goods taken together, as Aristotle states at 1097a23, and the same as to argue that the most final good is good in a most peculiar way from any other final good, as Aristotle states at 1097a20-25. That is why, Aristotle does categorically claim that *eudaimonia* is “final without qualification” (1097a35), i.e., in itself, *a priori*, without
the relational qualification. In other words, *eudaimonia* as a peculiar intellectual *energeia* is an intrinsic rather than relational good. He immediately adds that, in opposition to the most final good of *eudaimonia*, a non-relational good, the final goods are nothing else but *the means* for the sake of this and only function of *eudaimonia*: “[Happiness] we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness; judging that by means of them we shall be happy” (1097b1-5; emphasis added).

The final goods are pursued for their own sake, but also for the sake of the most final good. Thus, being means for *eudaimonia*, the mere final goods remain *relational goods* – they are valued in themselves, and also in relation to *eudaimonia*. Remaining the relational goods, they are not self-sufficient (valuable in isolation). Though valuable in-themselves, the mere final goods do not have the final goodness (are not entirely good-in-themselves). Their goodness is of the inferior kind, and their possession cannot give man a possession of the superior, most final, good, which is its own *telos prior* to any other, inferior goods.

The point of *NE* 1, 7 is precisely to prove that this teleological inferiority of the final goods in comparison to the most final end is of the functional nature, which has existential implications for the everyday human existence (I will consider these existential implications in my next chapter). That is to say that I might in principle fail to exercise the function of *eudaimonia*, the very special intellectual activity (*ένεργεια*), even though I possess all kinds of intrinsic and extrinsic final goods – being beautiful, healthy and honoured, practically wise and successful, and morally dutiful, etc. And if I fail to exercise
the function of *eudaimonia*, the special effort of a peculiar intellectual *energeia*, I fail to be a human being, because it is *this* function that defines human species – prior to and independently from all other functions that humans share with other species. In this case, I will certainly fail to achieve the full goodness of all possible final goods, including moral virtues. That is to say, I might be morally dutiful but, in-myself, *not* intrinsically good. Thus, inclusivists are wrong to make the most final end inclusive simply because the superior functional quality of the most final good cannot be constituted by the components of the inferior functional quality.

Here follows Aristotle’s controversial passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness, in which he defines happiness as self-sufficient (1197b8), and he defines self-sufficiency “as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (1197b14-15). Let me postpone my final judgment on this passage till chapter 6 of my dissertation, when I finish collecting all the necessary textual evidence for the interpretation of this passage from the point of view of the isolation criterion. Indeed, Aristotle immediately makes it clear that this passage on its own is not enough for understanding the nature of happiness as the most final good. He says: “Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude and a clearer account of what it is is still desired”. And he states: “This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man” (1097b23-25). At this point, the *ergon* passage starts.

**3.2 The reconsideration of the *ergon* passage in *NE* 1, 7**

Aristotle states that “to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude”, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired”. He continues: “This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a
sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have function or activity, the
good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in function, so would it seem to be for man, if he
has a function” (1097b23-28), says Aristotle. Inclusivists consider the ergon passage to
be the major textual evidence for their inclusive interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia.
According to inclusivists, human function is a collection of all functions a human needs
for his well-being. Ergon of man cannot be identified just with theoria, they say, simply
because man has many other functions, among them some without which he would not
even survive. Hence, they conclude, happiness is the excellent performance of all func-
tions a human needs for his well-being. Inclusivists interpret the NE 1, 7 passage on the
self-sufficiency of happiness as the premiss of the function argument, and the NE 1, 7
passage on teleia aretê as the conclusion of the function argument. Happiness should
include the excellent performance of all functions man needs for his well-being because
it is self-sufficient by definition. Hence, teleia aretê, they say, is the compound of all
human excellences, with every excellence being the excellent performance of a function
(out of many) man needs for his well-being.

The most important feature of the inclusivist interpretation is that inclusivists re-
ject the causal role of human ergon as making humans pursue happiness and, so, do not
believe that the ergon passage provides the causal explanation of eudaimonia, i.e., “why”
man pursue happiness. If human ergon is some specific function, peculiar to man, it is
reasonable to conclude (as Aristotle, in fact, does) that a specific function causes humans
to desire some specific mode of well-being different from other modes of well-being, that
humans share with other animals. In this case, this specific mode of well-being is a sin-
gle purpose man has for everything he does. But inclusivists believe that function argu-
ment does not explain “why” man desires happiness, but only “what” man desires. Man desires and needs many things, and, according to inclusivists, happiness does automatically result from obtaining them. The function argument, says Ackrill, does not presuppose that men are made to serve a single purpose:

I can explain all my other aims by saying that I regard them as contributing – in one way or another – to eudaimonia, whereas I cannot say (or be sensibly asked) why I want eudaimonia; Aristotle … is not asking what it is to be a good man, but what is the good for man. It is not self-evident that the best thing for a man is to be the best possible man; Aristotle seeks to discover what is the good for man by determining his specific function (1973, 19-20; emphasis added).

“What is desired by man” or “what is good for man” are the beneficial consequences or utility achieved by the excellent performance of various and multiple functions. Inclusivist interpretation is essentially a consequentialist one. Telos is an end in this sense of being a spatio-temporal terminus of action. According to the logic of this interpretation, should man desire something else, more and more, these too would necessarily have to be included into the ergon of man.

Based on this assessment of Aristotle’s functional argument as incapable of explaining “what it is to be a good man”, Ackrill concludes that Aristotle does not give a satisfactory account of the nature of man. Even more, Ackrill insists: “[The question] – what is the best life for a man to lead – also remains without a satisfactory answer” (31); “If the nature of man is thus unintelligible, the best life for man must remain incapable of clear specification even in principle. Nor can it now seem surprising that Aristotle fails to answer the other question, the question about morality” (1980, 33).

The second feature of the inclusivist interpretation is the belief of inclusivists that all intrinsically valuable activities are equally contributing to eudaimonia (see especially
Ackrill, 1973, 19; 21). According to Ackrill, “there is nothing in the function argument to imply that there is an order or importance among [all the distinctive virtues of man]” (1973, 21). Thus, inclusivists categorically reject the hierarchy between intrinsically valuable activities. Because inclusivists define eudaimonia by the utility, and man needs, for his well-being, different utility under different circumstances, different intrinsically valuable activities become central under different circumstances. It is because all the intrinsically valuable activities equally contribute to happiness in different circumstances that, according to Ackrill, ergon passage does not formulate “a unifying plan” for adding goods up (22). As a consequence, he says, the references to good man and to the notion of the noble “do not begin to reveal any principle or test whereby the man of practical wisdom can decide what is the noble or the right thing to do” (31)\(^3\). Thus, for inclusivists, their denial that the ergon argument gives a causal explanation of what it is to be a good man is essentially linked with their denial that the ergon argument posits the hierarchichal order of the soul which provides the “unifying plan” of a happy life and which singles out one function that is superior to all other functions and peculiar to man.

The early Cooper, who has formulated an exclusivist interpretation of NE 10, 7-8, and who denies that the NE 1, 7 teleia aretê is inclusive, follows Ackrill in the inclusivist interpretation of the NE 1, 7 ergon passage with its denial of the hierarchical order within the soul: “Both the intellectual and the emotional sides of our make-up belong equally essentially and fundamentally to what we are” (1975, 167; emphasis added). Cooper insists that “in all the places in Aristotle, with the sole exception of [the] passage from the tenth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, in which [exclusivist] theory is stated, the human

\(^3\) That is why Ackrill calls Aristotle’s ethics “broken-backed” (1980, 5), “paradoxical” (32), “ambiguous” (29), “obscure and mysterious” (33), and “a circle of a blind alley” (31).
being is identified not with this theoretical intellect but either, as in Plato, with an undif-
ferentiated mind regarded principally from the practical side, or else with the practical intel-
lect itself” (1975, 169; emphasis added). It is because inclusivists construe the hu-
man good as utility, that the third feature of the inclusivist interpretation of the ergon pas-
sage is their inevitable reduction of the undifferentiated mind to the practical intellect
with its virtue of phronēsis.

Based on his interpretation of the NE 1, 7 ergon passage, Cooper claims that iden-
tification of man with his intellect in Book 9, 4 cannot “support the theory of human
identity put forward in Book 10” because in Book 9, man is identified with his practical
intellect (1975, 174-175). When, in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that reasoning is
a governing element, he means, argues Cooper, that reasoning governs not reasoning but
desire and passions, and hence a human necessarily needs these parts (1975, 147; EE
1219b37-1220a2). In support of this argument, Cooper posits that everywhere in Ari-
stotle, except Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, nous is “gratified” only by the ac-
knowledgegment of its right practical decisions:

When Aristotle says the good man “gratifies his mind” he means only that, whatever
he does, he does it because he has decided upon it by reasoning; he does not mean
that he forgoes dinner or sex in order to continue work on some intellectual problem
or project (thus neglecting appetite in favor of “the pleasure of the mind”) (172-173;
emphasis added).

The inclusive interpretation of the NE 1, 7 ergon passage appears to be so con-
vincing that even Kenny, who argues more categorically than the early Cooper for the
exclusivist interpretation of the NE 1, and, especially, that teleia aretē cannot be a com-
pound of all the virtues, does nonetheless concede that human ergon is a compound of all
functions man exercises. Consequently, he is forced to argue that the 1098a16-18 pas-
sage on teleia aretē is “a separate, self-standing development” (1992, 29). Kenny’s belief in the inclusivist character of Aristotle’s ergon argument goes well with his other belief that, in all the kinds of happy life, phronēsis is the “ruling part of the soul”, and, so, it is phronēsis that is concerned with “the whole good of man” (1978, 163, 165). Without phronēsis, there is no moral virtue, says Kenny (1978, 163). He agrees with Broadie that the mixed happy life is “the life of practical wisdom enlightened by nobility and looking toward theōria “ (Broadie, 1991, 386; Kenny, 1992, 103). Broadie goes even farther by making phronēsis a functional differentia of human species: “No doubt practical activity distinguishes human lives from the lives of other animals” (Broadie, 1991, 417). Therefore, says Broadie, we are “essentially practical beings, hence … beings whose essential virtues are practical” (389).

Nonetheless, contrary to the inclusivist interpretation of the ergon passage, what Aristotle says is not that the good of man is defined by the collection of all functions he exercises, but that man as such has one, specific, peculiar function that is different from other functions he exercises: “Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function apart from all these? … What then can this be?” (1097b29-33; emphasis added). From this statement, it is clear that practical functions of man as a carpenter or tanner or any other of his practical functions do not constitute his peculiar function as a man. His peculiar function as a man is a function “apart” from his practical functions. Hence, it will be a mistake to say that the good of man, eudaimonia, is the excellent performance of his compounded practical excellences, like those he demonstrates as a carpenter and a tanner. That is, Aristotle defines human function with the criterion of isolation – its isolation from all the practical
functions a man entertains as a carpenter or tanner. The 1097b29-33 statement does simply rephrase the opening line in Aristotle’s *ergon* argument: “Just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function” (1097b23-28). The 1097b23-28 statement does also define human function with the criterion of isolation – its isolation from all the practical functions a man entertains as a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in fact, apart from all the functions that other things entertain.

Even more, continues Aristotle, the peculiar function of man is different from the functions of his *every* part: “… As eye, hand, foot, and in general *each of the parts* evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function *apart* from all these? What then can this be?” (1097b31-33; emphasis added). It is clear that Aristotle views man not as a compound of his parts, like eyes, hands, feet, etc., each one with its own function, and that he rejects the inclusive interpretation of human *ergon*. Human *ergon* is not a collection of all functions a human exercises in his every part, and which he needs for his well-being. Hence, it will be a mistake to say that the good of man, *eudaimonia*, is the excellent performance of the compounded functions that are exercised by “each of his parts”. Once again, Aristotle defines human function with the criterion of isolation – its isolation from all functions a man entertains as a compound of parts.

Aristotle answers the question ‘what the *ergon* of man can be’ by sorting all functions human entertains. He immediately stresses that what he is looking for makes man different from all other species. Or, in other words, Aristotle defines human function as a function *peculiar* to humans within the functional hierarchy between species: “Life seems
to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man” (1097b33-34; emphasis added). That is, all over again, he defines human function with the criterion of isolation – its isolation from all functions humans share with other species. He continues his consideration of the peculiarity of human function: “… We are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle” (1097b34-1098a3; emphasis added), i.e., mind. And Aristotle states most explicitly: “The function of man is an energeia of soul which follows or implies a rational principle” (1098a8-9). Hence, Aristotle continues to define human function with the criterion of isolation – its isolation from all functions a man shares with other species.

Aristotle explains: “As ‘life of the rational element’ has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of energeia (activity) is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term” (1098a5-8). ‘The life of the rational element’ in the other meaning is evidently praxis that results from ‘the life of the rational element’ in its proper meaning, i.e., as energeia. Aristotle insists: “The function of man [is] a certain kind of life, and this [is] an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man [is] the good and noble performance of these” (1098a13-15; emphasis added). Thus, Aristotle evidently excludes dinner and sex from the human ergon, i.e., the functions of nutrition and reproduction a man shares with other animals. Consequently, eudaimonia does not include good sex and good dinner, though good sex and good dinner might be preconditions for the exercise of its specific peculiar function – a certain energeia produced by the element that has a rational principle. Eudaimonia is a
perfection of the certain and peculiar kind of life “apart” from all other kinds of life attributable to man. That is, Aristotle defines eudaimonia with the criterion of isolation – its isolation from all other kinds of life.

Aristotle explains further that of the element that has a rational principle, “one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought” (1098a3-5). Thus, Aristotle does explicitly formulate the differentiation between the parts of the rational element. One part is obedient, that is, passive and inferior. And another part is ruling, that is, active and superior. Below is my analysis of the relevant passages, which indicate that passive part of the rational element is practical reason; and the active part of the rational element is contemplative reason. Hence, Ackrill is wrong to state that there is no hierarchy between the functions a human entertains. And Cooper is wrong to state: “In all the places in Aristotle, with the sole exception of [the] passage from the tenth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, in which [exclusivist] theory is stated, the human being is identified not with this theoretical intellect but either, as in Plato, with an undifferentiated mind regarded principally from the practical side, or else with the practical intellect itself” (1975, 169; emphasis added).

At this moment, the transition to the passage on the final virtue and the very passage follow. Aristotle states, “without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness [is] added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well)”. Contrary to Kenny’s belief that the teleia aretē passage is the development separate from the ergon passage, this
statement does unbreakably link the excellence (aretē) with the function. Aristotle continues with the teleia aretē passage:

If this is the case, [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence; if this is the case,] human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most final (1098a9-19).

Because Aristotle excluded from the ergon of man the functions that are not peculiar to man, i.e., nutrition, growth, reproduction and perception, and identified human ergon with the function of rational element, it is clear that the teleia aretē is exclusively the excellence of the rational element. Nonetheless, it appears that the ergon passage on its own is too abrupt and concise to appear conclusive regarding the differentiation within the rational element, the identification of its parts, and whether human ergon pertains to both parts of the rational element or only to its superior, active, part (and, consequently, whether teleia aretē is a compound of the excellences of both parts, or it is only the excellence of the superior part of the rational element).

3.3 Textual support for the new interpretation in NE 1, 13

Importantly, the ergon passage is not the only passage in the Aristotelian corpus where he divides the rational element into the active, superior, part and the passive inferior part, with the corresponding superior / best (ariste) virtue and the inferior virtue. There are other passages that formulate the same differentiation within the rational element and between the corresponding virtues – in NE 1, 13 where Aristotle continues to define the division of the rational element into its inferior passive function and its superior active function he sketched in the ergon passage; in NE 6, 1 where he confirms this
division and the formulation of the inferior passive function and the superior active function of the rational element; and in the De Anima 3, 5 which does the same. The current state of affairs in the Aristotelian scholarship indicates that the analysis of the ergon passage and the teleia aretē passage is impossible without the analysis of these passages, which is not yet done.

In NE 1, 13, Aristotle states upfront that he defines the structure of the soul with the specific intent to set ‘the element that has a rational principle’ apart from the other human functions. He starts his discussion of the structure of the soul by confirming that eudaimonia is “an energeia of the soul” (1102a16). That is why, he says, “the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul” (1102a17-18), and “must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in view” (1102a22-23). This means that eudaimonia as the energeia of the element that has a rational principle does inevitably imply the self-awareness and self-knowledge of this energeia, put clearly in the definition by a philosopher.

“One element of the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle”, says Aristotle (1102a27-28). The irrational element, continues Aristotle, is twofold (1102b29). One division is “vegetative in its nature” (1102a34-35) or “nutritive” (1102b13). “Now”, he says, “the excellence of this seems to be common to all species and not specifically human” (1102b4-5). This confirms that, as in the ergon passage, Aristotle defines eudaimonia by the criterion of peculiarity or isolation of its function from the functions a human shares with other species. The nutritive faculty “seems to function most in sleep, while goodness or badness are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are no better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally
enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad)” (1102b5-10). This confirms that *eudaimonia* as the specific *energeia* of the soul is not only a *self-conscious* activity of the soul, but it is also a self-conscious activity of the soul “in that respect in which it is called good or bad”. This indicates Ackrill is wrong in stating: “Aristotle … is not asking *what it is to be a good man*”; and: “It is not self-evident that the best thing for a man is to be the best possible man” (1973, 19-20).

There is another irrational element in the soul, which Aristotle calls “the appetitive” or “desiring” element (1102b31). Aristotle defines this element by two features. Though the desiring element is “naturally opposed to the rational principle” (1102b18), it “shares in a rational principle” (1102b13-14), “as far as it listens and obeys it” (1102b31). When we give advice, says Aristotle, we address the desiring part of the irrational element (1102b34-1103a2). This is important for my later discussion of advice as the efficient cause of action, and how advice is different from *eudaimonia* being a final cause of action. “Therefore”, says Aristotle, “the irrational element also [like soul as a whole] appears to be twofold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive, and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it in so far as it listens to and obeys it” (1102b29-32).

“If [desiring element] also must be said to have a rational principle, that which has a rational principle”, continues Aristotle, “will be itself twofold: one subdivision having [a rational principle] in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one’s father”, as it is put in Ross’ translation (1103a2-5). In Rackham’s translation, this is worded as follows: if “it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as rational, in that case it is the rational part which, as well as the
whole soul, is divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and in itself, the other obedient to it as a child to its father”. Virtue, Aristotle concludes *NE* 1, 13, is distinguished into kinds according to this difference between the parts of rational element: “Some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral” (1103a3-6).

Kenny interprets this passage as follows: the subdivision of the desiring part that has the rational principle “in the strict sense and in itself” is *practical intellect*, which Aristotle defines in *NE* 6, 2 as “desiderative reason” or “ratiocinative desire’ (1139b4), and in which, as Cooper says, “both the intellectual and the emotional sides of our make-up belong *equally essentially* and *fundamentally* to what we are” (1975, 167; emphasis added). Practical intellect with its virtue of *phronēsis*, says Kenny, is the governing function, and it is wrong to think that the rational part of the soul, though being twofold, consists of a superior (*theōria*) and inferior (*phronēsis*): “What Aristotle says is that the human being is composed of superior and inferior, that is to say of rational and irrational parts of the soul” (1992, 97). On this interpretation, the entire soul is a desiring or appetitive entity, with one part being a desiring subdivision *without* a rational principle, and the second part being a desiring subdivision *with* a rational principle.

Evidently, Kenny cannot explain in which sense one of the subdivisions of the rational element has rational principle “in the proper sense and in itself”, that is, without any admixture of the desiring / appetitive function, disinterestedly. Kenny simply omits from his analysis Aristotle’s statement in which sense the element having rational principle is “divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and
in itself, the other obedient to it as a child to its father” (emphasis added) (1103a2).

Nonetheless, *NE* 1, 13 has an explicit indication of how we should interpret the division of the rational element and where we should place the function of *phronēsis* in this division. Aristotle uses the same “obedience to one’s father” metaphor, when he speaks of the subdivision of the irrational element:

The irrational element also appears to be twofold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive, and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of ‘taking account’ of one’s father or one’s friends, not that in which we speak of ‘accounting’ for a mathematical property (1102b29-34; emphasis added).

From this statement, it is clear that the desiring element can obey the rational principle only in a sense of obeying one’s father and never in the sense of ‘accounting’ for a mathematical property. The desiring element that shares in rational principle is always in the obedient or passive – inferior -- position. The function that ‘accounts’ for a mathematical property is the function that has rational principle “in the proper sense and in itself”, without the admixture of appetite. It is to account for this disinterested function that Aristotle divides the rational element of the soul (as opposed to the irrational element) into two subdivisions: the part which is the proper rational element, and the obedient part. It is clear that the part, which is properly or in-itself rational, is an active and superior part as opposed to the obedient / inferior, improperly rational, part. And it is clear that an active part, accounting for a mathematical property, is contemplative reason, while a passive part, which rationalizes our desires and appetites, is practical reason (“desiderative reason” or “ratiocinative desire”).

3.4 Textual support for the new interpretation in *NE* 6 = *EE* 5
Aristotle formulates all this in a much clear form in *NE* 6, 1 = *EE* 5 – the next passage which is essential for differentiating between the functions of the soul and between the parts of the rational element, and for formulating human function as a function peculiar to humans:

We said before that there are two parts of the soul – that which grasps a rule or rational principle, and the irrational; let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle. And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle – one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things; for where objects differ in kind the part of soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have. Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle. We must, then, learn what is the best state of each of these parts; for this is the virtue of each (1139a3-16; emphasis added).

This passage leaves no doubt that the calculative or practically wise part of the rational element is not the entire rational element, but only one part of it. This passage does also leave no doubt that the active part of the rational element is the contemplative reason, which is reason proper or in-itself, ‘accounting’ for mathematical property (the invariable); while the passive or obedient part is the practical reason which deliberates about and calculates the variable. And, indeed, at the very end of *NE* 1, 7, half-page down from the *ergon* passage, right after the formulation of the teleia aretê, Aristotle does also indicate what kind of intellectual activity that the active (as opposed to the obedient) part of the rational element is engaged in. He says that his task as a philosopher is to investigate each set of first principles. It is evident that only the active part of the rational element is capable of such a formulation, because it is the active part that is exercising thought
“We must”, says Aristotle, “take pains to state [first principles] definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows” (1098b5-6).

In NE 6, 6 = EE 5, Aristotle analyzes in detail the workings of nous (intuitive reason) categorically claiming that “it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles”, the universal -- a priori, invariable and necessary (1141a7-8). In NE 6, 8 = EE 5, he argues that intuitive reason is opposed to practical wisdom, for “intuitive reason is of the limiting premises, for which no reason can be given”, i.e., it operates with immediate self-evident assumptions, “while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular”, i.e., the variable (1142a25-26). These passages add additional textual evidence that the active part of the rational element is nous as theoria (intuitive reason operating with a priori assumptions); and the obedient or passive part is practical intellect. Intuitive reason and scientific knowledge constitute sophia (philosophical wisdom) (1141a17-18), posits Aristotle in NE 6, 7 = EE 5. And, now, it becomes clear why Aristotle, as a philosopher, “takes pains” to state first principles definitely as he states in NE 1, 7. He says in NE 6, 7: “Wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man (sophos) must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles” (1141a17-20). “Therefore”, he concludes, “wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge” (1141a20-21; emphasis added).

The fact that Aristotle does not finish his explanation of the division of the soul and the division of the rational element in NE 1, 7 and even in NE 1, 13 and postpones the clearer formulation till Book 6 indicates that two Ethics, as we know them, are clearly a compendium of notes taken for the lectures or at the lectures, but not a formal philoso-
phical treatise. They represent a fluid manner of live discussion that goes sometimes in many directions at once. Nonetheless, they represent a live discussion that always gets back on track, and never leaves questions unanswered. It is clearly a logically consistent whole, though not according to the more rigid structure of a treatise. Thus, the conceptual continuance between *NE* 1, 7, *NE* 1, 13 and *NE* 6, 1 = *EE* 5 is an important indication that it is wrong to interpret two *Ethics* as a collection of discrepant and uncoordinated treatises separated both temporally and conceptually, as Kenny suggests. Also this fact rebuts Kenny’s view that *NE* 6 belongs to the *Eudemonic Ethics*, not the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is more probable, that, because both treatises were the compendia of notes, Aristotle himself made three central books common for two versions of his lectures. I will address the issue of the repeated treatise on pleasure, appearing in *NE* 7 = *EE* 6 and *NE* 10, 5 in chapter 6 of my dissertation to show that they represent different treatment of pleasure, and so do not constitute the problem of repetition and, so, discrepancy, as Kenny claims.

3.5 Textual support for the new interpretation in the *De Anima* and its teleological argument for the identification of *sustēma* with its highest function

The division of the element that has a rational principle into an active superior part and a passive inferior part in the *NE* 1, 7 *ergon* passage, *NE* 1, 13, and *NE* 6, 1 = *EE* 5 is a clear reference to what Aristotle says about the element that has a rational principle in the *De Anima* 3, 5. In the *De Anima* 3, 5, Aristotle does in detail define the structure of the element that has a rational principle. He famously divides mind, ‘the element that has a rational principle’, into inferior passive intellect and superior active intellect, that is, passive part as having such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in
the sense of possessing one and exercising thought, as he words it in the NE 1, 7 ergon passage. Let me look closer at Aristotle’s division of mind, i.e., the element that has a rational principle, in the De Anima 3, 5.

Aristotle starts by stressing that “since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g., an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul” (430a10-13). Compare his assessment of the nature of affections: “The affections of soul are enmattered formulable essences” (403a23-24; emphasis added). Thus, this passage confirms that Aristotle posits a definite hierarchy between the functions of the soul. One function of the soul is productive or active, actual and superior; and another part of the soul is passive, potential and inferior. This passage is additional evidence that the early Cooper is wrong to state that both the intellectual and the emotional sides of our make-up belong equally to what we are (1975, 167). Aristotle continues: “And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things” (430a14-16). So, this passage confirms also that there is the hierarchy between two parts of the mind itself, one being inferior, passive, and the other superior, active.

“Mind in this [active] sense of it”, Aristotle goes on, “is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (energeia) (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms)” (430a18-19; emphasis added). This passage makes it clear that, in a strict sense, only the active
intellect is *energeia* (activity), while the passive intellect is simply the psychophysical matter that the active intellect forms, its material or tool. Also this passage is crucial for understanding Aristotelian notion of *energeia*. It explicitly states that it is the nature of *energeia* to be separable, impassible and unmixed. It is because the active intellect is *energeia* that it is separable, impassible and unmixed. This fact has crucial implication for Aristotle’s notion of *eudaimonia*, which, he says, is *energeia*. Being *energeia*, *eudaimonia*, according to the *De Anima* 3, 5, is the function of the superior, i.e., active intellect, and, so, it must be separable, impassible and unmixed.

Aristotle does also speak about the impassible and separate nature of the active intellect in the *De Anima* 2, 2: “[nous] seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of soul … are incapable of separate existence though, of course, distinguishable by definition” (413b25-29). He emphasizes the separable nature of *nous* in the *De Anima* 3, 4: “Mind is separable from [the body]” and has no organ of its own (429a24-429b4).

In the *De Anima* 2, 3, Aristotle confirms that this separable, impassible, unmixed, immortal and eternal intellectual *energeia* is the intuitive mind of the *Analytics* and *NE* 6, 6 and 7 – “the mind that knows with immediate intuition” (415a11-12). In the *De Anima* 1, 3, he confirms that the passive intellect is indeed practical intellect as opposed to the active / contemplative intellect: “If the circular movement is eternal, there must be something which mind is always thinking – what can this be? For all practical processes of thinking have limits – they all go on for the sake of something outside the process”; unlike theoretical processes of thinking (407a23-25; emphasis added). To say that practical
thinking goes on for the sake of something outside itself is the other way to say that it does not have its telos intrinsically, or within itself, and, so, is not and cannot in principle be the most final good, and, hence, the ergon of man.

Thus, the De Anima 1, 3 passage gives an additional textual support to the beginning of NE 1, 7 where Aristotle defines the isolated intrinsicality of the most final good as the isolated intrinsicality of its telos, thus positing that the most final good is its own telos. And this passage gives also the additional clarification of how the beginning of NE 1, 7 is linked with NE 1, 7 ergon passage. In the ergon passage, Aristotle defines human ergon as the most final good, good-in-itself, or its own end (self-justified and self-aimed). Human ergon cannot in principle have telos outside itself, or, in other words, cannot be exercised for the sake of something outside itself. Because practical thinking is always for the sake of something outside itself, practical intellect cannot pertain to human ergon. Thus, human ergon is the function of the superior, active – contemplative -- part of the mind, which is the end-in-itself. Consequently, eudaimonia is the perfect functioning of the superior, the active, part of the mind, realized in the energeia of theôria. Let me call this argument the teleological argument proving that the ergon of man consists in the self-aimed function of the active intellect, i.e., the contemplative reason, and cannot be the function of the passive intellect, i.e., the practical reason.

These passages in the De Anima indicate that not only is Cooper wrong to state that everywhere in Aristotle except NE 10, 7 and 8 the human being is identified with an undifferentiated mind, but he is also wrong to state that this undifferentiated mind is regarded “principally from the practical side”, or else identified “with the practical intellect itself” (1975, 169; emphasis added). These passages do as well confirm that when, in the
ergon passage, Aristotle states that eudaimonia is the energeia of the rational element in accordance with its appropriate excellence, he does in no way refer to the practical intellect (with its excellence of phronēsis) which is not self-aimed precisely because it is a passive intellect -- only a passive psychophysical matter and not an activity (energeia). Speaking of eudaimonia as energeia, he refers to the contemplative intellect (with its excellence of philosophia) which is self-aimed precisely because it is an active intellect, or an activity (energeia) – “originating force”.

So, the most important conceptual impact of these passages in the De Anima, and, especially, in the De Anima 3, 5, is not simply that mind cannot be in any case considered as “an undifferentiated mind” and certainly not as “principally” a practical, i.e., passive, mind. Their most important conceptual impact is that mind, in its proper sense, in its essential nature, or in-itself, is energeia. Mind is identified with its highest function. This is exactly what Aristotle defines in NE 1, 13, and, so, not only in NE 10, 7 and 8, with the notion of mind “in itself” or “in its proper sense” (1103a4-5). Mind as energeia has a special ontological status – it is defined by the criterion of isolation, i.e., apart from intellectual functions inseparable from body. The teleological argument proving that the ergon of man consists in the self-aimed function of the active intellect is a missing link in the ergon passage. The ergon of man is a function of the rational element, says Aristotle. And of this, there are the active superior part and the passive inferior part. According to the above argument, Aristotle does not refer to the passive inferior part of the rational element (practical reason) when he speaks of the ergon of man in the ergon passage of NE 1, 7. Accordingly, when in the teleia aretē passage, Aristotle defines eudaimonia as the energeia of the rational element according to the superior virtue, he refers to the en-
ergeia of the superior active intellect which virtue is superior to the virtue of the inferior passive intellect. That is, he refers to the energeia of the active intellect according to its virtue of sophia, and not to the energeia of the passive intellect according to its virtue of phronēsis. Consequently, this energeia of the active superior intellectual element in the ergon and teleia aretê passages of NE 1, 7 has the same attributes as it has in the De Anima: it is “separable, impassible, unmixed”. Hence, the NE 1, 7 ergon and teleia aretê passages, supported by the NE 1, 13, NE 6, 1 passages and all of the De Anima passages, are conceptually identical with NE 10, 7 and 8.

Not less important is that the De Anima 3, 5 does explicitly state that the active intellect is “a cause” (the final cause, one of four causes) shaping everything man does, as form shaping matter, similarly to art shaping its material. Thus, Ackrill is wrong to deny that human ergon is a cause and that it explains why humans desire happiness. If human ergon consists in the energeia of the active part of the rational element, and this energeia is a cause of everything a man does, as Aristotle claims in the De Anima 3, 5, then human ergon is indeed the final cause of everything a man does. Eudaimonia as the excellent functioning of the active part of the rational element (functioning according to its appropriate excellence, philosophia) is the excellent manifestation of the active intellect as the final cause. Aristotle does indeed say NE 1, 12 that eudaimonia “is the first principle” and “cause of goods” (1102a2-4; emphasis added), not an effect. “It is not to be placed among potentialities” (1101b12-13). I consider the causal nature of eudaimonia in detail in chapter 4 of my dissertation.

Let me now take a closer look at the attributes of the mind-in-itself. That mind as energeia (with its highest manifestation in eudaimonia) is separable means that it is not
entelechy, which is the intellectual function inseparable from the body and rooted in perception, induction, and phantasia, i.e., representational thought. The highest function of the mind is separate and independent from the body. The separability of the mind means also that it is immortal. “This alone is immortal and eternal”, says Aristotle (430a22-23). The impassibility of mind does also mean that mind is always in the state of knowledge, i.e., actuality.

“Actual knowledge is identical with its object”, stresses Aristotle in the De Anima 3, 5 (430a20) and 3, 6 (431a1). He confirms in the De Anima 3, 7: “In every case the mind which is actively thinking is the objects it thinks” (431b17-18). That mind in its proper sense (with its highest manifestation in eudaimonia) is impassible and always in the state of actuality means not simply that it itself is imperishable, but rather that its object is impassible, for the mind is identical with its object. The mind attached to the human soul is impassible only because it is identical with its impassible object – the Mind (Nous) on the cosmic scale. This is precisely the reason that Aristotle gives in NE 6, 1 = EE 5 for the differentiation between the passive, inferior, and active, superior, parts of the rational element. He says we should differentiate between them, “for where objects differ in kind the part of soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have” (1139a9-12). Thus, NE 6, 1 = EE 5 completely supports De Anima 3, 5 on all points, including the separable impassible nature of mind, so that NE 6, 1 = EE 5 and De Anima prove to be conceptually identical with NE 10, 7-8.

That mind in itself (with its highest manifestation in eudaimonia) is unmixed underlines that it is wrong to interpret mind in Aristotle’s philosophy from the inclusivist
point of view – as the compound or mixture of its various functions, and, consequently, it is wrong to interpret eudaimonia inclusively. That the superior or ruling part of the rational element has rational principle “in itself” means that it has no admixture of the desiring element. In the De Anima 1, 4, Aristotle confirms his belief that mind as such, or in-itself, is different both from the other functions of the soul and from its own passive intellectual function. Mind, as the superior function, is one as opposed to the composite of all other functions of the soul:

The case of mind is different [from the other functions of the soul]; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed… In old age the activity of mind or intellectual apprehension declines only through the decay of some other inward part; mind itself is impassible. Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has mind, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible (408b17-29; emphasis added).

Hence, Hardie is wrong to define Aristotle’s teaching on the mind as dualism. As isolated function, in itself, or in its essential nature and its proper sense, mind is not dualistic. That mind is unmixed means not only that it is not inclusive (not a compound), but also that it is not dualistic. Though it is differentiated in its functions, mind is essentially one. “When mind”, says Aristotle in the De Anima 3, 5, “is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal” (430a23-25; emphasis added). It is because mind is unmixed that it is in the unconditional and unchangeable state of actuality, i.e., in the state of knowledge: “Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not” (430a22-23). “We do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible, and without it nothing thinks”, continues Aristotle (430a23-25; emphasis
added). Thus, strictly speaking, the passive intellect is not a part of the mind, but its aspect (hypostasis) or, rather, a function, when mind becomes “enmattered”, though Aristotle does indeed speak of the rational element as having parts.

3.6 The hierarchical argument for the identification of eudaimonia with theōria based on the identification of any sustēma with its highest function

Identified with its superior function, nous includes its inferior functions as its parts not in the quasi-democratic sense when all the parts have an equal say in forming the whole – the superior function along with the inferior functions (as, let’s say, individual potatoes in a heap of potatoes) -- but in a quasi-slavery sense when a master has the subservient functions of the whole as parts of himself in such a way that they are completely submitted to his superior function. In other words, a master is the whole, but he cannot in principle be identified with the sum of the inferior functions serving him. He is one. Thus, a passive and inferior function is a part of a master or the active and superior function, but not in the sense that inclusivists imply in a part-whole relation. It is obvious that inclusivists take part-whole lexicon in Aristotle without accounting for its specific, historically determined, meaning. In the patriarchal, rigidly hierarchical society of Aristotle’s time and ideal, no inferior part of the whole could have had been a forming part of the superior. Let me call this argument the hierarchical argument proving that mind, as any other sustēma (systematic whole) is identified with its highest function, and, therefore, the ergon of man, as the certain energeia of mind, consists in the function of its superior part, the active intellect. Below is my analysis of the other passages in which Aristotle argues that any systematic whole (sustēma) is identified not with the sum of parts, but with its superior function.
It is precisely the slave-master terminology that Aristotle uses in the 1249b16-21 passage of EE 7, 15 (the concluding passage of EE) when he states that “man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part” (1249b10-11): “One must … live with reference to the ruling principle and … the activity of the ruling principle, as slave must live with reference to that of the master…” (1249b6-9). In EE 7, 9 Aristotle specifically emphasizes that there is no partnership or equal relationship, and, so, no justice between the passive or subservient function and the active or superior function “for the sake of which the pair exists” (1241b18-20). He explains his notion of a part-whole relation in which a master is a whole but still is one and not a sum of his parts:

They are not two, but the first term in each pair [soul and body; artisan and tool; master and slave; active intellect and passive intellect] is one, and the second a part of this one, but not itself one. Nor is the good to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the one for the sake of which the pair exists (1241b19-24; emphasis added).

In the next chapter, devoted specifically to the relation of moral virtue to eudaimonia, I analyze how the same notion of the total submission of the inferior function to the superior function within the whole applies to moral virtue which Aristotle does indeed identify as an inferior function or a tool. Let me briefly summarize my argument there to make complete my present discussion of the part and the whole in Aristotle’s understanding. In the EE 7, 14, Aristotle says that virtue cannot move the soul, simply because it is just “an instrument [tool] of the intellect” (1248a29-30). Being a tool or an inferior function of the whole, moral virtue cannot in principle be the part of the whole in the sense posited by inclusivists. Moral virtue as a tool is not itself one alongside the superior function of theoria. Nor is the good to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the superior function of theoria – “to the one for the sake of which the
pair exists”. Thus, the quality of moral virtue to be valuable-in-itself does not change its position in the pair of the superior and the inferior functions of the soul. Because moral virtue does ultimately exist for the sake of the superior function, it is inevitably simply a subservient and totally submitted part of the superior function, and the whole is identified with its superior function (it is one, not the composite). In the next chapter, I also show that when EE 7, 15 states that “man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part” (1249b10-11), it refers both to phronēsis and moral / practical virtues as the subject or a slave of the ruling function of the rational element, i.e., the active intellect.

Aristotle reverts to the servant-master terminology every time he speaks of the relation between the superior part and the inferior part of the whole. In NE 6, 12 = EE 5, he describes the relation between phronēsis (the virtue of the passive and inferior function of the practical reason) and sophia (the virtue of the active and superior function of the contemplative reason) exactly as the relation between a master and a servant or a steward. Philosophia has authority over phronēsis precisely because it is a function superior to phronēsis: “It would be thought strange if practical wisdom being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in authority over it” (1143b31-33). In NE 6, 13 = EE 5, he reiterates: “Again [phronēsis] is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e., over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state” (1145a7-12). This passage indicates that, though phronēsis issues orders, it is a subservient function, that is, a passive function in the ultimate sense of the hierarchy.
Being a servant or an inferior / passive function of the sustēma, practical reason cannot in principle be the part of the rational element in the sense posited by inclusivists. Practical reason as a servant is not itself one alongside the superior function of theōria. Nor is the good to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the superior function of theōria – “to the one for the sake of which the pair exists”. Thus, the quality of practical reason to be indispensable for human survival does not change its position in the pair of the superior and the inferior functions of the soul. Because practical reason does ultimately exist for the sake of the superior function of theōria, it is inevitably simply a subservient and totally submitted part of the superior function, and the whole is identified with its superior function (it is one, not the composite). What was said regarding moral virtues and phronēsis applies to any inferior function of the whole, as Aristotle argues in NE 10, 6: “The activity of the better of any two things -- whether it be two elements of our being or two men – is ... ipso facto superior and more of the nature of happiness” (1177a4-6).

This textual evidence explains in which precisely sense sophia is the part of virtue entire. In NE 6, 12 = EE 5, Aristotle says: “As health produces health; so does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy” (1144a3-6). Inclusivist interpretation uses this passage as one of its major pieces of evidence that the teleia aretē in the common books and EE, in general, is inclusive or virtue entire (with all its parts), and, so, eudaimonia as energeia in accordance with the teleia aretē should be inclusive too. But according to the passages analyzed above, notwithstanding the fact that rational element (as the whole or sustēma) has parts, it is identified with its highest function (active intellect).
The inferior parts are simply the inferior functions of the one, and not the *constitutive* or *forming* parts of the one. It is because the inferior parts of the whole are not *constitutive* or *forming* parts that the whole is identified with its superior function, and not with the composite of parts, and, so, is *one*. Analogously, notwithstanding the fact that virtue entire (as the whole) has parts, it is identified with its superior virtue. This superior virtue is precisely an active or productive virtue: it is indeed the virtue of *sophia* that *produces* happiness. Therefore, one of the major inclusivist arguments collapses.

Likewise, man, in general, is identified as a whole or *sustēma* with his highest, the active, function, as Aristotle argues in *NE* 9, 8. Characteristically, this argument in *NE* 9, 8 develops along the same lines as in the 1241b19-24 passage of *EE* 7, 9. In every possible pair of the inferior function and the superior function, the superior function dominates the inferior function to the point of its total submission, so that the inferior function is not *one* alongside the superior function, and, though valuable in itself, is ultimately only the tool or servant of the superior function, and the pair is identified *entirely* with the superior function. In *NE* 9, 8, Aristotle does explicitly claim that this is characteristic of any systematic whole (*sustēma*). For example, *polis* – a systematic whole – is identified with its ruling function, though it functions on multiple socio-politico-economical levels. And the same is true for a man: “Just as city *or any other systematic whole* is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man” (1168b31-33; emphasis added). That is, a man is identified with his active intellect with its activity of *theōria*.

The 1168b31-33 passage in *NE* 9, 8 on the self-identification of man with his superior function is a paraphrase of what Aristotle says in *NE* 10, 7:

But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much
as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is
the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison
with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we
must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and,
being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immor-
tal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even
if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.

*This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and bet-
ter part of him.* It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his
self but that of something else. And, what we said before will apply now; that
which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing
(1177b26-1178a6).

This *NE* 10, 7 passage supports all the passages discussed above, which state that the
whole (*sustēma*) is identified with its superior (ruling) function, and so man, as a
*sustēma*, should be identified with his superior function of active intellect: “This [divine
*nous*] would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part
of him”.

3.7 Implications of the hierarchical argument for the *teleia aretē* passage in *NE* 1, 7

To conclude this line of my argument, let me now formulate all the implications
of the hierarchical argument for the *NE* 1, 7 *teleia aretē* passage. The *NE* 1, 7 *ergon* pas-
sage states that the happiness of man is rooted in his function (*ergon*), that the *ergon* of
man is the *energeia* of the rational element, and there are two parts of the rational ele-
ment – the superior part (the active intellect) and the inferior part (the passive intellect).
Each part has its own *energeia* and its own virtue, corresponding to its excellent function-
ing, i.e., the excellent performance of its activity. The excellent performance of the *ener-
geia* of the active intellect is *philosophia* (philosophical wisdom), and the excellent per-
formance of the *energeia* of the passive intellect is *phronēsis* (practical wisdom). Be-
cause there is the hierarchy between the parts of the rational element, there is the corre-
spondent hierarchy between their *energeiai* and between their virtues. The virtue of the superior part of the rational element, *sophia*, is superior to the virtue of the inferior part of the rational element, *phronēsis*.

The *NE 1, 7 teleia aretē* passage states that the most final good, *eudaimonia*, defined by the *ergon* of man, is the *energeia* of the rational element in accordance with the best (*ariste*) or superior virtue. Based only on the *teleia aretē* passage itself, Kenny argued that only one virtue can be the best or superior virtue, but he did not recognize the logical and conceptual connection between the *teleia aretē* passage and the *ergon* passage, i.e., that this superior virtue corresponds to the active part of the rational element, which is a superior part. That is why he was forced to argue that the *teleia aretē* passage was an independent development in Aristotle’s argument, what finally made him proclaim Aristotle’s position inconsistent (Kenny, 1992, 29). Nonetheless, there is an indication in the text of *NE 1, 7*, right between the *ergon* passage and the *teleia aretē* passage, that the *teleia aretē* is the excellence appropriate to some specific, peculiar *energeia*. Aristotle posits that an activity (*energeia*) is well performed “when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence” (1098a15-16; emphasis added). This is the universal generalization stating that each *energeia* has its own appropriate, peculiar excellence. Because Aristotle just divided the rational element into two parts, each one with its appropriate activity, it is clear that the two *energeiai* of the parts of the rational element are each performed with its own appropriate excellence. “If this is the case”, continues Aristotle, “human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best (*ariste*) and most final (*teleia*)” (1098a16-19). So, it is not only that only one virtue can be the best
(ἀριστη), but, even further, only one virtue can be appropriate for a specific, peculiar activity (energeia), and the best virtue is the virtue appropriate for the best activity. Indeed, Aristotle states that eudaimonia is energeia, not energeiai (1098a17-19). And he states that “the function of man is an energeia of soul which follows or implies a rational principle” (1098a8-9), and not energeiai. Only one excellence is the “appropriate excellence” for the special intellectual energeia of eudaimonia. And this excellence is the best precisely because it is appropriate to the excellent performance of eudaimonia, the best energeia.

The above analyzed passages from the NE, EE, and De Anima confirm that the rational element is indeed divided into two parts – the passive or inferior part, which is the practical reason with its inferior virtue of phronēsis, and the active or superior part, which is the contemplative reason with its superior virtue of sophia, and indicate that any sustēma is identified with its superior function. This latter thesis is the missing conclusion of the ergon argument itself and the missing link between the ergon passage and the teleia aretē passage. Man as any sustēma is identified with his highest function, or, in other words, man’s function is his highest function. Because the entire sustēma of man is identified with his superior function – theōria -- man’s happiness is simply the perfect performance of this function. That is, when Aristotle says “human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best (ariste) and most final (teleia)” (1098a16-19), he means: eudaimonia is the peculiar energeia of the superior part of the rational element in accordance with its appropriate virtue, sophia. Thus, teleia aretē passage is simply a paraphrase of Aristotle’s statement in NE 10, 7:
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us… that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said (1177a12-18; emphasis added).

Both NE 1, 7 and NE 10, 7 stress the importance of the proper or appropriate excellence for every specific, peculiar activity (energeia). They both posit that the peculiar, superior, energeia of the active part of the rational element should have its own peculiar, superior, excellence, which is its proper. Or, in other words, both of them underline that the superior virtue corresponds to the best thing in us, which is the divine or closest to the divine element in us, and, so, is our ruler. Now, after the analysis of all other appropriate passages in the NE, it is clear why Aristotle says in the 1177a12-18 passage of NE 10, 7: “That this activity is contemplative we have already said”. Essentially the notion of ariste kai teleia aretê posits the hierarchy between the excellences of a man parallel to the hierarchy between functions a man exercises. Ariste kai teleia aretê, a superior excellence, is defined by the criterion of isolation. It is set apart from the inferior part of the rational element with its inferior function and its inferior excellence.

3.8 The argument from the peculiarity of human ergon for the identification of eudaimonia with theoría

As it is clear now, Aristotle leaves no doubt that the ergon of man is the energeia only of one, superior, part of the rational element – its active part. Accordingly, eudaimonia is the eminent exercise of the active part of the rational element – its superior part, that is, the exercise of the active intellect according to its virtue -- sophia. So far, I have analyzed two arguments – the teleological and the hierarchical arguments – that clarify
the *ergon* argument. There is another line of thought in Aristotle’s *Ethics* that supports this interpretation of the *ergon* passage. Let me call it *the argument from the peculiarity of human ergon*. Before I proceed to the peculiarity argument, let me give the concise statement of all these arguments.

The teleological argument, or the argument from the intrinsicality of the good, states that practical reason has its *telos* outside itself, and, so, is not the most final end which is the end-in-itself (its own end). Only the end-in-itself is the most final good. Human function is the most final good / the most final end (an end-in-itself). Therefore, human function is the function of the active part of the rational element, which is an end-in-itself or the most final good. So, human function is different from the practical reason which is not an end-in-itself.

The hierarchical argument states that in any *sustēma*, the *sustēma* is identified with its superior function. So, when, in the NE 1, 7 *ergon* passage, Aristotle states that *ergon* of man is the *energeia* of the rational element and that rational element consists of the active / superior and passive / inferior parts, it is clear that he identifies the *ergon* of man with the *energeia* of the superior part -- the active intellect. Analogously, when, in the NE 1, 7 *teleia aretē* passage, Aristotle states that the *eudaimonia* of man is the *energeia* of the rational element in accordance with the superior virtue, he identifies the superior virtue with the virtue of the superior part of the rational element, that is, with *sophia*. *Eudaimonia*, then, is the *energeia* of the active intellect in the excellent degree of *sophia*.

*The argument from the peculiarity of human ergon* states that practical reason is a function that even the lower animals have. That is, practical reason is not the function peculiar to human species. The *ergon* passage insists that the human function is a func-
tion peculiar to human species. Therefore, practical reason does not pertain to the human ergon, and human ergon is the function of the active part of the rational element, which is peculiar to the human species.

Now let me expand on the peculiarity argument. Aristotle’s conviction, expressed in the ergon passage, that human function should be peculiar to humans is based on his belief that cosmos is a systematic whole (sustēma), in which every part has its own functional role or purpose, as he most strikingly expressed in the 1075a16-23 passage of the Metaphysics Α, 10: “All things are ordered together somehow”. Though parts can share some functions, each must bring something peculiar into the overall functioning of the whole. Thus, the purposefulness of each part of the whole (its teleological value) depends on whether it has in itself some peculiar function. The peculiar function is the most intrinsic function that every part of cosmos has independently of every other part – in-itself, apart, or in isolation from any other part. The more valuable is the part for the functioning of the whole, the more peculiar its function is. Because man is the part of cosmos, he must bring something peculiar into the overall functioning of the whole, and, therefore, his function cannot be a compound of functions he shares with other species, but must be a function specific to human species.

The confusion over NE 1, 7 ergon argument is understandable, for the text represents the argument in a concise, almost abrupt, form. It is manifest that Aristotle builds his entire ergon argument upon the premiss that “we are seeking what is peculiar to man” (1097b34; emphasis added). He excludes from human ergon the modes of life, which are “common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal” (1097b34-1098a3; emphasis added). Via exclusion and isolation, Aristotle narrows the candidates for being a human
ergon to “an active life of the element that has a rational principle” (1098a3-4). He does furthermore narrow down the candidates for being a human ergon. First, Aristotle points out that the rational element has two parts – one active, and another passive. Secondly, he insists that the proper sense of the term “an active life of a rational element” is energeia, not the application of rational element in practical life (praxis). Hence, he says, “the function of man is an activity (energeia) of soul which follows or implies a rational principle” (1098a8-9). The immediate transition of the argument to the teleia aretê passage with its statement that the human good is the good and noble functioning of the energeia of rational element in accordance with the best and most final virtue, leaves out the full consideration of whether only one part of the rational element, its active part, is peculiar to human species, or practical reason does also pertain to the human ergon.

Nonetheless, the whole development of the argument presupposes that the former is what Aristotle implies when he points out that rational element has two parts, one active, i.e., exercising thought, and another one passive, i.e., obedient to the former.

Thus, for the correct interpretation of the NE 1, 7 ergon and teleia aretê passages, it is necessary to look for the other texts in Aristotle, which do consider the parts of the rational element from the point of view of their peculiarity for the human species. In NE 6, 6 and 7 = EE 5, Aristotle undertakes a comparison between the active part of the rational element, i.e., the intuitive reason that exercises thought, and its passive or obedient part, the practical reason, with their corresponding excellences, sophia and phronēsis. According to Aristotle, one reason of why practical reason is inferior to intuitive reason, with phronēsis being inferior to sophia, is that practical reason is not a function peculiar to human species: “Some even of the lower animals have practical wisdom” (1141a29).
Therefore, according to the requirement of peculiarity insisted upon in the ergon passage, human ergon cannot include or consist in the practical reason with its excellence of phronēsis, and the human good, eudaimonia, cannot include or consist in the excellent performance of the practical reason. Thus, Broadie is wrong to state: “No doubt practical activity distinguishes human lives from the lives of other animals” (Broadie, 1991, 417).

There are two variants of the argument from the peculiarity of human ergon. The first variant is as follows: (1) phronēsis is not peculiar to humans, for even some lower animals have phronēsis; (2) human ergon is peculiar to human species; (3) therefore, phronēsis does not pertain to the ergon of man and his happiness. The second variant is as follows: (1) some lower animals have phronēsis; (2) while these animals have phronēsis, animals in general cannot have happiness, as Aristotle claims in NE 1, 9 (1099b34-1100a1) and NE 10, 8 (1178b23-24); (3) therefore, phronēsis is not the activity that pertains to the happiness of man. Humans are happy not qua animals, but as identified with their divine nous.

Aristotle firmly believes that any systematic whole must be hierarchical precisely because he believes in the necessary functional peculiarity of every part of the cosmos. Aristotle’s entire philosophy is hierarchical functionalism. Some parts are more important in their functional peculiarity for the preservation of the whole, and every part within the whole, and some parts are less important. Some parts are valuable in themselves, and some only as means for the former. And there must be the ruler, the most important, The Superior function of the sustēma. The position of Ruler is defined by its utmost peculiar function – the function which he does not share with any part of the cosmos, and which is valuable only in-itself, and never a means for anything else, and, thus, is the most final
good. Therefore, all the three arguments -- the teleological, hierarchical and peculiarity arguments – converge. The peculiarity argument does also explain in which sense The Ruler, the most final good, is self-sufficient. He cannot be self-sufficient in the sense of including the inferior functions, precisely because his function is peculiar from the inferior functions. The peculiarity of his function lies in the fact that he is valuable intrinsically, in-himself, in isolation from anything else. Hence, the self-sufficiency of the Ruler consists in his functional peculiarity, which is an end-in-itself (he is his own self-justified and self-originating end).

3.9 Concluding thoughts on the functional nature of happiness

Let me make the final observations about all I said in this chapter. Like Plato, Aristotle believes that there is an analogy between three systematic wholes -- cosmos, polis and psyche. The macrocosm is reflected in the microcosm, and both polis and psyche operate according to the same laws as cosmos. Polis and psyche each must have a ruler approximating the role of God in cosmos. Though Aristotle states explicitly in NE 10, 7 that nous is our ruler (1177a13-15), and in NE 10, 8 that nous is a thing apart from our human sustêma (1178a21-22), it is apparent that because modern Aristotelian scholars did not give consideration to this analogy between macrocosm and microcosm that confusion over the ruling function of the human soul emerged. The other reason for misunderstanding Aristotle’s hierarchical world-view might be that his true view must be upfront repellent and, so, unintelligible to a man raised in a modern western democracy. Indeed, the statement that any sustêma is identified with its highest function directly translates into the statement that only The Ruler can be the most final end or the end-in-itself, and, so, the most final good. The statement that only The Ruler is himself his own end trans-
lates into the statement that only The Ruler can be self-sufficient. The Ruler is self-sufficient not because his subjects are his parts, but precisely because his subjects are not his parts in the constitutive sense. Also the Ruler is self-sufficient not because his subjects are his means, but precisely because his subjects are not his means. And being self-sufficient, The Ruler of the sustêma cannot be the part of the sustêma he rules; he is set apart from and above cosmos, polis and psyche. But because every part of cosmos, polis and psyche has God as its most final end, God is, at the same time, within the cosmos, polis and psyche as the purpose or The Mover who moves the cosmos, polis and psyche by attracting every part of the cosmos, polis and psyche to himself.

Let me summarize my argument in this chapter. The superior function of the ruler within a sustêma lies in the self-awareness of the whole. If not for this awareness of the whole in its own existence, there will be no whole as such. God as thought thinking of thinking is thinking the essences (eidoi) within the material particulars. Thus, God, the ruling function of cosmos, rules its parts not being an imperative ruler, but from within the parts of cosmos themselves -- by being a purpose or motivation for every part of cosmos. God motivates every part of cosmos to realize its own peculiar, intrinsic, and hierarchically significant eidos via its own peculiar, intrinsic, and hierarchically significant ergon. The more the part is valuable in the hierarchy of cosmos, the more it is motivated to realize its own peculiar, intrinsic good, because only by making its own function most peculiar it can most contribute to the whole. But only humans among animals are consciously aware of the superior value of the whole, because they have a divine or divine-like nous with its activity of theôria – a thing most peculiar or apart / isolated from the body-soul composite, to suntheton (1178a18-22), as Aristotle says in NE 10, 8. Nous, as
“a thing apart”, can be aware of the whole precisely because it can contemplate the whole from aside, or rather, contemplate itself within a whole from aside.

So, human *ergon* is the peculiar function, viz., *energeia* that only humans can exercise, and only via one part of the soul – the rational element, and only via one part of the rational element – its active part. *Eudaimonia* is the eminent exercise of this specific function in accordance with a specific peculiar virtue which is not only appropriate, but also the best or superior among other virtues. The superiority of this virtue corresponds to the superiority of the function. And the peculiarity of this virtue corresponds to the peculiarity of the function. In *NE* 1, 7, Aristotle does oppose various *energeiai* of the soul (with their proper excellences) to the one, specific *energeia* of happiness (with its proper excellence) which is both the most *τελειοτάτη καὶ αριστή*. It is clear now that *ergon* and *teleia aretê* passages develop Aristotle’s argument in *NE* 1, 6 on isolation. By defining the *energeia* of happiness, i.e., the excellent functioning of the active intellect, as “that which when isolated” remains self-sufficient, Aristotle posits that the *energeia* of the active intellect is functionally indispensable even in isolation from any and all of the other human *energeiai*, i.e., when man is inactive in any other sense. Being functionally indispensable, the *energeia* of the active intellect (*theōria*) is most intrinsically good, that is, good in isolation from other *energeiai*. And it is most peculiar – self-originated and self-justified.

Thus, the inclusivist and mixist interpretation is wrong to make the *ergon* of man inclusive. The *ergon* of man cannot include functions that are not peculiar to man, like, for example, practical wisdom with its virtue of *phronēsis*. Because the *ergon* of man cannot be inclusive, the self-sufficiency of happiness cannot be inclusive. And inclusiv-
ists and mixists are wrong to deny that the *ergon* of man is causally significant, and insist that *ergon* argument *does not* link the notion of good man with the notion of happy man, and does only link the notion of “what is good for man” with the notion of happy man. It is clear now that Aristotle does state in his *ergon* argument that the good lies not in something outside or “for” man, but inside man himself – in his *peculiar* function, so that the happy man is a good man who *perfects* his inherent good embedded in his function. Thus, *ergon* argument bears the ultimate explanatory power: Aristotle explains *why* man desires happiness via his *ergon* argument.

Also inclusivists and mixists are wrong to state that all intrinsically valuable activities are *equally* contributing to *eudaimonia*, that is, there is no hierarchy and even differentiation between human *energeiai*: “There is nothing in the function argument to imply that there is an order or importance among [all the distinctive virtues of man]” (Ackrill, 1973, 21); “both the intellectual and the emotional sides of our make-up belong *equally essentially and fundamentally* to what we are” (Cooper, 1975, 167; emphasis added); “in all the places in Aristotle, with the sole exception of [the] passage from the tenth Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which [exclusivist] theory is stated, the human being is identified not with this theoretical intellect but either, as in Plato, with an *undifferentiated mind* regarded *principally* from the *practical side*, or else with the practical intellect itself” (Cooper, 1975, 169; emphasis added).

Inclusivists and mixist interpretation is wrong to make practical reason the ruling function in the human soul concerned with the “whole good of man” (Kenny, 1978, 163, 165), and to make *phronēsis* a functional differentia of human species: “No doubt practical activity distinguishes human lives from the lives of other animals” (Broadie, 1991,
417), so that, we are “essentially practical beings, hence … beings whose essential virtues are practical” (Broadie, 389). And, though Hardie makes a significant break-through by pointing out that understanding the dichotomy of passive and active intellects in the *De Anima* is necessary for understanding the doctrine of theoretical reason in *NE* 10, 7-8 (1968, 354-355), he is wrong to posit that Aristotle was a dualist; and he is wrong in his belief that neither in *NE* nor elsewhere in Aristotle’s surviving works, Aristotle formulates the distinction between the active intellect exercising thought (causally efficacious, productive, immortal and eternal) and the passive or obedient intellect (destructible), he formulated in the *De Anima* 3, 5 (439a10-14) (348, 353).
Eudaimonia as incompatible with the maximization of moral virtues and unidentifiable with their compound

4.1 The requirement to limit social interactions and moral / practical virtues involved

It is apparent that the confusion on how to treat the self-sufficiency of happiness had arisen because the criterion of isolation was not given any attention by previous interpreters. In this chapter, I consider how the requirement of isolation is supported by other passages from the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics, all of which indicating that happiness, even in the secondary happy life, cannot consist of the compound of moral virtues. This is especially important because of the latest development in the debate, i.e., the claim by Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper that secondary happiness consists only of moral / practical virtues without theoria.

Both Cooper and Kenny recognize that there could be a conflict between the subordinate ends, and between the subordinate ends and the most final end, i.e., between different energeiai. Man needs to weigh his ends to reach a balance between competing objectives. But this “weighing of the ends” does not concern, they say, moral virtues. Moral obligations are supposed to be fully and unconditionally satisfied before the agent is allowed to think of anything else, even his happiness. In fact, all contemporary interpreters insist upon the absolute value of moral virtue. But, essentially, they substitute the requirement of the unconditional fulfillment of the moral duty with the requirement of the unconditional and unlimited moral perfection (the maximization of moral virtue): “Virtue is something of which there cannot be too much” (Kenny, 1978, 208), so that, according
to them, a morally perfect agent is simply obliged to be happy. This is most categorically expressed by Broadie: “It is not open to Aristotle to hold, as it might be to us under some different abstract conception of virtue, that a person can be actively virtuous (in conditions favouring the activity), yet not to that extent be happy” (Broadie, 371). Nonetheless, both NE and EE make it clear that the identification of happiness with moral perfectionism is inconsistent with Aristotle’s argument there (1) against the maximization of moral virtues in a happy life; and (2) against the identification of happiness with a compound of moral virtues in conditions both favouring and not favouring the morally virtuous activity, and for both maximized and not maximized moral virtues.

The first passage where Aristotle argues that the maximization of goods, including the intrinsic goods (among them, moral virtues) is detrimental for happiness is directly concerned with the notion of self-sufficiency of happiness. This passage on self-sufficiency makes very likely that, contrary to the belief of inclusivists, self-sufficiency for Aristotle is not the unlimited maximization of goods-in-themselves. This passage is even more important because the other passage on self-sufficiency of happiness in NE 1, 7 (1097b14-21) is commonly used by inclusivists to prove their point that the excess of goods is always good, i.e., good should be maximized: “Of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b14-21). To make the importance of this passage even more dramatic, this passage immediately precedes the 1097b14-21 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness in NE 1, 7:

… By self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendents and ‘friends’ friends we are in for an infinite series (1097b8-13; emphasis added).
Inclusivists, notably the early Hardie, interpret this passage in the sense that self-sufficiency of the good must be inclusive, for man is by nature not a solitary but a social animal, and in his social life, concerning parents, children, wife, and in general his friends and fellow citizens, necessarily needs social virtues to function effectively, and, hence, his happiness consists of the compounded energeiai in accordance to the compounded virtues, and, especially, moral virtues. Hardie uses this assumption as the additional evidence that the 1097b14-21 passage propounds the all-inclusiveness of happiness in stating that it is always desirable to add even the least of goods, if it is missing, “for that which is added becomes the excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b19-21). Nonetheless, this, anti-solipsist, interpretation of the 1097b8-13 passage cannot explain why, in the 1097b14-21 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness, happiness is defined as self-sufficient even in isolation, precisely because, on the anti-solipsist interpretation, man essentially is not and must not be isolated, and his happiness allegedly aims at adding up more and more goods in a socially expanding life.

But more notably, the categorically socially-expansionist interpretation of the 1097b8-13 passage does not do justice to the passage itself, for this passage does indeed emphatically argue against the excess of social interactions (and, hence, moral virtues practiced in these social interactions) since these form an infinite series⁴, and literally insists upon the limit to the quantity of social interactions, and, so, upon the limit to the maximization of both the extrinsic and the intrinsic goods involved, including the moral excellences of a citizen. Importantly, the 1097b8-13 passage shows that Aristotle is convinced that, though man needs social interactions, his social interactions, as he puts it,

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⁴ Infinites do not even admit of a greatest, so that “complete happiness” would never be attainable.
must be limited. This fact does not allow for the interpretation of the 1097b14-21 passage as arguing for the excess of the goods (their maximization), and, thus, undermines the major argument by inclusivists. Now, it is clear that, by itself, the 1097b14-21 passage constitutes a riddle, for it contains the statement “for that which is added becomes the excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b19-21) right after the 1097b8-13 passage where Aristotle argues against the excess of the goods as an infinite series. Because it is improbable that Aristotle contradicts himself on one and the same page of his treatise, the wider textual analysis is needed to solve the riddle. The most substantial textual evidence that the self-sufficiency of happiness cannot be rendered in inclusivist terms appears in the NE 10, 1-5, which I will consider in chapter 6 of my dissertation. In fact, NE 10, 1-5 solves the riddle of the 1097b14-21 passage by pointing to the origin of the statement “that which is added becomes the excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable”, which, as it does at that point clearly appear, is not endorsed by Aristotle.

In the same vein, Aristotle argues in both NE and EE that man can have only a limited number of friends. All the passages on the limit of friendships, considered below, explain in much detail what exactly Aristotle meant in the 1097b8-13 passage when he argued against the excess in social interactions as an infinite series, and in which sense the limit in social interactions puts a necessary limit upon the exercise of virtues. Also, the following analysis of the Aristotelian notion of friendship as a specific energeia (“the function of friendship is activity (energeia)”, EE 1237a34, see also NE 1157b10-12) is crucial for understanding what it means that eudaimonia is energeia and why the excess of the intrinsic goods (even moral energeiai) other than its own specific intellectual ene-
geia is detrimental to it. It is essential that because Aristotle defines friendship as *ener-
geia* (the intrinsic activity of the soul), it will be a mistake to view friendship in his ac-
count as an external good (like honour). Indeed, Aristotle says at the very onset of *NE 8*,
1 that “[friendship] is a virtue or implies virtue” (1155a1-2), because every *energeia* (ac-
tivity) has an appropriate *aretê* (virtue) when it is performed in the excellent degree. He
emphasizes his point by stating in *NE 8*, 5 that “friendship [is] a state of character”
(1157b29), and that “men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not as a re-
sult of feeling but as a result of a state of character” (1157b31-33). The *EE* supports this
view: “Friendship seems a sort of moral habit” (1234b29). Thus, when, in *NE 8*, Ari-
sotle argues against the excess of friendships (their quantity) and in friendships (their
quality or intensity), he *explicitly* argues against the excess in regards to virtue(s).

Aristotle starts his argument against the excess of virtue(s) in regards to friendship
in *NE 8*, 3 by stating that an authentic friendship is a *good* relationship between two *good*
men, and “it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are rare”
(1156b24-25). It is quite a sober position taking the limit for granted. Secondly, and
most importantly, an authentic friendship is a social interaction of a specific quality, in
which friend is loved not for pleasure or utility, but for himself. Because in the true
friendship, a friend is loved for himself, it is natural that all it takes is a spending time
together, the more time the better. And, naturally, this interaction can in principle exist
only between a selective few, for it takes time, effort, and familiarity.

True friendship starts with a reciprocated feeling: goodwill becomes friendship
only when it is reciprocated (1155b33-34), insists Aristotle, and “each has been found
lovable and been trusted by each” (1156b27-28). But reciprocated goodwill should ex-
press itself continuously in shared experiences to form a true friendship: the desire to be friends is not enough, “for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not” (1156b31-32). That is why sour people, says Aristotle, “may bear goodwill to each other, for they wish one another well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends because they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship” (1158a7-9). In fact, “friendship requires time and familiarity” to such a degree that “men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’” (1156b26-27):

One cannot be friends to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them [the friendship of virtue when a friend is loved not for pleasure or utility, but for his own sake], just as one cannot be in love with many people at once, for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for many people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his eyes. One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with him, and that is very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time (1158a13-17; emphasis added).

Aristotle confirms in the EE: “You cannot know the mind of man or woman till you have tied them as you might cattle. Nor is a friend made except through time … neither are men at once friends as soon as they wish to be friends” (1237b15-23).

Maximization of friendships simply does not make sense, for man should live with his friend, meaning that he should share deeds, thoughts, and, especially virtuous energeiai with his friend: “There is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together” (1157b19-20); “for friends the most desirable thing is living together” (1171a32); and in the EE: “The wish to be together is characteristic of friendship”, 1245b27-28)\(^5\), -- and

\(^5\) “Those, however, who approve of each other, but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends” (1157b17-19).
man has just a certain amount of time and *energeia*. Aristotle has the variation of this argument in the *EE*: “The primary friendship [friendship of virtue] is not found between many, for it is hard to test many men, for one would have to live with each” (1237b34-36). The maximization of friendships does make sense *existentially*, for it is impossible to live with many men at once. By “existentially”, I mean day-to-day existence of a man, involving all his major and minute experiences – reflections and intellections, both practical and contemplative, perceptions and evaluations -- in a unity inseparable from the unique circumstances of this, one and only, specific [particular] individual.

In addition, Aristotle argues in detail in *NE* 9, 10 that a man should be “neither friendless nor have an excessive number of friends” (1170b20-24). He starts his argument by saying that this is definitely true both in regards to the friendship of utility (“for to do services to many people in return is laborious task and life is not long enough for its performance”), and the friendship of pleasure (for “few are enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough”): “Therefore friends in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are superfluous, and hindrances to the noble life; so that we have no need of them” (1170b23-29). But, insists Aristotle, in the friendship of virtue, there is also “a limit to the number of one’s friends, as there is to the size of the city”:

You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not a single number, but anything that falls between certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a fixed number – perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together (for that, we found, is thought to be very characteristic of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and divide oneself up among them is plain (1170b29-1171a1-5).

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6 My usage of the term “existential” has no explicit or implicit references to existentialism, but to the usage of this term defined in Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as “grounded in existence or the experience of existence”.
“Living together” has the following existential implications, continues Aristotle in NE 9, 10. One’s friends must be friends of one another, “if they are to spend their days together”, but “it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number”. And it is difficult “to rejoice and to grieve in an intimate way with many people, for it may likely happen that one has at once to be happy with one friend and to mourn with another” (1171a5-8). Aristotle reaches a conclusion: “Presumably, then, it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are enough for the purpose of living together; for it would seem actually impossible to be a great friend to many people. This is why one cannot love several people; love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that can only be felt towards one person; therefore great friendship too can only be felt towards a few people” (1171a8-13). This, reaffirms Aristotle, seems to be confirmed by practice, for comradely friendships are not found between many people, and famous friendships of this sort are always between two people, while “those who have many friends and mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one’s friend, except in the way proper to fellow-citizens, and such people are also called obsequious” (1171a13-18). Only in a way proper to fellow-citizens it is possible to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man: “But one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on the character of our friends themselves, and we must be content if we find even a few such” (1171a18-21).

NE 8, 1 explains further. The sharing of deeds, thoughts, and virtuous energeiai with a friend stimulates ever better thinking and better acting (1155a15-16). But friendship goes beyond the sharing of those deeds, thoughts and energeiai, which each friend can produce even on his own, alone. Friendship is the production of a specific energeia
that friends produce together and only when being together, while “those [friends] who are asleep or locally separated are not performing” (1157b8-9). In fact, acting and thinking together is not that essential as producing this special energeia of friendship together, for even enemies can be engaged in a shared acting and thinking. That is why, when Aristotle says that distance impedes friendship, he refers to the special energeia that is interrupted: “Distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity (energeia) of it” (1157b10-12). The EE supports this account by stating, “the function of friendship is activity (energeia)” (1237a34). To produce the mutual energeia of friendship, “the friend must be present too; whence the proverb, ‘distant friends are a burden’, so that men must not be at a distance from one another when there is friendship between them” (1245a23-25).

Man simply cannot commit to a useful or pleasant stranger and, in general, to the many the same energeia that he commits to his friends. The quality of friendships stands in reverse proportion to their quantity: the more authentic are one’s relationships, the less their quantity is, and to such a degree that the excess of feeling can in principle be directed only to one and only person, the lover. That is why Aristotle says that other so-called kinds of friendship – friendships for the sake of pleasure or utility – only seem to be friendships “by their likeness to the friendships of virtue” (1158b7-8), but, essentially, in these relationships, men do not “live much with each other” (and, so, do not produce the energeia of friendship), for sometimes they do not find each other pleasant and useful (1156a22-27). That is why these kinds of friendship are “incidental” and “easily dissolved” (1156a18-20).
Moreover, had a man forced upon himself too much social interaction for the sake of pleasure or utility, he would inevitably have less and less time for the few true friendships he has, and would certainly destroy them. The same stands true for the excessive civil duties. Had a man forced upon himself too much of the civil duties, he would inevitably have less and less time for a few true friendships he has, and would certainly destroy them. The fact that, when man is occupied with his civic duties (and the correspondent energeiai) and gets separated with his friend(s), he “does not perform” as a friend to his friend(s), or, in other words, does not produce with his friend(s) the shared energeia of friendship, is a clear indication that there is a certain limit to social duties with the exercise of the correspondent virtues and the production of the correspondent energeiai that a man can take upon himself without the detriment to his intimate life where the most intense energeia of friendship can be produced towards one and only lover. The energeiai can interfere with each other to such a degree that one can impede the other.

In this regard, it is important that, according to Aristotle, “friendship seems to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice” (1155a22-23). Though Aristotle does differentiate between friendship as companionship between friends in the strict sense and friendship as mere association among men, he tends to represent the very structure of any community as the network of friendships (similarly in the EE: “Agreement is the friendship of fellow citizens”, 1241a34-35). He even posits the correspondence of friendship to the virtue of justice: “The extent of [men’s] association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them” (1159b28-30), and in EE, “generally all justice is in relation to a friend” (1241b20-21), so

7 The reverse is also true: “All constitutions are found together in the household, both the true and the corrupt forms” (EE 1241b27-38), meaning that every relationship takes upon itself the form of a definite political order (reflecting a macrocosm within a microcosm).
that “friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an equal extension” (1160a8-9). Now, says Aristotle, there are necessarily different kinds of friendship, and, correspondingly, different demands of justice for different kinds of friendships (different manifestations of the virtue of justice). “All forms of community are like parts of the political community” (1160b8-9), and every part has its own value within the whole (sustêma) of the polis, with its value being very different from the value of the other part.

That is the true reason why friendships within the community vary by the intensity (the reason being socio-economical and not simply psychological that we feel more intensely towards those who are most close to us):

Brothers and comrades have all things in common, but the others … have definite things in common – some more things, some fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly friendships. And the claims of justice differ too; the duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other are not the same nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship… The injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g., it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to wound a father than any one else. And the demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship… (1159b32-1160a7).

According to this passage, it is senseless and impossible to give to a fellow-citizen the same intensity of friendship (the same energeia) that is given to one’s comrade, and give to one’s comrade the same intensity of friendship (the same energeia) that is given to one’s brother or father. This passage is the indication that the principle of maximization or excess fails not only regarding the quantity of friendships / social interactions, meaning that one can have only a certain, limited, amount of friends and only one lover, but also regarding the quality (intensity) of friendships, implying that every kind of friendship does necessarily possess its own specific quality or intensity (the definite
quantity and quality of *energeia* produced). This lays down a limit to the intensive maximization of friendships, because certain kinds of relationships cannot be intensified beyond the certain point. An agent has to analyze the whole of his life as a *sustēma* (the systematic whole), and to weigh each relationship (with its *energeia*) against any other relationship (each one with its own *energeia*) and all the other relationships taken together (with their *energeiai*) to determine the quantity of his friendships and the quality (intensity) of each one of them. Aristotle confirms this point in *NE* 9, 2: “Since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class what is appropriate and becoming” (1165a16-18). Aristotle goes on to analyze the principle of preference in much detail explaining how the limit in the intensity of friendship depends on nearness of relation and on virtue and usefulness:

It would be thought that in the matter of food we should help our parents before all others, since we owe our own nourishment to them… and honour too one should give to one’s parents as one does to the gods… for that matter one should not give the same honour to one’s father and one’s mother, nor again should one give them the honour due to a philosopher or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again a mother…. While to comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of speech and common use of all things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens and to every other class one should always try to assign what is appropriate, and to compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or usefulness (1165a21-35; emphasis added).

It is clear that the 11608-9, 1159b32-1160a7 and 1165a21-35 passages go beyond proving that the principle of the maximization of social interactions fails on the personal level (one can produce only certain amount of *energeia*, and the more *energeia* he produces towards one specific friend, the less amount of friends he does consequently have, according to the principle that one’s unbalanced *energeiai* might impede each other and according to the principle of priority). The passages do also show that the principle of
maximization of social interactions fails on the social level. The polis operates according to the principle of the proportionate balance between energeiai of its agents, for “all forms of community are like parts of the political community” (11608-9). That is why Aristotle assesses the issue of the allotment of energeiai in social interactions to be not just a personal issue, but the issue of social justice. In fact, Aristotle devotes much of the Politics to laying down the principles of the polis as the sustēma (the systematic whole) organized by metron (measure between the energeiai of the agents, and, consequently, their practical actions and extrinsic goods) according to analogia (proportion). I will analyze this issue in detail in the next chapter of my dissertation.

But most important, 1159b32-1160a7 passage lays down a very specific concept of justice. According to this concept, justice corresponds to the intensity of the friendship: “The demands of justice … seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship” and, correspondingly, “the injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense”. This is quite an antiheroic stand characteristic to the middle-class ethics of Aristotle with its transition from the Greek classicism of heroic epics towards the “little man” of Hellenism. For Aristotle, man bears more duty towards his family than towards his fellow citizens, and if he prefers his fellow citizens over his father and his brothers, he exhibits the extreme case of injustice.8 In NE 9, 3, Aristotle confirms: when man has been deceived by the pretences of a false friend, “he will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit money, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable” (1165b10-14). Thus, it is evident that, according to Aristotle’s ethics, to sustain a close-tied family and friends, pro-

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8 Aristotle’s Ethics here provides evidence of the emergence of Hellenistic individualism characterized by the rise of family or clan as a unit separate from and even opposite to the tribal state. In Greek classicism, family was inseparable from the tribe, and polis was like one big family.
ducing the very intense *energeia* of friendship is *more virtuous* than to engage, on a grand scale, in the depersonalized social and political activities built upon the principles of the pro-Kantian universal justice according to which justice applies to everybody *equally* the same, or *universal*, rules (categorical imperatives).

According to Aristotle, if an agent chooses to maximize his social interactions, he can do that only by making his social interactions less intense, more impersonal, or, in Aristotle’s term, less true, and, as Aristotle claims, less just and less virtuous, for he will be deprived of true friendships and will fail to fulfill his duties towards his true friends and family from whom he will be separated by this other, impersonal or less personal, social interactions. Thus, paradoxically, in Aristotle’s scheme, to exercise fewer virtues, viz., towards the smaller number of people, but more intensely, viz., towards the smaller number of people, is more virtuous than to expand one’s social and political influence indiscriminately. Unfortunately, the modern interpreters fail to notice this implied nepotism and social frugality of Aristotle’s ethics when they look at his ethics through the glasses of either Kantianism or Utilitarianism.

Aristotle cannot be interpreted from the Kantian grounds, for it is evident that Aristotle professes necessary inequality within the *sustēma* of *polis*. *Polis* is a hierarchical entity with virtue distributed unequally, first of all, between ruler and his subjects, and then between those who are enlightened and those who are not. This is reflected in the household with inequality between father and sons, husband and wife, so that, let’s say, wife gets less virtue than her husband, though husband and wife are tied together by the necessity of their co-existence (see 1238b19-26). To compensate for inequality, men apply *proportionate justice*, according to which the better man must get more out of the re-
relationship than the worse one, with being worse or better defined according to the ability to function. In the same way, man should give more of his *energeia* to his close friends and family, rather than his fellow citizens, simply because they have more value to him than his fellow citizens. Aristotle’s *proportionate justice* is directly opposite to the principles of Christian morality that lies at the foundation of the Kantian *universal justice*, and according to which the worse must get more out of the relationship with the better man than the better man himself. This Christian principle of equality via compensation is mostly categorically expressed in a Christian belief that the most poor in spirit reap the most lavish rewards in heaven.

Unlike Christianity, Aristotle supports Plato in believing in the attraction of like to like. The better one is, the more good he attracts, and, even more important, the more good he deserves. This is an organic vision of *cosmos* as a living organism, in which functional parts remain, while dysfunctional parts do not, getting atrophied and rudimental. *NE* 9, 3 gives a detailed discussion of why the rejection of the dysfunctional friend necessarily happens after he falls in his value. Man should not love his brother / friend unconditionally (as Christianity demands), and ought to help him only to a certain degree conditioned by (1) whether the friend is curable from his evils (1165b18-20) and (2) by our non-alienable right to stay away from misfortune. In *NE* 9, 11, Aristotle admits that “men in adversity need help” (1171a23) and “grief is lightened when friends sorrow with us” (1171a30), but, he claims, “to see [a friend] pained at our misfortunes is painful; for every one shuns being a cause of pain to his friends”. “For this reason”, concludes Arist-

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9 Aristotle says about the proportionate justice between unequals in any kind of relationship (including most intimate like love): “The same thing is not just for the superior and the inferior; what is proportional is just” (1241b37-39), with proportion being “inverse”, i.e., “as the superior is to the inferior, so should what he receives from the inferior be to what the inferior receives from him, he being in the position of ruler to subject” (1242b5-10), so that “justice is proportion to merit” (1248b8).
totle, “people of manly nature guard against making their friends grieve with them” (1171b5-8). Respecting the right of every man to be safe from suffering, we should “summon [our friends] to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give them as little a share as possible in our evils” (1171b16-19). Thus, even when in need, good man should not pursue the maximization of his social interactions. On the contrary, the situation when we are in need, i.e., misfortune, requires from us to limit our social interactions, even with closest friends, in order to safeguard other people from our pain. A manly man should be reluctant in imposing upon his friends a moral duty of either helping him or consoling him.

This text is one of the building blocks in Aristotle’s powerful argument against Kantian categorical imperative to view any man as an end and not as a means and value him for his own sake, but, at the same time, to always sacrifice one’s happiness for the sake of moral duty. If moral duty demands, says Kant, an agent should forgo his happiness in order to help his brother. Though Kantian and Aristotelian imperatives have semblance – both profess the intrinsic non-alienable value of a human being, this semblance is deceiving, because the Kantian imperative, in its subjection of personal happiness to the inter-personal and even impersonal moral duty, is the expression of Christian moral prerogative to love one’s brother more than oneself, and, ultimately, is the rejection of self-love for the sake of the higher power – “the goodness with which the world is governed”, “the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be

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10 Kant: “All rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as ends in themselves” (Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Second Section, trans. by Thomas K. Abbot, 1873).

11 Aristotle considers slaves to be slaves by nature, and, so, not a fully functional human beings. That is why slaves are not valued in themselves, and are simply the means for their masters.
regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed” (Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, First Section, trans. by Thomas K. Abbot, 1873). It is necessary to understand the crucial difference between two imperatives, for it is precisely the Christian imperative that urges to maximize one’s moral duty, viewed as sacred with all the virtues involved, to the point of denouncing one’s earthly life entirely for the sake of the reward in heaven.

Because Christian brotherly love is based on *self-denial* (Kant’s expression), the emphasis on loving one’s brother gets easily shifted to loving one’s enemy, for, from the point of view of self-denial, to love one’s enemy is more laudable than to love one’s friend. This doctrine is so incongruous with Aristotelian *Ethics*, to which Kant is much obliged, that, to apply it in his ethics, he directly turns, for the ultimate justification, to the Scripture, “in which we are commanded to love our neighbour, even our enemy, … even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination – nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion” (Ibid.). Commending a philanthropist who is “clouded by sorrow of his own extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others” and, in general, a man who performs his duty remaining “cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others”, Kant claims that the estranged and cold-hearted philanthropy, with its repulsion and even unconquerable aversion to its objects, is of “a far higher worth than that of a goodnatured temperament” (Ibid.). Friendliness towards the objects of one’s beneficence, does, so to speak, *pollute* the goodness of a moral act, for “such actions be done from duty, not from inclination” (Ibid.).

Evidently, the hateful and miserable philanthropist is an example of an agent who, for the sake of helping those whom he despises, and even his enemies, postpones his in-
dividual happiness. Essentially, the more repulsion does an agent overcome in helping his brother, the stronger and more commendable his good will is, the good will being simply the unconditional “respect for the law”, i.e., *a priori*, universal and categorical imperatives of morality: “In fact, the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command of duty are so much the more evident, the less the subjective impulses favor it and the more they oppose it; without being able in the highest degree to weaken the obligation of the law or to diminish its validity” (Ibid., Second Section). Likewise, the misery of a dutiful man increases his moral worthiness, for, from the point of view of self-denial, to renounce oneself for the sake of duty when you most need to take care of yourself first simply to survive is more laudable than to perform one’s duty when you are not miserable.

It is understandable that, because according to Kantian imperative, an agent does not and must not produce a specific intimate *energeia* of friendship towards the objects of his benevolence, he can increase their number indefinitely, to such a degree that he would ultimately prefer making impersonal donations to anonymous *objects*, rather than *subjects*, in a scheme. This thorough inhumane indifference towards people made into the objects of some superior benevolent order is what lies in the foundation of the maximization of virtue preached by Kantianism. Kant says: only “if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole… that is to say we can conceive a kingdom of ends”\(^{12}\) (Ibid., Second Section). Only through the impersonality, Kantianism is capable of expressing the universality of its benevolence. And though

\(^{12}\) In Hegel’s terms, Kantian imperative is opposed to Aristotelian imperative as the abstract universal is opposed to the concrete universal.
Kant teaches that a kingdom of ends is within us, and so we are willingly, as free agents, should subscribe to its gross impersonal goodness, analogously to Christianity preaching that the divine kingdom is within us, one could indeed argue that it is this Kantian and Christian objectification of human beings, their complete unconditional subjection to the anonymous good of the many that is the foundation of the totalitarianism of fascism and communism. This ideological dynamics reveals the importance of the issue with the Aristotelian happiness understood by the majority of modern Anglo-American interpreters as the Kantian maximization of moral virtue. It points to the true significance of their incapacity to realize Aristotle’s opposition and even repulsion to the principles of Kantian ethics, and the necessity to finally resolve the issue.

According to the Aristotelian ethics, this Kantian categorical imperative and the Christian view, in general, are self-contradictory. If in the relationship of two brothers, the first brother sacrifices his individual happiness to fulfill his moral duty towards the second brother, then only this second brother is treated as an end in himself and not as a means and valued for his own sake, while the first brother is treated as a means for the happiness of the second brother and valued not for his own sake but only as far as he is capable of living for the sake of his brother. Thus, this Kantian categorical imperative fails: it does not establish that a man should be valued only for his own sake, as an end-in-himself, and never be treated as a means. It does not pass its own test of universality (i.e., that the requirement to treat everybody as an end-in-himself should be applied to both brothers, and to everybody else equally). And, so, Aristotle shows that when we mount upon our friends an excessive moral duty of, let’s say, grieving with us, we, in fact, by making them sacrifice their own individual happiness for our sake, convert them
into our means and destroy our true friendship with them. Thus, making the individual happiness the highest good, Aristotle does necessarily claim for each individual his own personal space where only intimate friends are admitted and crowds are not allowed, and where even close friends cannot require of us the excessive moral duty that will transform us into a means for somebody’s happiness.

Friendship gets ruined not only when one’s friend gets worse (1165b12-24), adds Aristotle in NE 9, 3, but also “if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue” (1165b23-25). If this happened, “how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together” (1165b26-30). Thus, man cannot produce the same *energeia* of friendship towards people of a different value, even if they are, let’s say, members of his close family. In addition, value hierarchy is a dynamic notion, sensitive to the fluctuation of value. Friendship cannot be maximized both extensively (the number of friends) and intensively (intensity of friendship) towards men who do not have value or who are losing it.

It is evident that Aristotle lacks any trace of the Christian love for the weak – those who cannot properly function within the organism of a *polis*, and, for that matter, both Christian notions of universal love and unconditional love. Aristotle does categorically reject the maximization of social interactions on charitable grounds. Even compassion towards a misfortunate friend does not override the prime mover in Aristotle’s ethics – self-love. Self-love is the foundation of Aristotle’s rejection of the maximization of social interactions and, so, moral and practical virtues involved. According to Aristotle,
it is human nature to always prefer oneself above others even in the disinterested contemplation (“naturally the perception and knowledge of oneself is more desirable” than the perception and knowledge of others, even one’s closest friends, 1244b34-35) and even in the pursuit of one’s nobility (“the good man is seen to assign to himself [and not to others] the greater share in what is noble”, 1169a35-36, emphasis added). Thus, through the principle of preference of one’s intimately personal life over the socially impersonal life, and the principle of preference of those who are more valuable over those who are less valuable even in our intimate life, we rise to the pinnacle of Aristotle’s ethics – self-love, which is categorically opposite to the Kantian, and Christian, self-denial. All the passages analyzed in the next section prove not only that the maximization of moral virtue is irrelevant and even detrimental to happiness, but also that happiness cannot in principle consist in compounding the moral virtues, for happiness and moral virtue are of the different nature.

4.2 The causal priority of eudaimonia: self-love as self-causation and self-causation as eudaimonia

In this section, I will analyze the significance that Aristotle’s postulate of self-love as self-causation via the function of active intellect has for Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia. Aristotle devotes the entire NE 9, 8 to the analysis of “whether a man should love himself most, or some one else” (1168a27-28). He starts by acknowledging that people criticize those who love themselves most and call them self-lovers, using this as an epithet of disgrace and opposing them to the good man who acts for honour’s sake and acts for his friend’s sake and sacrifices his own interest (1168a28-34)\(^\text{13}\). But, continues

\(^{13}\) This discussion by Aristotle indicates that the roots of Kantianism go all the way to the Aristotelian times.
Aristotle, the facts clash with this view: “Men say that one ought to love best one’s best friend, and a man’s best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a man’s attitude towards himself” (1168b1-4). It is from this relation of man to himself, i.e., his self-love, that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to our neighbours, while, still, “he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best” (1168b5-9).

Aristotle says that both views are plausible, though only to a certain degree (1168b13-14). Man is indeed his own best friend and ought to love himself best (1169a12). But loving oneself is not the pursuance of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures, that is, not the gratification of appetites, and, so, the irrational element within oneself (1168b15-23), but the pursuance of virtue, and the gratification of the most authoritative element in oneself which is reason (nous). Essentially, aretê here is excellence in general, not necessarily just moral virtue, and Aristotle here as elsewhere insists on the hierarchy of human excellences. Man is a systematic whole (sustêma) analogous to cosmos and polis, and like any sustêma, says Aristotle, man is identical with his most authoritative element: “Just as city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man” (1168b31-33; emphasis added). “Therefore”, continues Aristotle, “the man who loves this and gratifies it is most of all a lover of self” (1168b27-33). Unquestionably, Aristotle puts intellectual virtue, in general, and the highest intellectual virtue, which is the excellence of the most authoritative human element -- the active intellect -- above moral virtue. Subdued to a ruler within the soul, moral virtue is defined by a limit, while the excellence of the ruler should know no limits. In other words, self-love (the love of one’s ruler, Nous) has no limits,
while the love of others on moral grounds has limits. It is self-love, not moral virtues, that is the true nobility, even if “no one is to know of it” (1168b1-4); and self-love as the true nobility is above sociability and beyond moral obligations precisely because it is nobility even if “no one is to know of it”. Let me look more closely at the development of Aristotle’s argument.

It is true, admits Aristotle, that good man does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and “if necessary dies for them” (1169a18-20). Good men “will throw away wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more” (1169a27-28); good man will sacrifice honour and office to his friend (1169a30-31). But in this throwing away one’s wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, the good man does nonetheless assign himself the greater good, than the one assigned to his friend to whom he makes sacrifices, – nobility. And it is crucial that in pursuing his own highest good – nobility – good man “may even give up actions to his friend”, for “it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself” (1169a33-34).

The fact that it is nobler for a man to become the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself proves without doubt that, for Aristotle, not only is the virtuous action (and its maximization) not the most noble thing, but that it is not even a necessary condition for achieving nobility, and, for that matter, happiness. Man’s nobility is possible without ever engaging in virtuous action. Moreover, the highest nobility is achievable only when man does, on his own accord, give up the virtuous action. To resolve the issue with the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, which some modern interpreters identify, for the secondary happy life, as exclusively the virtuous action, it is important to pay the utmost at-
attention to this passage, and to understand why Aristotle thinks that to be a cause of action is more noble than to act. Also, it is important to understand what kind of causation it is when man becomes a cause of his friend’s acting, and whether this causation is initiated by the compound of moral virtues as such or by some intellectual virtue, like *phronēsis* (with its activity of deliberation) or by *sophia* (with its activity of *theōria*).

Following is the interpretation of the Aristotelian causation in relation, first, to friendship, and, then, to moral virtues and happiness, which indicates that neither the inclusivists nor exclusivists are right in their causal interpretation of happiness, and that their misinterpretation of the Aristotelian causation is one of the reason why they are wrong about the Aristotelian happiness. In his *Ethics*, Aristotle differentiates the efficient and final causes of action. In the *Metaphysics* 1, 6, Aristotle contrasts the efficient cause with the formal cause which, for the animate beings, coincides with the final cause (*Metaph. 1044a36-40*): “The form generates only once, but what we observe is that one table is made from one matter, while the man who applies the form, though he is one, makes many tables. And the relation of male to the female is similar; for the latter is impregnated by one copulation, but the male impregnates many females; yet these are analogues of [the] first principles” (*988a1-8*). In his *Ethics*, Aristotle makes it clear that when a man causes the action of his friend, he is not the *efficient* cause, which he is when he makes many tables according to one paradigm of the table, or when he impregnates many women.

One of the clues to this interpretation is in the *Physics* 2, 3, where Aristotle defines the efficient causes as follows: the efficient cause is “the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. *the man who gave advice is a cause*, the father is cause of
the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed” (194b29-32; emphasis added). Because man gave up action to his friend and, so, practical reasoning responsible for reasonable action, he cannot move his friends, so to speak, from aside by his advice in the form of practical deliberation. And, in fact, Aristotle directly argues in EE 7, 12 and NE 9, 9, which I consider in the next section, that true friends cannot in principle advice each other and, so, be efficient causes for each other’s actions, because they are both self-sufficient: “For friends who are self-dependent neither teaching nor learning is possible; for if one learns, he is not as he should be; and if he teaches, his friend is not” (1245a16-19).

Here is the gist of Aristotle’s notion of causation in relation to ethics. Efficient causes are those concerned with need and change which is the actualization of the potentiality, i.e., I choose to act here and now because I lack something or because I am forced to act by an external causal chain. Efficient causes depend on the changeable spatio-temporal circumstances, so that “the same thing is the cause of contrary results” (Phys. 2, 3 195a11-13). They can be deliberated about and are taken care of in a compulsive manner by phronēsis, the imperative ruler, i.e., I can manipulate the efficient causes, both as their originator and their effect on me. Ultimately, the efficient causes are merely the means for achieving the final ends and the most final end, which is unchangeable (“fixed for all”), self-caused, i.e., self-contained (not concerned with need of any kind, and consists simply in its own functional self-realization), essential (independent of and superior to any changeable spatio-temporal circumstances), and cannot be deliberated about because it is unchangeable.
Efficient causes are not the true causes of action – they are either external or secondary to man’s intrinsic self-moving or self-causing principle. The most final end is a true cause of action -- the final cause, with no cause beyond and above, the uncaused cause of everything man does. The most final end is a purpose or motive, and not the end result of action. As a purpose, it comes prior to action, and, instead of being caused by action, it is itself the cause of action. But, most important, the most final end as a purpose is out of the temporal sequence of the past, the present and the future. It is ever present as the moving principle in everything a man does, as the self-awareness of his ergon – the activity of the active intellect. The most final end is intrinsic to man as his continuous minute-to-minute functioning. Man has himself as his most final end (that is, he views himself as an end, and not a means for the sake of moral duty or utility), and, that is why, man’s moving principle is self-moving or self-causing. Man’s ultimate motivation comes simply from his auto-contemplation or self-knowledge.

This self-awareness is the contemplation of one’s own intrinsic / functional goodness – eudaimonia -- independent of and prior to any beneficial or detrimental experience (including moral experience) and to any external causes and external consequences. It is this intrinsic goodness of man that causes goodness of everything he does. Thus, happiness (the ultimate goodness) is an actuality (1101b12-13), not liable to change and becoming – a cause rather than effect (1102a2-4). In other words, being identified with his superior function, the divine nous, man is good in-himself prior to any system of external benevolence, redemption, and duty and does not need to prove himself good by moral action. And, the minimum or moderate sufficient conditions satisfied, he is happy when he is aware of his self-goodness, prior to his action.
Without the motivation and purpose of happiness, any moral / practical action, even if successful, does not attain the ultimate goodness, i.e., the unhappy moral perfectionist is categorically not good-in-himself. That is, the goodness of moral action itself is ultimately caused by happiness. Moral duty without contemplation is the form of compulsion that destroys man as self-moving agent. Happiness is causally and teleologically prior to moral virtue, and, therefore, coming before moral virtue, happiness cannot be a compound of moral virtues. The final ends and the most final end in motivation and self-motivation are assumed in the immediate self-evident a priori intuitions of nous (the active or intuitive intellect), based upon the inherent functionality of man. Thus, neither moral virtue as such (not belonging to the intellection at all), nor phronēsis being an inferior form of intellection, can function as the self-awareness of the most final end. Like God, divine or divine-like nous in man is not an imperative ruler, but rules via motivating and giving a purpose. It is evident that one man might be the non-compulsive cause of the other man’s action only in this sense of motivating his friend, i.e., helping him to make a due assumption of the end.

Exclusivists deny this causal significance of eudaimonia as contemplation of the divine in a macrocosm and man himself, as a microcosm, and, thus, fail to reveal the true purposefulness of theoria and the nature of man as sustēma (systematic whole). Inclusivists, in the consequentialist spirit of Utilitarianism, claim that happiness is the consequence of moral / practical actions, or, in other words, that moral / practical actions cause the end-result of happiness. Nonetheless, according to Aristotle, the end or the purpose causally precedes the means, so that the means, e.g., slaves, do not and cannot in principle cause what they are means for, e.g., the happiness of their owner. In other words, in-
clusivists fail to recognize that happiness, being a cause, cannot be a compound of its own effects. Below is the detailed textual evidence for this interpretation. All the analyzed passages develop Aristotle’s theory on the division of the rational element into the passive intellect and the active intellect, further explaining that the active intellect is the ruler because it is the unmoved mover and the uncaused cause of actions.

Aristotle teaching on motivation and self-motivation is the foundation of his theory of how it happens that man acts. He gives the most detailed discussion of his action theory in EE 2, 10. According to Aristotle, man does not choose his ends, but only the means for achieving his ends: “No one chooses the end, but the means to an end… no one chooses to be happy but to make money or run risks for the purpose of being happy” (1226a8-11); “About the end no one deliberates (this being fixed for all), but about that which tends to it” (1226b10-11; emphasis added). It is phronēsis that conducts deliberation; and, so, the above statement clearly posits that phronēsis does not determine the ends. Compare NE 3, 5:

The aiming at the end is not self-chosen but one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed by nature who is well endowed with this. For it is what is greatest and most noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another, but must have just such as it was when given us at birth… To both men alike, the good and the bad, the end appears and is fixed by nature or however it may be, and it is by referring everything else to this that men do whatever they do (1114b6-17; emphasis added).

One man cannot teach the other man or give him advice, or, in other words, be an efficient cause of his actions simply because every man cannot choose and, consequently, cannot get or learn from another what he has to do. If he is not mentally sick or perverted, man does initially have the ability to become conscious of his ends on his own.
Let me look more closely at the role and limitations of *phronēsis* in relation to action. “The object of choice must be one of the things in our power”, says Aristotle in *EE* 2, 10 (1225b37-38). We can deliberate only about the changeable and changeable by us - - that which is “capable of being otherwise”, says Aristotle in *NE* 6, 2 (1139b5-8). It is the function of *phronēsis* to regulate, via deliberation, our choices: “Choice arises out of deliberate opinion” (1226b8-9), so that “consideration [of *phronēsis*] is the source and cause of the desire, and the man desires because of consideration” (1226b20-21), continues Aristotle in *EE* 2, 10. So, while advice is an efficient cause of man’s action, coming from without, choice is the efficient cause of man’s action from within: “The origin of action – its efficient, not its final cause – is choice” (1139a32), adds Aristotle in *NE* 6, 2. Deliberation about choice is an advice that man formulates for himself when he finds himself under specific circumstances.

To the contrary, we cannot deliberate about the end because it is not “capable of being otherwise” and, so, is unchangeable by us. “No one deliberates about things that are invariable” (1140a32-33), stresses Aristotle in *NE* 6, 5. Thus, both *NE* and *EE* agree that we do not choose the end because having or nor having it is not in our power, meaning that it is given or, rather, imprinted in us prior to any experience, deliberation, desire and choice. And both *NE* and *EE* agree that only contrary to nature and by perversion not the good but the apparent good is the end (1227a22-23), for by nature one wishes the good, but contrary to nature and through perversion the bad as well (1227a29-31). We deliberate about and choose only the means towards the end, because only they are what is changeable by our action. That is why Aristotle’s action theory is based on his thesis that man’s *phronēsis* with its activity of deliberation has nothing to do with defining his
ends. Man defines his ends not by *phronēsis*, by the *energeia* of his active intellect – the only kind of intellection that is aware of the unchangeable or invariable, i.e., the universal (*NE 6, 2 1139a7-15*). Below is more evidence for this interpretation.

In *NE 6, 2*, Aristotle makes a distinction between an end in the unqualified sense (that one about which no one deliberates), and “an end in a particular relation and the end of a particular operation” (that one which is linked with deliberation) (*1139b2-4*). Though we cannot deliberate about the end in the unqualified sense, deliberation has the most final end (the end in the unqualified sense) as its ultimate point of reference: “Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense … is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end” (*1142b2-32*), with deliberation in a particular sense being subjected to the preeminence of deliberation in the unqualified sense. This, on its own, shows that *phronēsis* has a secondary, subservient role in human intellection about how to act.

While not defined in the deliberation of *phronēsis*, the end is *assumed* in an *a priori proposition* / *self-evident definition* which is the *immediate intuition* of *nous*, the ruling principle within the soul. “The beginning starts from the definition or essence” (*200a34-35*), says Aristotle in his discussion of the four causes in the *Physics 2, 9*. The definition or essence is concerned with the functionality of man, which is self-justified independently of its consequences under a specific circumstance, even negative consequences under a specific circumstance. In *EE 2, 6*, Aristotle confirms that these *a priori* assumptions about the ends are first principles, and that “the source or principle is the *cause* of all that exists or arises through it” (*1222b30-31*; emphasis added). He illustrates
a priori principles as causes with the example of the triangle: “Supposing there were no further cause for the triangle’s having [its angles equal to two right angles] (and, clearly, there is no further cause), then the triangle would be a sort of principle or cause of all that comes later [i.e., of the quadrilateral having its angles equal to four right angles]” (1222b30-41).

The end as an a priori or first principle is essentially a purpose of action, not its desirable effect or consequence. A purpose is an a priori intellection not only because it always comes prior to action, but also because it justifies an action even if it fails, via offering an ultimate, self-evident, based-on-functionality, justification. Man is self-justified to act on his ultimate purposes even if they are not justified by impending failure due to some accidental external circumstance. Man has the unalienable right to resist the compulsion of the external causation, and to play a major causal role of his own, e.g., in tearing down the structure of the external causes, if it obstructs his functionality. Happy man cannot essentially be compelled or forced from outside, by the external causal chains. Happy man (that is, man how he is supposed to be) is moved by himself -- by his own, free, intrinsic self-motivation independently from unfavourable or favourable circumstances. And, so, Aristotle says in NE 3, 3: “Man is a moving principle of actions” (1112b32); “the moving principle is in ourselves” (1112b28). Aristotle’s statement that man is a moving principle of actions or has a moving principle of his actions in himself means that man is ultimately self-caused (has his final / formal cause intrinsically).

This is the essential difference between the Aristotelian and the Utilitarian action theories. According to the Utilitarianism, which lies in the foundation of the inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics, end (telos) (what one aims at) is the result or the ef-
fect of some action which, in this case, is considered to be the cause. Here the telos is the utility or the reward one reaps for his labour at the finish of the labour. This is a consequentialist position, so that happiness appears to be a consequence of a successfully performed deliberation and action. Happiness, thus, is viewed as the end in a particular relation and the end of a particular operation, but not as an end in the unqualified sense, which, as Aristotle insists, is the final and the true cause of man as a self-moving agent. As a result, inclusivists fail to recognize that, if happiness is a consequence, it cannot be self-sufficient or lacking nothing in isolation from all the other goods because it is and will be always open to more additions. That is, in this case, happiness cannot be isolated at all from all the other goods, being, as a consequence, totally dependent on the extraneous conditions and circumstances.

Contrary to the consequentialist ethics, the Aristotelian teleological ethics posits that the telos as a purpose rather than a consequence is completely independent of action per se, comes prior to action as its cause, and, so, is the start rather than the finish of action, determining the goodness of action notwithstanding its results or consequences, either positive or negative. As it is clear from Metaphysics A, 7, the consequentialism of the Utilitarian / inclusivist interpretation does simply reinstate the consequentialism of Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who argue that “supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning, “because the beginnings both of plants and animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these” (1072b30-34), and whose position Aristotle rebuts by arguing that completeness (finality) is the cause and not an effect
(1072b35-1073a2). Evidently, this fact goes unnoticed by inclusivists simply because they take Aristotle’s ethics out of the historical context.

At the end of EE 2, 11, Aristotle explains further: “We praise or blame all men with regard to their choice rather than their acts (though activity (energeia) is more desirable than virtue), because men may do bad acts under compulsion, but no one chooses them under compulsion” (1228a12-15). In fact, compulsion is precisely the mechanism of how the efficient cause operates. To make a self-moving man a subject to an efficient cause is to make him a subject to compulsion. Thus, in Aristotle’s teleological hierarchy, choice is higher than action (which can be done under compulsion), and the ends (purposes) are higher than choice, so that the intuitive or contemplative activity (energeia) of nous, which defines the ends, is higher than phronēsis which is responsible for choice, and is higher (more desirable) than virtue, because it is the energeia of nous that initiates virtue, and not just the habituated actions, contrary to the Utilitarian / consequentialist interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics.

Because, as Aristotle states in NE 6, 6, “it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles” (1141a7-8), and as he states in NE 6, 8, intuitive reason, as operating with assumptions of limited self-evident premises, is opposed to practical wisdom, it is absolutely clear from NE 6 that it is intuitive reason and not practical wisdom that defines ends / first principles. Because intuitive reason and scientific knowledge constitute philosophia (philosophic wisdom), philosophia plays an essential causal role in the polis, for philosophia, not phronēsis, is responsible for formulating the ends on the individual and social levels (1141a17-18), posits Aristotle in NE 6, 7. In my next chapter, I will bring in

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14 “for the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete being; e.g., we must say that before the seed there is a man – not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes”.
the example from the *Politics*, 8 of how exactly a philosopher determines the ends for the *polis*. In *EE* 2, 10, after stating his grounds on action theory, Aristotle immediately refers to his *Analytics* with its teaching that the assumptions of first (i.e., *a priori*) principles are given not via the deliberations of passive intellect (*phronēsis*) but via the assumptions of active intellect (*nous*):

No one deliberates about the end; this is the starting point and *assumption*, like the assumption in theoretical science (we have spoken about this … minutely in the *Analytics*). Every one’s inquiry … is about what tends to the end, e.g., whether they shall go to war or not, when this is what they are deliberating about. *But the cause of the object will come first* (1227a7-15; emphasis added).

In *EE* 2, 6, Aristotle does also refer to his *Analytics*: “The necessity of what we are endeavouring to show is clear from the *Analytics*” (1222b40-41).

In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle explains that the forming of the universal is possible through sense perception and induction only because the soul possesses the ability of intuition: “It will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises” (100b13) which are immediate and self-evident. And, so, “intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge” (100b14-15). Aristotle goes on, in *EE* 2, 10, to compare *a priori* propositions about the ends of actions with the *a priori* propositions in mathematics: “No art asks questions about the end; for as in theoretical sciences *the assumptions are our starting points*, so in the productive the end is starting-point and *assumed*. E.g. we reason that since this body is to be made healthy, therefore so and so must be found in it if health is to be had – just as in geometry we argue, if the angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, then so and so must be the case” (1227b28-30; emphasis added). Compare *NE* 3, 3: “We deliberate not about ends but about means. For doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether
he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. They assume the end…” (1112b13-15; emphasis added).

Hence, it is evident that when, in NE 9, 8 Aristotle says “it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself”, what Aristotle refers to is the final causation of pure intellect, which is the sharing by two true friends in the energeia produced by nous making a priori assumptions about the ends. This brings us to the conclusion that energeia of friendship is mostly the energeia of the active intellect, the ruling principle. Aristotle argues for this thesis explicitly and extensively in the EE 7, 12 and the parallel text in NE 9, 9, the analysis of which is to follow, -- the texts where he posits that this energeia of nous is nothing else but contemplation. The mutual contemplation of the ends “fixed for all” is the purely intellectual disinterested motivation and self-motivation, opposed to the imperative rule of practical reason which is “desiring what is advantageous” (1169a4-6) in friendships based on pleasure or utility. That is why to serve better as the final cause or a motivator, man does actually give up acting and, so, practical thinking responsible for the advantageous acting. Importantly, one man can be a final cause or motivator for the other man because they share in possession of the divine nous attached to the human soul of every man. Only as a consequence, they share the intrinsic final ends and the most final end, which are fixed for all,

Let me look more closely at how Aristotle’s discussion of action, causation and motivation in friendship from the point of view of the self-causation of ends bears on his theory of happiness. Because any motivation or self-motivation is simply the realization of man’s own intrinsic self-causation, it goes always all the way through the structure of ends up to the most intrinsic, most final end – happiness. Defining a soul as a systematic
hierarchical whole (*sustēma*), Aristotle is concerned, first of all, with final goods, or ends proper, and not with the instrumental goods, which are simply the means for achieving the final ends. Only final goods are those that are assumed prior to experience, that is, prior to the any external chains of causes and effects, while instrumental goods are imposed upon an agent by external causal chains. The finality of the end / good is essentially its causal finality, meaning that it is uncaused by any superior external cause. And the self-sufficiency of the end / good is its causal self-sufficiency, meaning that it is self-caused rather than caused from outside by causal chains, so that the more the end is final / self-sufficient, the more self-caused it is. Because the most final, self-sufficient or self-contained end / good cannot be caused by any superior external cause, it is the uncaused cause.

This immanent self-causation of the most final end is what allows man to make assumptions about its intrinsic goodness independently of and prior to any order of benevolence imposed from outside and manipulating the agent with its reward and punishment. Thus, according to Aristotle, the nature of the superiority of the most final end over simply the final ends is of a causal nature: the most final end is the final cause. So, Aristotle claims in the common *NE* Book 7, 8: “The final cause is the first principle” (1151a17; emphasis added). Aristotle directly says in the *NE* 1, 12 that happiness (the most final end) “is the first principle” and “cause of goods” (1102a2-4; emphasis added). Happiness is the self-sufficient and most final good, because it is most final, or uncaused, cause within the soul. It is the intrinsic moving principle of itself and of any action of man. Aristotle confirms in *EE* 2, 10, referring to final causation: “The purpose of a thing’s existence or production [i.e., happiness for humans] is what we specially call its
cause” (1226b29-30; emphasis added), viz., the final cause. In fact, Aristotle’s action theory is nothing else than a teaching on how final ends that are intrinsic to a subject become a major causal factor in the objective world. Final ends become a causal force by being realized as a purpose or motive by an agent – a motive that overrides any external causality.

Importantly, happiness “is not to be placed among potentialities” (1101b12-13). Aristotle’s statement that happiness is actuality not potentiality does mean that it has nothing to do with efficient causes, which actualize potentialities. It is because happiness is the uncaused or self-caused cause that happiness cannot in principle be a potentiality. Actuality is unconditional, i.e., prior to any experience, not liable to change, and out of the scheme of becoming. Happiness as actuality is an innate functional perfection of the human species. Contrary to Christianity, Aristotle’s ethics believes that humans, by nature, in-themselves, are already as good as they can be. It does not admit of the past fall and the future redemption caused by some external superior evil and some external superior good, on the grand scale of Hell or Heaven, or on a petty-bourgeois scale of the Utilitarian profit and loss.

It appears that the difficulty the Christianized mind has with Aristotle’s belief that happiness is already and always an actuality for humans is precisely the inculcated Christian belief in the fallen, rotten, corrupted nature of man. And the Christian strive for perfection, or perfectionism, either of the Utilitarian or Kantian brand, is itself an implicit evidence of this belief that man is not as good as he can be, or as he was once, or as he would be or could be allowed to be by some external superior good or evil. On the contrary, the Aristotelian strive for happiness, i.e., the functional perfection, is not the strive
to become better, to achieve more, to gain more power and acquire more wealth, but, the minimum sufficient conditions satisfied\(^{15}\), is simply the intense self-awareness of one's own *unconditional a priori* goodness – goodness that man owes to nobody and nothing else but himself. That is why it is *most* noble to surrender one’s wealth, office, and even action itself for the sake of one’s simple self-awareness.

Happiness as the self-awareness of oneself as the ultimate purpose (self-purpose) is the uncaused cause and the unmoved mover because this purpose is intrinsically and eternally fixed. This means that the most final good cannot be caused by something external because it is functionally peculiar to the species prior to any relational good(s).

Happiness is the knowledge of oneself – the divine within oneself -- as the most final good and the most final end that are *a priori* established for all. In other words, the self-awareness or one’s knowledge of one’s most final end is essentially *self-knowledge*. The self-sufficiency of a happy man means that, minimum or moderate sufficient conditions satisfied, he needs only self-knowledge to be happy, with action being only the means for creating the sufficient conditions for the restful self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is itself self-sufficient – self-caused and self-focused or self-contained analogously to “thought thinking of its own thinking” attributed by Aristotle to God, the ultimate uncaused cause and unmoved mover.

Aristotle’s postulate that man is himself a moving principle does mean that man possesses by the right of his birth as a human the self-knowledge of how to act, that is prior to the considerations of the right place, right time and right circumstance: “Every one ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the moving principle back to

\(^{15}\) The minimum sufficient conditions include sufficient health, beauty, social and family involvement, and prosperity. In the light of the *ergon* argument, it is clear that these extrinsic goods are valued *only* if they allow man to realize his peculiar function of the active intellect.
himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses” (1113a6-8), says Aristotle in NE 3, 3. That is why “the faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest”, says Aristotle in the De Anima (434a16). Thus, the only necessary condition for happiness is the possession of the divine nous. The exercise of moral action is not the necessary condition for happiness. Aristotle argues emphatically that the true human life is not action, but knowledge, i.e. the unmoved rest, which is the energeia of nous, in EE 7, 12 and NE 9, 9, the analysis of which comes next. Aristotle’s thesis that human life is self-knowledge does precisely mean that Aristotle’s teleological ethics finds the ultimate purpose of man not externally to man, but within man himself: man is a self-moving end-in-himself. Knowledge, the unmoved rest, stimulates and motivates praxis without being its imperative ruler, i.e., without issuing actual commands over practical actions.

Because human life is knowledge, and eudaimonia is a self-motivated contemplation of this knowledge, unhappiness is ignorance, states Aristotle in NE 3, 5: “Every one does evil acts through ignorance of the end” (1114b4-5). On the other side, an ignorant man can do good actions under compulsion, and, though he might succeed in his good actions, he would fail to achieve happiness, because he is ignorant of the most final end. Even more, if an ignorant man does good actions freely, by his own choice, but ignorantly, he would still never achieve even the secondary happiness. And the ignorant man would have no right to blame circumstances or anybody else, for every man has the power inside to become aware of the final cause or moving principle (1114a1-4), since they are unchangeable and intrinsic for every man.

In NE 1, 3, Aristotle explains that the most final “self-subsistent” good is the cause of other goods in the sense that it “causes the goodness of all these as well”
It is because happiness causes the goodness of anything else the happy man owns or does (and not otherwise) that Aristotle calls the good / happy man “the norm and measure” of things (1113a32-33) in NE 3, 4 and in NE 10, 5: “The good man as such is the measure of each thing” (1176a16-17; emphasis added). Aristotle reaffirms this view that good man is a measure of things in the NE 10, 6: “Those things are both valuable and pleasant which are such to the good man” (1176b25-26); and in EE 7, 15: “Objects are noble when a man’s motives for acting and choosing them are noble” (1249a5-6; see also 1249a13-14). Moral virtues (maximized or measured) cannot in principle be the cause of happiness, because their own ultimate goodness is caused by man’s motive to achieve his individual happiness. According to Aristotle’s ethics, a Kantian masochist who is morally virtuous but thoroughly unhappy simply fulfills his moral duty imposed upon him by external causality, but he is not good in the most final sense or in-himself. Consequently, his moral duty, even if successfully accomplished, is not fully good-in-itself, and does ultimately fail to realize its status of being a final good.

Thus, both NE and EE agree that happiness being a cause rather than an effect is, on its own, a proof that happiness cannot be the compound of moral virtues, and cannot in principle be caused by compounding the moral virtues, simply because happiness, as the final [uncaused or a priori] cause and first principle, comes prior to moral action and moral virtues which are habits formed by persistent moral actions. Let me call it the causation argument for the impossibility of eudaimonia to be identified with the compound of moral virtues. Also the causal nature of happiness proves by implication that the maximization of moral virtue cannot have any effect upon happiness simply because it does not have causal power over happiness, the uncaused cause. This explains, as well,
that when a man causes action of his friend, this happens prior or beyond morality per se, and cannot in principle be a moral obligation. When helping others in the pursuit of happiness becomes a moral obligation, it destroys the intrinsic self-causation of a moral agent and prevents him from being happy. This loss of the ability to be happy, and, thus, intrinsically good, characterizes both a subject and an object in the Kantian scheme of the categorical and dutiful benevolence. In EE 7, 12 and NE 9, 9, Aristotle gives a further explanation of his belief that happiness is a cause rather than an effect.

But, most important, this teaching on happiness being an uncaused cause and the unmoved mover of the soul gives an additional textual support to the belief that Aristotle’s *eudaimonia* as the *energeia* of the ruling element of the soul, *nous*, which is divine or divine-like, is itself divine or divine-like, being analogous to the *energeia* of God, the uncaused cause and unmoved mover on a cosmic scale. In NE 1, 12, Aristotle directly says that because happiness is a special *energeia* which is a first principle and a cause of goods, “no one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better” (*NE* 1101b25-27). That is why happiness as the divine or divine-like activity, i.e., the *energeia* of a certain, superior kind, cannot in principle be composed of the moral virtues as activities of the other, inferior, kind.

Hence, Aristotle explicitly states that good man should prefer the intellection of his ruling element to moral action to such a degree that he might not simply put a limit upon moral action, but would give it up entirely to achieve the greater nobility for himself not only in the *NE* 10, 7-8. Let me summarize the above analysis. *NE* 9, 8 makes it absolutely clear that nobility for Aristotle is manifested not in moral action but in the intellection of the ruling element within the soul. And, because it is nobler to give up action than
to act, it is clear that moral action and its maximization has no causal power over the most final end – happiness. On the contrary, it is the *energeia* of happiness that exercises the causal power over moral goodness. Moral virtue is causally inferior to happiness, because it is *teleologically* inferior to happiness, that is, it has its most final end above and beyond itself – in *eudaimonia as theoria*, i.e., *the self-awareness of the ever-existent purpose of human life to be functionally perfect in-itself*. It is *eudaimonia* -- the perfect activity of the active intellect -- that defines *all* the ends of moral virtue as such, and their goodness. I will analyze this issue of the teleological and causal subjugation of moral virtue in more detail in my section on the concluding passage of *EE* 7, 15 where Aristotle defines *theoria* as the *standard* of human life, and in my section on the three prominent lives in *NE* 1, 5 where Aristotle defines the life of moral virtue as *incomplete* / not final (1095b31-32).

In fact, Aristotle is the first philosopher for whom the possession of the divine element (the ruler, which, by definition, is self-contained or self-sufficient) makes man an atomic individual – a self-contained entity which is essentially and existentially independent from other atomic individuals – though limited by the hierarchy of value within the society. On one side, an atomic individual *ought to* help his friend *only* to a certain degree, and not unconditionally, as it is clear from *NE* 9, 3. And, on the other side, good man in misfortune should desire help and compassion from his friends *only* to a certain degree and not unconditionally, as it is clear from *NE* 9, 11. But in all scenarios, good man puts his self-love, i.e., the realization of his *nous*, above any social interaction and moral action. The unconditional requirement of the personal, *atomic*, happiness makes the maximization of moral virtue impossible.
The following is the analysis of the relevant text in the *EE* 7, 12 and the parallel text in *NE* 9, 9, which explain human atomism in detail, and, specifically, why it is incongruent with the maximization of social interactions and practical/moral virtues involved, and give additional textual support to the certainty that the Aristotelian ruler within the soul is the divine (or divine-like) element. Also, these texts make it clear that there supposed to be another association between friends, than the one based on moral duty, -- mutual duty-free contemplation of the divine element within each one of them. In this kind of association, self-love of neither friend is violated. In fact, these texts show that moral virtue is a form of compulsion in the societal form of human existence, which is *in principle untrue*, because it is based on the absence of self-sufficiency of its agents. This textual evidence testifies that Aristotle had very sober social views indeed, and his endorsement of human society, best known as his motto that man is a social animal, refers only to the duty-free and disinterested mutual contemplation.

### 4.3 Mutual contemplation as the only true justification of social interaction: *EE* 7, 12 on the life as knowledge

The *EE* 7, 12 makes a direct connection between the fewer friendships and man’s self-sufficiency. Aristotle claims that “the good man is perfectly independent”, i.e., self-sufficient, and he asks: “If the possessor of virtue is happy, why should he need a friend?” (1244b4-5). Noticeably, as it is clear from this statement, neither the goodness of man, nor his happiness, nor his self-sufficiency require social interactions (and, of course, *excessive* social interactions). The differentia of self-sufficiency is *isolation*. Or, in other words, the ability to fully function when isolated is the evidence of self-sufficiency. The *EE* 7, 12 makes it clear that social interaction per se is based on need,
and, so, the lack of self-sufficiency, while “the independent man neither needs useful people nor people to cheer him, nor society; his own society is enough for him” (1244b5-7). Like the NE 10, 8, the EE 7, 12 takes God as a paradigm of self-sufficiency, and construes the notion of the self-sufficiency of man as man’s attempt, though only an attempt, at approximation to the self-sufficiency of God. The self-sufficiency of man should be based on isolation, says Aristotle, and “this is most plain in the case of a god; for it is clear that, needing nothing, he will not need a friend, nor have one, supposing that he does not need one” (1244b8-10). His position on the limitations in the quantity of friendships/social interactions is the most categorical:

In accordance with the approximation to god’s self-sufficiency, “the happiest man will least need a friend, and only as far as it is impossible for him to be independent. Therefore the man who lives the best life must have fewest friends, and they must become fewer, and he must show no eagerness for men to become his friends, but despise not merely the useful but even men desirable for society (1244b9-12).

This argument makes it evident that so-called friendships of pleasure and utility, based on need, i.e., the lack of self-sufficiency, are not the relationships that can in principle belong to a good man who is self-sufficient by definition. NE 9, 9 confirms: good man does not need useful friends, “since he already has the things that are good”; nor he needs pleasant friends, “for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure” (1169b23-27). Nonetheless, says Aristotle, good man wants to have friends and has friends. That is why the statement that good man does not need friends is “partially right” and “partially missed the truth” (1244b12-23). Later on, he adds regarding the belief that a good man needs friends: “That the contrary appeared as the conclusion of the argument was also reasonable, since the argument said what was true” (1245b11-13), i.e., that man should approximate, according to his abilities, to the self-sufficiency of a god.
This is only the approximation: man cannot assimilate god’s being, for god is a self-contained being: “The deity is his own well-being”, while we are not. And if a good man would try imitating god in his self-sufficiency, “the virtuous man will not even think”, for god thinks nothing beyond himself, while “with us welfare involves a something beyond us” (1245b18-20). Nonetheless, as the very end of the EE makes it absolutely sure, the standard of one’s entire being is the contemplation of the divine, and submitting the entire existence of one’s self to this end (1249a16-22). Because Aristotle posits the identity of mind and its object (DA 430a20, 431a1; Met. 1072b18-28), it is reasonable to admit that, in the energeia of theōria, man does indeed approximate to the divine self-sufficiency as far as it is possible for a human. I will consider the concluding text of the EE with all its relevance to Aristotle’s argument against the maximization of moral virtue and against the identification of happiness as the compound of virtues at the end of this chapter.

Essentially, the statement that a good man does not need friends did partially miss the truth not in relation to practical virtues. Practical virtues are always dealing with need, while true friends are both self-sufficient, and, so, Aristotle offers a special consideration why a self-sufficient man needs friends, and this consideration goes beyond and against the requirements of practical virtues and the notion of moral duty. Friendship of good men is based upon disinterested giving, rather than upon taking while in need: “When we need nothing, then we all seek others to share our enjoyment, those whom we may benefit rather than those who will benefit us. And we judge better when independent than when in want, and most of all we then seek friends worthy to be lived with” (1244b17-21). Because true friendship is the relationship between equals, implying that
neither friend is in need, “giving” consists in something rather very different from satisfying other’s need through practicing practical virtues and fulfilling one’s moral duty.

The disinterested “giving” between true friends, explains Aristotle, is precisely the interchange of energeia of friendship consisting in mutual contemplating the other like second self (1245a29-30), which is free, self-originated, and, thus, free of moral duty. Life as “an end” and living in its existential meaning “must be regarded as a kind of knowledge” (1244b29), says Aristotle, so that “one always desires to live, because one always desires to know” and “get known” (1245a9-11). And “there would be no difference between [one’s knowing of oneself] and another’s knowing instead of oneself” (1244b31-33), though, he immediately adds that “naturally the perception and knowledge of oneself is more desirable” (1244b34-35). But, ultimately, “to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one’s self and to know one’s self” (1245a35-37), for the existence of one’s friend as one’s separate “second self” does not impede, but, vice versa, facilitates one’s knowing of oneself, as it were from aside (1245a34-35).

Aristotle explains that this kind of knowing oneself and one’s friend has nothing to do with “eating together, drinking together”, and any other thing common with the other animals, “for what is the difference between doing these things in the neighbourhood of others or apart from them” (1245a13-15). But “even to share in speech of a casual kind does not make the case different”, continues Aristotle (1245a15-16). And more important, “for friends who are self-dependent neither teaching nor learning is possible; for if one learns, he is not as he should be; and if he teaches, his friend is not” (1245a16-19). Thus, the knowledge of one’s self through one’s second self is the knowledge of things unchangeable, or, in Aristotle’s words, “the determined” (1245a2-4), though true
friendship includes sharing in passion and action as well (1245b1-3). But the knowledge of the unchangeable core of the very existence of one’s friend and oneself (i.e., the existential manifestation of the most final, unchangeable end within the life of a friend and oneself) is the foundation of everything else. This knowledge is indeed given only through contemplation (*theōria*), and, so, Aristotle says: “Therefore men should contemplate in common” (1245b4-5). Aristotle analyzes the “determined” or “determinate” as the objects of contemplation versus “indeterminate” in detail in *NE* 10, 1-5. This distinction is crucial for understanding his notion of *eudaimonia*, and I will consider it in chapter 6 of my dissertation.

So true friendships are very few not simply because it is hard to test many people on purely psychological or emotional or moral grounds, but precisely because it is impossible to have with many this kind of intense concentrated activity of mutual contemplation of the unchangeable within the self, which is risen over the demands, necessities, needs and duties of the practical everyday life. Thus, Aristotle confirms that we are “praying for many friends, while we say that man who has many friends has no friend” (1245b20-21), for “the activity of joint perception must exist among fewer. So that it is not only hard to get many friends – for probation is necessary – but also to use them when you have got them” (1245b23-26).

Hence, in true friendship where friends are equal in mutual self-sufficiency, they interchange *energeia* of friendship, which has the quality of being self-contained or self-sufficient. Because this *energeia* does not emerge through lack or need or the externally imposed necessity, but is rooted in the self-contained functional structure of one’s self, it is the *free* manifestation of the unchangeable within one’s self (the self-expression of the
eternal). In the untrue forms of friendship, man is not self-sufficient and needs from his friend things (extrinsic goods) rather than his friend’s very existence (with his *energeia*) (1237b31-33). Aristotle’s is a sober acknowledgement that the very existence of human society is necessarily based on the lack of self-sufficiency: “Civic friendships has been established mainly in accordance with utility; for men seem to have come together because each is not sufficient in himself” (1242b6-9). Because social form of existence is derived from the lack of self-sufficiency, it does necessarily produce untrue forms of relationships – the so-called friendships of utility or pleasure. Essentially, to maximize one’s social interconnections beyond true friendships is to deprive oneself of one’s self-sufficiency.

For solving the problem of Aristotle’s *eudaimonia*, it is crucial to pay an utmost attention to Aristotle’s statement in *EE* 7, 12 that life “as an end” is “perception and knowledge” and *not* practical or moral actions. Because individual life as “an end” is “perception and knowledge”, “life in society”, says Aristotle, “is perception and knowledge in common”, and *not* practical and moral actions in common. Because “living must be regarded as a kind of knowledge” (1244b23-26), and knowledge can be only of things unchangeable\(^\text{16}\), given in *theoria* via *a priori* assumptions, it is clear that only through *theoria* can any man reach the *telos* of his life and realize his *ergon*. Categorically, Aristotle claims that “*mere* perception and *mere* knowledge is *most* desirable to every one, and hence the desire of living is congenial in all” (1244b26-28; emphasis added). And so, the individual can in fact *completely* forgo action and still realize the *telos* of his life by *mere* perception and *mere* knowledge, as Aristotle argues in *NE* 9, 8 urging a man to give up his action to his friend. Ultimately, the essence of a human being as a political

\(^{16}\)“What we know is not even capable of being otherwise” (*NE* 6, 3 1139b20).
animal does not consist in practical or moral actions *per se* (individual or social), or, in other words, in sharing of utility and pleasure. It consists in contemplating in common. Hence, man’s will to have a friend is rooted not in his need or lack of self-sufficiency compensated by practical virtues and regulated by moral duty, but in his free will *simply* to live, that is, as Aristotle believes, *to know* – to exercise his activity of *theoria* alone and in common with his friends. But most important, the bare fact that life as an end consists in *knowledge* makes the maximization of practical / moral virtues irrelevant and impossible, as well as it proves that the human *telos* and *ergon* cannot consist of the compound of practical / moral virtues even in the case when they are, let’s say, measured.

4.4 Man does not need moral duty to prove himself good: *NE* 9, 9 on the life as knowledge

*NE* 9, 9 goes into even a greater detail in arguing that contemplation is the sole end of human life, and the sole end of the virtuous friendship (the true form of sociability), thus confirming that the maximization of moral virtue is irrelevant and detrimental for human happiness. This chapter is even more important for deciphering Aristotle’s riddle of *eudaimonia* than *NE* 9, 8, for, like *EE* 7, 12, it shifts focus from just “a man” to “the supremely happy man”. It directly states that “the purpose” of “the supremely happy man” is indeed “*to contemplate* worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities” (1170a2-3; emphasis added), thus identifying the *energeia* of happiness as the *energeia* of contemplation. This activity of contemplation identified as *eudaimonia* is in fact a special effort of intellect that an agent, aiming at happiness, makes entirely *on his own*, and it is in this sense also that this *energeia* is self-contained or complete: “We have said at the outset that happi-
ness is an activity (*energeia*); and activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property” (1169b28-30). This activity is “virtuous and pleasant in itself” (1169b31-32), meaning that it is not made good or pleasant by the externally conditioned fulfillment of moral obligation. Nonetheless, self-origination of this *energeia* does not make the supremely happy man a loner, for “we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our own” (1169b34-35), and “by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active [in the *energeia* of contemplation]; but with others and towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity [of contemplation] will be more continuous” (1170a5-8).

Also, like *EE 7, 12, NE 9, 9* is absolutely clear on what exactly we contemplate when we contemplate worthy actions of our neighbours and our own – we contemplate “the determinate”, or the unchangeable within us, which Aristotle identifies as *The Good*. This is, most of all, the auto-or-self-contemplation – the contemplation of one’s self, and, only after that, the contemplation of one’s self within one’s friend, because simply by contemplating one’s life, one can contemplate the determinate or The Good: “[Human life] is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good” (1170a20-21). But wicked and corrupt life or life spent in pain is not, for this kind of life is indeterminate, as are its attributes (1170a23-25). Aristotle gives the following consideration of why exactly human life might become corrupt or indeterminate. This consideration is concerned with the nature or differentia of human life. If one’s life falls short of this differentia, it becomes corrupt or indeterminate, and incapable of producing the *energeia* of *eudaimonia*.
By its nature, human “life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving and thinking”, and the power of thinking “is defined by reference to the corresponding activity (energeia)” (1170a17-19); “existence [is] defined as perceiving (αισθησις) or thinking (νοησις)” (1170b1). In this, NE 9, 9 completely supports EE 7, 12 which claims that human life is a kind of knowledge. Clearly, perception is a wrong word here. What Ross translated as “perception” is in fact the introspective self-consciousness orapperception, in Kantian terms. In fact, Aristotle directly says in NE 6, 8 that “the term of perception applies in a fuller sense to mathematical intuition (αισθησις) than to prudence (φρονησις)” (1142a29-31, in H. Rackham translation). It is precisely because human life is initially identical with thinking and apperception culminating in invariable knowledge (rather than variable opinion), that humans can in principle produce the energeia of happiness, which is essentially this self-awareness of the determinate. Other animals cannot cognize and, so, identify themselves with the determinate within their lives, and, thus, are incapable of eudaimonia. In the same way, a corrupt human life falls short of contemplating the determinate, and simply degenerates to the bestial indeterminate life of the lower animals. Thus, human life being determinate consists not in its predestined invariable human end (telos) (the determinate as the part of the eternal cosmic design of ends), but in the self-consciousness of this end, which is given only to humans among animals, and only because they possess divine or divine-like nous. This fully explains in which sense eudaimonia is the cause rather than an effect of human life in its being structured socially, politically, morally, aesthetically, and in all other human ways.

Aristotle explains in detail what the function of the introspective self-consciousness is. Essentially, apperception and thinking identical with human life as
such are not perception and thinking that are directed outside of consciousness itself. They are indeed self-contained or self-sufficient because what is perceived and thought of is perceiving and thinking themselves self-referenced by self-consciousness. One’s own being is desirable for each man (and friend’s being desirable almost as that of oneself) only if man produces this activity of self-awareness – the awareness not only of his life per se, but also of his desire for life. This self-consciousness is present “if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks… and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think”, and even more, only if we are aware of our life as a whole, i.e., that it is our own atomic or self-contained life, because, ultimately, “to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or thinking)” (1170a28-1170b1).

The bare act of self-consciousness (when consciousness is conscious of itself and not simply of the external world) is good-in-itself, claims Aristotle: “Perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant)”, so that good men “are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is in itself good” (1170b1-5). Identified as the self-referenced knowledge of the determinate, happy human life consists in nothing else than the self-awareness of its own goodness and pleasantness. Sociability is justified only because and only if it helps one in this self-realization. Thus, this text confirms that man’s goodness is prior to any moral action, and, in fact, determines the goodness of moral action itself. Man does not indeed need moral action to prove that he is good.
Contrary to a Christian belief that man’s nature is corrupted by Primal Sin so that man should redeem himself by the excessive moral duty, Aristotle believes that man is good-in-himself -- each man on his own and just by his nature, which is determined by the presence in man of the divine element – *nous*. This self-awareness or self-consciousness of one’s goodness is precisely the contemplation (*theoria*) of one’s own mind – the same thinking of thinking that the *Metaphysics* defines as God’s only activity.

To perceive one’s life as good-in-itself and pleasant-in-itself does precisely mean that man *should* realize that he is good *prior* to any thought, perception, or action directed at the external world. And, so, because this knowledge of one’s own intrinsic goodness is the *a priori* knowledge, moral action cannot add to or take away from it. In fact, because humans are not gods, and only their *nous* is self-sufficient, while, in everything else, they lack self-sufficiency, and, so, necessarily enter into the *untrue forms of relationships* with others to compensate for this lack, the ensuing moral virtue with its externally imposed obligation, duty, regulation, code and the like is nothing else but a misfortunate by-product of this lack of self-sufficiency / deficiency or non-freedom – the actual process of compensating for the lack of self-sufficiency. A true form of relationship in its *energeia* of contemplation *does not* need moral duty, though, as Aristotle argues in *NE* 10, 9 and *Politics*, which I will consider in due course, it can, if needed, make sense out of it.

Ultimately, the apriority of human goodness means that man is entitled to reserve for himself a freedom to regulate his moral actions from the point of view of the priority of self-contemplation over moral action, so that he is always free to put limits upon his moral actions when they impede his self-contemplation and destroy his very life of self-knowledge. Man in Aristotle’s ideal is a law upon himself. Any social order that over-
rides this intrinsic freedom of man by imposing upon him an externally fixed moral norm is totalitarianism or despotism, in Aristotle’s terms. Aristotle writes his Politics not to create a system of externally fixed laws or norms, but to raise his fellow-citizens to the level of this intrinsically good self-awareness.

Thus, self-knowledge or self-contemplation is not a passive impression (imprinted from without upon the clean slate, tabula rasa, of our minds), but an active effort of our minds. It is self-contained or self-sufficient also in this sense that it is the activity of our second-order thoughts which rule over and, so, regulate our first-order thoughts and perceptions in such a way that the external world is not allowed to violate the a priori goodness, self-sufficiency and freedom of our divine or divine-like nous. In this sense, Aristotle follows Plato in his unity of ethics and aesthetics, for moral actions are regulated from the point of view of one’s life as the aesthetical whole with its own intrinsic unity, i.e., harmony or beauty, or, in other words, its own lawfulness and purposefulness. Moral actions are allowed only when they do not destroy the beauty of this systematic whole (sustēma). That is why at the end of EE, Aristotle identifies the human excellence as the good (agathon) which is beautiful (kalon) – kalokagathia (καλοκαγαθία), i.e., “beautiful good” (1249a18).

Therefore, the self-consciousness of the determinate within the self is the ultimate reason of why Aristotle insists on the limitation of social interactions and moral obligations implied, for it is not only that moral action does not cause the intrinsic a priori goodness of human life, the maximization of social interactions and practical / moral virtues is detrimental to this concentrated self-contemplation of an agent – the contempla-

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17 As Aristotle likes to repeat, they come second in the process of man’s self-realization, but first in the world-order.
tion of self by self. Social interaction is justified only if friends are engaged together in this contemplation, confirms Aristotle in NE 9, 9. Only if they are contemplating the determinate within each other, each contemplates the other as “the other self”, and, so, does not violate their mutual freedom and equality (1170b6-8). “This”, concludes Aristotle, “will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought, for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man” (1170b10-13; emphasis added).

Now it is even more clear that when Aristotle said in the previous chapter of NE 9 that a good man “may even give up actions to his friend”, for “it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself” (1169a33-34), what he meant was precisely that a good man via contemplating the unchangeable “determined” core within his friend, motivates it as a final cause in his friend’s action, and this is nobler, than even to act himself in a virtuous way. So, to know is nobler than to act. Moreover, knowing is more active than acting (praxis), because a knowing mind, being identical with its perfect, complete, determinate objects – eidoi, produces the perfect, complete, self-contained and determinate energeia, while a mind of an acting man being identical with its imperfect, incomplete and indeterminate objects, produces imperfect, incomplete, needy and indeterminate energeia which is a lesser activity\(^\text{18}\). That is why a knowing man is more live than an acting man, for Aristotle’s thesis that human life is identical with knowledge, and a knowing mind is identical with its objects has direct existential

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\(^\text{18}\) Strictly speaking, only the contemplative mind is identical with its objects of thought, which are eidoi, as Aristotle argues in the Metaphysics Λ, 7 (1072a30-36; 1072b18-28). Practical mind when it is identical with its objects becomes the contemplative mind; this expresses the unity of the mind, and its identification with its highest function. That is, théoria contemplates the objects of thought, eidoi, in both the contemplative and productive sciences. Nonetheless, Aristotle does also loosely refer to the imperfect objects of the practical mind, as being different from the perfect or proper objects of the contemplative mind in NE 6, 1 = EE 5 (1139a3-16).
implcations. Life as knowledge is the production of a certain *energeia* – the divine or
divine-like *energeia* of contemplation – *existentially*, so that man does truly live only
when he contemplates. Based on this, Aristotle encourages man to give up action to his
friend, for man is more active or live when he knows than when he acts. Aristotle makes
the most strong statement: “Life belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and
God is that actuality; and God’s self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal”
(1072b25-28). It is clear that the argument in *NE* 9, 9 prepares the concluding pages of
*EE* and *NE*, on which Aristotle argues that *theôria* is the standard of human life that be-
comes *eudaimonia* when *theôria* is exercised in the excellent degree of *sophia*, and where
he argues that *theôria* is divine because its objects are divine (1177a21-22).

It is precisely because human life is nothing else than the *energeia* of knowing
that knowing is active more *continuously*, asserts Aristotle. Its activity (*energeia*) is the
unceasing contextual actualization of the final ends within oneself and one’s friends. The
ultimate foundation of this belief of Aristotle’s is his thesis that the functional structure of
*cosmos* (the kingdom of ends in Kantian terms) is unchangeable, and so any human ac-
tion is a pitiable, though inevitable, fuss against the backdrop of the grandiose and eternal
cosmic design. The only thing that humans can nobly do is to realize via their *νοτὶς* and
its *νοητις* this perfect design and to faithfully adhere to it. Therefore, says Aristotle,
*mere* knowledge and *mere* perception suffices for a “supremely happy man”.

To understand Aristotle’s notion of happiness, we should always remember that
Thomas Aquinas has borrowed his argument from design from Aristotle: “Nature does
nothing in vain. For all things that exist by Nature are means to an end, or will be con-
comitants of means to an end” (*DA* 434a30-32); “Nature never makes anything without a
purpose and never leaves out what is necessary" (DA 432b21-22). The self-conscious life of man within the designed for eternity cosmos cannot in principle be indifferent to moral issues, as exclusivists want it; and it cannot in principle be just a practical life with its fetishes of progress and the higher effectiveness, as inclusivists want it. Life as knowledge of design is beyond morality both in the sense that it subdues morality to the higher good, and in the sense that this higher good grants to morality its own goodness, thus including it into the design.

Nonetheless, being most continuous, perfect, complete, self-contained and determinate, the energeia of knowing operates in the social conditions of lack, imperfection and inter-dependence, and is coexistent with the human psychophysical to suntheton (τὸ σὺνθετόν), which is finite, imperfect, incomplete, needy and indeterminate. Consequently, being identified with its superior function and, so, being one, nous does exercise both the superior function of the active intellect and the inferior function of the passive intellect with the possibility that the superior function of nous might be entirely suppressed, and man ends up on the bestial level of misery. These facts about human existence have the following implications. All the textual evidence on the true friendship being an intellectual energeia of theoria points to the fact that the notion of this specific energeia and energeia in general has for Aristotle a clearly defined existential meaning, i.e., energeia has quality that is inherent in the intellection of this or that specific person, meaning that it is contextual, has its own continuance, exhibits intensity or weakness, can get interrupted, and, in principle, cannot be maximized extensively, so that it cannot be reproduced in the same intensity towards many people, or towards people different in value, and cannot be combined with the other energeiai indiscriminately. After the spe-
specific limit, the excess of the other *energeiai* will impede and even destroy the *energeia* of friendship.

This knowledge about the Aristotelian notion of the true friendship as the *energeia* of the active intellect, and the notion of *energeia* in general, is one of the clues to understanding the notion of happiness as the *energeia* of the active intellect, and, specifically, that Aristotle treats the notion of happiness being an *energeia* also from the existential grounds. The congeniality between the *energeia* of friendship and the *energeia* of *eudaimonia* is precisely the major point of both *NE* 9, 9 and *EE* 7, 12. This congeniality goes beyond the similarity between two different *energeiai*. It is clear from these texts that the *energeia* of the true friendship and the *energeia* of *eudaimonia* is one and the same *energeia* -- the specific intellectual *energeia* with the corresponding intellectual virtue, i.e., the *energeia* of contemplation or introspective self-consciousness with its excellence of *sophia* in a life which “must be regarded as a kind of knowledge” (1244b29; emphasis added).

Evidently, *eudaimonia* as *energeia* has for Aristotle a clearly defined existential meaning, i.e., it has quality that is inherent in the intellection of this or that specific person, so that the person might in principle fail to produce a specific intellectual *energeia* of happiness notwithstanding the moral, practical or any other success in his life. And, even more important, the *energeia* of happiness cannot be combined with the other *energeiai* indiscriminately. After the specific limit, the excess of the other *energeiai* will impede and even destroy the *energeia* of happiness. This can be called the *principle of the existential exclusion between human *energeiai**. This principle is the implication of the isolation principle.
The principle of the existential exclusion between energeiai seems to be the gist of Aristotle’s argument in the NE 10, 7 against the excessive social interactions. Aristotle claims that “happiness is thought to depend on leisure” (1177b4-5) and is the production of a certain energeia, the energeia of theōria, in a leisurely state. “Now”, he says, “the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely” (1177b6-8). Statesman himself is seeking “a happiness different from political actions, and evidently sought as being different” (1177b15-16; emphasis added). Aristotle gives a comprehensive list of virtues that are at work in the unleisurely affairs of a statesman: temperance, courage, liberality, justice, etc. (1177a29-1177b1; 1178a28-34). Aristotle does specifically insist that the perfect exercise of virtues involves both the will and the deed, and so virtues are inseparable from actions (1178a34-1178b1). It is clear that if a statesman is seeking a happiness different from political actions, he is seeking a happiness different from his practical virtues.

The most challenging task of a statesman is to find a balance between his leisurely engagement in theōria and his political and military affairs which are simply a means to get more leisure and so get more opportunity to produce the energeia of happiness identified as theōria, “for we are busy”, says Aristotle, “that we may have leisure” (1177b5-6). If the statesman fails to find this balance and his life becomes too unleisurely and weary, he loses the time, opportunity and even ability to produce the very special energeia – the true energeia of happiness, and can be happy only in the secondary degree (1177b6-1178a8). If a statesman needs to limit his political actions to gain more leisure, it means that he needs to limit the exercise of his practical virtues to achieve his happiness. I analyze Aristotle’s principle of the existential exclusion between human energeiai in more
detail in my sections on \textit{NE} 10, 7-9 and \textit{NE} 1, 5 passage on the three paradigmatic lives in chapter 5 of my dissertation, and chapter 6 of my dissertation on \textit{NE} 10, 1-5, which constitutes the major body of Aristotle’s text on this principle.

4.5 The requirement to limit the intensity of the most close social interactions

Aristotle develops even further his argument against the maximization of the moral virtues and against the identification of happiness with the compound of moral virtues. He argues that not only must the quantity of friendships have a limit, and not only must the different kinds of friendship have the different kinds of intensity, but also even the most intensive quality of the closest friendship must as well have a limit. This is the other implication of the priority of self-love over self-denial in Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics}, and, hence, the other building block in Aristotle’s argument against the unconditional universal love which was posited by Christianity, and which inevitably got transformed, through Kantianism, into the masochism and sadism of the impersonal good in all kinds of totalitarianism. Aristotle develops this specific point in his argument against the maximization and excess of the intrinsic goods (including moral \textit{energeia}) and extrinsic goods (including honour) in \textit{NE} 7, 4 where he states that excess is destructive \textit{even in things that are good-in-themselves}:

…those who contrary to the rule either are mastered by or pursue one of the objects which are naturally noble and good, e.g., those who busy themselves more than they ought about honour or about children and parents, [are not wicked]; for these too are goods, and those who busy themselves about them are praised; but yet there is an excess even in them [here Aristotle gives examples]. There is no wickedness, then, with regard to these objects, for the reason named, viz., because each of them is by nature a thing worthy of choice for its own sake; yet excesses in respect of them are bad and to be avoided (1148a28-1148b4).

Importantly, this passage cannot be interpreted as referring \textit{only} to the extrinsic goods (honour being the highest extrinsic good valued in-itself, and material gain being
the lowest extrinsic good valued simply as an instrument), for, in this passage, Aristotle is concerned rather with social interactions per se than simply with honour as the token of social appreciation. And, essentially, according to Aristotle, any social interaction involves the exercise of virtues, and not simply the transaction of some external goods. To put a limit on social interactions is to put limit on the exercise of virtues. Indeed, the interaction with children and parents is apparently both moral and intellectual. It involves moral duty, moral action (busying oneself), and, so, various moral virtues. And it produces both the moral and intellectual energeiai, i.e., the intrinsic goods of the soul. How much or to which degree to busy oneself with other people and, especially, with close relationships is what occupies Aristotle in this passage. He definitely views the excessive intensity in the closest relationships, like those between children and parents, as a problem for achieving individual happiness.

Thus, the 1159b32-1160a7 passage, which encourages the more intensity of friendship between parents and children than between comrades and fellow-citizens, is not enough, on its own, to understand the limitations Aristotle puts upon social interactions along with engaged virtues. Not only should the certain limit be laid upon the extrinsic goods, but the certain limit should as well be laid upon the intrinsic goods of the soul, other than the energeia of happiness identified as theôria. The 1148a28-1148b4 passage is concerned not with the excess of social interactions in a whole of one’s life, but with the excess within this or that social interaction taken on its own, including “true friendship”. Aristotle continues that such excesses in respect of things that are good-in-themselves are not incontinence per se, for incontinence is not only to be avoided but also blameworthy. Nonetheless, he says, these excesses are analogous to incontinence: “This
is why we say with a qualification … ‘incontinent in respect of honour, or of gain’”

(1148b4-14).

In the same spirit, when in the EE 7, 11, Aristotle discusses the different kinds of friendship, and what is due to the different kinds of friends (e.g., “whether we ought to render useful services and help to [the good man / friend in virtue], or to one who makes a return and has power”, 1244a2-4), he does categorically claim that “those who give [indiscriminately] all to the object of their love, when they ought not, are worthless” (1244a18-19; emphasis added). The limit is precisely the kind and the measure of energeia the soul generates for any kind of a friend, including the most true, the most intimate friend, the lover. And it is essential that Aristotle concentrates here on the most intense friendship, between lovers. The utmost intensity of friendship does not mean that no limit is imposed upon the exercise of virtues. “Even to Zeus we do not sacrifice all things” (1244a14; emphasis added), underlines Aristotle. Similarly, in NE 9, 2: “That we should not make the same return to everyone, nor give a father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain enough” (1165a14-16).

Any friendship as social interaction aims not at its own maximization, but, to the contrary, at its own limit or certain measure which creates a balanced or systematical whole of the relationship (sustēma) between two people. Friendship, like any sustēma, is identified with its superior function – the energeia of the active intellect. Any sustēma exercises its superior function with no limits; and this on its own puts a necessary limit on the exercise of the inferior functions of the sustēma. Analogously in friendship, its moral, social and political components (its components of pleasure, utility and duty) are not the constitutive parts of its sustēma and should be completely subdued by its intellec-
tual function, and, so, limited by a due measure. Hence, the *energeia* of friendship motivates the action engaged in friendship, and regulates the extrinsic goods via discrimination and limitation: “There are things which should be rendered to the useful friend and others to the good one” (1244a15-17). And, so, to the superior friend and benefactor, “who has given one existence one ought to give it in return, but not necessarily one’s society; that gift is for the pleasant friend” (1244a27-31). But, as the universal rule, the excess of any *social interaction* in any kind of friendship is “worthless”. There should be no excess (maximization) in any social relation, and in one’s social life taken as a whole.

The 1148a28-1148b4 passage against the excess of the extrinsic and intrinsic goods in *NE* 7, 4 is even more significant, for it appears in a common book shared by the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* (*NE* 7 = *EE* 6). Contrary to the belief of Kenny, Kraut and Cooper, this passage alongside with the other *EE* passages discussed (especially 1244a14-31 passage against the excesses in the most close friendship in *EE* 7, 11, and *EE* 7, 12 discussion of self-sufficiency in a true friendship) points to the congeniality of the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean* ideals of happiness, in general, and, more specifically, to the congeniality of the *Eudemian* happy mixed life and the *Nicomachean* happy political life. Besides the issue that *eudaimonia* as a specific *energeia* is of the different nature than moral virtue, it is clear that if both *Ethics* posit the indiscriminate human striving for happiness with no limit imposed, and, at the same time, both *Ethics* argue against practical / moral excellences in excess, political, practical and moral action cannot be all that constitutes political happy life, and, thus, Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper are wrong in their assumption that *NE* 10, 8 political happy life (so called “secondary happy life”) lacks *theêria*. Let me look at this issue more closely.
If Kenny, Kraut and Cooper are right that the secondary happiness consists entirely of practical virtues and only of them, and, as it appears, according to Aristotle, the practical virtues should be measured by some limit, then secondary happiness itself would be necessarily measured by this limit. Nonetheless, nowhere does Aristotle say that the end of happiness itself should be measured by a limit. The *energeia* of happiness can be limited by the imperfect human body. But Aristotle’s thesis that happiness is the utmost purpose of our existence makes the very assumption that our pursuit of happiness should be limited absurd. Moreover, if happiness in a secondary happy life is identical with the moral / practical virtues, and their excess is destructive for happiness, the very striving for happiness does paradoxically appear to be destructive to happiness itself. Thus, even on its own, Aristotle’s belief that the excess of practical / moral virtues is destructive to happiness is a proof that, contrary to the belief of Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper, even secondary happiness cannot consist only of moral / practical virtues. In this case, they are also wrong that the *Eudemian* happy mixed life and the secondary happy life are different ideals of life, the first including *theòria*, and the second lacking *theòria*. I will consider this issue in more detail when, in the next chapter, I turn to *NE* 10, 6-9 and its textual support for the criterion of isolation in relation to moral / practical virtues.

*4.6 EE 7, 15* on the necessity to limit both extrinsic and intrinsic goods and on *theòria* as the standard of human life

Even more, in addition to the argument mounted against the excess in the closest relationships as a kind of incontinence in the 1148a28-1148b4 passage in the common *NE 7 = EE 6* book, the 1244a14-31 passage in *EE 7, 11* against the excesses in friendship and the *EE 7, 12* discussion of self-sufficiency in a true friendship, Aristotle offers a long
and detailed argument at the very end of the *Eudemian Ethics*, in chapter 15 of Book 7 against the excess (the maximization of both the extrinsic and intrinsic goods) and for the balanced measure within the soul, established by the ultimate *criterion* or *standard* of the good / happiness. The standard is identified as the functioning of the theoretic faculty contemplating God in accordance with *teleia aretê* of καλοκαγαθία (εστίν οὖν καλοκαγαθία αρετὴ τέλειος, 1249a16-17), which, by implication, is *sophia* (philosophical wisdom), i.e., the excellent performance of *theôria*. Thus, this text shows that *teleia aretê is sophia*, and not the compound of virtues. Also it shows that the most final good / happiness, as the standard of *theôria*, cannot be identified with the compound of virtues, including moral virtues.

Aristotle defines the ultimate criterion of the good as follows:

Since the doctor has a *standard* by reference to which he distinguishes the healthy from the unhealthy body, and with reference to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, while if less or more is done health is the result no longer, so in regard to actions and choice of what is naturally good but not praise-worthy, the good man should have a standard both of disposition and of choice, and similarly in regard to avoidance of excess or deficiency of wealth and good fortune, the standard being … ‘as reason directs’; this corresponds to saying in regard to diet that the standard should be medical science and its principles (1249a22-1249b5). But, this, though true, is not clear. One must, then, here as elsewhere, live with reference to the ruling principle and with reference to the formed habit and the activity of the ruling principle, as the slave must live with reference to that of the master… But since man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part, each of us should live according to the governing element within himself – but this is ambiguous, for medical science governs in one sense, health in another, the former existing for the latter. And so is with the theoretic faculty; for God is not an imperative ruler, but is the end with a view to which prudence (*phronēsis*) issues its commands… What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods – whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things – will most produce the contemplation of God is the noblest standard, but any that through deficiency or excess hinders one from the contemplation of God is bad (1249a22-1249b21; emphasis added).
This passage was universally interpreted as laying down a limit *only* to the extrinsic goods, like bodily goods and wealth, but not to the moral virtues. And, indeed, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is much more sober tending towards Hellenistic ways, much more aware of human suffering, much more sensitive and empathic to human vulnerability, and, in this sense, much more humane than the *Eudemian Ethics*, and, in general, Plato’s heroic [classic] eulogy of virtues (the pursuance of virtues no matter what, what became in the Hellenism the aestheticized virtue in the inhumane other-worldliness of Plotinus’ *henosis*). This, on its own, is a remarkable evidence that the *Eudemian Ethics* is not only more schematic, but also more Platonic in its approach, and is earlier than the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Meanwhile, as it is clear from the other *EE* passages analyzed in this section, and, especially, 1148a28-1148b4 passage in the common (*NE 7 = EE 6*) book and the 1244a14-31 passage on friendship in the *EE 7*, *11*, the *Eudemian Ethics* has already a germ of the *Nicomachean* resistance to the [classic] heroic maximization of virtue. These passages imply that we need to look at the 1248b22-1249a21 passage more closely. The existing interpretation does not take into consideration the obvious fact that the 1249a22-1249b21 passage in *EE 7*, *15* is a *conclusion* of all the *EE* passages against the maximization of the moral / practical virtues and the identification of happiness with their compound. In this sense, both exclusivists and inclusivists do simply apply to the interpretation of the *EE* the same tactic, as they apply to the interpretation of *NE* – they do not see the overall text as the consistent whole. As the result, they do not see that Aristotle’s argument in the *EE* culminates to its end, concluding that excessive social interactions with
all the moral actions involved are bad and impede happiness, that is, the utmost functioning of the ruler – theoretic faculty.

The existing interpretation of this passage as laying down limit only to the extrinsic goods is based upon taking accent from choice and action and placing it entirely with the extrinsic goods themselves. This interpretation disregards in which sense this passage requires the limit in regards to choice and action, and does not account for the fact that what Aristotle is concerned with here is human existence as “a whole”, with perfect existence arising out of the balanced combination of virtues (1248b8-17), and not just with how to handle extrinsic goods. It is not enough to have the separate virtues, says Aristotle, for “the most numerous and important parts, if not all, must be in the same condition as the whole” (1248b12-17). If the whole of the soul is unbalanced, man cannot achieve happiness even if he excels in the separate virtues. Aristotle gives a very familiar simile with a doctor who has a standard only because he treats body as a whole, and vice versa (1249a22). To satisfy the standard “each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, while if less or more is done health is the result no longer” (1249a22-24; emphasis added).

Analogously, Aristotle states in the EE 7, 6 that “the parts of [the] soul are in a certain relation to each other” (1240a18-19). Every part of the soul is limited by a harmonious balance between all the parts of the soul, while only the ruler, explicitly identified in the EE 7, 15 passage as the theoretic faculty (1249b13), i.e., the contemplation of God (1249b19), has the unlimited power. Everything is done ultimately for its sake, as Aristotle directly states. Even moral action is ultimately justified by this highest end. The excessive functioning of one part of the soul, let’s say, moral virtue, will destroy a
balance, and deprive man of happiness. Evidently, EE defines the whole of the soul and the whole of human life as a systematic whole (sustēma) built upon the principle of hierarchical discrimination between all parts of the sustēma, including moral virtues. Aristotle gives the similar account of the soul as sustēma based upon the measure (metron) -- “the ratios” -- in NE 5, 11:

There is a justice, not indeed between a man and himself, but between certain parts in him; yet not every kind of justice but that of master and servant or that of husband and wife. For these are the ratios in which the part of the soul that has a rational principle stands to the irrational part; and it is with a view to these parts that people also think a man can be unjust to himself, viz. because these parts are liable to suffer something contrary to their respective desires; there is therefore thought to be a mutual justice between them as between ruler and ruled (1138b5-13).

In fact, the concluding passage of EE makes even a bigger emphasis than NE 10, 7-8 that the hierarchy within the soul culminates in the ruler, theôria. This passage collects the references to all the arguments Aristotle formulated in the Nicomachean Ethics, common NE / EE books, De Anima and Metaphysics for the division between the active intellect and the passive intellect -- between an imperative ruler, phronēsis, and the non-imperative ruler, theôria; for the submission of the practical, passive, intellect with its virtue of phronēsis to the contemplative, active, intellect with its activity of theôria and its virtue of sophia; and for the identification of the sustēma of man with his highest function – the active intellect \(^{19}\). This passage does even use the same lexicon, e.g., the slave-master jargon. This new interpretation, going against the existing one, shows that EE in its concluding chapter is indeed very close to the spirit to NE 10, 7-9. Let me investigate further how the text supports this new interpretation.

\(^{19}\) This conceptual congeniality between all the treatises of Aristotle point out to the fact that the time sequence of their execution, though adding nuances to our understanding of Aristotle, is irrelevant for understanding Aristotle’s philosophy. It is evident that Kenny uses his argument that EE is the later treatise simply to be able to more convincingly argue for the inconsistency of Aristotle’s philosophy.
Essentially, this passage is more concerned with the measured submission of *phronēsis*, and, so, the involved moral virtues, than with the measured possession of the extrinsic goods. The relation between the passive intellect and the active intellect occupies the central place in the passage because the passage formulates the standard of human life, which is the life according to the rational element -- ‘as reason directs’. Strikingly, the passage repeats almost exactly the development of the *NE* 1, 7 *ergon* passage. To say that man should live ‘as reason directs’, or according to the rational element, is unclear, says Aristotle. Hence, he clarifies his definition of the standard by saying that man should live in accordance to “the ruling” or “governing” principle, that is, the superior or active part of the rational element. At this point in the passage, Aristotle does distinguish not only between the ruling part and the subject part of man, that is, soul, which are accordingly the rational element and the irrational element. But, he does clearly distinguish between the ruling / active part and the subject / passive part of the rational element itself, which are accordingly the contemplative reason and the practical reason. Though the passive intellect / practical reason is the imperative ruler, it belongs in the subjected part of the rational element, and exists for the sake of the true ruler, *theōria*, which is not the imperative ruler. The passive intellect / practical reason operates *as the slave must with reference to the good of the master, theōria*.

The ultimate purpose of *phronēsis* is to govern man’s *praxis* in such a way, that its commands and choices create the most balanced *sustēma* out of *to suntheton* (*tò σύνθετον*) of the soul, so that “bodily goods, wealth, friends, or *other things*” “will most produce the contemplation of God”. The issue with “friends”, as I have shown, is concerned with the *energeia* and virtue of friendship, that is, the intrinsic good. It is evident
that “other things” which should be measured to produce contemplation are all the other choices that phronēsis makes to regulate both the extrinsic and intrinsic goods, including moral actions with corresponding moral virtues. If the practical reason does not produce, through deficiency or excess, the conditions for theoria, the practical reason is bad. A moral perfectionist of the Kantian draft is bad if he fails to produce, through the excess of his moral action, the intellectual energeia of happiness, even if he succeeds in fulfilling his moral duty. Though aretē is the final good (good-in-itself), and moral virtues are praise-worthy, they are bad if they do not aim at man’s own individual happiness, which is the contemplation of the divine. The moral perfectionist is as bad as the moral transgressor who fails to produce the contemplation of the divine through deficiency.

In fact, Aristotle does even consider the intermediate case – of the Laconians who exercise moral virtues only for the sake of natural goods or utility (in modern terms), and never for the sake of theoria (1248b37-1249a2). Aristotle says that “such men are good (for natural goods are good for them), but they have not nobility and goodness” (1249a1-2). His major point is that the Laconians should aim their moral and other virtues at the most final telos – the standard which is theoria – and not simply that the Laconians should measure their pursuit of natural goods. Therefore, Aristotle refers to the extrinsic goods, like bodily goods and wealth only as some examples of the application of the practical reason. So, the gist of the passage is rather to prove that the practical intellect is not the true ruler of the soul, though it is the imperative ruler of our appetites and desires, and not simply to discuss how to regulate the extrinsic goods per se. Being submitted by theoria, phronēsis should measure all its possible affairs, including moral virtues.
The active intellect is the true ruler though it is not an imperative ruler and does not give commands. It rules by being a standard and a purpose of everything man thinks and does, analogous to the ruling function of God in the \textit{cosmos}. The point of the passage in calling \textit{theōria} the standard of human life is that it is not optional, but imperative. If man does not produce the \textit{energeia} of \textit{theōria}, he is not only \textit{bad}, but he does not even live a truly human life and cannot be called a man, for he does not realize the \textit{function} or \textit{standard} of man, and simply degenerates to the bestial life of the lower animals. Clearly, the term ‘standard’ in this passage is a conceptual equivalent of the term ‘\textit{function}’ in the \textit{NE} 1, 7 \textit{ergon} passage. By calling \textit{theōria} a \textit{standard} of human life, Aristotle establishes the identification of the \textit{sustēma} of man with his highest function on the level of the functional self-identification of man.

It is essential that the \textit{EE} fully supports the \textit{NE} 10, 7-8 in identifying \textit{theōria}, the ruling function of the rational element, as the divine or divine-like function. Aristotle calls theoretic faculty not simply “divine” or “divine-like”, but “God” in 1249b16-21 passage in the \textit{EE} 7, 15 (the concluding passage of the \textit{EE} under consideration):

> Since man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part, each of us should live according to the governing element within himself – but this is ambiguous, for medical science [analogous to \textit{phronēsis}] governs in one sense, health in another, the former existing for the latter. And so it is with the theoretic faculty; for \textit{God} is not an imperative ruler (1249b10-13; emphasis added).

This wording can be easily explained by the passages in the \textit{De Anima} 3, 5 and 1, 4 where Aristotle claims that the ruling element or principle – the active intellect – is “separable, impassible, unmixed” (430a18), “immortal and eternal” (430a22-25), “an independent substance implanted within the soul and incapable of being destroyed” (408b17-19), “divine and impassible” (408b23-29), i.e., it gets separated from a human
body after death and reunites with its source – God. Calling *nous* in the human soul divine, Aristotle, essentially, claims that it is the same substance as God, who is *Nous* on the cosmic scale. In this sense, it is possible to say that *nous* in the human soul *is* God.

In *EE* 7, 14, Aristotle reaffirms: “As in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything. For in a sense the divine element in us moves everything” (1248a26-28). Aristotle explains: this divine element is not the discursive thought of the deliberative and demonstrative functions of *nous*, but precisely the intuitive *a priori* assumptions of the active intellect akin to the divination or inspiration when “the reasoning power is relaxed” (1248a39-40).

In *EE* 1, 7, Aristotle directly states that what allows man to be happy and, so, to be ultimately good is exclusively the functioning of the divine element in human soul: “No horse, bird, or fish is happy, nor anything the name of which does not imply some share of a divine element in its nature” (1217a26-28). Compare with the *NE* 10, 8:

> The other animals have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of [the theoretic activity]. For while the whole life of the gods is blessed [being contemplative], and that of men too in so far as some likeness of such activity belongs to them, none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does… Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation (1178b23-32).

Compare also with *NE* 10, 7 which claims both that *theoria* *is eudaimonia* and that the theoretical faculty is “itself divine” or “the most divine element in us” (1177a14-16), rather “divine” (1177b30). *Theoria* *as eudaimonia* is the best and divine activity not only because it is the activity of the best and divine thing in us, but also because its objects “are the best of knowable objects” – the divine objects (1177a20-22). *Nous* is identical

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20 The distinction that Nicolas of Cusa makes between rationality (*ratio*), which is discursive, and intellect, which is intuitive, goes all the way back to Aristotle.
with its objects, and, thus, is divine. In other words, nous in the microcosm of the human soul is capable of being gnosologically identical with its object -- the cosmic Nous -- only because it is ontologically identical with the cosmic Nous. Compare again with NE 10, 8 which claims that the theoretical faculty is “a thing apart” from to suntheton of our souls (1178a18-22), and “most akin to [the activity of God]” (1178b21-22). Hence, EE claims both that happiness is the functioning of the divine element, and that divine element is theoretic faculty, thus, fully supporting NE in positing that human happiness consists entirely in contemplation, i.e., the energeia of the divine faculty in the human soul.

It is because the functioning of the theoretic faculty is identified with happiness that this functioning of the theoretic faculty is called a standard of human living in the concluding passage of EE 7, 15. No man not practicing his theoretic faculty can in principle be happy. By arguing that the function or standard of human life – theōria – is of the divine nature, EE supports Aristotle’s argument that eudaimonia – the excellent performance of theōria – cannot be a compound of the energeiai that are of the inferior nature, i.e., not of the divine nature (they have the inferior motives, because they are inferior in-themselves, and vice versa). Also, by providing conceptual support to both the ergon passage in NE 1, 7 and the NE 10, 7-8 in its 1217a26-28 and 1249a22-1249b21 passages, the Eudemian Ethics does constitute an additional textual evidence that there is a smooth transition through all the books of NE from the ergon and teleia aretē passages in NE 1, 7 towards NE concluding books.

Because the EE 7, 15 concluding passage is concerned with the human life as sustēma identified by its highest standard, with the submission of all the other functions to the standard of theōria, and, especially, with the submission of phronēsis, the impera-
tive ruler, Aristotle does in fact speak more of “actions and choice” than of the extrinsic or intrinsic goods themselves, and, specifically, of choice, which precedes the very possession of the extrinsic goods and the very exercise of virtues, as I have shown on the example of the virtue of friendship. The emphasis on choice in the passage provides the following consideration why the extrinsic or natural goods per se are not what Aristotle is concerned here. By emphasizing the choice, Aristotle does entirely destroy the very notion of natural goods – “good” by nature. The overall message of the EE 7, 15 is that extrinsic goods are good for the good man, and bad for the bad man: “The goods men fight for and think the greatest – honour, wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune, and power – are naturally good, but may be to some hurtful because of their dispositions” (1248b27-30), while “to the ‘noble and good’ man they are also noble, for he does many noble deeds by reason of them” (1249a13-14). It is the motive that defines whether natural goods are indeed good: “Objects are noble when a man’s motives for acting and choosing them are noble” (1249a5-6). The ultimate motive or purpose of man’s life is the most final good, which is in the passage under consideration, is identified as theōria of the divine – the standard. Thus, it is theōria that not only demands the limit of the extrinsic goods, but also determines their goodness itself.

Let me now look more closely at the evidence EE provides to prove that the same argument applies to the intrinsic goods as well, i.e., not only does the standard of human life – the exercise of the active intellect – limit the exercise of moral virtues, but it also does ultimately determine their goodness. That is, the moral virtues are ultimately good if and only if they have a purpose of promoting theōria. All this textual evidence testifies that EE is as precise in defining the submissive and secondary place of moral virtues in
relation to *theōria*, as *NE* 10, 7-8 is, thus, clearly showing that moral duty does not have that exclusive place in the human soul which the modern Anglo-American interpreters claim it does.

In *EE* 7, 15, Aristotle states that *teleia aretē* is *kalokagathia* (1249a16-17) (translated as nobility), i.e., it is both beautiful (*kalon*) and good (*agathon*). It is *kalon* (beautiful) because it views the virtuous activity aesthetically – as containing its purpose and, so, its harmonious unity, entirely within itself. *Kalokagathos* practices the good *only* for its own sake, that is, disinterestedly. Moral virtue is indeed the final good – sought for its own sake. The existing interpretation of the concluding chapter of the *EE* is based upon the interpretation of nobility (beautiful good) as applying exceptionally to morally virtuous actions (nobility “looking toward *theōria*”, in Broadie’s terms, 1991, 387). This interpretation assesses Aristotle’s appeal to nobility as an imperative to maximize noble moral action. That is why this passage is not interpreted as laying down limit upon right action as well as the extrinsic goods. And that is why the existent interpretation would reject that the ultimate goodness even of moral action is determined by *theōria*.

Nonetheless, according to Aristotle, the more good is final, with no end external to itself, the more beautiful it is, i.e., more self-contained, with nobility (*kalokagathia*) being the paradigmatic beauty as self-containment, i.e., having its end *entirely* within itself. Moral virtue does not satisfy this criterion because it is not self-contained and not ultimately final, having its most final end above and beyond itself, defined in the *EE* 7, 15 concluding passage as the standard of human life, *theōria*. Thus, moral virtue(s) cannot be called nobility or *kalokagathia*. The teleological inferiority of moral virtue has its existential implications, meaning that moral virtues produce the *energeia* which is in-
compatible with the *energeia* of *eudaimonia*. That is why not only does moral virtue have its ultimate purpose not in itself but in creating conditions for *theōria*, it is a subject to a ruler, *theōria*, in all its own, moral, aspects. I will consider the existential implications of the teleological inferiority of moral virtues in much detail in the next chapter.

Being a subject to a ruler, moral virtue(s) cannot be called nobility or *kalokagathia*. Only *sophia* -- the excellence of the ruler, *theōria*, which is, according to EE 7, 15, the most final *telos* and has its *telos* entirely within itself -- is *kalokagathia*. This line of thought belongs to Aristotle’s *teleological argument against the possibility that happiness could be the compound of moral virtues*. Thus, Kenny, Kraut and Cooper, in their positing that the secondary happy life exhibits practical excellences but lacks *theōria*, simply reinstate the fallacy of the *Laconians*, to whom Aristotle denies nobility precisely for not submitting the works of their moral / practical virtue(s) to the ruler – *theōria*. According to EE 7, 15, Kenny, Kraut and Cooper deprive the practical agent of the only nobility possible. *Lacoonians* are the example of the fact that the compound of successful practical and moral actions does not mean that the most final end is achieved. Therefore, the most final end cannot be possibly said to be a compound of successful practical and moral actions.

*Kalokagathia* is defined in this passage as *teleia aretê* (*ἐστιν οὖν καλοκαγαθία *αρετή τελεία*, 1249a16-17). Thus, the concluding passage of EE proves that *teleia aretê* as nobility is *sophia* with its activity of *theōria*, which is the most final good – the standard, self-contained and practiced disinterestedly. By implication, *teleia aretê* is not moral / practical virtuousness or the compound of moral / practical virtues. Or, in other words, *teleia aretê is not* moral, but purely intellectual; and, moreover, intellectual in the
excellent degree – the nobility of the highest intellectual function, the active intellect.

Accordingly, *eudaimonia as energeia* in accordance with *telea aretē* cannot be the compound of moral virtues, but is *energeia* in accordance with the intellectual nobility – the excellence of the active intellect, *sophia*. Thus, moral virtue *does not* have an exclusive status in the soul, and should submit to its ruler – the active intellect – as slave submits to a master, with its goodness determined by a master.

Besides the *EE 7, 15* concluding passage itself and the *EE* passages on friendship, there is the other evidence in *EE* that the standard – the exercise of the active intellect – does both limit the exercise of moral virtues and determine their goodness. In the *EE 7, 14*, in the passage where he declares that it is the divine element in us which “moves everything” (1248a27-28), Aristotle gives a specific consideration why moral virtue is not final. He says that virtue cannot move the soul, simply because it is just “an instrument of the intellect” (1248a29-30). In the *EE 7, 9*, Aristotle analyzes the relationship between master and his “instrument” or “tool”. The instrument or tool relates to the artisan, as slave to a master: “There is the same relation between soul and body, artisan and tool, and master and slave” (1141b18-19). Being an instrument of *theōria* – the ruler – the moral virtue relates to *theōria* as slave to a master.

Thus, this text confirms that the slave-master terminology (1249b6-9) and a ruling part / subject part terminology (1249b10-11), which Aristotle uses in the concluding passages of *EE 7, 15* under consideration applies not only to the relation between the passive intellect and the active intellect, but also to the relation of moral virtue and the active intellect: “One must … live with reference to the ruling principle and … the activity of the ruling principle, as slave must live with reference to that of the master…” (1249b6-9).
There is no partnership, and, so, no justice between the tool and the artisan, the slave and the master (1241b18-20), continues Aristotle in EE 7, 9. Moreover:

They are not two, but the first term in each pair [soul and body; artisan and tool; master and slave; theōria and moral virtue] is one, and the second a part of this one, but not itself one. Nor is the good to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the one for the sake of which the pair exists… [The inferior function] is as it were a part and detachable tool of the master, the tool being a sort of inanimate slave (1241b19-24).

So, moral virtue being simply an instrument or slave of the active intellect has its own final end being completely submitted to the most final end of theōria. There is no partnership or justice between moral virtue and theōria. Moral virtue belongs to its ruler, theoretic faculty, for the sake of which it ultimately exists. That is why the good is not “to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the one for the sake of which the pair exists”.

Therefore, the fact that man has multiple virtues within the systematic whole (sustēma) of his soul does not mean that the systematic whole is the compound of these virtues. Any sustēma is identified with is highest function, and in the case of the soul -- with the divine function of the active intellect. So, when Aristotle starts the last section of the EE with words: “About each excellence by itself we have already spoken; now since we have distinguished their natures separately, we must describe clearly the excellence that arises out of the combination of them, what we have already called nobility-and-goodness (kalokagathia)” (1248b8-11), he does not refer to the sustēma (structure) in the inclusivist sense (combination), but proceeds to define sustēma in the hierarchical sense of its identification with the highest function – the standard.
This indicates that if, being an instrument or slave of the active intellect, moral action does not have a purpose of submitting to theoria, it does in principle fail to be good notwithstanding that it is good-in-itself in the case when it submits. Or, in other words, its intrinsic goodness is not ultimately final and is subject to its submission to theoria. Hence, the ultimate conclusion of EE is that even for a good man, his every choice should satisfy the standard – the functioning of the theoretic faculty -- in order to correctly determine not only the limit of the extrinsic and the intrinsic goods, but also whether either the extrinsic or the intrinsic goods are ultimately good or bad for him, and whether he himself can be even called a good man. Because the ultimate goodness of moral action / moral virtue is causally determined by theoria which is prior to the moral action / moral virtue, and which is the standard and the happiness of human life, happiness cannot be said to be a compound of moral virtues.

It is evident that 1241b18-24 passage in EE 7, 9 (master is one though the slave is his part); 1248a29-30 passage in EE 7, 14 (moral virtues are simply the instruments of the active intellect); and 1249b6-21 passage in EE 7, 15 (that the standard is theoria) support Aristotle’s argument in 1143b31-33 and 1145a7-12 passages of NE 6, 12 = EE 5; 1168b31-33 passage of NE 9, 8; and 1177b26-1178a6 passage of NE 10, 7 that any sustêma is to be identified with its highest function – the standard. Also it is evident that EE supports Aristotle’ argument in the NE 1, 3, NE 1, 9 and NE 1, 12 that happiness, the most final good, is a cause -- “the best of causes” (NE 1, 9 1099b24) -- rather than effect of compounding extrinsic and intrinsic goods (it “causes the goodness of all these as well”, 1095a28-29), and Aristotle’s overall argument that a good / happy man is a measure of things, not vice versa (see NE 10, 6: “Those things are both valuable and pleasant
which are such to the good man” 1176b25-26; NE 10, 5: “The good man as such is the measure of each thing” 1176a16-17; emphasis added; and NE 3, 4: the good / happy man is “the norm and measure” of things 1113a32-33). By arguing that the kalokagathia / nobility consists in theória, and not in the honourable fulfillment of practical and moral duty, EE 7, 15 does also support the 1168b5-9 passage in NE 9, 8 that it is more noble to forgo moral action in order to be a cause of action via the contemplative motivation of the agent, than to act.

I would like also to point to NE 1, 12 in addition to the evidence I analyzed in this section that EE 7, 15 concluding passage, the 1217a26-28 passage in EE 1, 7, and 1248a26-28 passage in EE 7, 14 do support the 408b17-19 and 408b23-29 passages in the De Anima 1, 4 and the 430a18 and 430a22-25 passages in the De Anima 3, 5, as well as the 1177a14-16, 1177a20-22 and 1177b30 passages in NE 10, 7, and the 1178a18-22 and 1178b21-22 passages in NE 10, 8 on the divine nature of theória. In fact, NE 1, 12 gives a version of the concluding passage of EE 7, 15, arguing that eudaimonia as theória is both divine, i.e., actuality, and a cause of goodness of all the other goods. Happiness “is not to be placed among potentialities” (1101b12-13) and is “a first principle for it is for the sake of this that we all do all that we do, and the first principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and divine” (1102a1-4). Aristotle gives the comparative analysis of happiness and virtues, or, as he puts it, the comparison between “things that are praised” and “things that are prized”. He states that virtue belongs to the first category and is praised always in relation to “something else”, e.g., a proper function and a standard. The second category is “what God and the good are”: “No one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather calls it blessed, as being something more divine and
“better”, the thing “perfect”. It is by reference to the things of this second category that “all other things are judged” (1101b12-32). Hence, contrary to inclusivism, it is impossible that virtues as something only to be praised are the constituents of happiness that is essentially different from them and is the thing to be prized – the divine standard.

Thus, contrary to the universal belief in the modern Aristotelian scholarship that the Eudemian Ethics encourages the unlimited pursuit of the practical excellences in the mixed life, the Eudemian Ethics does fully support the Nicomachean Ethics in arguing against the excess not only in extrinsic goods, but also the intrinsic goods of the soul, submitting them to one, highest, intrinsic good – theoria. All the discussed passages in EE and NE make it evident that Aristotle applies the notions of excess and defect not only as two extremes to determine a mean within this or that moral virtue but to the practical / moral virtues themselves (one by one, and taken together). A certain limit must be laid down to moral and practical perfection. Because Aristotle insists that excess even in regards intrinsic goods-in-themselves, like virtues, is destructive for happiness, Aristotle cannot possibly be said to propound the principle of maximization of moral virtues. This mistake of contemporary interpreters is especially striking in Kraut’s case, who claims regarding the secondary happy life that “the more ethical life is happier” (1991, 9).

That is the major body of the textual evidence that, contrary to the universal belief in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship, Aristotle argues not for, but against the maximization (excess) of moral / practical virtues. The excess or the maximization of both the extrinsic and intrinsic goods does not promote, but impedes happiness. Let me call this line in Aristotle’s argumentation for the isolation criterion of happiness the impediment argument against excess. It is clear that the Eudemian Ethics does fully support the Ni-
comachean Ethics in arguing against the identification of the most final good with the compound of virtues, including moral virtues, and for the identification of the most final good / function or standard of man with theōria. Moral virtue and eudaimonia have different teleological and causal nature. The goodness of man is not defined by right action and moral virtue. It is defined, both causally and teleologically, by the pursuance of the highest standard – theoretic activity, which is prior to action. Also, eudaimonia and moral virtue have different ontological status: eudaimonia is divine or divine-like and cannot consist of the inferior energeiai which are not divine or divine-like. Both treatises argue that a human life is a systematic whole (sustēma) identified with its highest function and structured by measure. The nobility consists in the exercise of the highest function – the active intellect, so that it is nobler to forgo moral action for the sake of contemplation than to undertake moral action, even if “no one is to know of this” (1168b1-4).

Life as such is knowledge, not action, or, more exactly, the self-awareness of this knowledge. If and only if a man undertakes a right action not only for its own sake but also for the sake of the utmost functioning of the ruler, the theoretic faculty, does a good man satisfy a standard of human living, and is good and happy. But if a man makes a choice of right actions, which does not culminate in theōria, he fails to be truly human and is not happy and not good, albeit he is outright morally dutiful.
Chapter 5

The significance of the principles of pain and pleasure / rest for eudaimonia

5.1 Pain inherent in moral virtue: the existential incompatibility between moral virtues and eudaimonia

There are more striking textual proofs that Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper are wrong in believing that there can be a happy life consisting only of moral / practical virtues (the secondary happy life), that is, devoid of theoria. Aristotle spends more time arguing not only against the maximization of moral / practical virtues, but also to make it clear that he would never admit of moral excellences as components of happiness even if they, let’s say, were to be weighed against the other ends in a compound most final end, and limited to a balanced measure. Specifically, he develops his argument for the existential exclusion between human energeiai to prove that man can excel in moral virtues, and still lack happiness. Moreover, even without the maximization of moral virtues, the more does man excel in moral virtues (even if just in one of them), the less he is capable of happiness.

At the very beginning of NE 1, 3, Aristotle points out that goods “bring harm to many people, for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage” (1094b16-19). Here, Aristotle does explicitly speak in terms of happiness being destroyed by a moral virtue, like courage. Evidently, Aristotle does not speak here of the excessive courage, for he defines the excessive courage as rashness (1115b28-29). Man can indeed be destroyed just by one deed of courage. If moral virtue
can destroy happiness (and even man himself), moral virtue cannot be identical with happiness.

Moral excellence as such tends to bring harm to happiness and can even destroy it, repeats Aristotle in the NE 1, 5: “Possession of virtue seems actually compatible with ... the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs” (1095b32-1096a2). This passage does explicitly state that because the possession of virtue comes together with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes, this state of affairs cannot in principle be experienced via the energeia of happiness. And it is clear: the act of courage that destroys one’s life, and, hence, one’s happiness in 1094b16-19 passage is precisely an example of how the possession of virtue is compatible with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes. In fact, the 1094b16-19 passage puts even a stronger stress on the incompatibility between the greatest sufferings and misfortunes, accompanying a morally virtuous life, and the energeia of happiness, for it emphasizes the fact that these greatest sufferings and misfortunes can undo not only man’s energeia of happiness, but man himself.

This connection between virtue and misfortunes / sufferings made so emphatically by Aristotle deserves much attention for it was not given any by previous interpreters, while it appears to be crucial for determining whether moral virtues can in principle be the components of happiness. Contrary to Christianity, Aristotle does absolutely lack the link between praiseworthy saintliness / blessedness and martyrdom. One might say he has an organic repulsion to suffering. And it is noteworthy that even for Christian philosophers, like, for example, Kant, “greatest sufferings and misfortunes” that come with fulfilling one’s moral duty cannot possibly be called happiness. That is why Kant pro-
claims that one should put one’s moral duty over one’s happiness (Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, First Section).

Essentially, misfortunes that come with the exercise of moral duty are caused *not* by the fact that agent sometimes fails in reaching his moral objectives, and *not only* by the fact that virtuous acts are sometimes hard to perform. Misfortune is initially and existentially the state when agents are in need, or not self-sufficient, what, as Aristotle explains in the 1242b6-9 passage of *EE* 7, 10, is the foundation of moral duty in the civil society based on utility and pleasure. But, ever more important is the fact that Aristotle does isolate suffering as the specific existential quality of moral virtues, which is different from misfortune itself. Misfortune is the objective state of agents involved, while their suffering is the subjective and dynamic activity (*energeia*) of their souls – the activity which is their awareness of misfortune. And it does not matter whether an agent performs a moral act to help himself in need or misfortune (e.g., to save himself via a courageous act), or to help another agent in need or misfortune (e.g., to save another via a courageous act), for in the act of perception and intellection, sense organ and mind identify themselves with their objects: “Actual knowledge is identical with its object” (*DA* 430a20; 431a1; *Met.* 1072b18-28). That is, moral virtue is inevitably experienced as the *energeia* of suffering.

Aristotle’s sensibility to suffering *necessarily* accompanying the virtuous acts is a crucial indication that Aristotle construes virtue not only as the state of character (static notion), but also as *energeia* (dynamic notion). “In regard to the virtue, some men are called good in respect to a state of character, others in respect of an activity (*energeia*), so too in the case of friendship” (1157b5-7), says Aristotle in *NE* 8, 5. The exercise of vir-
tue as *energeia* is a specific intellection that is experienced *existentially*, that is, with all the minute reactions of the agent to all the details of misfortune, and, in the case of moral virtues, also highly emotionally, as continuous, contextual activity of the soul, identical with its object – misfortune or the lack of self-sufficiency. Virtue is, in other words, experienced as a process within the soul, and not only as a fixed imperative (to fulfill the praiseworthy moral duty) and as a fixed result (the fulfillment of the praiseworthy moral duty). Thus, while the moral imperative and result are experienced positively, the realization of the initial need and, thus, the lack of self-sufficiency, and the process of coping with this calamity are always painful.

Pain inherent in a virtuous life makes it evident that only a certain measure of pain and, so, virtue, can be endured by an agent who has an organic strive for his individual happiness. But, more importantly, the *energeia* of happiness cannot in principle contain the *energeiai* of moral virtues, for they are painful. Aristotle categorically claims in *NE* 10, 1 that pleasure is “most intimately connected with our human nature” (1172a19-20), so that “men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful” (1172a25-26; 1173a14-15), and, secondly, in *NE* 10, 7 that “happiness has pleasure mingled with it” (1177a23-24) to such a degree that happiness is “the most pleasant thing in the world” (1099a24-25) as he states in *NE* 1, 8. The *EE* 1, 1 supports the point: “Happiness is at once the most beautiful and best of all things and also the pleasantest” (1214a8-9). The *energeia* of happiness as *theoria* is pleasurable in the highest degree possible for humans (1177a24-25). Aristotle insists in *NE* 10, 4: the *energeia* of happiness is most complete / final, and “the most complete [energeia] is pleasantest” (1174b21-22). Pleasure and pain are mutually destructive: they are not neutrals, but opposites (*NE* 10, 2, 1173a10-15).
Consequently, the *energeia* of happiness, as the paradigm of pleasure, and moral duty, as the paradigm of pain, are mutually destructive opposites. In fact, all “*energeiai* are destroyed by their proper pains” (*NE* 10, 5, 1175b17-18), and, in general, *every energeia is destroyed by another energeia* – the point I am considering in the next chapter.

And, indeed, in *NE* 8, 6, Aristotle formulates this opposition between *eudaimonia* and suffering in the most explicit way: “No one could put up with [what is painful] continuously, nor even with the Good itself if it were painful to him” (1158a23-25). Thus, because Aristotle calls *eudaimonia* the Good itself, while he unbreakably links the morally virtuous life with pain, and claims that man cannot put up even with the Good itself if it were painful, *eudaimonia* cannot possibly consist in morally virtuous life (even in the case if moral virtues are measured and even in the case if moral duty is fulfilled successfully). All the textual evidence analyzed above makes very likely that Kenny, Cooper and Kraut are wrong in claiming that the secondary happy life consists only of moral virtues. Had a life consisted only of moral virtues, it would have been utterly painful, and, so, entirely devoid of happiness. Remarkably, the utter submission to suffering is the cornerstone of the Christianized mind.

Analogously, Aristotle states regarding friendship in *NE* 8, 5: “No one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant” (1157b15-17); “People cannot live together if they are not pleasant” (1157b22-23). Because one cannot form a friendship with a man who, though virtuous, is unpleasant, while the morally virtuous life is by definition (analytically) painful or unpleasant, a certain limit is required for the very exercise of moral virtues to allow two virtuous men to form a friendship. This again points out to the
fact that when Aristotle calls the true friendship a certain virtue and a certain energeia, he does not identify the true friendship as a moral virtue and a moral energeia, but evidently as an intellectual virtue and intellectual energeia. That is why he claims that two true friends are equal / self-sufficient in their virtue of friendship, while moral duty does by definition imply inequality (one helps another in need) and the lack of self-sufficiency (that is, pain). Therefore, Ackrill’s inseparability requirement (to be happy is simply to act rightly) fails: right action either does not reach happiness (with all the greatest sufferings involved), or even leads to misery (e.g., a moral agent is destroyed by his courage).

5.2 The passage on the three types of life in NE 1, 5: the significance of the conflation of the moral life with the practical life

The 1095b32-1096a2 passage in NE 1, 5 stating that the moral virtues are inseparable from “the greatest sufferings and misfortunes” is ever more important for it appears inside the NE 1, 5 passage on “three prominent types of life” and whether any of them can be identified with happiness: the pleasurable life, the political life, and the contemplative life. In this passage, Aristotle develops his teleological argument against the possibility for happiness to be the compound of moral and practical virtues, and this passage testifies that Aristotle’s teleological argument is inseparable from his existential argument for the exclusion between human energeiai. Eudaimonia, as the pleasurable self-awareness of one’s self-sufficiency and intrinsic value, cannot be the compound of moral virtues with their painful self-awareness of lacking self-sufficiency and intrinsic value in “the greatest sufferings and misfortunes”, simply because pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive. Apart from this issue, this passage deserves a separate consideration because it discriminates between the honourable life, i.e., the reward-driven practical life, and the
moral life, i.e., the *disinterested* pursuit of moral virtue open to suffering, as *different* types of political life, while mixists, especially Broadie, demonstrate the tendency of conflating these two different types of political life. In this section, I show that this conflation is one of the reasons why inclusivists / mixists are wrong in their interpretation of the Aristotelian *eudaimonia*, and, specifically, of the place the moral virtues have in the Aristotelian *eudaimonia*. By conflating the altruistically painful moral life and the practical life driven by the satisfaction from reward and recognition, mixists suppress the fact that the moral life is inseparable from suffering, and, therefore, incongruent with the *energeia* of *eudaimonia*.

In the passage on the three types of life, Aristotle speaks not of the particular manifestations of moral virtues (which can be too much or too little), but of the morally excellent life *in general* and its suitability for being called happiness *in principle*. Aristotle is absolutely clear, and as early into the treatise as *NE* 1, 5, that the life of moral virtue cannot be identified with happiness. Reaffirming the 1248a29-30 passage in *EE* 7, 14 where he calls moral virtues simply the instruments of the active intellect, Aristotle insists that the moral life is incomplete / not final (1095b31-32); and even though moral virtues “are loved for themselves … it is evident that not even these are ends”, i.e., they lack utmost finality (1096a8-9). At the same time, as he states throughout his *Ethics*, happiness is by definition complete / final (*NE* 1, 7, 1097b5-7) and self-sufficient (*NE* 1, 7, 1097b14-16): “None of the attributes of happiness is *incomplete*” (*NE* 10, 7, 1177b24-25).

Therefore, the view that the secondary happy life can consist only of moral virtues is wrong, first of all, on the teleological grounds, before any other considerations are
made. The life consisting entirely of moral virtues will be *teleologically* insufficient, because such a life cannot *in principle* contain the most final end, says Aristotle. Consequently, this life will be utterly miserable – filled “with greatest sufferings and misfortunes” (1095b32-1096a1; emphasis added). Aristotle’s *teleological* argument against the possibility for happiness to be the compound of moral virtues is inseparable from his *existential* argument against the possibility for happiness to be the compound of moral virtues precisely because, for Aristotle, the end (*telos*) is to be experienced not in the heavenly after-life, like it is in Christianity, but *here* and *now* – and *completely*, reflecting his general metaphysical view on the inseparability of the *eidos* (*telos* as it is given *ontologically* and *functionally* – in *ergon*) from *hyle*. *Eudaimonia* as a certain *energeia* of the soul is the subjective awareness of pleasure, which corresponds to the certain objective state of affairs -- the proper functioning. Moral virtue as a different *energeia* of the soul is the subjective awareness of pain, which corresponds to the different objective state of affairs – malfunction with its aberration and calamity. It is not for nothing that Christianity founds its over-emphasis on moral duty upon the devaluation of the human soul, and, even more, the rejection of its intrinsic value, when the human soul is represented as fallen -- initially corrupted and intrinsically disgraced.

Compare Aristotle’s argument in *NE* 1, 5 also with his argument in *NE* 10, 6:

We must … class happiness as an activity (*energeia*) … and if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else, for happiness does not lack anything, but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity (1176b2-8).
Aristotle continues that “of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deed is a thing desirable for its own sake” (1176b8-10), and that “the happy life is thought to be virtuous” (1177a1). Nonetheless, he immediately reaffirms his stand in *NE* 1, 5 and 1, 7 that “everything that we choose we choose for the sake of something else – except happiness, which is an end” (1176b31-32), or, as he put it in *NE* 1, 10 “happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way final” (1101a17-18). The fact that moral virtue has its ultimate purpose beyond itself is not the only reason why moral virtue is not teleologically final. Though moral deed is desirable for its own sake, it does at the same time necessarily aim at the desirable practical effect beyond itself, e.g., saving a drowning man. Thus, moral virtue involves both the moral *energeia* and the moral act. Moral virtue is good-in-itself only as moral *energeia*, and it cannot in principle be good-in-itself as moral action. Because moral virtue is inseparable from the moral act, it is of the different, inferior, nature than *eudaimonia*, which is exclusively the *energeia* of the soul, self-originated and self-aimed. It is in the very nature of moral virtue to “seek something beyond its own *energeia*”.

The intellectual activity of happiness “seeks nothing beyond itself” because it is superior in itself with no other justification above itself. In other words, it is its own end or end-in-itself precisely because it is hierarchically the *ruler*: “The activity of the better of any two things — whether it be two elements of our being or two men — is *... ipso facto* superior and more of the nature of happiness” (1177a4-6). That is why the self-sufficiency of *energeia* is the other way of defining its teleological and hierarchical superiority. Only the ultimate end-in-itself is self-sufficient and is the ruler. *Theôria* “alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the con-
The activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself” (1177b18-20). And, as I have shown, this, concluding, argument of the NE is identical with the concluding argument in the EE.

The life of honour, the other specific kind of the political life, is also denied its identification with happiness. Aristotle makes it clear that the life of honour is what is usually meant by the political / practical life (honour is, “roughly speaking, the end of the political life”, 1095b22-23), and that the life of honour, or the political life per se, has even less chances than the morally excellent life for being called happiness. Aristotle says that people of superior refinement and of active disposition do indeed identify happiness with honour (superior social standing within the economical and political hierarchy of the society), “but”, he immediately adds, “it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for” (1095b23-24). Aristotle explains in detail.

The reason why political / practical life cannot be identified as happiness is precisely that the political / practical life lacks finality and self-sufficiency. It lacks finality because “men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured in their goodness” and honoured for their virtue, and, so, concludes Aristotle, “virtue is better”, or, in other words, more final an end. That is why he analyzes the morally excellent life after the life of honour, and places the morally excellent life above the practically excellent life (while Broadie does otherwise, arguing that the entire ethics of Aristotle is thoroughly practical, with the celebration of practical climax completing the happy life). The political / practical life lacks self-sufficiency, continues Aristotle, because “it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour, rather than on him who received it, but the good”, emphasizes
Aristotle, “we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him” (1095b24-26). Aristotle’s expression that the good is “not easily taken from man” does mean that the good preserves its goodness even if nobody knows, and, so, is above sociability with its honour or dishonour. Thus, the major difference between the practical and the moral life is their teleological status, or their claim to finality, which translates into the ability to be self-contained or self-sufficient, i.e., independent from the social recognition. The moral life does at least partially have an end in itself, or is intrinsically valuable independently of any extrinsic considerations, including practical success or failure, while the practical life does not have an end in itself, and is justified or condemned by its success or failure. Aristotle supports this line of argumentation in *NE* 10, 7: practical / political actions do not have their final end in themselves, or, in other words, “are not desirable for their own sake” (1177b15-18; emphasis added).

Thus, what Aristotle says about the incompleteness or the teleological insufficiency of the moral life applies even to a stronger degree to the political life. Political life is even more uneasily, troublesome and needy than the moral life because it does completely consist of actions, which always aim at the ends extrinsic to themselves, while in *eudaimonia*, “nothing is sought beyond activity” (*NE* 10, 6 1176b8). When in *NE* 10, 7, Aristotle states that theoria “alone would seem to be loved for its own sake for nothing arises from it apart from [itself]”, he immediately adds that, contrary to theoria, “from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action” (1177b2-4), supporting his 1177b15-18 statement. Though the practical life is often rewarded, it does not bring the ultimate satisfaction on its own, and precisely because it does not have justification in itself. That is why, notwithstanding the external compensation, the practical life is more
miserable than the moral life. *NE* 10, 7-8 gives a series of examples of such a calamity, thus, providing the new twist of Aristotle’s existential argument inseparable from his teleological argument of why neither the moral nor the practical life per se can be identified with *eudaimonia*.

Now it is clear that mixists, especially Kenny, do mistakenly conflate moral excellence and practical excellence and claim, *contrary* to the passage on three paradigmatic lives, that the *EE* happiness in the mixed happy life, governed by *phronēsis* with its practical ideals, and that the *NE* secondary happy life is the celebration of practical excellence, i.e., the paradigmatic practical life (*practical life par excellence*) devoid of the disinterested *energeiai* of the soul. In fact, Kenny is capable of arguing for this interpretation only after he introduces the ‘contradiction’ between *NE*, 1 and 10 and the rest of the Aristotelian Ethics, thus, undermining the conceptual impact of the passage on three paradigmatic lives. Broadie goes even farther than Kenny in her assumption that the *morally* excellent agent is, at the same time, *necessarily*, a practically excellent agent, and, so, if not wealthy, then, at least, well off. Moreover, she is completely convinced that the morally or, in her terms, practically excellent agent must put no limits to his search of material gain (the lowest form of the extrinsic good). The wealthier does man become, the happier he is. *Theōria*, says Broadie, flourishes on material excess. Being economically secure from the pitiful misfortunes of the masses, the practically excellent agent has free time and resources to “celebrate” via *theōria* his practical excellence. The case of Broadie clearly shows that the over-emphasis on the practical life easily translates into the over-emphasis on the extrinsic goods like material gain and honour.
Of course, according to Aristotle, there might be cases when a morally excellent agent is simultaneously a practically excellent agent, and Aristotle is far removed from the Christian legacy of ascetics and hermits who gained their moral excellence in due proportion to losing their material possessions and even the slightest concern with practical affairs. Nonetheless, throughout his *Ethics* Aristotle defined the extrinsic goods only as the *instrumental* goods, that is, as satisfactory conditions for the intrinsic *energeiai* of the soul. See especially *NE* 1, 8 where he considers the external goods to be nothing more than “the equipment” (1099b1-2). The preoccupation with “the equipment” should be limited by a reasonable measure, and precisely because “the equipment” is not *the end-in-itself*. Thus, Aristotle argues for the *limit* of the extrinsic goods, as it is demonstrated especially by the concluding *EE* passage. The *EE* concluding passage fully supports the *NE* 1, 5 passage on the three paradigmatic lives, and, thus, is one of many pieces of textual evidence that Kenny is wrong to call Aristotle ‘contradictory’.

The limit on the extrinsic goods (gain and honour) and, so, the limit on the preoccupation with the extrinsic goods implies the limit on the practical virtues involved. If handling and taking care of “equipment” consume too much time and effort, the agent fails to use “the equipment” for the sake of the end-in-itself. And, as Aristotle argues, neither the moral life per se nor the practical life per se can be called the end-in-itself. In fact, the passage on the three lives shows that the busying oneself with *praxis* is more destructive to happiness, than the preoccupation with moral virtues, because in comparison with the moral life, the practical life, argues Aristotle, does totally aim at the goods *extraneous* to the *energeiai* of the soul, including moral virtues as a specific, inferior, *energeia* and happiness as a specific, superior, *energeia*. This total teleological inferiority
characterizes both the extrinsic goods themselves and the correspondent practical actions, both being merely a *means*. So, when in *NE* 1, 8, Aristotle calls the external goods simply “the equipment” (1099b1-2), his purpose is to bring up the distinction between the extrinsic goods extraneous to the soul and the processes within the soul itself. This distinction is important for his statement that the end itself “falls among goods of the soul [i.e., intrinsic goods] and not among external goods” (1098b18-19), that is, *eudaimonia* is the internal process within the soul -- *energeia*. This passage makes it clear that happiness, being the intrinsic good of the soul, does not include the extrinsic goods as its components. Thus, the recent Cooper is wrong when who argues that happiness *simpliciter* includes the extrinsic goods as its components. *NE* 10, 7-8 provides more textual evidence to prove the recent Cooper wrong on this point, and I will analyze it shortly.

Also the 1098b18-19 passage adds the additional textual evidence it that, because the practical life aims at the goods extraneous to *happiness*, as the intrinsic good of the soul, happiness cannot be identified with the life of practical excellence (as a kind of the political life). And, thus, Broadie is wrong to identify any kind of life as the life of practical excellence, and Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper are wrong to identify the secondary life as the life exclusively of practical excellence without *theôria*. The recent Cooper is especially wrong because he calls the secondary life, thus interpreted, happiness *simpliciter* or the *paradigmatic* happiness. Because it is a penchant of the contemporary Anglo-American interpreters to split Aristotle into bits and pieces, and represent them as inconsistent, they fail to recognize the argumentative line which starts in the *NE* 1, 5 passage on the three paradigmatic lives by giving the examples from life or the existential illustrations of how exactly the practical life aims at the goods extraneous to hap-
piness, thus preparing the grounds for Aristotle’s argument in *NE* 1, 8. Aristotle summarizes, and, in fact, reinforces and intensifies this argument in *NE* 10, 7-8, arguing against the excess of the extrinsic and intrinsic goods and against the identification of happiness with the life of moral / practical excellence as such. The development is so important that I devote the whole section to its analysis (to come next).

Even more, the argument from the identity of *energeia* with its object has the most serious implications for the political / practical life. The virtuous *energeia* of the soul directed at the extrinsic goods are identical with their objects, and, so, are simply of a different and inferior nature than the virtuous *energeia* of happiness that is not aimed at anything beyond itself. Though all that we do we do for the sake of happiness, it is precisely because the practical actions always aim at the extrinsic goods beyond the virtuous *energeia* of the soul that they might *in principle* impede the *energeia* of happiness intrinsic to the soul. This implication of impediment makes it even clearer that, contrary to Cooper’s recent position, the life manifested *only* in the *energeia* of the first kind can by no chance be identified as happiness, and, of course, never as happiness *simpliciter*. The passage on the three paradigmatic lives prepares the foundation for the extensive Aristotle’s argument in *NE* 10, 1-5 for the mutual destructiveness between the different *energeia*, which is also built as the teleological argument for the finality of the good.

The discrimination between the practical life and the moral life in the passage on the three paradigmatic lives is the additional indication that, in Aristotle’s ethical scheme, there is a strict hierarchy between man’s activities, which corresponds to the hierarchy between the parts of his soul. The better parts are more self-sufficient and complete and *pleasurable* (have their purpose more within themselves), while only one, the best or su-
prior, part, i.e., theoretic faculty identified as a ruler at the end of EE and NE, has the utmost finality, the utmost self-sufficiency and the utmost pleasure, and, so, is eudaimonia: “If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be that of the best thing in us... [which is] our natural ruler and guide [that] takes thought of things noble and divine” (NE 10, 7 1177a12-15; emphasis added). Contrary to the belief of inclusivists and mixists, Aristotle’s teleology is not horizontal, but vertical, with value (self-sufficiency, finality, determinacy, and pleasure) increasing to the top of the hierarchical ladder.

In the context of the contemporary Anglo-American Aristotelian studies with their inclination towards Utilitarianism, it is most important that the passage on the three paradigmatic lives clearly posits that the life of moral excellence and the life of practical excellence are the different kinds of political life for Aristotle. And, indeed, it is clear from 1094b16-19 passage that when a morally excelling agent is destroyed by his courage, one cannot possibly say that he is, at the same time, a practically excelling agent. Hence, there is no identity between the agent’s moral excellence and his practical excellence. The falsity of the alleged identity between the moral excellence and the practical excellence is crucial for understanding Aristotle’s attitude to moral virtue, because the alleged identity conceals the vulnerability of a moral agent, and, as a consequence, conceals that happiness cannot in principle be identified with a morally excelling life. Also, it is evident that the mistaken identification of the moral life as the practical life is what does not allow Kenny to cope with the difficulty of the ergon passage in the sense that he interprets excellent functioning from the practical viewpoint -- as the functional effectiveness to be maximized, and, in general, leads Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper to wrong-
fully posit that secondary happiness is a political life *per se* – a practically excellent life without *theōria*. It is precisely the security of the practical agent and his striving to maximize his practical effectiveness that made it plausible for modern Anglo-American Aristotelian scholars, after their identification of the moral agent as the practical agent, to speak of the maximization of moral virtue not as the sacrifice of individual happiness for the sake of moral duty (as it was done for centuries before Utilitarianism and Pragmatism), but from the standpoint of gain and prosperity (and even their excess).

5.3 *NE* 10, 6-8 on leisure as the principle of *eudaimonia*, different from its conditions / additions

Let me look more closely at how all the above arguments by Aristotle, proving that neither moral nor practical virtues can be the constituents of happiness, are summarized and reinforced in *NE* 10, 6-10, where, in a quite humble, and, one might say, anti-heroic [and anti-classic] account of happiness, a middle class man moderately furnished with wealth and honour still finds more sublime happiness than heroes and kings in his contemplation of the divine (and can even aspire to school heroes and kings like Aristotle himself). The more does this man get involved in the political and economical life of society, the more his life becomes unleisurely in acting morally and pursuing material gain, so that the more does he accrue wealth and social recognition, the less he finds himself capable of contemplation – true happiness, or happiness per se. Aristotle insists in *NE* 10, 7-8: excessive involvement in the life of *polis* is a “hindrance” to happiness (1178a28-1178b5).

*Eudaimonia* is indeed self-sufficient or self-dependent by definition (a self-contained *energeia*) (*NE* 10, 6 1176b2-6), and the more we indulge in the excesses of
practical and moral action, the less self-sufficient or less perfect our *energeiai* become, for, in our practical and moral action, we depend on opportunity, other people, material resources and other extrinsic conditions (*NE* 10, 7-8 1177a29-34; 1178a28-34). Consequently, we are less capable of happiness. At the same time, our psychophysical *to sun-theton* ("our composite nature") is *not self-sufficient* "for the purpose of contemplation", and, so, we indeed need "external prosperity", i.e., "our body also must be healthy and must have food and other attention" (*NE* 10, 8 1178b33-1179a1). "Still", emphasizes Aristotle, "we must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or great things, merely because he cannot be supremely happy without external goods; for self-sufficiency and action *do not involve excess*, and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea" (*NE* 10, 8 1179a1-5; emphasis added).

Two things are clear from these two assumptions about self-sufficiency of humans and their happiness. First, Aristotle never conflates the self-sufficiency of the *theōrētikos* as an agent, or rather its lack, with the self-sufficiency of his happiness which is an *energeia* of a "certain kind*. *Eudaimonia*, as the specific *energeia* is self-sufficient, but the *theōrētikos* himself is not. But this conflation is exactly what Kenny and the early Cooper did when they proclaimed that the self-sufficiency of the *theōrētikos* is the self-sufficiency of the marginalized asocial loner who would never sacrifice his engagement in *theōria* in order to save his neighbour from the burning house. Even revised, in its "minimalist" version, Kenny’s account still carries on this fallacy. Second, Aristotle does not interpret the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 10 from the standpoint that "that which is added becomes the excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more de-
sirable”, for here, as throughout the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics* (including the common books), he argues against the excess of both the extrinsic and intrinsic goods.

It is crucial that Aristotle argues against excess for both the perfect happy life (the life of contemplation), and the life happy in a secondary degree: “Even with moderate advantages one can act virtuously (this is manifest enough; for private persons are thought to do worthy acts no less than despots – indeed even more); and it is enough that we should have so much as that; for the life of the man who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy” (*NE* 10, 8 1179a5-9). And, on this issue, he refers not only to the authority of Anaxagoras, the philosopher, who has supposed “the happy man not to be rich nor a despot” contrary to most people who “judge by externals” (*NE* 10, 8 1179a12-15), but also to the authority of Solon, the political leader, who, as Aristotle states, well described a happy man as “moderately furnished with externals but as having done (as Solon thought) the noblest acts and lived temperately; for one can with but moderate possessions do what one ought” (*NE* 10, 8 1179a11-13). It is precisely because the secondary happy life is incapable of ridding itself of excess in action and gain that it falls below the perfect happy life. And because of the excess, the secondary happy life is less self-sufficient. A man happy in a secondary degree has his honour dependent on the extraneous opinion of other people, has his moral action contingent upon the extraneous circumstances and resources, and has his wealth vulnerable to any natural and political disaster (*NE* 10, 8 1178a24-1178b34).

At the same time, contrary to Kenny and the early Cooper, in *NE* 10, Aristotle defines the perfect happy life of the *theōrētikos* as a truly virtuous life, and the *theōrētikos* himself as a genuinely virtuous person. He is a willing and proactive moral agent, for he
is not forced to be moral by utility, necessity or duty, but, as Aristotle puts it, “chooses”
to be moral, with all the weight the notion of choice has in the Aristotelian ethics: “In so
far as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he chooses to do virtuous acts”, and,
continues Aristotle, “he will therefore need such aids [as are needed for virtuous deeds]
to living a human life” (NE 10, 8 1178b5-8; emphasis added). Essentially, when in NE
10, 6-9, Aristotle speaks of a happy man being virtuous in all senses, he does not differ-
entiate between the happiness of the politikos and the happiness of the theōrētikos. He
emphasizes that any happy man is virtuous. Compare NE 10, 6: “The happy life is
thought to be virtuous” (1177a1) with NE 10, 8: “The life of the man who is active in ac-
cordance with virtue will be happy” (1179a8-9).

It is evident that self-sufficiency and moral / practical virtues are not mutually ex-
clusive, only self-sufficiency and the excess of the latter are. In NE 10, 7, Aristotle says:
“The philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser
he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-
sufficient” (1177a34-1177b1). The significance of this passage is that the self-
sufficiency of the theōrētikos is defined by the criterion of isolation (he is self-sufficient
“even when by himself” in his energeia of happiness), but this kind of isolation does not
make him an asocial and amoral person (he can perhaps contemplate better if he has fel-
low-workers, and, in the case of such social interaction, will definitely choose to exercise
the needed social virtues).

Analogously, self-sufficiency and extrinsic goods are not mutually exclusive, only
self-sufficiency and the excess of the latter are. When, in NE 10, 8, Aristotle refers to the
extrinsic goods as the necessary “external equipment” or instruments, he stresses that
both the excellence of reason and the other excellences need it (though sophia needs it “little” or “less than moral virtue does”, 1178a24-25). But the excellences of the soul (which are the intrinsic goods) need the extrinsic goods only as conditions in the case of both the primary and the secondary happy lives. Thus, NE 10, 8 supports NE 1, 8 in positing that the intrinsic goods, with eudaimoinia being the highest intrinsic good, cannot have the extrinsic goods as constitutive parts. Evidently, NE 10, 8 reaffirms that the recent Cooper is wrong when he defines perfect happiness as theoria, but happiness simpliciter as the compound of the intrinsic and extrinsic goods, and makes the possession of the extrinsic goods one of the two differentia along with theoria between perfect happiness and happiness simpliciter (both kinds of happiness possessing moral virtues). At the same time, NE 10, 8 makes it clear that, while eudaimonia does not include gain and honour as its constitutive parts, the self-sufficiency of happiness as the intrinsic good does not make a happy man an ascetic or a hermit.

It is important to take notice that Aristotle treats “conditions” for happiness as additions. For example, when in NE 1, 8, Aristotle defines the external goods as “the equipment” (1099b1-2) and insists that the end itself, eudaimonia, “falls among goods of the soul [i.e., intrinsic goods] and not among external goods” (1098b18-19), he posits that happiness needs “the equipment” or the instrumental goods only “in addition” (1099b7-8; emphasis added). This, on its own, makes it clear that the addition of goods does not make the most final end the composite entity, or even the end-result of addition. It is apparent that Aristotle defines “additions” of the extrinsic goods to happiness as conditions and not as its constitutive parts, the reason being precisely that they are of the different nature, happiness being the intrinsic good and additions being the extrinsic goods. Fur-
ther on, in *NE* 1, 10, Aristotle calls the extrinsic conditions “*mere additions*” (1100b9). This provides the additional textual support that Cooper is wrong in stating that happiness *simpliciter* is the compound of both the intrinsic and extrinsic goods. Aristotle does clearly differentiate between the possession and the exercise of virtue in all its kinds and the “external equipment” needed for such an exercise in both the primary and the secondary happy lives simply as a *mere addition*. While a happy man is sufficiently equipped with the extrinsic goods, he experiences his happiness differently from his experience of its conditions.

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle also argues against confusing happiness with its conditions. In fact, Aristotle devotes the entire *EE* 1, 2 to strictly separate happiness from its conditions: “Health is not the same as the indispensable conditions of health; and so it is with many other things, e.g., the beautiful life and its indispensable conditions are not identical” (1214b14-17). And he complains that the confusion regarding the conditions of happiness is “the cause of the disputes about happy living, its nature and causes, for some take to be elements in happiness what are merely its indispensable conditions” (1214b25-28). Besides this major reason why the extrinsic goods cannot be the elements of happiness, i.e., happiness is an intrinsic good of the soul and that is why it cannot include the extrinsic goods, Aristotle gives in *NE* 1, 10 the other reason why the extrinsic goods, like wealth, cannot be the elements of happiness. He calls the conditions of happiness the “*mere additions*”, because happiness is sufficient in itself in the sense of being stable – “something permanent and by no means easily changed” (1100b2-3) -- while wealth and other extrinsic goods are not stable: “If we were to keep pace with [men’s] fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy
man out to be a chameleon and insecurely based” (1100b2-7). And, so, concludes Aristotle: “Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere additions” (1100b8-9).

All this textual evidence adds additional support for Aristotle’s criterion of isolation. Aristotle’s separation of happiness from its conditions and additions is, in fact, the simplest manifestation of his criterion of isolation. But most important, Aristotle defines all the goods besides theoria, not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic, as its instruments or conditions -- not its components. The intrinsic goods are also merely the additions that do not make happiness a composite or the end-result of addition:

Happiness has been said to be a virtuous activity (energeia) of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments (NE 1, 9 1099b26-28; emphasis added).

Aristotle makes it clear that, while the theōretikos is genuinely moral and sufficiently equipped with extrinsic goods, his happiness is nonetheless not the compound of the intrinsic goods (moral / practical virtues) and the extrinsic goods. Moreover, he does directly state that not just “perfect happiness”, but any happiness consists in contemplation:

“Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself precious. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation” (NE 10, 8 1178b28-32). Recently Cooper did indeed admit that this latter definition of happiness by Aristotle undermines his two major assumptions that (1) only the perfect happiness consists in contemplation, and (2) not only does secondary happiness, happiness simpliciter, never focus on contemplation as the most final end, but
it lacks theoria completely, and consists only in moral deeds. Even more, there is one more place in NE 10, 7 which Cooper missed in his analysis and which gives a more clear indication that he is wrong. At 1177b15-16, Aristotle directly says that the happiness of the politikos or ‘happiness in a secondary degree’ is “different from political action, and evidently sought as being different” (emphasis added). The fact that happiness is “evidently sought as being different” by a statesman himself makes the identification of the secondary happy life exclusively as the political life irrelevant.

Aristotle explains that “the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political and military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely” (1177b6-8), as well as any actions of the statesman (1177b12-13), while “happiness is thought to depend on leisure” (1177b4-5). Importantly, in making leisure the most manifest indication of self-sufficiency, this passage provides a new dimension to Aristotle’s existential argument against the possibility of moral / practical virtues to be the components of happiness, and fully supports the NE 1, 5 passage on the three paradigmatic lives. To say that the political / practical action is unleisurely is the other way of saying that the political / practical actions are existentially incompatible and incongruous with happiness because they deal with strife, misfortune and suffering. Hence, being existentially different, happiness even in the secondary happy life cannot be identified with political / moral action, and, certainly, not with the compound of political / moral actions plus the extrinsic goods like gain and honour. And that is why the politikos is seeking eudaimonia beyond his practical life. Or, in other words, the life of political / moral action cannot in principle be happiness simpliciter or happiness per se. Ultimately, to say that the politikos is seeking eudaimonia as being different is the other way of saying that
the practically excellent life per se is incomplete or insufficient teleologically, meaning that it cannot in principle contain the most final end, which is sought beyond and above the practical life.

NE 10, 7-8 makes it even more clear that, in his representation of the extrinsic goods as the components of eudaimonia, and reducing the human life to gain and honour, Cooper ignores Aristotle’s argument against the excess of the extrinsic goods and practical actions, which is based upon the different nature of the energeia produced in the soul by practical action aimed at utility and the energeia produced in the soul by the contemplation of the divine. Because NE 10, 7-8 summarizes the argument that Aristotle starts in NE 1, 5 in the passage on the three paradigmatic lives, NE 10, 7-8 does in a sense repeat the structure of the passage on the three lives, though on a completely new level. It does distinctly delineate the three possible scenarios: the moral life per se, the practical life per se, and the contemplative life per se. The first two lives considered together as the secondary happy life cannot in principle be happy without theoria, claims Aristotle in both NE 1, 5 and NE 10, 7-8. Even the politikos seeks happiness as contemplation – as the energeia different from his practical actions and concerns. But because his life is too troublesome, he can exercise theoria only in the inferior or secondary degree. And, like the NE 1, 5 passage on the three lives, NE 10, 7-8 gives examples, and, in fact, extensive examples of the situations when an agent needs to limit his wealth, honour and moral duty along with the involved practical and moral virtues in order to free time and effort for the exercise of theoria which is an activity beyond and above the practical life and the moral life. But, in fact, any preoccupation with gain and honour takes the attention of an agent from the intellectual energeia of eudaimonia, which is different and sought as be-
ing different. At 1177b8-12, Aristotle gives the most startling example of the impossibility for the practical life to be the end-in-itself, so that, ultimately, eudaimonia, an end-in-itself, is sought as being something else: “Warlike actions are completely [unleisurely] (for no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter”. In the same spirit, the life of gain for the sake of gain, or of honour for the sake of honour, or of moral duty for the sake of duty is entirely senseless in Aristotle’s view. Without theória, efforts to gain utility and fulfill duty are analogous to Sisyphus’ labours.

The intellectual energeia of eudaimonia is different because it is restful, and it is restful precisely because it is disinterested: it does not look for the motive, impetus, justification, and reward from the outside of itself. Hence, NE 10, 7-8 gives the final variant of Aristotle’s teleological argument with its existential implications against the maximization of moral / practical virtues and the possibility for happiness to consist of moral / practical virtues. In Aristotle’s ethics, disinterestedness is a synonym of the term ‘self-sufficiency’. The practical / political agent cannot be disinterested in virtue of definition, argues Aristotle in the NE 1, 5 passage on the three paradigmatic lives, and in NE 10, 7-8.

Besides eudaimonia, only the moral virtues possess the quality of being disinterested. Nonetheless, even the moral virtues are not disinterested entirely, and precisely because, as Aristotle argues, they seek happiness above themselves – as being different from the misfortunes and suffering inseparable from the moral virtues. In my next section, I will show that the theörētikos is actively involved in polis by formulating the theoretical foundation of the social and political life. And it is precisely the disinterested – the dif-
ferent and superior -- nature of *theōria* that makes it a ruler over the practical / political life per se – the life of gain and honour.

*NE* 10, 7-8 argument repeats or, rather, summarizes the *NE* 1, 5 argument even in its details. Compare *NE* 1, 5: the political / practical life lacks self-sufficiency, because “it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour, rather than on him who received it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him” (1095b24-26) with *NE* 10, 8: “The self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity. [For] the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the philosopher, even by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is” (1177a28-35).

All this textual evidence against the leading position in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship on happiness *simpliciter* is an indication that the last three chapters of *NE* 10 need a more careful textual analysis to determine whether two happy lives (the secondary and the primary) are differentiated by the absence and presence in them of *theōria*, or they are differentiated by something else, i.e., by the criterion of isolation in relation to the excess of the extrinsic and intrinsic goods. If there is textual evidence in these chapters of the *NE* 10 that the philosopher is not only sufficiently equipped with the extrinsic goods and not simply participates in the socio-political life of the *polis*, but is responsible for the virtue of all and every citizen in the *polis*, and, so, occupies *the clue role* in the socio-political life of the *polis* – the role that determines the socio-political life itself, via formulating its structure and the prerogatives of actions for the burgher himself and making the burgher internalize them as his own, then it would be proven that the secondary
life cannot in principle lack theoria, and theoria is not only the most final end even in the secondary happy life, but is the determining factor in this life and throughout this life. And, thus, the true criterion to differentiate between the secondary happy and the primary happy lives is the criterion of isolation in relation to excess, i.e., the ability to achieve the measure “that is fixed for all” – the standard of theoria. Indeed, Aristotle devotes the entire chapter 9 of NE 10 to the integration of the theoretkos into the life of polis.

5.4 NE 10. 8 on theoretkos being the paradigmatic moral agent most capable of apprehending the facts of life / establishing measure for the sake of leisurely theoria

NE 10, 9 was not given any attention by previous interpreters, though its significance is crucial in deciphering the riddle of the notion of the self-sufficiency and finality of happiness in relation to moral and practical virtues. It serves as a smooth transition of NE 10 into the Politics, formulating in a sketch the definition of the role philosophy has in the polis, developed in the Politics. I consider the relevant passages form the Politics at the end of this chapter. To fully appreciate the significance of NE 10, 9 and the consistency of the last three books of NE, I proceed now to analyze how the last passages of NE 10, 8 prepare the ground for the argument in NE 10, 9.

Right at the end of NE 10, 8, Aristotle points out that the theoretkos acts most rightly and nobly among the citizens of the polis:

Gods should reward those who care for the things that are dear to Gods “and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the philosopher is manifest. He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably be also the happiest; so that in this way too the philosopher will more than any other be happy” (1179a27-33; emphasis added).

Thus, not only is the theoretkos a genuine moral agent, but he is an exemplary and, even, a paradigmatic moral agent. This passage makes it clear that Kenny and the early Cooper
are simply not faithful to the text when they paint the *theōrētikos* as an amoral loner. The fact that the *theōrētikos* acts *most* rightly and nobly, but his *eudaimonia* does not at the same time consist in acting most rightly and nobly requires a different relation between the *energeia* of *theōria* and moral *energeiai* than either the relation of exclusion or the relation of inclusion or the relation of mixing. The relation of exclusion (even in its minimalist expression by the recent Kenny) misses the fact that the *theōrētikos* is a paradigmatic moral agent – the best moral agent possible who acts *most* rightly and nobly among the citizens of the polis – by choice and not duty. On the other side, both the relation of inclusion and mixing miss the fact that his *eudaimonia* is the *energeia* of a certain (exclusive) kind identical with its certain (exclusive) object – different from the moral action and moral *energeia* and sought as being different.

Noticeably, Aristotle develops this argument for the *theōrētikos* being an exemplary moral agent in the context of his considering the difference between *theōria* and mere theory, and the role *theōria* plays in making paradigmatic moral agents. This parallelism of two argumentative lines is briefly summarized at the end of *NE* 10, 8, and is extensively studied by Aristotle throughout *NE* 10, 9. After analyzing the opinions of Solon and Anaxagoras on happiness as incongruent with excess and different from practical action, Aristotle states: “The opinions of the wise seem, then, to harmonize with our arguments”, and continues that such arguments carry some degree of conviction, but “the truth in practical matters is discerned from the facts of life, for these are the decisive factor” (1179a13-20; emphasis added). What strikes about this statement is that Aristotle considers the issue of happiness to be important for practical matters, and makes the apprehension of the facts of life the decisive factor for happiness. He makes this statement
regarding any kind of happiness, not just happiness in the secondary degree. At the same
time, Aristotle argues in NE 10, 7-8 that in both happy lives, happiness consists in 
theoria. This is another categorical indication that those interpreters who considered theoria identified as happiness in the NE 10 to be irrelevant to the practical matters of life are wrong. There is supposed to be in the human soul an intellectual faculty that is responsible for grasping the facts of life, and, so, in NE 10, 9, Aristotle goes on to postulate, as elsewhere in his Ethics, that it is the active intellect with its energeia of theoria, to the most degree practiced by a philosopher, that grasps the facts of life. In NE 10, 9, Aristotle is quite clear that theoria functions as a political theory formulating for the citizens of the polis the facts of life.

Aristotle insists on the opposition of theoria, as the type of intellection that is capable of apprehending the facts of life, and mere theory that is not:

The truth in practical matters is discerned from the facts of life; for these are the decisive factor. We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must suppose it to be mere theory. Now he who exercises his reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to gods (NE 10, 8 1179a20-24; emphasis added).

First of all, this passage is the other piece of evidence that those modern interpreters who interpret theoria as “mere theory” and condemn NE 10, 7-9 for the indifference of a philosopher to the facts of life make a mistake. Meanwhile, not only does Aristotle argue in NE 10, 9 that it is theoria that grasps the facts of life and, so, is in no way a mere theory (either as academic theorizing, or as the other-worldly rapture of a mystic), but he provides specific examples of how theoria plays a ruling role in the polis, i.e., the details of how exactly theoria as political theory organizes the polis and makes its citizens good
and happy. Consequently, because a theōrētikos possesses the energeia of theôria to the perfect degree, he is the agent who acts rightly and nobly to the perfect degree.

Secondly, in this passage, there is the definitive transition from the statement about the facts of life to the statement about the cultivation of reason, stipulating that the cultivation of reason leads to the best state of mind, and this is most dear to gods. The transition is too abrupt, and its significance in this passage and for the entire Aristotelian Ethics was not yet considered in the modern Aristotelian scholarship (meanwhile, this abruptness is the other indication that the known text of Aristotle’s ethics is rather a compendium of notes taken at the lecture, or for the lecture). This transition implies the essential connection between facts of life and reason (nous). Reason featured here is the contemplative nous: the philosopher is most loved by gods, because gods’ only activity is contemplation (NE 10, 8 1178b22-23) and they “delight in that which is best and most akin to them (i.e., contemplative reason)” (NE 10, 8 1179a25-27). Thus, the passage is clear that theôria as the political theory, though not a mere theory, is the divine or divine-like energeia most akin to the energeia of gods, and, so, is different from “the truth in practical matters” formulated by phronēsis. At the same time, phronēsis is dependent on theôria for the grasping the facts of life.

The essential connection between the facts of life and contemplative nous is as follows: the fact is a first principle, states Aristotle in the NE 1, 7 (1098b2-3). And, as Aristotle insists in the NE, 6 and the Posterior Analytics, only the intuitive reason (nous) / the active intellect with its energeia of theôria is capable of grasping the first principles, and the intuitive reason (nous) / the active intellect is a part of philosophia, not phronēsis (1141a17-18). Because for Aristotle, eidos (the universal) is separable from hyle (the
particular) only in abstraction, *nous* is capable of seeing or *contemplating eidos* within *hyle* in the act of the direct intuitive observation. The fact of life or the first principle is the ontological unity of the universal and the particular. If man fails to intuit the universal within the particular, he fails to act with understanding. Evidently, *NE* 10, 9 supports all the other evidence I analyzed in my chapter 3 and 4 to show that *theôria*, as the activity of the active intellect, is the *ergon* of man, the ruler of his soul, and the uncaused cause and the unmoved mover of everything man does, feels, and thinks. *Theôria* intuits the first principles as *the facts of life* and formulates human ends in both speculative and productive sciences. It is precisely because *theôria* is the special case of *observing* life – the intuitive vision of the facts of life -- that Aristotle’s *theôria* is not a speculation of the discursive intellect (pure reason) in the Kantian or Hegelian sense, and not a scientific demonstration in the Aristotelian sense. This brings us to the very origin of the word *‘theôria* which derives from the Greek verb *θεωρέω* -- to look at, view, behold, observe, consider, that is, see with understanding, so that *theôria* does also signify “being a spectator at the theatre or public games” (see Liddell and Scott’s entry on *theôria*).

In fact, the verb *θεωρέω* is used constantly throughout the *Ethics* to refer to the intuitive understanding – the immediate observation of the truth. For example, when in *NE* 1, 7, Aristotle says that “of first principles we *see* some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways” (1098b3-5), the word he uses (‘see’) is *θεωρέω*. Aristotle uses this word also in *NE* 1, 10, when he says that “stability will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and *contemplation*…” (1100b18-20) in Ross’ translation, or “in doing and *contemplating* the
things that are in conformity with virtue” in Rackham’s translation; and in \textit{NE} 1, 13, when he says that “the student of politics must \textit{study} ("contemplate") the soul”. In \textit{NE} 4, 2, Aristotle uses the noun \textit{θεωρια} to signify the observation with understanding when, speaking of the magnificent man, he says: “the \textit{contemplation} of such an achievement inspires admiration” (1122b17). When, in \textit{NE} 6, 1, Aristotle confirms his division of the rational element into the passive intellect and the active intellect, he uses the verb \textit{θεωρεω} when he refers to the active intellect: “There are two parts which grasp a rational principle – one by which we \textit{contemplate} the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable; and one by which we \textit{contemplate} variable things” (1139a7-9). This passage confirms that the active intellect intuits the ends and the first principles in both speculative and productive sciences. Nonetheless, even within the variable, the active intellect intuits or \textit{sees} the invariable ("determinate") – truth. See on this \textit{NE} 6, 2 where Aristotle also uses the derivative of the noun \textit{θεωρια}: “Of intellect which is \textit{contemplative}, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad functioning (\textit{ergon}) are truth and falsity respectively” (1139a27-29).

Analogously, Aristotle uses the term ‘contemplating’ as signifying \textit{a priori} consideration or intuitive (immediate) understanding when in \textit{NE} 6, 5, he says: “We may arrive at the definition of the practical wisdom by considering (‘\textit{contemplating}’) who are the persons whom we call practically wise” (1140a24-25). Aristotle’s answer to this question – who are the practically wise men (\textit{φρονιμοι}) – is: they are those who exercise the \textit{energeia} of \textit{theoria}: “Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom because they can \textit{see} (‘\textit{contemplate}’) – or, in Rackham’s translation, “possess the faculty of discerning” (‘\textit{contemplating}’) – “what is good in themselves and what is good for men in gen-
eral” -- “for mankind” (1140b8-10; emphasis added), i.e., the universal. Only theōria can contemplate the universal. And these two passages are crucial for understanding that, because not only the sophoi but also the phronimoi can contemplate the universal, and because the practically wise men are practically wise only because they also exercise theōria, neither the inclusive / mixist nor the exclusivist account of theōria are correct. The inclusivist account misses the fact that theōria is hierarchically superior to all the other energeiai of the soul, and can neither include them within itself, nor be included on a par with them within some compound. Even phronimoi use theōria as the ruling function of their souls. The exclusivist account misses the fact that theōria is the ruling function in a sense that it indispensable even for the action itself – action done without theōria is the action done without understanding. Theōria is not a rapture of the mystic, but an ability to consider and grasp the facts of life. The recent belief of Kenny, Kraut and Cooper that happiness simpliciter lacks theōria completely misses the fact that theōria is the very ergon of every man – every man is a man if and only if he acts with understanding, i.e., exercises theōria, the activity of the active intellect. Man differs from other animals by the ability to see, ‘contemplate’, the universal.

In the same spirit, Aristotle uses θεορεω to refer to the same kind of consideration as if the immediate vision of truth in NE 6, 12 (1143b18-19) and in NE 7, 3 (1146b32-1147a3). In NE 7, 11, he directly says, “it is the business of the political philosopher to examine (‘to contemplate’) the nature of pleasure and pain” (1152b1-2). Finally, as I have already shown, the extremely happy man acquires friends only for the purposes of self--contemplation and mutual contemplation: “The extremely happy man will require good friends insomuch as he desires to contemplate actions that are good and
that are his own, and the actions of a good man that is his friend are such” (NE 9, 9 1170a2-5); and “we are better able to contemplate our neighbours than ourselves” (NE 9, 9 1169b34). Thus, Broadie is wrong to claim that theoria is a virtual non-entity in the NE till chapter 7 of Book 10. I have collected all these instances of the word θεωρεω and its derivatives to make clearer the logic of the concluding books of the NE. After reinforcing the special hierarchical status of theoria as a ruler in NE 10, 7-8, Aristotle goes on, in NE 10, 9, to explain how exactly theoria rules – both in the polis, and in the soul of every man. In the process of doing so, Aristotle systematizes and summarizes the instances of using θεωρεω by both theorētikoi and politikoi in both speculative and productive sciences.

All the above instances of using the notion of theoria analyzed in the context of Aristotle’s discrimination between theoria and mere theory in NE 10, 8 and 9 clarify NE 1, 4 where Aristotle does also refer to the facts of life and to the ability to discern the facts of life as the major impetus for becoming good, i.e., virtuous in all senses. Otherwise, taken on its own, NE 1, 4 is too sketchy, and was misinterpreted by inclusivists / mixists, specifically Broadie, as referring to the facts of life as the objects, first, of sense perception and, then, pragmatic deliberation. Below, I offer a new interpretation of NE 1, 4 which takes into consideration all the relevant passages.

Aristotle starts NE 1, 4 by stipulating that eudaimonia is the telos of the political science, and that, there is “very general agreement” that happiness is “the highest of all goods” (1095a13-19). Nonetheless, though happiness is generally identified with “living well and doing well” (1095a19), different people give different, and, moreover, contradictory accounts of what constitutes “living well and doing well”. Most importantly, “the
many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour” (1095a21-23). Even more, “they differ from one another – and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension” (1095s23-27). On its own, this is a perfect criticism of Broadie’s position, for her paradigm of happiness as practical excellence (“some good”) implies the acceptance of the diverse accounts of happiness and the shifting of the central good by the practical necessity. Nonetheless, Aristotle explicitly states that the practical accounts of happiness are contradictory. Because they are contradictory, the generalization via induction is impossible. At the same time, because people give the contradictory accounts of many particular goods, The Good – the universal – cannot be the compound of many particular and contradictory goods. That is why Aristotle proceeds to claim that the account of happiness is intuited as the unqualified – *a priori* – universal truth by the active intellect.

Aristotle states, definitely referring to Platonists, that: “Some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well” (1095a27-29; emphasis added). As it is clear from the following chapters of *NE* 1, which I have already analyzed, Aristotle agrees with Plato that the most final good (the universal) is indeed self-subsistent in isolation or “apart from these many goods” (*NE* 1, 7, 1097b9-19), and that it does indeed cause the goodness of the particular goods (*NE* 1, 12, 1102a1-4A), so that, the account of happiness belongs to the truth “without qualification”, i.e., universal truth, though, for Aristotle, inseparable from and intuited within the particular. Thus, *NE* 1, 4 prepares Aristotle’s overall argument in *NE*. 
In the context of his overall argument, *NE* 1, 4 confirms that because The Good is self-sufficient in isolation or “apart” from many particular goods, it cannot be the compound of the particular goods. Also, it is clear from this statement that The Good is self-subsistent precisely because it is isolated, i.e., set apart from the particular goods.

At this point in his argument in *NE* 1, 4, Aristotle emphasizes: “Let us not fail to notice that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles”, and confirms that Plato “was right in asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the way from or to the first principles?’” (1095a30-33). Aristotle stresses that “while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses – some to us, some without qualification” (1095b1-3). It is evident that the objects of knowledge without qualification are the first principles (the universal). It is important to keep in mind that the fact is a first principle, as Aristotle states in the *NE* 1, 7 (1098b2-3) – separable from the particular only in abstraction. And it is also evident that by “things known to us” Aristotle does not define our diverse and contradictory opinions about the many particular goods, determined by our particular experiences and formulated by our discursive mind, i.e., practical / passive intellect. It is precisely because the passive intellect yields the contradictory accounts of the good, and, so, its generalization via induction is unreliable, that knowledge (invariable, necessary and universal by definition) is impossible in this case. Passive intellect cannot in principle grasp the fact of life.

When we rationalize our particular empirical data, we employ arguments to the first principles. We do indeed begin with things known to us, says Aristotle (1095b3-4). That is why, says Aristotle, the students of ethics must have been brought up in good habits to be capable “to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, gen-
eraly, about the subjects of political science”, for “fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points” (1095a30-1095b7). Reason featured in this passage is evidently the discursive mind, i.e., the passive intellect employed in the scientific demonstration and practical deliberation. And the ability of immediate understanding as if spontaneous vision, as being different from the discursive reason, is precisely the activity of theòria (intuitive seeing) featured in all the relevant passages using the word θεωρεω, which I have discussed in this section. Only theòria is actually capable of reaching “to the first principles”, i.e., the facts of life. Thus, NE 1, 4 in its 1095a30-1095b7 passage does claim the essential connection between the ability to contemplate the universal within the particular and the correct and regulated habituation.

Theòria sees the universal in any particular, i.e., it is not limited to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies. All the aspects of good upbringing (not only astronomy) cultivate man’s ability of theorizing. Good upbringing means the imposition of beautiful and good (kalon and agathon) habits, so that a habituated life, in this context, is essentially the harmoniously or measurably organized particulars. Habit here is rather the self-awareness of the order (the universal), than the automatization of action, when action is done routinely as if automatically. Or, in other words, beautiful and good (kalon and agathon) habits in a habituated life reveal the universal to the mind in the most effective way. It happens because of the identity of mind and its objects. What Aristotle states here is: in order to have the organized mind, you should have the organized life. This point is crucial for understanding the connection between theòria and moral virtue. In NE 10, 9 and Politics 8, Aristotle directly claims that the philosopher with his activity of
theōria is responsible for the correct and regulated habituation of the citizens. And, at this point, NE 1, 4 ends.

Contrary to this interpretation, Broadie, and inclusivists / mixists in general claim that this last section of NE 1, 4 proves that the student of ethics or any good man, for that matter, does not need theōria to determine which course of action is good. They say, man simply needs good upbringing – virtuous habituation – to be good. It is clear now that they are capable of claiming that theōria is irrelevant to and ineffective in moral upbringing only because they interpret reason, referred to in the passage, as theōria and they interpret theōria as mere theory, i.e., abstract speculation (pure reason, in Kantian terms). That is why they all, except Hardie, insist that the rational faculty that grasps the facts of life – the starting points – is phronēsis. But, in fact, this latter section of NE 1, 4 is an extremely concise rendering of the major epistemological points made by Aristotle throughout his corpus, including Ethics, and especially in the Posterior Analytics.

Among all reviewed interpreters, only Hardie acknowledges that, though a student of ethics starts with sense perception and induction, because, for us, says Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, but not in the natural order of knowledge, particulars come before universals, man apprehends the first principles not by sense perception and induction (1.2, 71b33-72a5; 34). Though the lowest animals have sense perception and inductive reasoning (Aristotle says, they have practical wisdom), they do evidently lack the understanding of the first principles. Only humans possess the active intellect that intuits the universal within the particular in the immediate a priori vision or theōria. It is theōria that apprehends the first principles in induction (apagōgê), perception (aisthēsis), habituation (ethismos), and in other ways (1098b3-4; 37). In fact, habituation of virtue is
possible only after the agent is conscious of his virtuous action, i.e., does it not by chance, routinely or under the pressure from outside, but by his own choice and with understanding – the immediate *a priori* conviction. This means that he will act virtuously even if he would never get rewarded, even if he knows he will fail, and even if nobody would ever get to know of his virtuous deed. The will to act virtuously precedes action itself in the self-realization of the first principles before any spatio-temporal necessity to act emerges.

Here is the last consideration before I proceed to the analysis of *NE* 10, 9. It is important to note that the extensive usage of the word θεωρεω throughout the *NE* prepares the subtleties of separation between the secondary and the primary happy lives in *NE* 10, 8. Evidently, both *theorētikoi* and *politikoi* use *theoria*, because they are men only in virtue of exercising their *ergon* of the active intellect. But *theorētikoi* have more leisure to exercise *theoria* more intensely and in the larger scope – contemplating *cosmos* in a wider spectrum. Also, the criterion of hierarchy is as important as the criterion of leisure and scope. In comparison with the *politikoi*, the *theorētikoi* intuit the universal / the divine within the higher order particulars (objects of contemplation), i.e., the heavenly bodies.

Aristotle’s statement that the more man exercises *theoria*, the happier he is, implies that man should in ideal put no limits on his exercise of *theoria*. Nonetheless, *NE* 10, 7 sounds in a very sober and sad key, when Aristotle explicitly states that this ideal is too high for a man: “Such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the
exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life” (1177b26-31). Thus, Kenny and the early Cooper do simply overstate Aristotle’s preference of \textit{theōria} to anything else human exercises. Yes, Aristotle encourages us “to, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything” (1177b33-1178a2). Nonetheless, even the \textit{theōrētikoi} cannot devote his entire life to contemplating the highest order objects. This returns us to the important feature of Aristotle’s view on \textit{eudaimonia}. The \textit{energeia} of \textit{eudaimonia} is self-sufficient and divine, and man should try his best to overcome limits in its exercise. \textit{But}, man, as a physical being, is not self-sufficient, and his life cannot in \textit{principle} consist only of contemplating the highest objects. That is why even the \textit{theōrētikos} as an agent in the \textit{polis} will inevitably put limits to his exercise of \textit{theōria}, e.g., he will sleep. And, so, in \textit{NE} 7, 12, Aristotle says, “even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to health” (1153a21), i.e., when the \textit{theōrētikos} does not get enough sleep. Thus, insisting on a high ideal of \textit{theōria} with no limits for man, Aristotle does at the same time refuse to idealize his view on the clue role of \textit{theōria} in human life.

5.5 \textit{NE} 10, 9 on the role of \textit{theōria} in the systematization of \textit{polis}

Now let me give the analysis of how exactly Aristotle formulates in \textit{NE} 10, 9 the role of \textit{theōria} in grasping \textit{the facts of life}, and, so, the role of the philosopher in the \textit{polis}. He starts with the following words, which are the additional evidence that Book 10 in its concluding chapters is nothing else than a summary of the major points of the entire \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, preparing a transition to the \textit{Politics}:
If these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure, have been dealt with sufficiently in outline, are we to suppose that our programme has reached its end? Surely, as the saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them; with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good (1179a33-1179b3; emphasis added).

These words continue the argument in NE 10, 8 stating that the philosopher is the best ever -- the paradigmatic -- moral agent, who is intensely and intentionally concerned with becoming good. Now NE 10, 9 will show that the philosopher is also intensely and intentionally concerned with making his fellow citizens good. This take on becoming good via theōria – the contemplation of the facts of life -- throws a very different light on the beginning passages of NE 1, which almost literally repeat the same motto that it is better to become good than to reason well about the good: “The end aimed at is not knowledge but action” (NE 1, 3 1095a4-5). It appears that Aristotle does not argue that it is important to act rather than to know. He argues that it is important to act with knowledge – the knowledge of the universals, which the active intellect intuits or contemplates within the particulars. In fact, it is possible to act good if and only if one has knowledge. The knowledge of universals is the indemonstrable first premise in both the scientific and practical syllogism. Phronēsis is incapable of grasping a priori indemonstrable first premise. Therefore, to act good, man needs politics as science. Aristotle starts NE and concludes NE on the same note: the telos of writing an ethical / political treatise by the philosopher is to formulate in which sense the political theory or theōria is indispensable for the legislation of the polis and for making citizens good and happy.

Thus, both inclusivists and exclusivists fail to grasp the connection between theōria and praxis. Disconnecting theōria and praxis, both inclusivists and exclusivists
claim that *theōria* is irrelevant to the practical life. Nonetheless, Aristotle proves in the argument developed throughout his corpus that because only *theōria* is capable of grasping the facts of life, it is simply indispensable for *praxis*. *Praxis* grows out of the knowledge of facts of life, and *phronēsis* itself is impossible without the intuitive reason being a part of *sophia*. *NE* 10, 9 develops and completes the argument in *NE* 1, 4. Because it is impossible to act good without knowledge of the facts of life, a philosopher should teach his fellow citizens, and, if this is effective only for some of them, he should force his knowledge by legislation upon the entire society. Thus, not only is knowledge crucial to acting right on the individual level, knowledge should become an active force on the social level. This means that it should mold the souls even of those who are themselves devoid of knowledge. A philosopher applies habituation established and regulated by the law to those who are young and, so, yet immature to act upon conviction and to those who are inferior by nature and, so, simply incapable of acting upon conviction under any circumstance. Being habituated to the right ways, the former mature and become capable of contemplating themselves the facts of life; and the latter are controlled like beasts of burden. Thus, habituation appears to be an application of knowledge, rather than something opposed to it, as both inclusivists and exclusivists argue.

Let me look at the argument in *NE* 10, 9 closer. Because the purpose of writing a political treatise is to investigate how to make citizens good, Aristotle concludes his political treatise *Nicomachean Ethics* with the summary of three ways of how citizens are made good: by nature, teaching and habituation (1179b20-21). He says:

Nature’s part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some divine causes is present in those who are truly fortunate; while arguments and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the soul of the student much
first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed (1179b21-26).

That convictions are not powerful with all men is the second bitter acknowledgement Aristotle makes in the concluding books of *NE* after admitting in *NE* 10, 7 that the life of *theōria* is too high an ideal for a man, even a philosopher. This does not mean that arguments are not powerful, but they are powerful only with the noble souls, which are born already prepared for *theōria*. Or, as Aristotle puts it, the arguments “have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among our youth, and to make character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue” (1179b7-10). But arguments are not able to encourage the many to goodness, for they have inferior nature and are simply incapable of understanding / *theōria*, i.e., “these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment” (1179b11-13). The many live by passion like beasts and “have not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant” (1179b15-16). They will not hear argument that dissuades them, nor understand it if they do (1179b27-28). They yield only to force (1179b28-29). It is hard, stresses Aristotle, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character (1179b4-17). In becoming good, the character must be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base (1179b29-31). Therefore, for those who are not born with a gentle nature, the right training (habitation) is essential.

But right training is impossible without right laws, “for to live temperately and hardly is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young”. And for this rea-
son, “their nurture and occupation should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when they have become customary” (1179b32-1180a1). And we would need laws for adults as well, and such laws that would cover the whole of life, “for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of what is noble” (1180a1-4). Thus, the task of legislators is to stimulate men to virtue and urge them forward by the motive of the noble (1180a5-6) by establishing a right order in the society, and specifically regulating education. Aristotle formulates his ethical message as follows: “A good man, since he lives with his mind fixed on what is noble, will submit to argument, while a bad man, whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by pain like a beast of burden” (1180a9-11). He insists: there should be public and proper care by legislation for the questions of nurture and occupations (1180a25-30). This line of thought repeats almost literally the line of thought in NE 1, 1 where Aristotle says, politics is the most authoritative art or the master art because it is the science which “ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them” (1094a27-1094b2). Aristotle says that that “even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve” (1094b8-10). Aristotle defines “telos of the state” as the measured order of the polis, making the polis into the systematic whole aimed at the maximum realization of theoria by its citizens, so that “the whole of life” is organized to perfection both functionally and teleologically. Aristotle explains further in NE 1, 1: politics “uses the rest of the sciences and, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from” (1094a25-1094b7).
Nonetheless, the legislation should be balanced between the publicly regulated matters, and privately regulated matters. Aristotle considers this issue from the point of view of the balance between the universal rule and the particular in each case. “But”, stresses Aristotle, “the details can be best looked after” only by somebody “who has the general knowledge of what is good for every one or for people of a certain kind (for the sciences both are said to be, and are, concerned with what is universal)” (1180b12-16; emphasis added), so that “if a man does wish to become master of an art or science he must go to the universal and come to know it as well as possible; for, as we have said, it is with this that the sciences are concerned” (1180b20-23; emphasis added). This passage confirms that, not only science, but also any “art”, i.e., productive activity of man depends on man’s ability to theorize. And even more, the very existence of the *polis* depends on the ability of its citizens to theorize – to intuit the universals.

Thus, *NE* 10, 9 summarizes Aristotle’s major claim in his *Ethics* that the social order with its law and morals is possible only through the knowledge of universals, though, intuited within a particular, while the bare particular stripped from the universal can provide us only with the opinion. And only science using the activity of *theōria* can formulate for us the *a priori* knowledge of universals. Finally, concludes Aristotle, “he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better by his care must try to become capable of legislating” and “if any one can do it, it is *the man who knows*, just as in medicine and all other matters which give scope for care and prudence” (1180b23-29; emphasis added). The man *who knows* is a *sophos* or a philosopher. Thus, it is the man *who knows* – a *sophos* who exercises *theōria* -- that is at the same time the best *phronimos*. *Phronēsis* and *praxis* are impossible without *theōria* as political science which is the
knowledge of universals in the political sphere, or, as Aristotle calls it on the last page of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, “our philosophy of human nature” (1181b16-17). Hence, exclusivists are wrong to make the *theōrētikos* the asocial and apolitical loner. Not only is the *theōrētikos* neither asocial nor apolitical, but he is in fact the most social and political member of the *polis*. The *theōrētikos* is the man who *should* legislate because he is “the man who knows”, ultimately a philosopher-king, or a king instructed by a philosopher. A philosopher plays a central role in making citizens good. That is why *theōria* and *praxis* are inseparable. *Praxis* is impossible without the knowledge of universals given in science, but science itself is impossible without contemplating the universals as inseparable from particulars within the facts of life as first principles. That is why right after postulating the political role of a philosopher, Aristotle does again remind us: “Those who aim at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well” (1181a11-12). Thus, the relation between moral virtue and the most final good is not the relations of exclusion or inclusion – the artificial notions never used by Aristotle himself -- but the relation of legislation conducted by *sophos* via his *theōria* (political science).

5.6 *Politics* 8 on the role of *theōria* in the systematization of *polis*

The *Politics* 8 continues Aristotle’s argument in *NE* 10, 8 that a philosopher is the paradigmatic moral agent, and his argument in *NE* 10, 9 that the man who knows -- philosopher -- must formulate laws and educate citizens. Like the rest of the Aristotelian corpus, the *Politics* analyzes *polis* on the analogy with *psyche* and *cosmos*, i.e., arguing that *cosmos*, *polis*, and *psyche* are each one a *sustēma* governed by the same laws and the same ruler – the divine *nous* who defines the measure / standard for the being as a *sustēma* and each part of it. His argument in the *Politics* 8 is as follows. The ultimate end
of a freeman is he himself; his leisure is the first principle and end of his action, that is, the most final end, *eudaimonia*, consists in leisure which should be spent in the disinterested and useless intellectual activities of the active intellect. The *sophoi* should establish the proper education via legislation, since only via education they could conduce to the intellectual activity those who are not gently born (the argument similar to the one in *NE* 10, 9). Following Plato, Aristotle argues that music, as the intellectual activity, is indispensable for education. It imitates the movements of the soul measured into a *sustēma*. That is why creating and listening to music is a method of tuning the soul (and, ultimately, *polis*). In the mature years, a freeman should use music for the cultivation of his mind and for the intellectual enjoyment. It is a philosopher who defines which kind of music, i.e., which *metron* of the soul, should be used. Thus, according to the *Politics* 8, the philosopher plays the most important part in tuning the souls of the citizens, and the *polis* as a whole. The *Politics* makes clear that when, in *NE* 1, 1, Aristotle says that the political science determines “what we are to do and what we are to abstain from” (1094b6-7) and “which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them” (1094a29-1094b2), he refers to the *philosophoi*, not *phronimoi* who formulate political science. Aristotle does also confirm that *eudaimonia* -- the most final good of leisure spent in the intellectual enjoyment -- is called the most final because no other good is sought above it. So, the *Politics* 8 supports all the other textual evidence that Aristotle treats finality not in the inclusivist sense. Let me take a closer look at Aristotle’s argument.

Being a *sustēma*, the whole *polis* has one end (1337a21), so that “the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole” (1337a29-30). “The citizen should be
molded to suit the form of government under which he lives” (1337a13-14) via education established by legislation for all the citizens (1337a34) -- “one and the same for all” (1337a21-22). Aristotle confirms his argument in *NE* 10, 7 that the same end of the individuals and the state is leisure of the citizens spent in the disinterested and useless intellectual activities: “*The first principle* of all action is leisure. Both are required, but leisure is better than occupation and is its end; and therefore the question must be asked, what ought we do when at leisure?” (1337b32-35; emphasis added; see also 1334a12-16; 1329a1-2). Aristotle makes it clear that the disinterested and useless intellectual activity engaged in during the leisure time is contemplation [*theoria*]. “He who is occupied”, stresses Aristotle, “has in view some end which he has not attained; but happiness is an end” and “the pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from the noblest sources” (1338a4-9). So, in the *Politics* 8, Aristotle does explicitly identify happiness with leisure spent in the contemplative activity. Therefore, he continues: “There are branches of learning and education which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and those are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things”, which are pursued “not on the ground either of necessity or utility” (11338a10-14). He insists: “The end is not eligible for the sake of any future good” (1339b35-36). Thus, Aristotle makes sure to reinstate his belief that the finality of the most final good means that it is valued only for its own sake, and not because all other good were achieved, as inclusivists believe.

Besides this consideration, the *Politics* 8 provides the other textual evidence that the most final good cannot be inclusive of practical virtues. Far from including them into

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21 “Happiness is thought to depend on leisure” (1177b4-5).
the most final good, Aristotle treats the practical activities with contempt. Though all should aim at theoria in ideal, polis is a rigid hierarchy separated into a liberated class and a servile class. Those in the servile class are vulgarized by their labour / service and pursuit of profit, their mind degraded. Those in the liberal class are liberated from manual and menial labour. They are not allowed to have paid employments, and engage in commercial activity (to be merchants; 1328b39). That is, contrary to Broadie’s belief, freemen are not the predominantly practical beings governed by practical wisdom. They should not use themselves for the sake of something else beyond themselves (1337b12), and their practical concerns should never overweigh their devotion to the purely disinterested and useless intellectual activities pursued for their own sake in the time of leisure. Aristotle insists: nobility and usefulness or profitability are two opposite notions. “To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls” (1338b3-4). The education which is appropriate to the liberal class is the liberal education “in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because it is liberal or noble” (1338a30-32). Politics 8 does also represent a variation of the existential argument for the incompatibility of happiness and the exercise of practical / moral virtues, thus, supporting the passages from NE and EE, analyzed in this chapter: “Man ought not to labour at the same time with their minds and with their bodies; for the two kinds of labour are opposed to one another; the labour of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body” (1339a6-10).

At this point of his argument, Aristotle proceeds to the analysis of music as the intellectual enjoyment in leisure (1338a21-22). If leisure is the first principle of action, it is understandable why Aristotle finishes his Politics with the analysis of leisurely intellec-
tual activity of music. And it is understandable that music plays the important role in education, because the liberal youth should be taught not how to make money, but how to spend leisure in the noble way. Music provides intellectual enjoyment via imitating the *energeiai* of virtues in its *metron*.

Since then music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and hating aright, there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions. Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and of all the qualities contrary to these, and of the other qualities of character, which hardly fall short of the actual affections, as we know from our own experience, for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change (1340a16-24).

There is a certain affinity between musical modes and our soul, and that is why some philosophers say that the soul is *a tuning*, or possesses tuning (1340b17-19). *Tuning* in music means that not only does music imitate the movements of the soul, but it does also imitate their measure (*metron*), and, thus, influences the listener both with its representational and structural qualities. Here Aristotle refers to Pythagoreans and Plato who thought that *cosmos*, *polis*, and *psyche* are each a certain measure (*metron*) -- like music. Music possesses tuning, because the soul possesses tuning, or is a specific *sustēma* with a specific measure (*metron*). The *Politics* 8 testifies that Aristotle does agree with Pythagoreans and Plato that the tuning of the soul is essentially the care of *metron* in the soul. In its representational and structural imitations of the soul, the intellectual *energeia* of music is precisely the contemplation of one’s self and one’s friend or neighbour that Aristotle is talking about in *NE* 8. Via this contemplation, man cultivates his mind and tunes its soul: “Music conduces to virtue on the ground that it can form our minds and habituate us to true pleasures” (1339a21-26; see also 1340a6; 1340b11-12). Thus, the
Politics 8 confirms that Aristotle is consistent to view theōria, the disinterested contemplation, as the wide scope of intellectual activities, which systematize the soul by a right measure.

Even the introduction of music into the education should be realized with the right measure (1341a10). Whether only to listen or also to perform, the choice of instruments, the proper time for using them, the level of professionalism, or whether to engage in the professional mode of education in music, the kind of melodies and rhythms to play – all the questions of “the actual practice of the art” should be taken into consideration (1340b23; and the entire Politics 8, 6). Bad music, or music that does not have a right metron perverts minds (1342a23-24). And here comes the last page of the Politics where Aristotle announces who is actually responsible for the control over all these practical details in musical education. Aristotle says:

For the purposes of education, as I have already said, those modes and melodies should be employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian, as we said before; though we may include any others which are approved by philosophers who have had a musical education (1342a27-31; emphasis added).

Hence the Politics confirms that it is the contemplative intellect that is responsible for proper tuning the soul via the proper measure (metron). And it is a philosopher – the man exercising the active intellect to the perfect degree – who should establish a right measure or tuning for the entire society. It is evident that only theōria can define this measure, for the tuning of the soul is concerned with things useless, which, therefore, are beyond the expertise of phronēsis. It is not the phronimos who formulates the principles of the tuning of the soul. Phronimos implements the tuning after the philosopher has formulated its principles.
Let me summarize the theoretical output of *Politics* 8. Happiness is the leisurely, disinterested and useless contemplative activity of the mind, i.e., *theōria*. Aristotle defines music as the instance of *theōria*. Music illuminates to the mind how the universal final end / first principle, “fixed for all”, manifests itself in the particular harmonies of the soul. According to Aristotle, the entire state aims at *theōria* as the most final end. In fact, the state is a concentrated force of how to cultivate freemen in *theōria*. In such a practical work as the *Politics*, Aristotle demands the exaltation of the soul as the criterion of ultimate perfection. The citizens of the Aristotelian state should be *theōrētikoi* first, and only after that, *phronimoi*. Though *phronēsis* is necessary, it aims at the pure intellectual activities as its most final end.

5.7 The difference between *eudaimonia* as the contemplation of the measure and the arithmetic mean of the moral virtue

Because Aristotle applies measure to the *entire* spectrum of human life\(^{22}\), e.g., to health, navigation, friendship, justice, art, moral virtue, it is important to consider how *eudaimonia* as the contemplation of the measure of the soul [its tuning] is different from all other kinds of measure, especially the arithmetic mean as the measure of moral virtues. *NE* 2, 6 provides the clue for understanding this difference. *NE* 2, 6 demonstrates that not only does Aristotle use the lexicon of Pythagoreans and Plato (*unlimited, limit, measure, proportion or ratio*) in his analysis of the wholes, but he preserves and develops Pythagorean and Platonist concept of *sustēma* as the structured / measured whole of *eidoi* (immaterial essences), though with his significant reservation that *metron* is separable from *hyle* only in abstraction. Also he agrees with Pythagoreans and Plato that, because

\(^{22}\) See, for example, *NE* 2, 6: “A master of *any* art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this” (1106b6-7).
only theoria is capable of contemplating eidoi, only the contemplative mind can in principle systematize the soul according to its proper measure, or function. Thus, eudaimonia is the energeia of the contemplative mind. The argument in NE 2, 6 goes in the following way.

All things good relatively to us, which are known empirically and acted upon empirically, belong to “the unlimited”, meaning that they are never fixed-in-themselves. They are made qualitatively indefinite by their infinite number of relational properties, e.g., the same thing is at the same time large and small in relation to the smaller or larger thing, etc., and they acquire their quality only after the limit is mixed with the unlimited to create a measure with its principle of proportion. In opposition to “measure relatively to us” (the relational property), there is “measure in the object” (the intrinsic property):

In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little -- and this is not one, nor the same for all (1106a26-32; emphasis added).

“Measure relatively to us” (the particular) does not have fixity (see also 1104a4-19); changes according to the right place, right time, and right opportunity; belongs to the domain of moral virtue; and is defined by phronēsis. “Measure in the object” is “one and the same for all men”, i.e., the universal. It is the good or “the determined” (the “limited”) -- fixed for all", i.e., the measure / order / formula / function / standard of the human species, belonging to the domain of eudaimonia and defined by theoria. In other words, Aristotle identifies the good, eudaimonia, with “the measure in the object”, or, in
the wording of the 1106b6-15 passage, “measure according to nature” -- a different kind of measure than the measure regulating moral virtues.

*NE* 2, 6 supports the 1102a2-4 and 1101b12-13 passages in *NE* 1, 12 stating that *eudaimonia* is the first principle, that is, is the universal (“*one and the same for all men*”) and belongs to actuality. *NE* 2, 6 does also support the 414a13-14 passage in the *De Anima* 2, 2, stating that “the soul must be a ratio or formulable essence not a matter or subject”; the *EE* 7, 6 that “the parts of [the] soul are in a certain relation to each other” (1240a18-19), so that *every* part of the soul is limited by a harmonious balance between all the parts of the soul; the 1138b5-13 passage in *NE* 5, 11 that there is a certain ratio and, thus, justice between the parts of the soul; the 416a16-19 passage in the *De Anima* 2, 4, stating that “in the case of all complex wholes formed in the course of nature there is a limit or ratio which determines their size and increase, and limit and ratio are marks of soul not of fire, and belong to the side of formulable essence rather than that of matter”; the 1072a33 passage in the *Metaphysics* Λ (=12), 7, stating that “‘One’ [The Good] means measure (μετρον)”; and the 1075a12-16 passage in the *Metaphysics* Λ, 10, stating that one [the good] is the order within the sustēma. Ultimately, *NE* 2, 6 gives an additional explanation that sustēma is identified with its superior function in the sense that “being one” (unity) *is* measure; and it is the superior function – the active intellect – that defines the measure.

As it is clear from all passages discussed in this chapter, Aristotle has a systematic philosophy because, like Plato and Pythagoreans, he views the being as a sustēma, structured by the analogy between *cosmos, polis,* and *psyche.* This analogy presupposes that there is one ruler for *cosmos, polis,* and *psyche* – the divine *nous*; that the sustēma is
identified with its ruling element; and that the ruling element is the measure / order of the sustēma. Thus, the whole contemporary conjecture of his inconsistency, and his corpus consisting of discrepant treatises (Kenny) appears to be irrelevant. It is also important that, arguing that sustēma is the measure of eidoi (immaterial, a priori essences), Aristotle criticizes Empedocles who defines sustēma as the mixture of the material parts (DA 408a11-17). The view of Empedocles does in fact remind of mixism in the contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. Aristotle does also criticize Empedocles for not reaching the level of systematicity comparable to Plato, i.e., for his inability to incorporate the strife principle into the omnipotent and omniscient principle of the good (410b4-8). This criticism of Empedocles by Aristotle is a good criticism of the notion of the “central good” of inclusivists – the good that is defined and shifted around by the specific practical urgency (that is, relativistically).

It is evident that both inclusivists and exclusivists interpret Aristotle out of the historical context, and ascribe to him either the inclusivist or the exclusivist model of the soul and human life, which have nothing to do with his place in the development of the systematical philosophy. Contrary to exclusivism, “the measure in the object” would not allow the destruction of the lesser activities by the superior activity. Contrary to inclusivism and Empedocles, “the measure in the object” imposes the vertical hierarchy and submits the whole to one ruler. The Aristotelian account of the corrupted soul is similar to the Plato’s – it is the soul which lost its unification by the ruling element: “Such men do not rejoice or grieve with themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pull-
ing them in pieces” (NE 9, 4, 1166b18-24). And Aristotle would have interpreted both inclusivism and exclusivism as the accounts of the corrupted soul.
Chapter 6

The role of pleasure in making eudaimonia final and self-sufficient. The final reconsideration of the NE 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia

I postponed my final judgment on the passage of the self-sufficiency of happiness in NE 1, 7 till I collect all the textual support. There are only a few passages left to clarify this issue. These passages appear in NE 10, 1-5 and deal with the finality of the good within the discussion of pleasure. Neither exclusivists nor inclusivists pay attention to these passages. Following Aspasius, Kenny argues that this discussion of pleasure in Book 10 is the evidence of the inconsistency of the Nicomachean Ethics, because there was already the discussion of pleasure in Book 7 (and this is actually Kenny’s major argument).23 Also he sides up with the view that the final chapters of Nicomachean Ethics 10 has nothing to do with the preceding discussion of pleasure or happiness (1992, 139). Nonetheless, as it will become clear in my explication of this set of passages, the issue at stake in the Nicomachean Ethics 10, 1-5 is very different from the discussion of pleasure in Book 7 where pleasure was considered within the discussion of virtues, i.e., the virtues of continence and temperance. Contrary to Book 7, the NE 10, 1-5 discussion of pleasure is directly linked with the consecutive discussion of happiness as contemplation in the remainder of Book 10, for here Aristotle gives his further consideration to the notion of finality / completeness and its criterion of isolation.

23 “There was one strong reason against the view that Aristotle revised and moved the books [of his Ethics] himself. That is the existence of the treatment of pleasure, which duplicates, and is not cross-referenced to, the treatment in NE 10. This … appeared to Aspasius to be a reason for considering the hypothesis that it might not be by Aristotle at all [though Aspasius did not think there was a conflict in doctrine]” (1992, 135).
As Aristotle pointed out in Book 1 and as he repeats here, similar to virtuous activities, pleasure has the property of finality (teleion) -- it is chosen for itself (even if no utility ensues). But there is a much more important correlation between virtuous activities and pleasure, says Aristotle. Here is the skeleton of his argument. Every virtuous activity should be accompanied by or supervened by pleasure to be a truly virtuous activity (done with the initiative and satisfaction). Pleasure in this sense is rather spiritual elevation, empathic ecstasy, or the state of grace than pleasure in the vulgar, bodily, sense of physical gratification. Essentially, it is pleasure that completes every virtuous activity (makes it teleia). And, even more generally, any activity is completed by its own pleasure. Aristotle gives his special consideration to whether it is unconditionally true that even without pleasure, virtuous activity is good in itself. Aristotle argues, seemingly sacrilegiously, against this Platonist (and, later, Kantian) moralist stand to prove that it is pleasure that makes virtuous activity good-in-itself (self-subsistent). He derives this conclusion from his argument that pleasure completes any activity in a functional sense, meaning that pleasure is simply the most efficient functional realization of an activity. Therefore, argues Aristotle, pleasure is functionally inseparable from the activity itself. It is pleasure of this, functional, kind that makes virtuous activity good-in-itself, i.e., functionally complete and, thus, teleologically valuable in-itself / self-sufficient in isolation from other goods.

Thus, the relation between the activity and its supervening pleasure is not the relation of addition (the addition of pleasure to the activity). Pleasure is functionally inseparable from the activity itself, implying that every energeia has its own qualitatively unique pleasure functionally inseparable from it. This explains the fact that pleasures do
existentially differ from each other. Every activity is completed (made *teleia*) by its proper pleasure, and destroyed by the alien pleasure. Pleasure isolates activity from other activities, i.e., every activity is pleasurable in its own unique way. Or, in other words, a specific activity cannot be completed -- made complete, *teleia* -- by alien pleasure(s). A specific pleasure cannot be achieved by adding up other, incongruous, pleasures (even on the bodily level, the pleasure of eating cannot be built up by the pleasure of sex and the pleasure of sleep, and the pleasure of sleep will definitely destroy the pleasure of sex). Thus, no activity can add to or substitute its pleasure for the pleasure of the other activity.

The superior, final, virtue should have the superior, existentially specific, pleasure inseparable from it -- the kind of pleasure that makes an activity self-subsistent in the most isolation from other activities. The final virtue maximally intensified / fulfilled by its proper pleasure is the most intense realization of the species’ function (and this is what finality ultimately means). Beasts have their proper pleasures, and humans have theirs. Human function is peculiar and radically different from the function of the beasts. Though humans share with the other animals many functions, the activity functionally proper to humans cannot be completed -- made complete, *teleia* -- by the pleasures of the beasts. It is completed by its own specific, proper, pleasure, and destroyed by the alien pleasure of the beasts. That is why the consideration of pleasure in this, teleological and functional, aspect is what Aristotle needs to conclude his discussion of all the virtuous activities and proceed to the discussion of the best one among them as happiness. The significance of the *NE* 10, 1-5 passages for the interpretation of the *NE* 1 passages on the finality of the good and the final virtue was camouflaged by the translation of *teleion* and
teleia in reference to happiness and pleasure in these passages not as “final”, but as either “complete” or “perfect”, which do not do justice to this text.

While all the previous interpreters fail to take notice that NE 10, 1-5 discusses the notion of finality (being teleia) and the notion of self-sufficiency in conjunction with the discussion of human ergon, these passages make evident that these notions are inseparable for Aristotle. Human ergon defines happiness or the most final end for humans in the sense of peculiarity, i.e., the peculiarity of human pleasure. Peculiarity of species is functional isolation, i.e., the incompatibility between the human pleasure and the bestial pleasure. Functional isolation is the self-sufficiency of species, i.e., the ability of finding pleasure in its own functioning. Self-sufficiency of species cannot possibly be achieved by adding up all the functions (with their proper pleasures) that humans share with other animals. Thus, these passages are also crucial for understanding the NE 1 passages on the human ergon and the self-sufficiency of happiness. Because of the extreme importance of this text, let me go slowly in explicating Aristotle’s argument.

At the very outset of his NE 10, 1-5 teleological consideration of pleasure, Aristotle immediately points out that pleasure is “most intimately connected with our human nature”, or, in other words, is functionally significant in a human life (NE 10, 1 1172a18-20). As he always does, Aristotle starts with the discussion of what others think of pleasure in this, teleological, sense. Eudoxus believes that the essential characteristics of pleasure is that pleasure is teleia: “That is most an object of choice which we choose not because or for the sake of something else, and pleasure is admittedly of this nature; for no

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24 Like pleasure of sleep and food cannot constitute the pleasure of sex, so the human function proper, which is active intellect, cannot be built up by the addition of, let’s say, the function of growth to the function of digestion. The statement that when the functions that humans share with other animals are done with reason then they belong to man’s proper function is not, in fact, what Aristotle says about the peculiarity of human function.
one asks to what end he is pleased…” (NE 10, 2 1172b20-23). On this, Aristotle agrees with Eudoxus, and disagrees with Plato who believes that pleasure is not teleia, and, so, not The Good. And he categorically disagrees with both Eudoxus and Plato that human happiness is to be interpreted in the inclusivist manner. In fact, Eudoxus and Plato use the inclusivist interpretation of the happy life to the opposite ends. Eudoxus argues that because adding pleasure makes everything better, pleasure is the good, while Plato argues that because pleasure is added to the other goods, it cannot be the good. Plato agrees with Eudoxus that human happiness is a mixture or compound, but contrary to Eudoxus he believes that, because it is a mixture, human happiness cannot achieve the status of the Good (teleion), which cannot be mixed (see Philebus):

[Eudoxus] argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g., to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that is only by itself that the good can be increased. This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone. And so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it (1172b23-33; emphasis added).

It is clear from this passage that Aristotle sides with Plato that The Good cannot be a mixture or a compound: “The good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it”. He continues reaffirming this important belief: “Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves. What, then, is there that satisfies this criterion, which at the same time we can participate in? It is something of this sort that we are looking for” (NE 1172b33-35). Thus, as Aristotle clearly indicates from the start, this
specific discussion of the nature of pleasure [i.e., its being *teleia*] directly bears on the discussion of the nature of The Good [i.e., its being *teleion*].

This passage has two textual parallelisms with the *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness: expression “one of the goods, and no more a good than any other” is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 expression “being counted as one good thing among others” (1097b17-18); and the statement “every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone” is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 “if it were so counted [as one good thing among others] it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b18-21). Aristotle unambiguously singles out this, inclusivist, account of human happiness by Plato and Eudoxus as “the argument of a specific kind” -- “this argument”. It is clear that Aristotle does not take this argument to be his own. First of all, as Aristotle insists, because this argument yields two opposite conclusions – the one by Plato (pleasure is not the good) and the one by Eudoxus (pleasure is the good). Evidently, the passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7 is an abrupt recording, as it might be in the compendium of notes, of the long argument developed in *NE* 10, 4. Therefore, *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness simply cannot be interpreted on its own. Let me look at the further development of Aristotle’s argument before making a final verdict on the passage of the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7.

Because Aristotle agrees with Eudoxus that pleasure is *teleia*, though he will give his qualification of this thesis further on into his argument, Aristotle does at this point concentrate on his critique of Plato’s belief that pleasure is not *teleia*. He emphasizes that
people avoid pain as evil, and choose pleasure as good, which is reflected in the common view (and “that which every one thinks really is so”, 1172b36-1173b17): “Those who object that that at which all things aim is not necessarily good are, we may surmise, talking nonsense” (1172b35-36). Aristotle’s objective is to find the relation between pleasure and the good, which is evidently different from the one envisaged by Plato who argued that pleasure is simply a part of the mixed happy life.

Aristotle argues against Platonist (and Eleatic) view according to which pleasure is indeterminate (admits of degrees), while the good is determinate. People can indeed be more or less just and brave, but if some pleasures are unmixed and others mixed, and admit of degrees, this does not mean that pleasure is intermediate or, in other words, not teleia: “Just as health admits of degrees without being intermediate, why should not pleasure?” (NE 1173a15-25). Aristotle also argues against the Platonist (and Eleatic) belief that pleasure cannot be the good because it is supposedly a movement (κινησις) and a coming into being (the Becoming), while the good is perfect (the Being). Aristotle states that pleasure is not a movement and cannot be defined with the criteria of speed and slowness (1173a31-32): “We may become pleased quickly”, but “we cannot be pleased quickly” (1173a29-1173b1). Pleasure is teleia notwithstanding the criteria of movement. He continues by arguing against the Platonist (and Eleatic) view, according to which pleasure is replenishment while pain is lack. Aristotle says that these experiences are bodily, for replenishment takes place in the body, while that which feels pleasure is not the body, and, so, pleasure is not replenishment. Moreover, many pleasures [of learning, and even sensuous pleasures of smell, sight and hearing, etc.] do not presuppose pain
linked with lack. Thus, concludes Aristotle, pleasure cannot be defined as “the coming into being”, or not teleia (1173b8-19).

Though Platonists are definitely wrong about the interrelation between pleasure and the good, it nonetheless seems up front that pleasure does not always accompany the good and we ought to choose possessing the virtues even if no pleasure resulted (1174a1-8). It seems, continues Aristotle, pleasure per se, considered on its own, cannot be the good nor is all pleasure desirable. Nonetheless, he argues, that is true only of the specific pleasures – the ones that are not desirable in themselves. It is not true of those pleasures that “are desirable in themselves being different in kind or in their sources from the others” (1174a10-11)\(^{25}\). And, so, contrary to this plausible and laudable position that pleasures are separable from virtuous activities, Aristotle goes on to argue that pleasures are inseparable from their virtuous activities, and virtuous activities are inseparable from their pleasures. It is because pleasures are inseparable from the activities they accompany that pleasures differ in kind: “One cannot get the pleasure of the just man without being just, not that of the musical man without being musical” (1173b29-30). Unlike Kantianism, Aristotle proceeds by showing that one cannot, in fact, be properly just without having the pleasure of the just man, and be properly musical without having the pleasure of the musical man. Aristotle proves this by arguing that every specific pleasure (among pleasures-in-themselves) is teleia and functionally finalizes or completes virtuous activity (makes it teleia or good-in-itself).

From this point in his argument, Aristotle concentrates on the notion of finality and its quality of isolation. He points out that “seeing seems to be at any moment complete (teleion), for it does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete

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\(^{25}\)“Those derived from noble sources are different from those derived from base sources”, 1173b29-30.
its form (*eidos*); and pleasure also seems to be of this nature [i.e., *teleia*]. For *it is a whole and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form (*eidos*) will be completed* *(τελειωθησεται) if the pleasure lasts longer.* For this reason, too, it is not a movement’ (1174a14-18; emphasis added). It is clear from this passage that the finality of pleasure is understood as *self-contained* finality – it is an *eidos* that lacks nothing. It is because pleasure is *eidos* that it pertains to the realm of the Being, not the realm of the Becoming. It is because pleasure is *eidos* or complete-in-itself / self-contained whole (μοναδος) that pleasure cannot be “completed” by the addition or subtraction of something that is not pleasure itself or by the pleasure of the other kind -- by something that is another *eidos.*

*Eidos* is determinate (*the* determinate), meaning that it is monadic. For the reason that the finality of pleasure is the monadic finality of *eidos,* the finality of pleasure (pleasure being *teleia*) is the finality of *isolation.* Good-in-itself means “final-in-itself” (*eidos*) in isolation (μοναδος) and cannot be the sum of the elements incongruous or extraneous to it.

This formulation of pleasure by Aristotle as being *eidos* (the good having its form in itself) is his crucial departure from Plato’s view on pleasure. It is evident that it is precisely because, for Aristotle, *eidos* is inseparable from *hyle* in forming *existentially specific* (qualitatively unique) *ousia* that Aristotle contended Plato’s view on pleasure as being separable, indeterminate and, so, not *eidos,* being simply added to other goods or mixed with them. And, so, consequently, he argued against Plato’s inclusivism, i.e., Plato’s belief that happiness is a mixed life. It is important to understand why Plato did believe both that The Good is μοναδος *while* happy human life is mixed -- not μοναδος. For Plato, a soul is corrupted by its descent into the realm of becoming, so that a human
is incapable of realizing the monadic unity of the good. Hence, follows Plato’s pessimism about the soundness of human happiness, which is of a mixed kind. So, mixed happy life in Plato’s rendering is not an ideal, but rather a compromise, a consequence of the corruption of the immortal *divine* soul by the mortal *beastly* body, and, definitely, not an end (*telos*) that this immortal soul has by its nature. In opposition to Plato, Aristotle’s was a quest to retrieve the *eideic* unity denied to humans by Plato, and grant them the ability of full / final *human* happiness. In this context, to attribute to Aristotle Plato’s inclusivist argument concerning goods that can be counted among others, so that in a mixed happy life, “every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone” is to miss the entire point. Contemporary inclusivism / mixism does fail from the start because it takes Aristotle’s view on happiness out from the historical context, and, as a result, does not account for Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s inclusivism given in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, 1-5.

Following is Aristotle’s detailed refutation of the inclusivist belief that true wholeness (being a whole) can be achieved by the process of addition:

…Every movement (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made what it aims at. It is complete (*teleia*), therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other. For the fitting together of the stones is different from the fluttering of the column, and these are both different from the making of the temple; and the making of the temple is complete (*teleia*) (for it lacks nothing with a view to the end proposed), but the making of the base or of the triglyph is incomplete; for each is the making of only a part… So, too, in the case of walking and all the other movements. For if locomotion is a movement from here to there, it, too, has differences in kind – flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only so, but in walking itself there are such differences; for the whence and whither are not the same in the whole racecourse and in a part of this line and that; for one traverses not only a line but one which is in a place, and this one is in a different place from that (1174a18-1174b2).
Movement and practical action (*praxis*) here are construed as the process of addition (fitting parts together). Aristotle concludes: “…it seems that [addition as movement] is not complete at any and every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form (*eidos*) is complete at any and every time (*τελειον το ειδος*). Plainly, then, pleasure and [addition as movement] must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete”. He adds that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it *is* possible to be pleased, “for that which takes place in a moment is *a whole*”. Pleasure is a whole (*μοναδος*), while addition as movement and a coming into being can be ascribed only to those things that are “*divisible and not wholes*” (1174b3-14; emphasis added). By making the human *telos* divisible, contemporary inclusivism fails to account for Aristotle’s notion of the whole as eideic / monadic indivisible unity.

This passage is a solution to the paradox which is yielded by inclusivism and which Aristotle formulates in the *NE* 1, 9-10. A building is *teleion* only “in the whole time or at [the] final moment” of its completion, but not in every part of building process which is existentially different from any other part (parts “are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other”), says Aristotle in *NE* 10, 4. Had happiness been a compound of its parts, it would have never been achieved by man, for man lives in a moment (moment following moment), and a whole of his life, if considered as compound, is realized only “at the final moment” of its completion, that is, death. What complicates this paradox is that like the parts of the building process can fail and do fail, human life goes from ups to downs. This yields the consequent paradox that happiness
(time when a person is truly happy) is different from and is only a part of a happy life
rendered in inclusivist terms and containing both success and failure:

...There is required, as we said, not only complete (teleia) virtue but also a com-
plete life, since any changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most
prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the
Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretch-
edly no one calls happy. Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives;
must we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay this doctrine, is it also
the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, es-
specially for us who say that happiness is an activity (energeia)?... If we must see the
end and only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so be-
fore, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to
him is not to be predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men
happy, on account of the changes that may befall them... (NE 1, 9-10, 1100a4-
1100b1).

The only solution to the paradox is to render teleion as pertaining to a moment as such –
indivisible and qualitatively unique.

According to this passage, Cooper is wrong in his inclusivist argument based on
the analogy Aristotle draws between geometrical construction and deliberation [practical
reasoning] which is, according to Cooper, responsible for the attainment of happiness in
the Nicomachean Ethics minus Book 10: “A many-sided figure may have been analyzed
into its constituent triangles, and then the first step in the construction, the drawing of a
triangle, will be the construction of part of the many-sided figure itself. If deliberation is
like this, then among the things done that ‘contribute to’ an end will be the production of
some of its parts” (20; NE 3, 3 1112b20-24). The conceptual discrepancy between the
NE 10, 4 1174a18-1174b2 passage and Cooper’s interpretation of NE 3, 3 1112b20-24
passage is so striking that it is worthy to look at the text Cooper interprets closer. The
passage Cooper analyzes appears in the context of Aristotle’s analysis of deliberation and
its limits. Cooper builds his inclusivist argument for the bi-partite (divisible) end upon
two premises: (1) he believes that it is deliberation that is responsible for the formulation of the end (*telos*); (2) he believes that Aristotle defines deliberation in the inclusivist terms (constructing a whole by the process of “fitting parts together” as in a complex geometrical figure). Hence, concludes Cooper, the end itself should be a divisible complex whole.

Nonetheless, in the context of the 1112b20-24 passage, Aristotle argues to the contrary that “we deliberate not about ends but about means”, and even more categorically: no one “deliberates about his end”. We, says Aristotle, “assume the end” via the *a priori* intuitions of the active intellect, “since moving principle is in ourselves”. In its search for means toward the end, deliberation triggers actions, and actions are always “for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only the means… If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity” (1112b15-1113a3). So, Cooper is wrong in his premiss (1) that it is deliberation by *phronēsis* that is responsible for the formulation of the end. It is clear that deliberation as a process of construction in 1112b15-1113a3 passage is similar to the building process or any movement / addition / construction in the 1174a18-1174b2 passage. And in both passages, the end – *telos* with its attendant *teleia* pleasure – is not achieved by the process of addition / construction. That the end is given in an immediate intuition means that it is an indivisible *monadic* whole, which cannot be a compound or a mixture.

Let me now return back to *NE* 10, 1-5 discussion of pleasure from the teleological and functional standpoint. After defining pleasure as *τελειον το ειδος*, Aristotle goes on to define *τελεια ενεργεια* with the same criterion of isolated wholeness (*μοναδος*):

Since every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense which is in good condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful of its objects (for perfect
activity \( \tau \varepsilon \lambda \iota \alpha \nu \varepsilon \rho \gamma \iota \alpha \) seems to be ideally of this nature; whether we say that it is active, or the organ in which it resides, may be assumed to be immaterial), it follows that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. And this activity will be the most complete (\( \tau \varepsilon \lambda \iota \alpha \nu \) \( \tau \o \iota \varepsilon \iota \delta \o \) is pleasant). For, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense, and in respect of thought and contemplation no less, the most complete (\( \tau \varepsilon \lambda \iota \alpha \nu \)) is pleasantest, and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete; and the pleasure completes the activity (\( \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \rho \gamma \iota \alpha \)). But the pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the combination of object and sense, both good, just as health and the doctor are not in the same way the cause of man’s being healthy (NE 1174b15-27; emphasis added).

It is clear from this passage that the ability of \( \textit{energeia} \) to be \( \textit{teleia} \) or \( \tau \varepsilon \lambda \iota \alpha \nu \tau \o \varepsilon \iota \delta \o \) is based upon the functional unity between organ and its object. In other words, \( \textit{energeia} \) becomes complete in itself – when the organ becomes one with its proper object. Completeness of \( \textit{energeia} \) (its being \( \textit{teleia} \)) is impossible to achieve when organ has an improper object, i.e., via adding other \( \textit{energeiai} \) with their specific objects. Furthermore, there is a hierarchical subordination between \( \textit{energeiai} \), which is based upon the subordination between organs and their objects. The most \( \tau \varepsilon \lambda \iota \alpha \) activity operates with the best organ, and has the finest of objects. Thus, its being \( \textit{pleasantest} \) has functional foundation. Aristotle contends inclusivist belief that the correspondence between activity and its object is the one of combination or mixture, with its consequent belief that happy life is a mixed life in which separable goods are simply added to each other. Pleasure completes the activity only because it arises when there is the most intense functional, i.e., \( \textit{indivisible} \), unity between the organ and its object via the functionally proper \( \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \rho \gamma \iota \alpha \) (1174b27-1175a3). Pleasure and life as \( \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \rho \gamma \iota \alpha \) are so indivisibly bound together that they “do not admit of separation” (1175a19-20). Many times elsewhere Aristotle speaks
of the identity of sense and its object, mind and its object, and, more generally, *energeia* and its object.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, 5, Aristotle explains further what the indivisible functional unity of *energeia* means. Because each pleasure is inseparable from its functionally proper *energeia*, pleasures differ in kind, for “things different in kind are, we think”, says Aristotle, “completed by different things”, i.e., “activities differing in kind are completed by things different in kind”. The activities of thought differ in kind from those of the senses, and among themselves, and, so, do the pleasures that complete them. Moreover, *energeia* is intensified by its proper pleasure, but it is “injured by alien pleasures” (“hindered by pleasures arising from other sources”), for alien pleasures do pretty much what proper pains do, since activities are destroyed by their proper pains. What intensifies *energeia* is proper to it, but “things different in kind have properties different in kind” (1175a22-1175b2):

People who are fond of playing the flute are incapable of attending to arguments if they overhear some one playing the flute, since they enjoy flute-playing more than the activity in hand; so the pleasure connected with flute-playing destroys the activity concerned with argument. This happens, similarly, in all other cases, when one is active about two things at once; the more pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it is much more pleasant does so all the more, so that one even ceases from the other. This is why when we enjoy anything very much we do not throw ourselves into anything else, and do one thing only… (1175b2-12).

It is apparent from this passage that the quality of being *teleia* designates the functional intensity and unity of *energeia*. And *energeia* is *teleia only* in isolation from the other *energeiai*, for every *energeia* is made *teleia only* by its own properties. Not only cannot *energeia* be made *teleia* by the properties of another *energeia* or *energeiai*, but it will be,
insists Aristotle, eliminated by alien pleasure. That is why, contrary to inclusivism, teleia energeia cannot possibly be the compound of existentially different energeiai.

Aristotle concludes NE 10, 5 with specifying the functional distinctions and, hence, functional hierarchy between energeiai. Aristotle divides energeiai into worthy, neutral, and others to be avoided. The pleasure proper to a worthy energeia is good and that proper to an unworthy energeia is bad (1175b24-29). The hierarchy between energeiai is as follows: “Sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the pleasures, therefore, are similarly superior, and those of thought superior to these” (1176a1-3). Each animal has “a proper pleasure, as it has proper function, viz., that which corresponds to its activity”. The pleasures of creatures different in kind differ in kind, and, says Aristotle, “it is plausible to suppose that those of a single species do not differ” (though they vary). Horse, dog, and man have different pleasures, as Heraclitus says “asses would prefer sweepings to gold” (1176a3-10). And Aristotle’s last words in NE 10, 5, giving him the transition to the discussion of theoria as the most teleia energeia in the Nicomachean Ethics 10, 7 are as follows: “But of those that are thought to be good what kind of pleasure or what pleasure should be said to be that proper to man?”

It is absolutely clear from this passage that the most teleia energeia is defined by its peculiarity for human species. Humanly specific energeia cannot be made teleia by beastly pleasures. Peculiarity is the criterion of isolation applied to the ergon of species. In the light of this text, it becomes even more evident that inclusivists / mixists missed the point of the peculiarity of human ergon when they attempted to construe it as an inclusive whole consisting of all the energeiai that humans share with the other animals. But the more striking departure from this text is the attempt by the recent Cooper, Kenny
and Kraut to exclude from human life the *energeia* that does functionally make humans who they are: contemplation. This is especially striking with Kraut who argues that politicians do not contemplate more than pigs, and, so, their happiness is essentially the happiness of pigs (1991, 63) (“asses would prefer sweepings to gold”).

*NE* 10, 6 ties all the arguments of *NE* 10, 1-5 together by stating that happiness is *energeia* which is self-sufficient (lacks nothing), meaning that it is desirable in itself, so that “nothing is sought beyond this activity” (1176b2-8). Now it is evident that “lacks nothing” means that the most *teleia energeia* is τελειον το ειδος without qualification, or most unmixed. *Energeia*, in general, can be *teleia*, or, in other words, good-in-itself pursued for its own sake, only if man engages in one *energeia* at a time. Because the most *teleia energeia* produces its proper pleasure only within itself (unlike the practical pleasures of praise and gain, in general), it is most intense in its functional realization. The most *teleia energeia* is self-sufficient also for the reason that it is on its own determines in which sense humans differ from the other species. In other words, only this *energeia* is self-sufficient to make humans who they are supposed to be. And without *teleia energeia*, humans are not who they are supposed to be though they might have all the functions of the other species combined. Evidently, Aristotle renders the finality and self-sufficiency of *energeia* in terms of its functional peculiarity for the species. In addition, *teleia energeia* is the indivisible self-contained or self-sufficient whole (*monados*) in its every moment. Hence, monadic self-sufficiency as the qualification of finality means exclusivity.

*NE* 10, 1-5 passages provide the additional textual support to the belief that when in *NE* 1, 9, Aristotle defines happiness as “a virtuous *energeia* of soul, of a certain kind”
(1099b26-27; emphasis added), what he means is the existentially and functionally specific, i.e., existentially and functionally isolated, *energeia*. Happiness as *energeia* cannot be a compound consisting of other *energeiai* which are of other, also certain, kind simply because happiness is *energeia* different and isolated from these other *energeiai*. In the passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7, Aristotle does indeed define happiness as “that which when isolated makes life desirable” (1097b15).

Now, we can finally consider the *NE* 1, 7 1097b14-21 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness that follows Aristotle’s definition of the most final good:

> The self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others – if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable (1097b14-21).

All the contemporary interpreters considered the statement “that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” as Aristotle’s own belief. Nonetheless, right before this passage, at 1097b8-13, Aristotle argues against the maximization of goods and excess. Moreover, as I show, Aristotle does *extensively* argue for the limit not only to the extrinsic, but also to the intrinsic goods or good-in-themselves, going as far as insisting on the destructive role of moral perfectionism for happiness. All this textual evidence makes it entirely clear that, for Aristotle, *eudaimonia* as the most final and self-sufficient *energeia* cannot be achieved by the maximization of virtuous activities, and, more generally, cannot in principle be a compound of all the virtuous *energeiai*. This means that the statement “that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” can in no way be Aristotle’s
own belief. All the passages considered so far prepare the student of ethics for the isolation/exclusivity argument in the NE 10, 1-5, which is, as it is evident, not a new development, but the reinforcement of the point made as early as the beginning of NE 1, and, then, developed in NE 7, 4, and throughout the Ethics.

Let me go back to the very beginning of this chapter where I analyzed the inclusivist argument by Plato and Eudoxus:

[Eudoxus] argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g., to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that is only by itself that the good can be increased. This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone. And so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it. Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves (1172b23-35; emphasis added).

As it is clear now, Aristotle starts with this passage a discussion which occupies the entire NE 10, 1-6 to explain why he sides with Plato that The Good cannot be mixed or inclusive, and, hence, why it is wrong to ascribe to him the inclusivist view of the Good. According to both Plato and Aristotle, The Good cannot be a mixture, i.e., subject to addition and subtraction. But, contrary to Plato, Aristotle believes that human happiness is the Good, i.e., teleion, and agrees with Eudoxus that pleasure is teleia. At the same time, Aristotle explains why he disagrees with Eudoxus that the nature of the good being teleion is of the inclusive nature. Contrary to Eudoxus, he argues that its property of being teleion is the eideic/indivisible/functional unity of eidos and hyle in a qualitatively/existentially unique ousia. As a whole, NE 10, 1-6 represents one long elaborate argument by Aristotle to prove that, because The Good is not a mixture (not inclusive), the
human happiness -- which *is* The Good for Aristotle -- cannot be a mixture (cannot be inclusive). It is evident now that, for Aristotle, pleasure *is* in fact the realization of the *eideic* / *indivisible* / functional unity of *eidos* and *hyle* in a qualitatively / existentially unique *ousia*. That is why he is so concerned with the status of pleasure. In other words, that is why he has this long discussion of pleasure as *teleia* -- pleasure as *eidos* / *monados* -- before the very final chapters of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE* 10, 7-8) with their final consideration of the *teleia aretê* -- the *energeia* of *aretê* as *eidos* / *monados*. It is because Aristotle wants to prove that human happiness *is* the good, or is *eidos* / *monados* / *teleion* in isolation from other goods that he so vehemently opposes “this [inclusivist] argument” for the inclusive nature of human happiness by Plato and Eudoxus, “the argument of a specific kind”, which yields two opposite conclusions – the one by Plato (pleasure is *not* the good) and the one by Eudoxus (pleasure *is* the good).

Let me look closer at two textual parallelisms this passage has with the *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness -- expression “one of the goods, and no more a good than any other” which is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 expression “being counted as one good thing among others” (1097b17-18); and the statement “every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone” which is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 “if it were so counted [as one good thing among others] it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b18-21). Now, after all the other passages that I reviewed, it is clear that *NE* 10, 1-5 passages on the self-sufficient / isolated most final good / most final *energeia* is the clue to deciphering 1097b14-21 passage in the *NE* 1, 7 on the self-sufficiency of happiness. In both of these
texts, Aristotle opposes “one of the goods, and no more a good than any other” “being counted as one good thing among others” (in Plato’s and Eudoxus’ view on human happiness) to the self-subsistent or self-sufficient good that “when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” “without being counted as one good thing among others” (his own view on human happiness). Aristotle’s words “that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” is simply the reference to the popular belief formulated by the hedonist Eudoxus. It is not even the reference to Plato’s inclusivist view on human happiness (Plato’s belief that human happiness is a mixed life with pleasure added to the good), for Plato, like Aristotle, imposed limit upon excess. This consideration adds to the realization that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is rather the notes taken by the student than Aristotle’s actual theoretical treatise. When Aristotle was giving his lectures, he kept repeating these two major standpoints – by Eudoxus and Plato – but not in order to express his concession with their inclusivist view, but, vice versa, in order to make his own view more distinct from theirs.

Thus, the concluding part of the 1097b14-21 passage “if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” is the paraphrase of the hedonist theory by Eudoxus. And the concluding part of the 1172b23-35 passage “now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves” is the paraphrase of Plato’s theory who argued that what is added cannot be the good. As Aristotle stressed, these statements are opposite in its meaning to each other.
Let me summarize the opposition between Plato’s inclusivist view on human happiness and Aristotle’s functionalist exclusivist view. Modern inclusivists argue that the most final end (good-in-itself without qualification) is the compound of goods-in-themselves (final goods). Essentially, they do simply reinstate Plato’s theory that human happiness is a mixed life. They ignore the fact that Plato did at the same time believe that The Good is monados and cannot be constructed via adding up the goods-in-themselves. For, had it been a compound, The Good would be made more desirable “by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves”, but this is analytically wrong in virtue of definition of The Good (The Good is teleion). That is why the modern inclusivists fail to realize the repulsive pessimist nature of the inclusive happiness for Plato. There is nothing of an ideal in the inclusivist happiness. Plato believes that human happiness is of a mixed kind precisely because he does not believe in its soundness, i.e., that human happiness realizes The Good. Modern inclusivists do not notice that Aristotle does definitely agree with Plato that The Good is teleion in the sense that “nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves”, meaning that he also does not believe in the ability of mixed life to be The Good. But contrary to Plato, he argues that humans can realize the nature of the good being teleion in the indivisible moments of their functionally peculiar energeia – contemplation, i.e., humans can have sound happiness. When inclusivists reinstate Plato’s theory on happiness as a mixed life, they miss the point that the mixed life is never teleion. They say that nothing can be added to happiness in a mixed life to make a better good, because happiness already contains all goods, which could possibly be added to it. But, as Aristotle points out, the mixed life as a construct or compound can be con-
sidered *teleion* only in the moment of its completion, i.e., death; and this constitutes an *aporia* (the mixed life is never *teleion* when man is alive; and it is *teleion* only when man is dead).
Appendix

Critical overview of the major interpretations of eudaimonia in the contemporary Aristotelian scholarship

A.1 Ackrill’s account

The most important passage for the contemporary debate on the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia is the passage on the finality of the good, located at the very outset of the Nicomachean Ethics 1, and used in both inclusivist and exclusivist interpretations as one of their major justifications. The importance of the issue of the finality of the good for the issue of eudaimonia is based upon the teleological character of Aristotelian ethics, which proclaims eudaimonia to be the most final end (telos). Eudaimonia, as the most final end (telos), is a central issue of ethics for Aristotle, and, consequently, the major debate on Aristotelian ethics is the debate on eudaimonia.

The very first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics announces that every art and every inquiry, every action and pursuit aim at some good, and for this reason all things aim at the good (NE 1094a1-3), and the good or the chief good for man is happiness (1095a16-18). “Some goods” are particular goods, which are the subordinate ends desired for themselves but also for the sake of the chief end -- “the good”, or the eternal, i.e., unchangeable essence, “the universal” of the species (1094a10-16). The chief end is desired only for its own sake, and this stops the infinite series of desires (1094a19-20): “Not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking” (1097a27-30). According to the
degrees of finality, the finality of the end means that if nothing resulted from achieving it we should still choose it; the *ultimate* finality of the end means that absolutely nothing is sought beyond the attainment of this end, and happiness is this kind of an end (1097b3-7).

The inclusivist and exclusivist interpretations argue that Aristotle’s teleology should be interpreted in the inclusive or exclusive way respectfully. Inclusivist interpretation argues that if the finality of the good is not interpreted in the inclusive way, then the fatal confusion arises about (1) the criterion of right action and the intrinsicality of its value; (2) the meaning of the best life. If man’s life aims at one dominant, most final end of *eudaimonia* identified as *theōria*, then moral action is valuable if and only if it promotes *theōria* being, in this case, an end which is extrinsic to moral action itself. But if moral action is valuable only as a means for *theōria*, it appears that its own intrinsic value is jeopardized. (Ackrill, *British Academy Lecture: Aristotle on Eudaimonia*, 1975, reprinted 1980, 16).

Consequently, the happy life consisting *exclusively* in *theōria* would lack the intrinsic value of moral action – the value which, otherwise, is supposed to be independent of whether one is engaged in *theōria* or not. In this kind of happy life, Ackrill states, “one should do anything however seemingly monstrous if doing it has the slightest tendency to promote *theōria* – *and such an act would on this view actually be good and virtuous*” (*the denial of any independent value to action*, in Ackrill’s terms) (32; emphasis added). It may be proposed, continues Ackrill, that one should maximize *theōria*, and for the rest act well so that if and when *theōria* cannot be engaged in and nothing can be done to promote *theōria*, then the value of moral action will enter into consideration (*the*
absolute priority rule, in Ackrill’s terms). But, argues Ackrill, it is impossible to combine theoria, as the dominant activity, with virtuous action, given that theoria is the incommensurably more valuable activity, so that, even in this case, “one should do anything however monstrous if doing it has the slightest tendency to promote theoria – though such an act would on this view actually still be monstrous” (32; emphasis added).

However, Ackrill insists that the inclusivist account of Aristotle’s teleology shows that “there is no need to suppose that he was led into confusion on this matter by some inadequacy in his understanding of means and ends” (17). Ackrill founds the inclusivist account on Aristotle’s statement, which, as he says, “is often neglected and never ([he] thinks) given its full weight”: “It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions or something else apart from these” (1094a16-18). Ackrill emphasizes: Aristotle “is clearly saying here that his point about the subordination of one activity to another has application not only where … the subordinate activity produces a product or outcome which the superior activity uses, but also where the subordinate activity has no such end apart from itself but is its own end” (18).

Formulating what can be called the inseparability requirement, Ackrill argues that in the case when the subordinate activity is not directed to a product or outcome, the relation between the subordinate activity and the dominant activity is that of part to whole — “the relation an activity or end may have to an activity or end that includes or embraces it”. “One may think, continues Ackrill, of the relation of putting to playing golf or of playing golf to having a good holiday. One does not put in order to play golf as one buys a club in order to play golf … It will be “because” you wanted to play golf that you are putting, and “for the sake” of a good holiday that you playing golf; but this is because
putting and golfing are constituents of or ingredients in golfing and having a good holiday respectively, not because they are necessary preliminaries” (19).26

Happiness, viewed in this way, claims Ackrill, is not the result or outcome of a lifetime’s effort (like a contented retirement), but is a life, worth while and enjoyable all through. Therefore, all the bits of it must be worth while and enjoyable, not just means for bringing about subsequent bits, so that the inclusivist solution to the dilemma of Aristotelian teleology is as follows: “That the primary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the sake of eudaimonia is not incompatible with their being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia is constituted by activities that are ends in themselves” (19), or “contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities” (21). Ackrill emphasizes: “… when Aristotle says that A is for the sake of B, he need not mean that A is a means to subsequent B but may mean that A contributes as a constituent to B… This is a defense of Aristotle against the charge that in Book 1 a confusion about means and ends leads him to hold that action has value only as means to theoria” (29-30).

Thus, the relation between moral action and eudaimonia, posits Ackrill, is not the instrumental one of a means to an external end, but “a kind of subordination which makes it perfectly possible to say that moral action is for the sake of eudaimonia without implying that it is a means to producing something other than itself” (20). The most final end is never sought for the sake of anything else precisely because it includes all final ends (23). Ackrill adds that inclusivism acquits Aristotle of the alleged fallacy of stating at the

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26 In his introduction to Aristotle’s Ethics (1973), Ackrill gives the analogous example: if I am fishing on my holiday, then my holiday consists in / of fishing and does not require some special activity of celebration beyond fishing – my fishing is my holiday: “My objective is to have a good holiday. To that end I plan inter alia to go fishing. I shall not go fishing in order to do something afterwards (let alone in order to have a good holiday afterwards)” (Ackrill, 1973, 19).
onset of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that since every activity aims at some end there must be *The* end at which every activity aims. The fact that there is some end desired for itself, says Ackrill, everything else being desired for it, need not be taken to mean that there is a single object of desire. The fallacy disappears if one admits of the most final end – *the* good – that includes “every independently desired end” or is constructed “from any plurality of separate ends”, so that “there is just one (compound) end such that each of those separate ends is desired not only for itself but also for it” (25-26).

**A.2 Cooper’s account**

Cooper, who formulated the exclusivist position in the mid 70’s, does, however, follow Ackrill in the inclusivist interpretation of Aristotelian teleology in the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10, where, as he argues, Aristotle “regards morally virtuous action “as not merely an end in itself but even one of the constituent ends in the conception of flourishing”, and, in a broader sense, “counts other goods besides pure intellectual ones as basic constituents of the good life” (Cooper, 1975, 151; n162). Like Ackrill, Cooper claims the pursuance of the ultimate end in the mixed life does not rule out the intrinsic value of all other ends desired for their own sake: “It entails only that any such end is at the same time pursued as a means to the ultimate end” (16). And, as Ackrill does, Cooper interprets the subordinate ends being means not in the causal sense (means causes an end), but in the inclusive sense so that means satisfy bringing about the end even if they do not produce anything beyond themselves.

Cooper argues that the Greek expression *ta pros ta telê*, translated “means”, has broader application in signifying “things that contribute to” or “promote” or “have a positive bearing”, and that this broader application is to be insisted upon in interpreting Aris-
totle’s theory of ends (19-20). Opposing his internalist or inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1-9 and *Eudemian Ethics* to the externalist or causal one, Cooper claims that subordinate ends as means are not “causal conditions”, but “constituent parts” of the ultimate end (22, 97). For example, says Cooper, petitioning a letter to the governor to obtain a pardon for a condemned prisoner is not a *means* to the end of petitioning the governor: “it is what, in this case, the petitioning consists in” (19).

Cooper explains: in the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10, human happiness, as the ultimate end, *consists of* a compound of virtuous actions and activities which *are* subordinate ends but do not have instrumental dependence upon the ultimate end of happiness. They do not *cause* happiness or, in other words, are not the instruments for the sake of bringing about happiness in the externalist sense; they provide for happiness simply by being, in the internalist sense, “the constituent parts of complex ends” (82):

On this view, there would be no contrast … between regarding an act of virtue as a means of obtaining one’s ultimate end and choosing it for its own sake. For the ultimate end is something desired for its own sake …, and if morally virtuous action is one of the constituent parts of this, it – along with the other parts – will thereby also be desired for its own sake. And in performing acts of virtue on particular occasions one will be actually realizing, in the only way it can be realized, that inherent value which one attributes to virtuous action in making it a constituent of the ultimate end (82).

Cooper refers to the analogy Aristotle draws between geometrical construction and deliberation [practical reasoning] which is, according to Cooper, responsible for the attainment of happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10: “A many-sided figure may have been analyzed into its constituent triangles, and then the first step in the construction, the drawing of a triangle, will be the construction of part of the many-sided
figure itself. If deliberation is like this, then among the things done that ‘contribute to’ an end will be the production of some of its parts” (20; *NE* 1112b20-24). Analogously, the production of health consists in “the production of a part of the end being aimed at” – “some part of health which is lacking in the patient”: “No distinction is made between the step of rubbing the patient to make him warm and that of balancing his elements (if that is the relevant part of health) to make him healthy. Both are regarded as among *ta pros to telos*” (20-21; *NE* 1032b18-29).

Nonetheless, Cooper’s position on the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10 can be only a partial inclusivism, for, contrary to Ackrill’s indiscriminate inclusivism, Cooper recognizes that there can be a conflict between the subordinate ends and the ultimate end within the inclusivist model itself, complicated by a conflict between subordinate ends themselves. Cooper argues:

> It is easy to see that pursuit of [one’s] ultimate end may require choosing the less effective means to a given subordinate end – for example, if [one] has other subordinate ends as well, and there is some degree of conflict between the given end and one of these, the current balance may be struck by acting so that the given end is less fully or less certainly achieved than it might have been, while at the same time the other end is more certainly achieved than it might have been (17).

The balance between ends is achieved by the reference to the highest end “to see which end is to be preferred, how far the requirements of the one are to be allowed to interfere with the pursuit of the other, and so on” (18). This constitutes “weighing of the ends”, in Cooper’s words (19). It is clear that, on Cooper’s interpretation, when there is a conflict between the ends, a certain limit should be observed in compounding ends into one bundle of happiness.
This limit makes fine discriminations between various ends, and, finally, would not admit of Ackrill’s all-inclusivism or the principle of maximization. Cooper does also insist that a maximizer would not in principle accept the permanent inviolable principles designated by Aristotle as unalterable dispositions in certain types of situation (83). Therefore, defending the inviolable intrinsic value of moral action for Aristotle, Cooper concludes that Aristotle’s ethics is not a teleological ethics in the modern sense, but, while not being deontological in the modern sense either, it is closer to Kant and the deontologists, “if [as Cooper repeats after Rawls] the distinguishing feature of a teleological theory is that in it ‘the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good’”, while Aristotle conceives of eudaimonia as “a lifetime of morally virtuous action” (John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 24; Cooper, 1975, 87-88).

Though both Ackrill and Cooper do, with minor differences, agree on the inclusivist or comprehensive interpretation of the passage on the finality of the good in Book 1, they do categorically disagree on how this passage is linked with the passages on the finality of the good in Book 10. According to Cooper, Ackrill’s view would belong to a “crude interpretation”: it posits an extreme case of inclusivism for the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10, though including theōria into a set of virtuous activities of a happy man, but undermining its dominating role; and it posits an extreme case of exclusivism for the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, excluding moral virtues from a life of a truly happy man. Such an interpretation, posits Cooper, “makes the *Ethics* an untidy and somewhat incoherent book, and tends to give Aristotle a much less elevated view of moral values than most interpreters have themselves been anxious to concede” (151).
So, contrary to Ackrill, Cooper claims that “in his mature ethical theory” Aristotle does not totally abandon the conception of human flourishing as a mixed life, but “prefers another, intellectualist, ideal” which Cooper defines as “superhuman” by contrast with the “more down-to-earth ideal of the Eudemian Ethics” (179). Because the consistent exclusivism of Book 10 would stand in apparent contradiction with the mixed ideal of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics minus Book 10 and in the Eudemian Ethics, Cooper decisively limits the alleged exclusivism of Book 10 by bringing closer to each other the two modes of happy life outlined in Book 10 -- the secondary, i.e., moral, happy life and the primary, i.e., intellectualist, happy life. According to Cooper, not only does a secondary happy life include both moral excellence and the excellence of sophia (σοφία) with its activity of theōria (the requirement of mixing), but theōria remains a dominant good even in the secondary happy life (the requirement of the consistent domination of theōria). Because the secondary happy life and the primary happy life have the same dominant good – theōria – the secondary or moral happy life does not look as alien in Book 10, as it would be in the case when theōria is not a dominant good in it, or, even more, is completely excluded from it:

(1) “Aristotle nowhere says or implies that one who leads [moral life] identifies flourishing simply with morally virtuous activity… Thus, although he mentions nothing besides virtuous activity as a fundamental good on this scheme, he does not describe it as a dominant good”;
(2) “Nor … does he say that in living the ‘moral life’ one identifies oneself exclusively with one’s physical and emotional capacities.” Only in the primary happy life, man is identified exclusively with his intellect. “Nothing Aristotle says suggests that [those who live a moral life] adopt an equally restrictive conception which would forbid a human being to identify himself in part with his pure intellect”;

27 “An intellectualist thesis remains, but one so hedged about as not to contradict the more inclusive view put forward in the Eudemian Ethics and presupposed by the remainder of the Nicomachean” (91).
(3) “The call for the maximization of intellectual good finds no counterpart in the
description of this second life: here, there is no corresponding injunction to
maximize moral good” (166-167; emphasis added).

Nonetheless, says Cooper, Aristotle does not make clear whether the second happy life is
the same as the Eudeman mixed life devoted jointly to moral and intellectual cultivation,
for “he discusses the second life and the rationale for preferring it only so far as it con-
tains the moral virtues as fundamental values, and omits to specify it further, since for his
contrastive purposes this is sufficient” (166). Given this, continues Cooper, one might be
inclined to infer that the second happy life is a life of a “stolid burgher”, as exclusively
devoted to praxis (practical action), as the other life to theëria (what was actually done
later on by Kenny, Kraut, and by the recent Cooper himself). But, argues Cooper, this
interpretation would be in too much a tension with the concept of the Eudeman mixed
life, necessarily uniting praxis and theëria in one and the same life.

Thus, as early as 1975, Cooper offers a solution to the problem, underpinned by
Ackrill, of the inconsistency between the Eudeman Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics mi-
nus Book 10, on one hand, and the Nicomachean Ethics 10, on the other hand, this solu-
tion consisting in the requirement of mixing [so that any happy life does necessarily in-
clude theëria] and the requirement of the consistent domination of theëria, i.e., its domi-
nation even in the mixed happy life: “If this is correct, he insists, then Aristotle in calling
this life a ‘life of moral virtue’ names it after its distinctive aspect and does not imply that
there is no provision in it for the intellectual excellences and their exercise” (167). On
this interpretation, the secondary happy life of Book 10 is a link between Book 10, the
rest of the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Eudeman Ethics: not only does it introduce, as
legitimate, a moral life dominated by intellectualism into Book 10, but it also implies that
the mixed life in the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10 and the *Eudemian Ethics* is the same kind of life as the secondary happy life of Book 10, both being “mixed lives”, and both dominated by *theôria*, though remaining, at the same time, thoroughly moral.

Cooper claims that Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* has a tendency toward exclusivism (99-100)\(^28\), and only the central books exhibit consistent inclusivism. The central books, as well as the *Eudemian Ethics*, posit “a bipartite conception of human flourishing” (144, 147). In this bipartite conception, though *theôria* remains a dominant good the values of the moral life “are given a place alongside” the value of *theôria*, says Cooper:

The two fundamental ends of morally excellent action and pure speculative thinking are thus *the two coordinate parts of the single ultimate end*, which is to live a flourishing human life. In the constitution of this life the theoretical side is given a special weight, since, within the fixed frame provided by the moral virtues, intellectual virtues will be pursued and promoted to the maximum degree possible. Moral action is thus assigned a definite, but limited, value whereas pure thought is made the object of unrestrained pursuit once moral requirements are fully met (144; emphasis added).

Evidently, the dominance of *theôria* is limited, for Cooper’s bipartite model of Aristotelian teleology is a two-storey hierarchical model – one cannot reach the second floor of the “complex ultimate end” (112) till one has climbed to the first, and one would destroy the second floor if one destroys the first: “Neither of [the two fundamental ends of morally virtuous activity and intellectual activity] is subordinated to the other; moral virtue comes first, in the sense that it must be provided for first, but once moral virtue is securely entrenched, then intellectual goods are allowed to predominate” (143) – even “to the exclusion of all else” (142). Hence, the two-storey hierarchical model of teleology

\(^{28}\) Cooper says the purely intellectualist end apparently defended in Book 10 is “adumbrated” in Book 1, 113.
insures that moral virtues are never sacrificed or made dependent on *theôria* (142). There is no subordination between moral virtue and *theôria* because they have independent value, and Cooper does even use the expression “the dominant pair” (120). He specifically emphasizes that the concept of a bipartite ultimate end avoids the catastrophic implications of the “two ends” teleological model, in which ends could conflict, and then, one end would be sacrificed for the one considered to be more important or dominant (113). But it is precisely because Cooper qualifies his thesis of the predominance of *theôria* in the mixed life of the central books by the two-storey outlook of the hierarchy within the soul that he is able to introduce the predominance of *theôria* into the central books.

Thus, in order to blend the books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* into one coherent whole, Cooper first qualifies exclusivism in Book 10 [by bringing the secondary happy life closer to the primary happy life], and then qualifies inclusivism in the central books by introducing into them the limited exclusivism of a two-storey hierarchical model. He claims that (1) Aristotle rejects the principle of *extensive* maximization (all-inclusivism) on quasi-deontological grounds requiring the fixed system of moral principles; (2) Aristotle does specifically reject the principle of *intensive* maximization for moral action; (3) all-inclusivism does not hold, for the parts of the all-inclusive compound can conflict with each other; (4) *theôria* remains the dominant good in a mixed life even in the central books, though allowing, at the same time, for Cooper’s “plurality of independent values” (110).

This solution, though, posits the following puzzle. In his interpretation of the *NE ergon* passage, Cooper claims that the human *ergon* consists in the exercise of moral vir-
tues and practical intellect, or, as he says, “the distinctly human excellences are the moral virtues, on one hand, and the virtues of the practical intellect on the other” (117-118).

But, in this case, it appears that in Cooper’s bipartite model of a mixed life, theoria as the most final end has nothing to do with human ergon. On the other side, because Cooper rejects the intensive maximization of moral action, he appears to reject the fullest possible realization of human ergon, for, for him, human ergon consists in moral action.

But blending inclusivism into Book 10 to link it with the central books, Cooper does not only preserve, but exaggerates the exclusivism of the primary happy life. According to Cooper, the most final good in Book 10 is the activity of theoria alone, in exclusion of all other virtuous activities: “Only theoria is loved for itself” (or “for its own sake”, 156; emphasis added). In other words, only the end of theoria has a status of finality in Book 10. Cooper’s major argument for the opposition between the secondary and primary happy lives is that because Aristotle uses the Greek word bios designating a mode of life to define the primary and secondary happy lives, and, according to Liddell-Scott-Jones’ Greek-English Lexicon, “in any period of time one can only have one mode of life” (160), the primary or intellectualist happy life and the secondary or moral happy life are “alternative ideals” (180).

A human being, says Cooper, is identified with his theoretical intellect in the Nicomachean Ethics 10. Cooper claims that this way of thinking “plainly derives from the theory of the De Anima”, in which, according to Cooper, “the highest intellectual function is not connected … with the other functions nor with any body”29 (175), and “which encourages the idea that a human being is essentially godlike” (177). Cooper posits that

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29 “It is, as Aristotle says at one place (413b26), psuchēs genos heteron, another kind of soul (cf. also 402b1-3, 408b18-19); and it seems to say elsewhere (De Gen. An. 736b27-28, 737a10, 744b21), it comes into the body from outside (thurathen)."
Aristotle seems simply to work out the consequences of this idea in the theory of flourishing in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 10 (177). This postulation of a non-physical and separable *nous* is the “sole exception” to Aristotle’s identification of the human being not with his theoretical intellect but “either, as in Plato, with an undifferentiated mind regarded principally from the practical side, or else with the practical intellect itself” (169). This claim by Cooper does necessarily commit him either to claiming that Aristotle is inconsistent or to positing two human *erga* instead of one human *ergon* conventionally ascribed to Aristotle. And because Cooper’s self-proclaimed task is to make the Aristotelian ethical corpus consistent, he is left with the second alternative, i.e., to admit of two *erga* corresponding to “two souls” instead of one, “one the actuality of a body and the other not” (176) (what would happen later to Kraut’s interpretation seeking also for the consistency in Aristotle’s ethics but categorically opposing the primary and the secondary happy lives). Cooper explicitly states that Aristotle posits *two* kinds of human identity, and that the one derived from *De Anima* “will hardly recommend itself to everyone” (178).

Consequently, Cooper contends that moral virtue constitutes a part only of the secondary happy life, “and plays no role at all” in the primary happy life dominated by the activity of *theōria* (179; emphasis added). Even if a *theōretikos* would do moral acts, he could not do them as a truly moral person, for, according to Cooper, “he will lack the kind of commitment to this kind of activity that is an essential characteristic of the virtuous person” (164). The virtuous acts “are not his own acts; they are a concession to the human being – the living physical body – with which he refuses to identify himself” (165). In separating *theōria* from moral action in the primary happy life, Cooper does go
further than Ackrill, for while Ackrill thought of the extreme exclusivism as *the denial of any independent value to action*, with moral action being only a means to *theōria*, Cooper argues that the primary happy life of Book 10, bereft of moral virtue *completely* (or, as he says, “beyond morality”, n150), does not use moral virtue even as a means to *theōria*:

“Aristotle does not put forward the theory that the development and continued exercise of these virtues is a necessary condition of the flowering of the intellect” (161-162; 165). If one adopts the intellectualist ideal of Book 10, says Cooper, one is to “cut one’s volitional ties to one’s physical and emotional nature” (163). Finally, Cooper’s overall position on Aristotelian teleology should be defined as exclusivism by two criteria: (1) he posits *theōria* as a *dominant good* even for the mixed life of the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10 and the *Eudemian Ethics* (a mixed happy life is “the life of a philosopher fully engaged in social, political, and family activities”, 145; emphasis added); and (2) he formulates the most extreme case of exclusivism for the primary happy life in Book 10.

Cooper does further argue that his version of exclusivism is capable of explaining away the alleged puzzles of the other important *NE* and *EE* passages applying the notion of finality – the passage on happiness being final or complete (*teleion*) in the sense of self-sufficiency and the passage on happiness as being an *energeia* according to the final or most final / complete (*teleia*) virtue. Cooper agrees with Hardie’s inclusivist interpretation of the *NE* passage on the self-sufficiency (as a special sense of completeness or finality) of happiness (1097b16-20)\(^31\), in which, as Cooper says, “Aristotle explicitly rec-

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\(^30\) Cooper says: “By the intellectual life which he pronounces ‘most flourishing’ Aristotle means a contemplative life led by a person who takes no interest in family, social, or political life, although he will, as necessary, do his part in these spheres since his attainment of the maximum possible leisure for theoretical work depends upon doing so” (167).

\(^31\) “The self-sufficient we … define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others – if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by
ognizes that flourishing must be conceived of as including a number of good things rather than as dominated by a single end, on the ground that flourishing must be the consummately best thing, whereas any quantity of a concrete good thing can be bettered by the addition to it of some quantity, however small, of another good thing, however small” (99). At the same time, Cooper claims that the other important NE passage on happiness as _energeia_ according to the complete or final virtue (ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν τελείαν\(^{32}\)) supports the exclusivist interpretation (99). Cooper points out to the connection of this passage with the passage in the tenth book formulating the order between excellences and defining _theōria_ as the best and final excellence – “the best thing in us” (1177a12-18; 99-100; see also 148). He emphasizes that, for Aristotle, _eudaimonia_, being something _teleon_, must be the exercise of something similarly _teleon_ (116). “So it seems not unreasonable to conclude”, says Cooper, “that in his first book account Aristotle is paving the way for the theory of the tenth book: ‘activity expressing the best and most final excellence’ in the earlier passage seems to be a reference to the exercise of theoretical wisdom” (100).

Cooper acknowledges that one can support the _inclusivist_ interpretation of the NE 1 passage on the complete or final virtue by pointing to _EE_ 1219a39 where ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν τελείαν clearly means the exercise of human excellence as a whole\(^{33}\). However, Cooper contends the inclusivist interpretation of the NE 1 passage on the final virtue with the following considerations:

the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b14-21).

\(^{32}\) Passage on happiness as “excellent spiritual or mental activity, or, if there are several forms of excellence, spiritual activity expressing the best and most final excellence” (1098a16-18).

\(^{33}\) “...Since happiness was something complete, and living is either complete or incomplete and so also virtue – one virtue being a whole, the other a part – and the activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete, therefore happiness would be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue” (1219a35-39).
(1) The context in which the notion of the complete of final virtue appears in the Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics is different, i.e., “in the NE the contrast between πλείους αι αρεταί and την αρίστην και τελειοτάτην surely does strongly invite one to take the ‘best and most final excellence’ as one among the several particular excellences”;

(2) “There is a large difference between η τελεία αρετή and η τελειοτάτη αρετή: the former could easily, even without the explicit indications in the EE context, be taken to mean excellence as a whole (cf. Phys. III 6 207a13-14), but the superlative, being by its very nature exclusionary, could only do so in a very special context”34;

(3) In the NE context, “the sense of τελειοτάτη is introduced earlier in the chapter (1097a25-b6) where τελειότατον is explained (a34-b1) as meaning “most having the character of an end” (n100).

That is why, concludes Cooper, he prefers the translation “most final” instead of “most complete” in the NE 1 passage on the final virtue, and excellences do differ with respect to this feature. Leaving aside ευδαιμονία itself, says Cooper, moral action does bring with it other desired goods, while σοφία does not (1177b2-4), and so σοφία is the “most final” because it alone has the entire finality of intention within itself (n100).

Cooper emphasizes that taken together these NE 1 and NE 10 passages on the final virtue, the passages which are “extremely explicit”, commit Aristotle to the view that happiness is to be identified with θεωρία (101). Nonetheless, continues Cooper:

It is important not to exaggerate the degree in which concern for goodness of the action itself is foreign to concern for an ulterior intellectualist end. For there is, in itself, nothing inconsistent in the thesis that pure thinking is the ultimate end recognized by the practically intelligent man, while he still recognizes and pursues other ends as well, among them το καλόν ή αὐτή εὐπραξία [“goodness of action itself”]… There is no bar against some of these other things also being ends – that is, desired for their own sake – and Aristotle makes this clear (1097b2-5) (105).

34 Cooper insists: “τελεία αρετή in the EE’s formula [1219a39] means something quite different from τελειοτάτη in the NE’s (1098a18). It has a different meaning also from τελεία αρετή in 1249a16, where the reference is to complete moral virtue (as also at NE=EE 1129b26, where it is applied to justice)” (n118).
Thus, in Cooper’s view, his rendering of τέλεια as “final” (not as “complete”) in the 1098a16-18 passage on happiness as energeia according to the final virtue does not create a tension with his inclusivist or comprehensive interpretation of the 1097b16-20 passage on happiness as being final in the sense of self-sufficiency, because, on his interpretation, the finality of theōria does not cancel the finality of moral virtue, and they are capable of coexisting within the bipartite most final end, though with the hierarchical superiority of theōria. This fulfills Cooper’s objective to render Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia as being “broad enough to accommodate the moral agent’s end while at the same time permitting the intellectualist development in Book X” (n101). Cooper supports his concept of the bipartite most final end by pointing to the NE 1144a5-6 passage: “For, being a part of virtue as a whole it (viz., theoretical wisdom), causes a man to flourish [merely] by being possessed and exercised”; and to the EE 1219a37 and 1220a2-4 passages where, as he says, “it is clear that the other main constituent of virtue as a whole is moral virtue” (112). Cooper insists that Aristotle does explicitly have the distinction between particular excellences and excellence taken as a whole (hê men gar holê, hê de morion, 1219a37) – “literally”, says Cooper, “excellence the whole and excellence the part” (116).

Nonetheless, Cooper’s bipartite end solution as a compromise between inclusivism and exclusivism is in tension with his extreme exclusivism towards the primary [intellectualist] happiness that does not have morally virtuous action as its constituent, being “beyond morality” (see also 148), and, so, not a bipartite end. This tension arises because Cooper applies the concept of the wholeness of the soul not only to the Nicomachean Ethics 1-9 and the Nicomachean Ethics 10 on the secondary happy life, but

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35 According to Cooper’s own definition, this kind of exclusivism is a “crude interpretation” (151).
also to the passages of the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 on the primary happy life. His claim is precisely that “if the intellectualist interpretation is to be maintained at all, plainly one must also hold that Aristotle thought it could not happen that the two ends [of *theòria* and *praxis*] should conflict” (107). But, in this case, it is puzzling why Cooper insists not only on the possibility but also and mostly on the *necessity* of this conflict in the primary happy life. If Cooper’s initial objective is to prove Aristotle consistent, it is puzzling why he does at the same time maintain that the primary happy life is essentially inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle’s ethical writings, because it does unavoidably breed men who are only condescending to morality, but not genuinely moral (and who does not apply morality even as a means for *theòria*).

In 1999, in *Reason and Emotion, Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory*, Chapter “Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration”, Cooper has remarkably rejected exclusivism in favour of inclusivism of the most extreme kind, which posits that happiness is not simply a complete virtue in a mixed life, but a complex good consisting of various particular goods like pleasure, wealth, honor, health, virtue, etc. (1999, 220). Cooper limits his analysis to the discussion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, claiming that “only in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and not in the *Eudemian Ethics* or the *Magna Moralia*, nor yet in the *Politics*, does Aristotle explicitly compare the value of theoretical study as against practical activity”36 (213). Cooper reconsiders his major claim regarding the *Nicomachean Ethics*, made in 1975, that, while in the *Eudemian Ethics*, *eudaimonia* is, as he says, “activity of complete virtue”, “complete virtue” meaning all the human virtues within *kalokagathia* (nobility) (1219a38-39; 213, the *Nicomachean*

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36 This statement of Cooper’s is specifically important in the context of my own interpretation, for I claim to have found passages in the *Politics* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, which testify to the contrary.
Ethics has two disjoint accounts of happiness – a mixed happy life and a contemplative happy life, and that the latter “threatens” the structure and content of the moral life (214) to such a degree that “anyone who successfully led the contemplative life recommended in Book X as the ideal one for a human being would not and could not be at the same time a morally virtuous person” (218) (“an intellectual ideal … leaves no room for morality”, 219). In such a context, says Cooper, it seems that Aristotle’s “attitude towards moral virtue is strictly qualified at best, if not actually compromised altogether” (215). Cooper continues that, in 1975, he was “forced” to conclude that Aristotle’s theory of eudaimonia in Book 10 is inconsistent with his analysis of moral virtue in the earlier books, thus, implicitly accepting that he failed, though tried, to link all the books of the Nicomachean Ethics into one consistent whole at that time. Now, he says: “This was not a conclusion I was happy to come to” (218).

Cooper posits, that, finally, after years of the debate, we may be in a position to make sense of the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole (215). He claims now that had Aristotle been intending to present two happy lives as two opposite life ideals, with the primary happy life completely devoid of moral virtues (as Cooper himself claimed in 1975), “surely [Aristotle] ought to have made this clear in a preliminary way already in the first book”. “That he does not do this”, continues Cooper, “certainly encourages the hope that it may be possible, despite what I argued in my book, to interpret the theory of happiness in Book X so that it does cohere with the rest of the treatise” (218).

37 Cooper formulates his 1975 position as follows: “It is hardly credible that [Aristotle] should see [the] complex balance of attachments [to one’s family, friends, fellow-citizens, and to one’s emotional and bodily satisfactions] as just what one should induce in oneself and regularly express in one’s more particular choices and actions, in order to further one’s philosophical work” (216).
38 At the same time, Cooper does, paradoxically, say that he “thought there was something possibly salutary in the idea that the practices of morality and the moral way of life were suitable only for most human beings under most circumstances, and not necessarily for those whose capacities and fundamental interests set them apart from the communal life that is the best most of us can aspire to” (218).
Cooper says that he based his earlier interpretation upon those passages of Book 10 where Aristotle seems to state that *eudaimonia* consists in the single activity of *theōria*. Now, he wants to suggest “that this is not in fact what Aristotle intends to say in these passages” (219). Cooper refers to Book 10, 6 1177a9-10 passage where Aristotle claims that happiness depends not on pleasant leisure-time activities, but on *energeiai* (activities) of virtue (*ον γαρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς η ἐυδαιμονία, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς κατ’ αρετὴν ενεργείαις*) (219). Cooper claims that this passage defines happiness as a complex end which is a compound of all the human virtuous *energeiai*. To justify the inclusivist interpretation of this passage in the context of Book 10 which contains, as it is conventionally believed, passages where Aristotle identifies happiness with one specific *energeia*, the *energeia* of *theōria*, Cooper gives a new, completely different, interpretation of these passages, and revisits his earlier interpretation of the *NE* 1 1098a16-18 passage on the final (complete) virtue. He formulates the general line of his argumentation as follows:

It is legitimate to expect that whatever relationship is intended here [viz., in Book 1] between happiness conceived of as virtuous activity of the soul and activity of the best and most complete virtue, the same relationship will be intended in the Book X passage, where Aristotle says that if happiness is virtuous activity it is *reasonable* that it should be of the most superior virtue (221).

Contrary to his 1975 interpretation, Cooper now insists that the Book 1 passage on the final virtue does not identify happiness with the single activity; likewise, the Book 10 passage does not (221). He insists: “[The] first sentence of Book X, chapter 7 [“if happiness is activity of virtue, it is reasonable that it should be of the most superior virtue”], should not be taken to identify happiness with any single virtuous activity alone” (227). He further argues that in Book 10, Aristotle identifies *theōria* [carried on for a
complete lifetime] with ‘complete happiness’ (hē teleia eudaimonia), not with happiness simpliciter. Contrary to ‘complete happiness’, happiness simpliciter consists of all the virtuous energeiai of the soul. This interpretation allows, claims Cooper, to combine the focus on theōria in Book 10 with the commitment to morally good action demonstrated by Aristotle elsewhere. It preserves the teleological autonomy of moral excellence and phronēsis, which, says Cooper, determines the due measure in all the human attachments, actions and activities (217) and, thus, “dictates the structure of evaluations making up the morally virtuous state of character” (216). Contrary to his 1975 view, Cooper now accepts that moral virtues provide “a condition of quiescence” in which theōria can be awakened. But this only underlines, on Cooper’s view, the fact that there is no direct teleological connection between moral virtues and theōria (viz., moral virtues aim at theōria as their most final end) – only the indirect teleological connection (viz., moral virtues do simply create conditions for theōria) (217).

Cooper founds his 1999 conclusion that happiness simpliciter is final / complete virtue in the inclusivist sense upon his reconsideration of the ergon passage (1097b24-1098a15) which states that human happiness consists in the perfect exercise of the function peculiar to men, viz., his rational power. He insists that the inclusivist definition of happiness in Book 1 is a conclusion from ergon argument (220):

Since (see 1098a4-5) our rational power is a complex thing, having several aspects and functions, the perfected exercise of our specific nature will require several activities, the. activities of the virtues that perfect the several aspects and functions of our rational power. Thus Aristotle’s own argument seems to require

39 Cooper says: “[Aristotle] thinks the morally virtuous person values the multifarious persons, things, experiences and activities that he cares fundamentally about independently of the effects that so valuing them has on his capacity and opportunity for philosophical work” (217). More specifically, Cooper claims the independent value of non-rational desires (217).

40 This is a very important statement in the context of my own interpretation, which argues otherwise.
the conclusion that happiness is activity of complete virtue, i.e., activity of all the specifically human virtues, the ones belonging to our rational capacities (222).

Cooper reiterates that nothing in the *ergon* passage offers any basis for saying that, if there are several functions and virtues, the virtue that is ‘most complete’ will be the only one that is needed for happiness (227). Cooper concludes that the *ergon* argument clearly shows that happiness *simpliciter* cannot be identified with ‘the most complete virtue’ (only ‘the complete happiness’ can). Cooper does also refer to the 1097b6-16 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness which he interprets in the inclusivist sense: happiness is the value that “cannot be increased by adding anything good to it, for the reason that it is to be conceived as a comprehensive good, somehow already containing whatever good you might think to supplement it with by adding to it” (223).

Furthermore, Cooper posits that, in Book 1, Aristotle has four restatements of the passage on the final (complete) virtue. He insists that any interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics should support all four of these passages:

In three of the four (1100a4-5 [cf. 1099b26]; 1101a14-16; 1102a5-6) Aristotle says clearly that according to his theory happiness is activity of *complete* virtue (in two of the three he adds: under certain conditions, viz., over a complete life and equipped with sufficient external goods) (221).

Cooper acknowledges that Aristotle does not say explicitly, as he does in the *Eudemian Ethics* (1219a35-39), that “complete virtue” (*τελεία αρετή*) consists of all human virtues, but, says Cooper, this is what Aristotle intends (221). Nonetheless, while Cooper interprets “complete virtue” in the inclusivist sense, he does still argue that “the most complete virtue” cannot be interpreted in the inclusivist sense. Cooper says the fact that on Aristotle’s view the most final / complete good is also a comprehensive end does not

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41 I will argue otherwise.
show that the most final / complete virtue is a sum of virtues. Even Ackrill, argues Cooper, notices that “the expression ‘most complete virtue’ cannot fail to remind the reader of Aristotle’s elaborate discussion and classification a page earlier of ends as more or less complete” (223). 

The predicate “most complete” means, in a special, “semi-technical”, sense, ‘chosen for itself and never for the sake of anything else’. The most complete virtue, concludes Cooper, should be the virtue that is chosen always for itself alone and never for the sake of anything else (223). And, indeed, in the fourth “restatement” passage (1099a29-31), which Ackrill, as Cooper points out, intentionally ignores, Aristotle says that he identifies happiness with “the best activities or with one of these, the best one”. Cooper continues: “Unless by ‘activity of the best and most complete virtue’ Aristotle meant activity of the single particular virtue, among all the particular human virtues, which is best and most complete, this sentence has nothing to refer back to” (223-224). Nonetheless, this line of Cooper’s argumentation has the following tension. He draws a parallel between the most complete virtue, in the sense of being ‘endy’, and the most final end, in the sense of being ‘endy’. Based on this parallel, he argues that ‘most complete / final’ virtue cannot be comprehensive like ‘complete / final virtue’. At the same time, he argues that the most final end is indeed comprehensive. But, in this case, Cooper is not entitled to argue that because the most final virtue is ‘endy’ in the same sense as the most final end, the most final virtue is not comprehensive.

At the same time, if Cooper insists that the relationship between happiness and the best / most complete energeia in Book 1 is the same as the one in Book 10 (221), and is indeed the relationship of identity, this statement is in tension with his major statement
that Aristotle defines happiness not as the best / most final energeia, but, to start with, simply as happiness simpliciter mixing all the virtuous energeiai. Cooper does not indeed rely upon any textual evidence in Book 1 to support his division of human happiness into happiness simpliciter and complete happiness, for the reason that there is none. But, in this case, his claim that the relationship between happiness and the best / most complete energeia in Book 1 is the same as the one in Book 10, stands against his qualification of happiness as divided into two kinds (simple one and complete one).

Based on this assumed difference between the complete and the most complete virtue, and contrary to his own belief of 1975, Cooper claims now that the secondary happiness is devoid of theoria. The reason was evidently that, otherwise, mixism would make the two happy lives (now being both moral) appear indistinguishable from each other. It is remarkable that in order to escape this conflation possible with the emergence of mixism, Kenny, Kraut and the recent Cooper all agree that a politician never theorizes.

Cooper states about the secondary happy life: “Happy it is, but not the happiest we are by nature capable of” (232). This latter statement implicitly defines theoria as the most efficient human functioning – ‘the happiest kind of life we are by nature capable of’. Puzzling enough, Cooper does at the same time state that happiness simpliciter, which is the realization of human ergon per se consisting in the exercise of all the virtuous activities of the soul, does not even include theoria. Cooper leaves the relation between human ergon per se and human ergon in the excellent degree unclear. It seems that growing more perfect, the human ergon radically changes its nature from being identical with the exercise of all the virtuous activities of the soul except theoria to being

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42 Cooper says: “The assertion that one human being is happier than another the more he contemplates does not imply that the human being who contemplates not at all but lives a thoroughly ‘practical’, but morally good life, has no eudaimonia” (234).
identical with the exercise of only one virtuous activity of the soul, namely, theōria. As a result, Cooper’s meaning of happiness simpliciter is ambiguous. Happiness simpliciter, which is the exercise of all the virtuous activities of the soul, can be identified neither with the secondary happy life, because this happy life lacks theōria, nor with the primary happy life, because that happy life consists only of theōria.

It seems that on Cooper’s 1999 interpretation denying theōria to the secondary happy life (and on Kenny’s and Kraut’s, similar, ones), the most complete virtue has nothing to do with human ergon per se (happiness simpliciter). Or, in other words, the most perfect human functioning does paradoxically reject the major principle of the fundamental human functioning. Consequentially, the terms ‘complete’ and ‘the most complete’ appear, in Cooper’s context, to be not connected with each other at all. ‘The most complete virtue’ is not, for Cooper, the perfect degree of ‘complete virtue’. They exist on different teleological planes – the complete virtue has a comprehensive meaning (it includes and implies all the virtues), and the most complete virtue has an exclusive meaning (it is chosen only for its own sake in exclusion of all the other virtues). In addition, Cooper admits that, at the end of discussion, Aristotle does once say (1178b32) simply that “happiness” itself (not “complete happiness) is “some sort of contemplative study” (229). Cooper appears incapable of explaining away this statement by Aristotle, and, as a result, his division of happiness into happiness simpliciter and ‘complete happiness’ is inconclusive, leaving unclear the role of theōria in human happiness.

A.3 Kenny’s account

Anthony Kenny opposes Cooper’s attempt to tie up all the parts of Aristotle’s ethical corpus into one coherent whole using a set of arguments which, he says, “exhibit
that there are such great differences between [the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics*] that it is misleading to talk simply of Aristotle’s ethical system, even though the conceptual frameworks of the two works are similar” (1992, 112). He argues that the *Nicomachean Ethics* posits a different teleological principle than the *Eudemian Ethics*: the former propounding “the dominant, intellectualist view” and the latter propounding “the inclusive, organic view” (1978, 208). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, happiness does essentially consist in the contemplative activity of *nous*, with the life of *phronēsis* and *aretē* downgraded to the rank of a second-rate happiness, while in the *Eudemian Ethics*, happiness consists in the perfect functioning of all the parts of the soul.

Kenny argues more consistently and categorically than Cooper against the inclusivist interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. According to Kenny, Aristotle shows in Book 10 that *theōria* possesses all the qualities which Book 1 ascribes to happiness: “If Aristotle underwent a spectacular change in his view of happiness between Book 1 and Book 10 he wrote Book 10 in such a way as to cover up the change entirely” (1978, 203; 1992, 19, 86, 88). At the same time, Kenny argues that the common books, which the *Nicomachean Ethics* shares with the *Eudemian Ethics*, propound the teleological paradigm found in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and, thus, properly belong to the *Eudemian Ethics* (1978, 190). Kenny posits that “Our *NE* consists of an anthology of genuine but separate Aristotelian treatises, of uncertain date, which were collected together into anthology of ethical writings after Aristotle’s death by his son Nicomachus: an anthology in which

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43 Nonetheless, Kenny admits that the evidence is ambiguous: “From one passage it is clear that while writing the common books their author was at least aware of the possibility of the Nicomachean conception” (1978, 190), so that he states: “Whether the *EE* is later than the *NE*, and whether it is philosophically superior to it, are questions which I deliberately left open” (1992, 114). Moreover, Kenny posits that the evidence is essentially inconclusive: “My aim in attacking the dogma of the priority of the *EE* was not to set up another dogma in its place, but to encourage agnosticism: an agnosticism that was open to the possibility – no more – that the *NE*, or parts of it, were superceded by the *EE*” (116; emphasis added).
Nicomachus included three books which belonged to an existing and more lengthy treatise, the EE” (1992, 140).

Nonetheless, notwithstanding the general consistency of his view over the fourteen years that have elapsed between the publication of his two books, Kenny’s interpretation exhibits a substantial but subtle change mirroring the overall change in the debate from the division of the interpretations into inclusivism and exclusivism towards the mixist interpretation. In his first book, Kenny supports Cooper’s two-story hierarchical model of teleology for the mixed life, which is an exclusivist qualification of inclusivism:

If the AE [common books] belongs with the EE then there is consistently presented a view which combines an inclusive conception of happiness as the exercise of all the virtues with the insistence on the primacy and supreme value of philosophical contemplation. On this view, wisdom [phronēsis] and the moral virtues find expression in actions which are both parts of happiness in themselves and also promote the contemplation which is the supreme element in happiness (1978, 213; emphasis added).

But already in his early work, Kenny offers the further development of the internalist interpretation of the relation between ends and means that is offered by Ackrill and Cooper. He emphasizes the distinction between hexis (ἕξις; the state of the soul) and energeia (ἐνέργεια; the activity of the soul). Opposing the static internalist model of happiness to his own dynamic internalist model of happiness, Kenny claims that the happiness of the mixed life is energeia and, being such, is essentially constituted by the energeiai of different hexeis of the soul: “Moral virtue and wisdom [phronēsis, in Kenny’s translation], though different hexeis, are exercised inseparably in a single energeia, so that they are not competing but collaborating elements in happiness” (193). Because all the virtuous energeiai of the soul merge within happiness, for the virtuous man the concepts ‘agathon’ (goodness), ‘hēdu’ (pleasantness), and ‘kalon’ (fineness) coincide in their ap-
plication. And so Aristotle, says Kenny, carries out his promise to show that happiness combines the three superlatives – finest, best, and pleasantest – of the Deliac inscription (1214a7-8) (207). In his 1992 book, Kenny calls this syncretism of happiness the *trichotomy* of goods (1992, 8-9).

Kenny elaborates on this argument in his later book: in the *Eudemian Ethics* and common books, (1) “virtues are for the sake of their exercises” – *energeiai* (activities of the soul); (2) virtues do not exist in separation from each other and are combined within a complete and perfect virtue of *kalokagathia* (1248b8-11); (3) therefore, “it is the exercise of *kalokagathia* (καλοκάγαθία) that is the supreme human good which constitutes happiness” – a complete (comprehensive) and perfect *energeia* (1992, 94-95). The concept of happiness being *energeia* shows the irrelevance of the externalist causal model of happiness, which posits that happiness is ‘caused’ by means of achieving happiness. Kenny stresses that Aristotle offers a causality reverse to the externalist causal model of happiness, so that happiness itself as the most final end or the final cause “is the cause of the goodness of the means to it”, and “it is the worthwhileness of the end of an action which makes the actions leading to it themselves worth while” (1978, 197).

The concept of merging all the *energeiai* of the soul into one *energeia* of happiness will later allow Kenny to support Cooper’s argument for the “weighing of the ends” in the case of their conflict, which Kenny calls “the comparative evaluation of ends” and “the prioritization of ends” within “the hierarchy of ends” (1992, 2). Also Kenny emphasizes that natural goods may in some individual cases be harmful, though they are naturally good (9). But, unlike Cooper’s two-storey teleological model of the mixed life, in which moral excellence is pursued unlimitedly and unconditionally to its full satisfac-
tion, but the principle of the intensive maximization of moral action is nonetheless rejected, Kenny narrows the application of the prioritization of ends criterion to the external goods, in exclusion of moral virtues: “Virtue is something of which there cannot be too much” (1978, 208).

In his second book, Kenny makes an additional, radical step along the line of attributing an exclusive teleological value to moral virtue, and departs from Cooper’s two-storey model. He does not claim any longer that the Eudemian Ethics posits “the exercise of all the virtues with the insistence on the primacy and supreme value of philosophical contemplation” (1978, 213), but claims now (1) that the mixed life can terminate or reach its utmost finality not only in contemplation; and (2), even more radically, the mixed life can terminate or reach its utmost finality not necessarily in happiness: “It is not the case that every single action of every agent has happiness as its ultimate end: some actions are the result of chains of practical reasoning, which halt elsewhere – in honour, perhaps, or understanding or pleasure” (1992, 8). Kenny formulates what can be called the teleological paradox of eudaimonism, specifically evident in Aristotle’s discussion of friendship. Kenny claims that both Ethics reveal that Aristotle “felt uncomfortable in the attempt to find room within his eudaemonistic system for the manifest importance of friendship” (52), for:

Whichever Ethics we take as our text, we are left with the same question to pose to Aristotle. If the happy man needs friends in order to benefit them rather than himself, then surely his ultimate goal is not, as the systematic development of the treatises leads us to believe, his own supreme good. If, on the other hand, he needs friends to promote his own self-knowledge and self-satisfaction, then surely his friendship is not a genuine love of his friends for their own sake (54).
While expressly positing that in the *Eudemonian Ethics*, friendship is a major constituent of happiness (53), Kenny does not offer a solution to this paradox, remarking only that this difficulty haunted the Aristotelian tradition through the centuries (54). Nonetheless, it is contextually evident that the teleological paradox of eudaimonism made Kenny realize that the issues with inclusivism go farther than the prioritization issue between moral virtues and *thēōria*, or that inclusivism does *in general* have issues with the prioritization of one end over the other, or the rest of the ends. Kenny’s recent mixism is his implicit solution to the problem, and it is the development of his early dynamic internalist model of the interrelation of ends and means, with happiness being an *energeia*.

Because for the later Kenny, the mixed life can terminate *equally* in either pleasure, or honour, or understanding, his is the *horizontal model of teleology*, or the *plurality of ends model* with no overarching single end in opposition to the pyramid-like model of teleology, which, as Kenny admits, is traditionally attributed to Aristotle and which states that “every one, in every choice, aims at a single end which is common to the choices of all” (7). Kenny refers to Broadie as formulating the same teleological model:

> Other kinds of noble activity [than *thēōria*] are ends for the noble person; hence wealth in excess of what is needed for leisure spent in *thēōria* would not necessarily be in excess of the ethical mean, since it could well be needed for other noble practices. This would not arise, of course, if nothing is noble except the pursuing and engaging in *thēōria* or if no rational choice were wise unless made with this end in view. But there is no ground in the EE for such a monolithic interpretation, and much to suggest that Aristotle recognizes a plurality of noble ends (Kenny, n100; Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 384; emphasis added).

This position is underlined by Kenny’s dynamic internalist model of the relation between ends and means:

> The process of building up wealth, health or political power is not logically structured by any specific further purpose for which these results will be employed… The practical skill of money making is the same whether one plans to use money
for war, education, or pleasure… (Kenny, 1992, n15; Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 382).

No end (telos), external in its energeia, can control the “logical” or, rather, teleological “structure” of the dynamic system of agent’s energeiai.

Kenny’s horizontal model of teleology of the mixed life makes a reverse step from Cooper back to the inseparability requirement formulated by Ackrill (i.e., the most final end is “inseparable” from the task at hand): the second storey of theória is essentially not necessary in the building of honour / nobility with honour / nobility being itself proclaimed the ultimate end of human life -- the only happiness there is:

In the EE, as in the NE, happiness is an end; and we know from the books’ first paragraph that happiness is the noblest thing there is (1214a8). But the way in which happiness functions as an end seems to be not that the happy man does things in order to be happy, but rather that he does, for the sake of their own nobility, the noble things which in fact constitute the happiness which makes life worth while (cf. 1215b30, 1216a11-13) (21).

Developing his 1978 concept of the syncretism of happiness being a total energeia, Kenny designates this justification of the horizontal teleology by the term “the omnivalence of happiness” (9): “For the ideally virtuous man, according to the EE, the concepts good, pleasant, and noble coincide in their application” (21). Thus, according to Kenny, the virtuous man might erect a building of pleasure, or a building of honour, or a building of understanding [Kenny’s translation for sophia] -- only one of them, only two of them, or all the three of them -- and achieve an equal happiness in any and all of them, for his happiness should essentially be of a mixed kind: it would mix the attributes of pleasure,

44 Kenny seems to make no distinction between honour (coming from outside in the praises by others) and nobility (intrinsically inherent in a noble action notwithstanding scorn or praise by others), for he uses these notions interchangeably, e.g., when he states that “happy life can halt equally in honour, perhaps, or understanding or pleasure” (1992, 8).
honour, and understanding. Understanding is not a second storey where a hierophant
separates himself from the contingencies of practical life, but is an attribute of the self-
same noble life. That is why, says Kenny, not only is understanding a part of mixed hap-
piness which is a whole consisting of parts, but it is inseparable from or *mixed with* every
part of mixed happiness, taken on its own:

It … sets the standard to which the activities of the other virtues must conform if
they are to remain within the realm of virtue and happiness (1249a21-b15) …

What particular behaviour in concrete circumstances counts as virtuous living
cannot be settled, Aristotle tells us at the end of the EE, without consideration of
the contemplation and service of God (1249b15-22)45 (22; emphasis added).

But, with this ultimate criterion of goodness emphasized, the *kalos kagathos* of
the *Eudemian Ethics* does not turn out to be identical with the *theorētikos* of the Ni-
comachean Ethics 10 (101). First, analyzing this criterion in the *Eudemian Ethics*, Kenny
separates contemplation per se from the service of God. What serves God is the soul as a
whole, and not just its speculative part (99), and, thus, the service of God is not contem-
plation proper, but consists in moral and practical deeds. Kenny insists that Aristotle
agrees on this with a character Euthyphro from Plato’s dialogue46. He claims that just as
Book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* states that *sophia* is productive of happiness by being
possessed and operative as a part of virtue entire, the final book of the *Eudemian Ethics*
spells out in parallel terms the contribution of the life of virtue:

The activity of wisdom [*phronēsis* in Kenny’s translation] plus moral virtues is it-
self part of the exercise of virtue which constitutes happiness; it has an efficient
causal relationship to the contemplative happiness, but it is also itself *a form of*

45 “Whatever choice or possession of natural goods – bodily goods, wealth, friends, and the like – will most
conduce to the contemplation of God is best: this is the finest criterion. But any standard of living which
either through excess or defect hinders the service and contemplation of God is bad” (1249b6-21).
46 “By the service of the gods Euthyphro has in mind acts of justice, like the attempt to punish a murderer
… if Aristotle does have the *Euthyphro* in mind here, then the service of God could well include acts of
moral virtue. These are the *kalai praxeis* of the *kalos kagathos* … – by which we make our contribution to
the splendour of the universe” (102).
happiness, by being a form of service to God. It contributes to happiness by being part of it, in the way that good breathing contributes to good singing; not in the way that (say) eating certain foods rather than others contributes to good singing (37; emphasis added).

Here Aristotle’s statement “the contemplation and service of God are the criterion of goodness” (with the service of God possibly being contemplative) is transformed into the statement “practical wisdom and moral virtues as the service of God are the criterion of goodness along with theoria as the criterion of goodness”, so that “in every action and sentiment, the EE happy person bears in mind not only the contemplation of God, but also the service of God” (111).

Second, Kenny makes contemplation, as the criterion of goodness, have a very limited scope of application – it puts a limit to natural goods, but cannot limit moral virtue:

It is not said … that the contemplation of God determines everything in the good person’s life; it is the criterion for the choice of natural goods like health, wealth, and strength. The noble actions of the moral virtues are chosen for their own sake and have their own internal criterion, namely the mean (99-100).

Furthermore, though Kenny does not deny that theoria is “glorious in itself”47, he agrees with Broadie that “since contemplation generates no natural goods, its only hope of entry into the good life is via the category of the noble” (101; Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 289; emphasis added). At the same time, Kenny supports Broadie’s definition of the noble as the category of the practical (making practical changes in the world): “In the ethics Aristotle’s focus never ceases to be practical. He views theoria not internally, so to speak, but as a practical objective” (Kenny, 103; Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 386; emphasis added).

47 “The contemplation of God in the EE will include the vision of how the first mover is related to all the levels of motion and causation in the glorious cosmos we inhabit”, and the contemplation can be that of the theologian, the mystic, and simply the mathematician (1992, 105-106).
phasis added). This statement does explicitly deny theoria its internal criterion of nobility independent from utility (theoria is viewed “not internally”). The significance of theoria is ultimately judged and granted by practical deliberations. This limits the role of contemplation as the criterion of goodness even more.

In the fact that Kenny construes nobility in practical terms lies the reason why he uses the notions of nobility and honour interchangeably. Because the goodness of anything whatsoever is ultimately judged by its external relation to utility, and not by its own intrinsic goodness, both Kenny and Broadie erase the difference between nobility (as being intrinsically honourable independently of the praise or scorn of others) and honour (as bestowed by others in their praise). Theoria not viewed “internally” means that theoria is viewed “externally” -- from the external standpoint of honour which is tied up with utilitarian considerations and necessarily conditioned practically. If the goodness of theoria is determined by the extrinsic considerations of honour, theoria loses, entirely or partially, its own intrinsic nobility. This limits the role of contemplation as the criterion of goodness from inside, so to speak.

According to Kenny and Broadie, not only is theoria “a significant” but not “an autonomous” element in the EE life (111), but the mixed life is predominantly a practical life; and so between two criteria of goodness – practical deeds as “the service of God” and theoria as “the contemplation of God” – the first criterion appears to be dominating. The kalos kagathos judges himself only on the basis of his moral / practical criteria of nobility, and never on the basis of criteria alien to practicality. Because a person who theorizes in the EE mixed life is, first of all, a kalos kagathos, and only after that – a theōrētikos, assume Kenny and Broadie, he would never sacrifice his practical life for the
sake of pure *theòria*, and even think of theoretical interests as something that could be completely independent from his practical interests. His practical interests would come first, and only after that -- his speculative interests, but if and only if it would be allowed by the prerogatives of his practical life. And even more, because *theòria* itself is proclaimed by mixism to be *always* “a practical objective”, the characteristic feature of mixism is the erasing of the distinction between the practical and the speculative, between the utilitarian and the disinterested.

This essentially pragmatist interpretation of the mixed life necessarily implies that *theòria*, entering one’s life not on its own but only via the practical noble, is dependent upon all the contingencies of practical life. Thus, Kenny supports Broadie in stating that *theòria* serves as “a moral safeguard: it preserves practical nobility in *superfluity* much as practical nobility preserves sheer basic goodness” (101; Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 289; emphasis added), thus emphasizing that *theòria* depends on material superfluity as its condition. In the context of the ultimate practicality of the mixed life, as interpreted by Kenny and Broadie, this condition is not a sufficient, but a necessary condition, and *theòria*, hence, loses its self-sufficiency: *theòria* is possible and justified only upon the excess of material wealth – no superfluity, no *theòria*.

This denial of any self-standing of *theòria* is radically different from Cooper’s quest for the qualified autonomy of *theòria* even in the mixed life. In Cooper’s two-storey teleological model, *theòria*, as the top floor up the hierarchical staircase, preserved its own intrinsic justification and its own space – *theòria* presupposed, as its necessary condition, the prior fulfillment of all the moral obligations, and, as its sufficient condition, the moderate equipment with the external goods, suitable for a middle class man,
but it did not presuppose, as its necessary condition, the excess of material wealth, and, therefore, preserved its status as the most self-sufficient activity even outside the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.

On the whole, the crucial departure Kenny makes from the position of Ackrill or Cooper regarding *theōria* is that, according to Kenny, the two *Ethics* of Aristotle offer two different, or rather, radically opposite concepts of *theōria*. The *EE theōria* is indeed called by Kenny “a moral” safeguard of the superfluous natural goods, meaning that because man does all things *only* for the sake of their nobility (21) (the inseparability requirement), *theōria* is nothing else than the highest manifestation of honour / nobility. It guards more natural goods than a simple practical nobility, and, therefore, is a paradigmatic nobility -- morality in the excellent degree, or morality par excellence. On the contrary, *theōria* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a marginal, almost asocial activity essentially separated from the moral / practical life, with this separation becoming more pronounced or radical in the unfolding of the *Nicomachean treatise* to the degree of mutual exclusiveness between *theōria* and moral action (the more speculative activity the less moral action): “In the early book [Book 1] the dominant sense of *autarkes* [self-sufficient] was ‘that which on its own makes a man happy’, in the final book [Book 10] the dominant sense seems to be ‘that which makes a man happy on his own’” (36). Kenny stresses that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, Aristotle is torn between two views – either to make contemplation the activity of the most human thing in us (1178a6) or the activity of something superhuman in us (1177a26), and representing the divine in us as “a thing apart” (1178a22) (106). While in the *Eudemian Ethics*, according to Kenny, “the divine element
in humans belongs on the appetitive, not the intellectual side of the soul” (73), and is “something superior to intelligence” (72).

Kenny’s dualism in interpreting *theōria* explains why Kenny posits the requirement of the most thorough mixing for the *Eudemian Ethics* (*Kenny’s omnivalence of happiness*), but argues against the concept of “mixing” for the secondary happy life in the *Nicomachean Ethics* formulated by the early Cooper (*Kenny’s monovalence of happiness*). Kenny interprets *theōria* and moral virtues as mutually exclusive in the *Nicomachean Ethics* so that, according to Kenny, not only is it true that the primary happy life completely lacks moral virtues, but it is also true that the secondary happy life completely lacks *theōria*. Kenny says about Cooper’s belief that the *NE* secondary happy life is a mixed life: “The only positive argument [Cooper] offers for it is that it would be strange if the mixed life championed in the *EE* were not so much as mentioned in the *NE*. That is so, only if the *NE* is later than the *EE*. And for this we need an independent argument” (1978, n209). And Kenny reaffirms in his later book: “Nowhere is it suggested in the *NE*, as it is in the *EE*, that contemplation and moral virtue are each constituents of a single overall happiness”, so that, according to Kenny, the primary happy life consists only in contemplation, and the parts of the secondary happy life are not moral virtue plus contemplation, as Cooper has claimed, but “the activities of the different moral virtues” (1992, 29).

Arguing against any “mixing” in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (minus shared books), Kenny criticizes the later Cooper for his “nuanced form of the inclusive view” (n7) in the attempt to “draw the sting” of intellectualism in Book 10 and acquit the *Nicomachean* theorizer from the charge of immorality by arguing that not only the secondary happy
life, but also the primary happy life is a mixed life (contemplation is perfect happiness not in the sense of being the whole of happiness but in the sense of being the best part of happiness containing also moral virtues) (Cooper, “Contemplation and Happiness” in *Reason and Emotion*, 1999). Cooper’s argument, contends Kenny, is vulnerable to the argument by an earlier Cooper for the strict differentiation between two kinds of happy life as two modes of happy life, so that it is existentially possible for an agent to engage only in one mode of happy life at a time. Also, adds Kenny, if, as Cooper now suggests, a *theōretikos* is also a politician, he will need all the external goods to practice politics and, hence, will lack self-sufficiency required by Book 10 for the primary happy life (92).

But Kenny’s exclusivism regarding the *NE* primary happy life with its specific (asocial) mode of *theōria* has undergone the same substantial but subtle change as his inclusivism regarding the *EE* mixed happy life. In his earlier book, Kenny agrees with Cooper that “the type of person whom many regard as the hero of the *Nicomachean Ethics* turns out, by the standards of the *Eudemian Ethics*, to be a vicious and ignoble character”. Kenny identifies a *theōretikos* with the cunning man – “a man who pursues a single dominant goal and is ruthless about other values”, for he “gave himself to the single-hearted and unrelenting pursuit of philosophy without regard for the moral virtues” (1978, 214). In his later book, Kenny rejects the intellectualist extremism of the early Cooper who interpreted the primary happy life in such a way that the contemplative was necessarily “a strange and repellent human being” (1992, 89) – “the ruthless, treacherous theorizer” (90-91).

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48 “If Aristotle made contemplation alone a constituent of perfect happiness, then in cases when there is a conflict between the demands of moral virtue and the demands of contemplation, Aristotle must say that the agent should engage in contemplation, even if the alternative is saving his neighbour from a burning house”, 89.
Kenny argues against the early Cooper that while moral virtues are not the constituents of the *NE* primary happiness, they are a necessary condition of it (37). Kenny contends it is “unfair” to claim along with the early Cooper that a *theōrētikos* would, if needed, sacrifice moral virtue for the sake of *theōria*:

> Virtues, after all, are excellences, and in Aristotle’s scheme someone may lack conspicuous virtue without falling into the opposite vice… The teaching of *NE* 10 is perhaps even compatible with the idea that the contemplative does possess the moral virtues, but does not possess them as forming part of his happiness (38, see also 91).

According to Kenny’s *minimalist interpretation*, as he calls it, a *theōrētikos* “fulfils minimum moral demands such as refraining from murder, theft, and adultery”, thus obtaining “a pass degree in morality without obtaining the honours degree awarded for the excellence of moral virtue” (91). Though, Kenny admits that since a *theōrētikos* is not committed to moral virtue as a constituent of happiness, there is a difficulty in explaining how the morality of a *theōrētikos* is compatible with his doing everything for the sake of happiness. But he points out that this consideration will not survive Aristotle’s analysis of incontinence: the incontinent man does not pursue pleasure as a constituent of the happy life, while the intemperate man does (38, n38). This argument, not developed by Kenny beyond these preliminary statements, seems to state that a *theōrētikos* has a moral happy life without making moral action a constituent of happiness, like the continent man has a pleasurable happy life without making pleasure a constituent of happiness, though he still has the desire for the sensual extravaganza, while the temperate man does not.

As a matter of fact, Kenny’s minimalist account of the *NE* interrelation between *theōria* and moral virtues is the implicit application of the principle of horizontal teleol-
ogy to the *NE* primary happy life, in particular. Kenny does indeed define his minimalism not only as (1) the allowance the theorizer makes for the moral virtue as the condition of his happiness, but also as (2) “the minimalist interpretation of those passages in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which say that happiness is that for the sake of which everything else is done” (91). While contending that the theorizer will have only a pass degree in morality, Kenny insists, at the same time, that “he will … do temperate things for their own sake”, independent of the sake of *theōria* (92). It appears that, though the moral virtues are only the conditions, and not the constituents of the happiness within the primary happy life, they constitute within this life their own teleological paradigm – different and independent from *theōria* (a court house beside the temple of *theōria* – small in size but with its own set of laws not liable to *theōria*).

Hence, according to Kenny, though in the primary happy life, *theōria* constitutes the whole of happiness, it is only a part of the happy life (a paradoxical proposition which is formulated as well by Broadie) (41). A primary happy life consists of *energeia*, which constitutes happiness (*theōria*), and *energeiai*, which do not constitute happiness (the moral virtues). And though the latter do not constitute happiness, they are teleologically necessary for living a happy life, and are teleologically independent from *energeia* that constitutes happiness. Therefore, Kenny does paradoxically separate happiness from a happy life. He assesses his proposition that “happiness is not always the most final end in the happy life” as a way of reconciliation between the inclusivist and exclusivist views (8).

Thus, Kenny’s minimalism is essentially a teleological minimalism, especially striking in his minimalist interpretation of the *NE* primary happy life: (1) not every activ-
ity pursues the central good as its most final good and, thus, can be teleologically autonomous; (2) the central good cannot dominate or even influence the intrinsic teleology of autonomous activity. It is essential that it is at this point and not earlier, when he posited the principle of horizontal teleology for the EE mixed happy life, that Kenny refers to Broadie’s most extreme expression of teleological minimalism: “The central good sometimes functions as a constraint rather than a goal in the ordinary sense of a positively aimed for objective” (n91; Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 31).

Because even in the primary happy life, (1) happiness, oddly enough, is only a part of a happy life; (2) and, thus, happiness as the central good is only a constraint and not a final cause proper, so that (3) moral virtues have their ultimate finality independent of theoria, Kenny can allow himself to make two opposite teleological statements: (1) that theoria is the dominant superior activity in the primary happy life; and (2) that the comparative evaluation of the ends is applicable not only to the mixed life, but also to the NE primary happy life, thus necessarily positing some intellectual energeia (different from theoria) which is responsible for weighing the competing claims of theoria and moral virtue, and to which theoria is liable in this respect as to a superior energeia.

Kenny says, when analyzing whether a theorētikos will be moral or not:

… the activity of moral virtue is given its definition by the mean, and the mean differs from person to person. The right number of brave actions … will be greater for the politicians than it will be for the theorizer. Wisdom [phronēsis in Kenny’s translation] will prescribe differently in the two cases, because of the different overarching end which constitutes the chief happiness of each of the two types of virtuous person. It will diminish the demands of the other fine and noble activities, in order to preserve the maximum room for contemplative happiness (91; emphasis added).
Hence, according to the later Kenny it is *phronēsis* that is the *energeia* responsible for weighing the conflicting ends even within the primary happy life, and, thus, even in the contemplative life, *theōria* is subordinated to *phronēsis* for determining its teleological limits – minimizing or maximizing its teleological domain\(^{49}\). Even in this kind of happy life, the deliberation of practical wisdom determines not only to which degree all the other *energeiai* should be engaged in so that *theōria* would remain a predominant *energeia*, but also to which degree *theōria* itself is to be engaged in so as not to jeopardize the ultimate finality of moral virtue, independent of *theōria*. Weighing the ends is construed by Kenny on the analogy with the moral mean, and, essentially, as itself being a moral or quasi-moral -- practical, in Broadie’s terms -- measure defined by *phronēsis* for all the kinds of happy lives and applied, in every case, to the entire life, either moral proper or contemplative. Kenny substantiates this claim on the governing role of *phronēsis* by arguing that it is wrong to think that the rational part of the soul, though being twofold, consists of a superior (*theōria*) and inferior (*phronēsis*): “What Aristotle says is that the human being is composed of superior and inferior, that is to say of rational and irrational parts of the soul” (97)\(^{50}\).

Finally, Kenny’s horizontal teleology offers the following different and autonomous teleological paradigms. (1) In the *Eudemian Ethics* and common books, there is no overarching end for all the human *energeiai* within one happy life, and for all the human lives within the *polis* – every agent builds his own building or buildings terminating in pleasure, honour or understanding (*sophia* in Kenny’s translation), mixing different *ener-

\(^{49}\) It is specifically notable that, in this citation, Kenny speaks of “the chief happiness of the two types of virtuous person”, implicitly separating happiness *simpliciter* (which is of the practical kind) from the “chief” or “perfect” happiness, similarly to the position of the late Cooper.

\(^{50}\) Nonetheless, Kenny leaves obscure what is then meant by the rational part itself being twofold.
geiai of the soul in the erection of every building. The teleological paradigm of the Eudemian Ethics, as interpreted by Kenny, is a pure mixism developed in parallel with Broadie. (2) In the Nicomachean Ethics, 10, the primary happy life has theoria as a predominant activity, but it is predominant not as a ruler or the governing element of the soul, but as the most perfect energeia that occupies the biggest building alongside the building of moral virtue, which is not that big but is still built on its own grounds independently and separately from the building of theoria. The two buildings are owned and supervised by the ruling authority of phronēsis – the two buildings are indeed built on the common grounds of phronēsis with its energeia undertaking the weighing of the ends, or determining how much ground is to be allotted for this building or that. Because it is up to phronēsis, and not theoria, as to how to allot the ground for building, phronēsis does always take care that both buildings are built, and not just one, so that theoria would not suppress the independent value of moral virtue. Otherwise, there is no connection between these two buildings, or no mixing of the energeia of understanding with the energeia of moral virtue. (3) In the Nicomachean Ethics, 10, the secondary happy life is an honourable life governed by phronēsis, but is not the mixed life of the Eudemian Ethics, for it consists only of the different kinds of moral virtues, but does not include theoria, and, hence, this kind of happy life has only one building. In a sense, this last teleological variation is exclusivism applied within the Nicomachean Ethics, 10 not to the life of contemplation, but to the life of moral virtue (not to the primary happy life, but to the secondary happy life) (this is the position which Kenny shares with Kraut and the recent Cooper). (4) In addition to this teleological variety, Kenny distinguishes the great-souled man of Books 2–4 of the Nicomachean Ethics as a teleological paradigm of its own, the
teleological nature of which is nonetheless left obscure by Kenny: “Even if NE 1 and NE 10 are reconcilable, the NE as a whole seems to have two different heroes: the contemplative of 1 and 10, and the great-souled man of 2-4” (93).

Evidently, Kenny’s horizontal teleology marks a radical departure from the initial notions of inclusivism and exclusivism and shifts the debate from the opposition of exclusivism and inclusivism to the mixed interpretation:

[A] Before, the mixed life was the life, which had separate specific compartments for the teleologically independent activities (e.g., two storeys in Cooper’s two-storey teleological model of the mixed life), so that even though it was a mixed life, the energeia of one activity did not mix with the energeia of the other activity (the external mixing principle). This can be called externalist mixism, and it is not mixism proper. Now, for Kenny, the mixed life is an intrinsically mixed life, meaning that every teleologically independent energeia is immanently or in-itself mixed with all the essential human energeiai (the internal mixing principle)51. This can be called internalist mixism, which is mixism proper. The internal mixing principle is what allowed the mixists to posit horizontal teleology – to separate two storeys of Cooper’s two-storey teleological model into two, three and more teleologically independent buildings each hosting its own central activity sharing the properties of the energeiai central in the other buildings.

[B] If for Cooper, even a mixed life necessarily terminated in one perfect (teleion) activity, for Kenny, a mixed life has a compound of autonomous ends each terminating in its own activity, perfect in itself. Because it is a practical life with different agendas to-

51 This is a peculiar application of the Socratic principle of the unity of virtue (i.e., if man has one virtue, he does necessarily have all the other virtues). In my next chapter on the flaws and inconsistencies of the present interpretations in relation to Aristotle’s text, I will consider whether this application is proper in Aristotle’s context.
day and tomorrow, the central or preferred good is chosen accordingly and, hence, is thoroughly fluid. In addition, because each activity is omnivalent (contains pleasure, honour and understanding), it does not need a domination of some external overarching end, expressing in this way the consistent intrinsicality of teleological motivation for mixism. In the context of the entire life, the constant change within the plurality of ends to make them adequate to the dynamics of practical realities and the essential plurality of ends itself undermine even the possibility of the unifying life plan with this plan’s single end pursued under any circumstance. Any centralizing plan is not a goal, but only a constraint. In a sense, here a practical agent dominates his ends, rather than some end, even the most perfect, is allowed to dominate his life.

Kenny does not simply return to Ackrill’s inseparability requirement that happiness is an activity inseparable from an honourable action, so that an agent attains happiness by simply acting right. He develops it as follows. Ackrill remarkably realized that such a teleological approach makes it hard to find a unifying teleological scheme in Aristotle, for, on this approach, different pieces of Aristotle’s corpus seem to posit different heroes each one with his own teleological paradigm in which happiness is inseparable from his central activity of the moment. Therefore, the inseparability criterion as such was insufficient to solve the alleged textual contradictions pointing in the direction of either inclusivism or exclusivism. It is to solve the problems with the inseparability requirement that Kenny formulated for mixism three more requirements: (1) the requirement of the teleological autonomy of every activity within the happy life, inseparable from the requirement of the omnivalence of the happy life; (2) the requirement of the weighing of ends in the intrinsically mixed or omnivalent happy life, and, hence, accord-
ing to (1) and (2) the fluidity of *the central good of the moment*; and (3) the requirement for the governing role of *phronēsis* weighing the ends in any kind of happy life. Horizontal teleology, or the requirement of the teleological autonomy of every activity constituting the happy life, is the foundation for the other requirements and makes all the difference between Ackrill’s inclusivism and mixism in that Ackrill evaluated the absence of the unifying teleological scheme as a fault, while the mixists evaluate this absence as a default.

It is precisely because Kenny posits the plurality of ultimate ends that he does not find it unnatural to state that Aristotle formulates radically different teleological projects for the different parts of his ethical corpus (“it is misleading to talk simply of Aristotle’s ethical system”, 112), and, even in the most extreme way, radically different teleological projects within one and the same part of his ethical corpus, i.e., the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10. In actuality, it would be inexact to say that the adept of the horizontal teleology does not find the unified Aristotelian ethics. For Kenny, it is simply pointless to seek for the unification of the Aristotelian ethical corpus, for if the centrality of the final good is substituted with its fluidity, every bit and piece of both Ethics is entitled to its own and autonomous agenda. The teleological autonomy of different human activities transforms, on Kenny’s interpretation, into the irreconcilable teleological autonomy of different parts of the Aristotelian ethical corpus itself. That is why he so explicitly stated that his task was rather to ignite agnosticism than to arrive at a conclusive interpretation (116).

Because of Kenny’s shift to mixism, Kenny’s teleological paradigm for the *Nicomachean* primary happy life cannot be assessed as exclusivism proper. Rather, it is a qualified mixist version of exclusivism, defining the dominance of *theōria* only as a con-
straint, while subordinating *theòria* to actual governing by *phronësis*\(^{52}\), and allowing for the teleological autonomy of moral action. The primary *happiness* consists only in contemplation, and, thus, is *not mixed*, but the primary *happy life is mixed* for it is composed of two autonomous [teleological] domains – contemplation and moral action, with moral action coming first in weighing the ends by *phronësis*. At the same time, Kenny’s teleological paradigm for the *Nicomachean* secondary happy life cannot be assessed as inclusivism proper, as well, because Kenny excludes *theòria* out of the secondary happy life, the rationale for this being, as in case with the recent Cooper, to escape the conflation of two happy lives, the primary and the secondary, now being both moral. But it is not exclusivism regarding the secondary happy life either, for the secondary happiness is not reduced to one single virtuous activity (though, probably, one can still call it ‘a special case of exclusivism, because one kind of virtue, i.e., moral, is chosen over the other kind of virtue, i.e., contemplative intellectual virtue). The secondary happiness consists of the mixture of all the virtuous activities of the soul in exclusion of *theòria*, but represent neither the extrinsic mixism (which states that happy life is a mixture of *all* the virtuous activities of the soul next to each other), nor the intrinsic mixism (which states that happy life is a mixture of *all* the virtuous activities of the soul inseparable from each other within *each and all* of the virtuous activities of the soul). Kenny leaves the teleological nature of the secondary happy life obscure, without explaining its principle by any other reasoning than making it distinguishable from the primary happy life.

\(^{52}\) This needs to be stressed again: not only does Kenny posit that *phronësis* determines the limits in which *theòria* is to be engaged in (the extrinsic limitation), but Kenny does also argue that *phronësis* defines for *theòria* its own “internal criterion of goodness” (he repeats after Broadie that *theòria* is viewed not *internally*, so to speak, but always as a practical objective) (the intrinsic limitation). In both scenarios, and especially, in the second one, Kenny represents *phronësis* as governing *theòria* – by giving commands not simply for the sake of *theòria*, but to *theòria* itself. I will explicate this issue in a more detail in my section on Broadie.
Nonetheless, this interpretation of the secondary happy life is deeply rooted in mixism. The exclusion of *theōria* from the secondary happy life reaffirms the major ideas of mixism that *phronēsis* is a governing virtue of the soul in any kind of happy life, and, ultimately, that man can be happy even when lacking *theōria*, so that, in the secondary happy life, *theōria* appears not to be linked with human *ergon*, happiness being the excellent human functioning. But, in this case, Kenny (as well as the recent Cooper) posits two *erga* for the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, instead of one human *ergon*, historically attributed to Aristotle – the primary happiness identified with the perfect contemplative functioning, and the secondary happiness identified with the perfect practical functioning. Finally, Kenny’s mixism is in principle inconsistent, for (1) Kenny is forced to admit of two autonomous and non-intermixed human *erga*, i.e., the secondary and the primary happy lives, within one and the same textual continuum; (2) Kenny is incapable of pursuing not only the principle of the *intrinsic* mixing, but also the principle of extrinsic mixing for the secondary happy life, which was historically viewed as a paradigm of a mixed life, both (1) and (2) being a result of the development of mixism itself (as the escape from the conflation of two happy lives now being both moral).

Ultimately, Kenny posits even more than two human *erga* for the Aristotelian ethical corpus, corresponding to the primary and the secondary modes of happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10. Every teleological paradigm that he construes for Aristotle (total four) is essentially the manifestation of a specific *ergon*. Multiple *erga* posit multiple different or, rather, opposite types of a human being. Most distinctly, the *EE* type of a human being functionally necessitates the syncretism of all of his *energeiai*, while the *NE* type of a human being who is happy in a secondary way functionally necessitates the re-
pulsion of the syncretism (or the intrinsic mixism) of all of his energetai, with the inter-
mediate position of the other NE type of a human being whose happiness in a primary 
way functionally necessitates the co-existence of moral action and contemplation (what is 
especially, an extrinsic mixism).

But Kenny’s allowing for two parallel and autonomous teleological paradigms of 
mixing and unmixing within one and the same textual continuum of the Nicomachean 
Ethics 10 is the most complete expression of the horizontal teleology. Indeed, this disin-
tegration of the text by the interpreter cannot be as easily justified by calling it the tex-
tural inconsistency as the more distanced from each other parts and pieces of the Aristote-
lian ethical corpus. Here, the principle of horizontal teleology is applied to the society as 
a whole and not to the individual life as its unit, meaning that the society allows for the 
multiple different ultimate ends (and erga), with the individual lives terminating in this or 
that single “overarching” ultimate end. This extreme of horizontal teleology means that 
the society cannot be unified even by the principle of mixism (its one part accepts mixing 
as the teleological principle, and the other part does not). With the pragmatic fluidity of 
its consequential good, mixism loses the last hold of the quasi-deontological grounds 
Cooper was so anxious to preserve in Aristotle, meaning, first of all, that mixism itself is 
not a deon (norm or rule) or categorical imperative, and, secondly and most important, 
that, thus, the very possibility of the categorical imperative as its absolute overriding or 
overarching of anything else by the central good is implicitly denied. It is remarkable 
that the exclusivism of the early Cooper in this sense is a predecessor of the horizontal 
teleology because he argues for the categorical autonomy of the two happy lives in the 
Nicomachean Ethics 10.
Because Kenny’s mixism is inconsistent or has a limited scope, his mixism with its syncretism and fluidity comes posterior to his overall horizontal teleology with its autonomy in plurality. Or, rather, paradoxically, mixism posits horizontal teleology (or teleological autonomy), and horizontal teleology makes mixism itself inconsistent, for horizontal teleology quite naturally operates with two and more opposite principles: especially, the intrinsic mixing and the intrinsic unmixing in the monovalent and omnivalent modes of happiness. Or, in other words, Kenny’s pluralism dooms him to be inconclusive and to posit two, three, four, etc., different teleological paradigms with their correspondent specific \textit{erga}.

Let me summarize the implications of Kenny’s over-emphasis of \textit{phronēsis} as the landmark in the development of mixism. The horizontal teleology posits the superior status of \textit{phronēsis} for any kind of happy life. It is \textit{phronēsis} that rules over the teleological grounds of all the human \textit{energeiai} in the EE mixed happy life, the \textit{NE} primary happy life, and the \textit{NE} secondary happy life. But it is precisely Kenny’s rendering of exclusivism for the \textit{NE} secondary happy life that makes his statement of the superiority of \textit{phronēsis} most extreme. The superiority of \textit{phronēsis} in this kind of happy life is so unconditional that no \textit{theōria} is admitted into a happy life. But, presumably, had \textit{phronēsis} found it practically necessary to employ \textit{theōria} in the secondary happy life, Kenny would surely not object to such a qualification of his special case of exclusivism regarding the \textit{NE} secondary happy life, if he is consistent in positing the ruling role of \textit{phronēsis} for any kind of happy life. And, thus, Kraut, developing the mixists’ view on this point, does not essentially object to the omnipotence of the mixing principle in any kind of
happy life, though, at the same time, denying that the *NE* secondary happy life should be in a principle a mixed life.

Therefore, while Kenny’s and Kraut’s horizontal teleology posits equally the mixing principle and the unmixing principle, horizontal teleology tends towards the mixing principle, with *phronēsis* being the ruler of the soul. This needs to be stressed: because, on this interpretation, *phronēsis* is the governing activity of the soul, the issue of the competition between *theōria* and the moral virtues, with either the exclusion of the moral virtues by *theōria*, or the exclusion of *theōria* by the moral virtues, becomes irrelevant. *Phronēsis* weighs all the ends till a reasonable balance between them is achieved. It is this dominance of *phronēsis* in the soul that allows Kenny to apply the unmixing principle quite differently from the former exclusivism. The unmixing principle applied now to the moral life does not carry with it the force of a categorical imperative, but is liable to on-going practical deliberation by *phronēsis*. Finally, while Kenny’s version of mixism ousts both inclusivism and exclusivism, his exclusion of *theōria* from the secondary happy life is a tacit recognition of its separate teleological space within society. Therefore, Kenny occupies the middle ground between the inclusivism / exclusivism of the initial stage of the debate and the pure mixism of Broadie who emphatically denies any autonomy to *theōria*.

The other important passage that Kenny comments on is the *NE* 1 passage on the final (*teleia*, complete) virtue. Comparing the *NE* and the *EE* notion of *teleia* and *teleion*, Kenny argues that, in the *Eudemian Ethics*53, not only is happiness defined as *kalokagathia*, which is a final virtue in a sense of *total* virtue consisting of all the virtues as its parts (1978, 190, 206), but happiness is also defined as activity of ‘complete life’ in ac-

53 Nonetheless, Kenny admits that the evidence is ambiguous in the common books (1978, 190).
cordance with complete (teleia) virtue, all of which (life, virtue, and happiness itself) are defined in the organic, as Kenny says, inclusive terms (“Life is either complete or incomplete, and so also virtue – one being whole virtue, another a part” (1219a35-39) (199; 203; 208). Kenny reinforces this point in his later book (1992, 6): “The soul’s virtue whose activity is the supreme good is a virtue which is constituted by the several virtues of the different parts of the soul” (“just as good bodily condition is compounded of the partial virtues, so is the virtue of the soul considered as an end”, 1220a3-4) (19).

In addition to this, in the common books, which Kenny argues belong to the Eudemian Ethics, legal justice is identical with this perfect virtue (or rather the particular aspect of its utilization in respect to others), defined with the use of the part-whole terminology (1978, 67-68). Even more, while in the Nicomachean Ethics, human ergon is the ergon of man, that can be ambiguous in its definition, in the Eudemian Ethics, human ergon is the ergon of the soul, with happiness consisting in the ideal functioning of every part of the soul (1978, 193, 202; 1992, 93). Kalos kagathos must have all the individual virtues, just as a body can only be healthy if all, or at least the main parts of it, are healthy (1248b8-16; 20).

Finally, in the disputed books, says Kenny, Aristotle states that “[learning and wisdom] are indeed productive: not like medical skill in relation to health, but like health itself; it is thus that learning is productive of happiness: for being a part of virtue entire by being possessed and being operative it is productive of happiness” (1144a3-6), thus clearly indicating that virtue entire is a whole consisting of parts (1978, 209): “Learning [sophia in Kenny’s translation] is only a part of virtue entire; it would be pointless of Aristotle to remind us of this here if he intended to say, as many commentators make him
say, that is it the whole of happiness” (1978, 210; 1992, 37, 94). It is because happiness is the activity of virtue entire, and learning is part of virtue entire that learning is productive of happiness: it is one of the hexeis which causally produce energeiai which compose happiness. Thus understood, this passage is in perfect accord with the Eudemian Ethics 1 and 8 and in flagrant contradiction with the Nicomachean Ethics 10 and more muffled contraction with the Nicomachean Ethics 1, concludes Kenny (1978, 210). Nonetheless, in his later book, Kenny admits that the EE use of ‘teleia’ (‘teleion’) combines the two senses ‘complete / comprehensive’ and ‘perfect / final’54 (1992, 20).

At the same time in the Nicomachean Ethics 1, argues Kenny, the final virtue (teleia) means ‘final’ or literally ‘endy’ rather than complete / comprehensive. The final virtue is sought for its own sake, and the most final virtue (teleiotatēn), the superior (“better than the rest”) virtue, is sought always for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else55 (1978, 201; 205): “If it means ‘complete’ then again it implies that there is no other element in perfect happiness apart from the contemplative activity of nous” (1992, 87). Kenny emphasizes that the NE 1 passage on the final (complete) virtue logically develops the passage on the finality of agathon (the good), in which, says Kenny, “[Aristotle] does not regard happiness as an inclusive end, but as a dominant one” (204). In his later book, Kenny develops this point: if we consider the term ‘teleion’ as having the same meaning as it had in the preamble to the function argument of 1097b24-1098a17, then it must mean ‘final’ or ‘supreme’. Kenny continues: “According to this sense … honour is more perfect than wealth; but honour is not more complete or com-

54 Kenny adds: “The word ‘perfect’ (teleion) in both treatises can bear either of the meanings ‘complete’ or ‘final’. But in the definition of happiness the Nicomachian treatise places the emphasis on finality, while the Eudemian places the emphasis on comprehensiveness” (1992, 22).
55 Kenny restates this point in his 1992 book (86), and acknowledges that it was first made by Cooper (18).
prehensive than wealth” (1992, 17). But now Kenny makes a milder statement that “Aristotle is at this point leaving room for, rather than arguing for, the identification of contemplation with perfect happiness”56 (17).

Meanwhile, in Aristotle on the Perfect Life, Kenny remarkably agrees with Roche (Roche, Ergon and Eudaimonia, 183) that the NE 1 passage on the final virtue, if interpreted in the exclusivist sense (i.e., that the most final virtue is theoria) cannot be a conclusion of the function (ergon) argument, because the function argument does not state that ‘the function of man is activity of soul in accordance with theoretical reason’. It should be, says Kenny, “a separate, self-standing development” (1992, 29). Evidently, these are the developments in Aristotle’s argument that contradict each other, according to Kenny. But Kenny does not attempt to make sense of this alleged contradiction in the NE Book 1.

In both of his books, Kenny argues that Ackrill’s attempt to interpret the NE 1 passage on the final virtue in the inclusivist sense fails because of the following considerations. To interpret the passage in the inclusivist way, we have to translate its final part not as most translators do, as ‘the best the most perfect among them’, but, with Ackrill, as ‘the best and most complete virtue’, i.e., virtue which is the whole of which the individual virtues are parts. And, indeed, says Kenny, “aretē, like the English word ‘virtue’, can be used as a mass-noun (as in ‘a man of great virtue’) or as a count-noun (as in ‘a man of many virtues’); but, on Ackrill’s view, Aristotle is made to switch from the mass-noun to the count-noun use and back again to the mass-noun use within a space of ten words” (1978, 205; 1992, 30).

56 Kenny also says that this is a traditional view (1992, 18)
Kenny insists that the clause “if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete” keeps open a place for the eventual doctrine of Nicomachean Ethics 10, constituting evidence that when Nicomachean Ethics 1 was written Aristotle had in mind the main idea of Nicomachean Ethics 10 (1096a5), while there is also evidence that when he wrote Nicomachean Ethics 10 he was thinking about Nicomachean Ethics 1 (1177a11) (1978, 205; 1992, 87). Kenny continues that the further evidence is contained in Aristotle’s discussion of Delian inscription in the Nicomachean Ethics 1, 8: “The properties severed by the inscription, Aristotle says, all belong to the best activities; and these, or one of them, namely the best, we identify with happiness (1099a30-1). The most an inclusive interpreter can claim here is that the inclusive view is offered there as one alternative” (1992, 30). But it is more natural to read this passage as epexegetic rather than disjunctive; and an inclusivist cannot possibly claim that this passage rules out the dominant interpretation (30). Kenny concludes that even if Ackrill is right about Nicomachean Ethics 1, the contrast between the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics remains, for, nowhere in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle posits that happiness is identical with theoria (1978, 205-206).

In his 1992 book, Kenny undertakes a detailed interpretation of the NE 1 passage defining happiness as being self-sufficient (to autarkes), i.e., as “that which on its own makes life worthy of choice and lacking in nothing” (1097b14-15), so that “we think [happiness] most choice-worthy of all things, without being counted along with other things – but if so counted clearly made more choice-worthy by the addition of even the least of goods” (1097b16-20). This passage, says Kenny, is used as a principal support for the inclusivist interpretation of the concept of happiness (notably by Ackrill and Coo-
per). It is argued that if happiness is “lacking in nothing”, it cannot be restricted solely to contemplation, but must be comprehensive – nothing can be added to it to make a better good, because happiness already contains all goods which could possibly be added to it (1097b8-21) (1992, 23-24).

Kenny rebuts that we must distinguish two questions: (1) ‘Is the happy man self-sufficient?’ and (2) ‘Is x by itself self-sufficient for happiness?’ “Someone, for instance”, says Kenny, “who regarded love as the essence of happiness might answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative” (23). Analogously, Aristotle does not maintain in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that a happy man is self-sufficient, for he needs friends (1169b2-1170b19), and in Book 10, that the contemplative will contemplate better with colleagues (1177a17-35; 1178a22-b7), but he does maintain that contemplation alone (provided that the conditions for contemplating have been fulfilled) is sufficient to make a man happy (23-24). The contemplative will need the necessities of life no less than the just man, but he will not need beneficiaries of his well-doing.

Kenny continues that Aristotle’s words “without being counted along with other things” may have either the meaning of a conditional proposition or the meaning of a counterfactual proposition. In the first sense [A], they mean ‘if it is not counted along with everything else’; and Aristotle’s words ‘if so counted’ mean ‘if it is, as it might be, counted along with something else’. The sense will be that happiness, when not added to anything else, is most choice-worthy—though, if added to anything else, is more choice-worthy with even the least good added. If happiness were meant as an inclusive end, containing all the goods sought for their own sake, “it would be absurd to speak of goods
additional to happiness”. Hence, Aristotle cannot in principle consider happiness as an inclusive end – unless he means the suggestion of addition to be absurd (24),

And, indeed, in the second sense [B], Aristotle’s expression ‘without being counted along with other things’ is taken to mean that happiness is not the kind of thing that can be counted as one thing among others. ‘If so added’ is considered (specifically by Ackrill and Cooper) as *per impossibile* condition (if it were – *per impossibile* – counted along). According to this interpretation, there are two reasons why happiness cannot be counted along with other things, and things cannot be added to happiness: firstly, happiness already contains all goods which could possibly have been added to it, and to count it with one of them would involve counting something twice; secondly, happiness is a supreme end to which other things are means, so that happiness cannot be counted along with other things because ends and means are not commensurable (24-25)57.

Kenny argues that even if [B] view (that a clause ‘without being counted along with other things’ belongs to a counterfactual) is the correct reading, it does not follow that Aristotle is here viewing happiness as an inclusive end (or as ‘a comprehensive ordering of first-order goods’). Apart from syntax, says Kenny, there are two reasons why: (1) Aristotle is listing agreed attributes of happiness, but the views of others identify happiness with some particular good, and not as an inclusive end; (2) if happiness is all-inclusive, it must include ‘even the least of goods’, such as the attractive hair mentioned by Eustratius; but this is absurd, says Kenny (25-26).

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57 Kenny says that some commentators (e.g., Alexander, and the author of *Magna Moralia*, 1184a26) take the one view, and some (e.g., Heliodorus) take the second view. He concludes that “a consensus in favour of the thesis that happiness cannot be counted along with other things is not the same thing, therefore, as a consensus that happiness is a comprehensive ordering of the first-order goods” (25).
Kenny analyzes Stephen White’s claim that taking the passage indicatively so as to allow for counting happiness together with other goods does not entail that happiness is a single good rather than an inclusive end. White argues that happiness is a subset of goods, and some goods can always be added to it, and so counting it together with lesser goods does not entail counting its parts twice over. The resulting greater good would be more than the minimum required for happiness: “But to use this procedure to construct the best good possible, and to look for something so good that nothing ever could be added to it, would be to mistake the kind of self-sufficiency possessed by happiness” (S. White, *Aristotelian Happiness*, 120). White insists that when Aristotle states, in *AE C* (1172b23), that “the good does not become more choice-worthy when anything is added to it” he is not expressing his own view, but reporting Plato’s (this point also made by Heinaman, *Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency*, 43). Aristotle is taken to reject Plato’s view because, under Plato’s condition, happiness would be impossible to obtain: if nothing *could* be added to happiness, it would have to include all the final goods here and now *ad maiorem nauseam*. That is why, concludes White, happiness is inclusive (it consists of the list of final goods capable of addition), but not comprehensive or all-inclusive (it does not contain all the final goods possible, in which case it would have been incapable of addition) (26-27).

Kenny rebuts White’s view by drawing on the analysis of the issue by Robert Heinaman. Heinaman states that, according to Aristotle, the total life of a human being consists of a variety of activities, e.g., perceiving, digesting, growing, thinking. Each activity is called by Aristotle a ‘life’, and when he identifies happiness with a certain kind
of life, he identifies it with a certain kind of activity, not ‘total life’ of compounded activities (28; Heinaman, *Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency*, 33).

### A.4 Broadie’s account

In *Ethics with Aristotle* (S. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991), Sarah Broadie differs from all the other participants in the debate by consistently making three claims: (1) the Aristotelian ethical corpus is consistent – it is a practical moral philosophy through and through; (2) there is a unifying scheme in one’s happy life – it is a selfsame practical life through and through, governed by *phronēsis*, and with a constant utilitarian focus on the utility of practical action; (3) in the best life, which is the excellent practical life, there is never a conflict between *theōria* and *praxis*, for *theōria* is the celebration of *praxis*. Broadie bases these claims upon the model of horizontal teleology she calls “the celebration model”, and argues for these claims in the following way.

Positing that “in the ethics Aristotle’s focus never ceases to be practical” (387) and stressing that “the good’ at which ‘all things aim’ has been identified as the objective of those who govern” – the *politikos* or statesman (15), Broadie’s end is to smoothen out the difference she finds between chapter 7 and 8 of Book 10 and the rest of the *Nicomachean Ethics* plus the *Eudemian Ethics* (370; 373-374; 387). Aristotle’s intention in both of his *Ethics*, she insists, is fundamentally the same, with both *Ethics* focused on “the life of practical excellence at its best” (389) – “a life of practical wisdom enlightened by nobility and looking toward *theōria*” (387). Thus, Broadie’s first claim on the consistency of the Aristotelian ethical corpus is based upon her second claim on the consistency of human life, practical all through.
Aristotle, Broadie emphasizes, does indeed offer a unifying scheme for one’s life, either happy or not – practicality or utilitarian focus on the utility of action. She continues that because human life is practical without exceptions (exceptions being a deviation from human nature), the happy life can be nothing else but excellent practicality: “The sheer desire to understand the nature of this life, unburdened by concern for the practical benefits of the knowledge, is not an attitude that Aristotle countenances in the Ethics. If there are or might be practical benefits, it is hardly human not to take an interest in them” (3; emphasis added).

Broadie states about happiness or the highest good:

The highest good whose nature we investigate in ethics is essentially a practicable objective. Only practical beings could have as their good such a good; but being practical is a form of rationality. If we were not essentially rational, we should not be essentially practical either (35).

To make sure, Broadie differentiates between “practical” and “practicable”. Broadie does not give a detailed explanation of what she means beyond simply saying that theoretical activity is practicable, but it is not practical, “because it intends to make no changes in the world” (36). One can assume that she means by “practicability” the continuous, and, more important, intentional and organized character of the intellectual activity of the soul with this activity having its own internal structure, objectives, and methods of achieving these objectives. If Broadie recognizes the practicability of theoria, then theoria, in her view, is a form of praxis along with being energeia (the activity of the soul). The difference between practicability and practicality, then, seems to be that practicability aims at the intrinsic good of the soul, while practicality aims at the external goods or utility, e.g., riches, social prestige, and attractiveness. In this case, praxis is not
reducible to the utilitarian practicality. But, as it is clear from her book, including the above citation, Broadie constantly blurs the difference between practicability and practicality, implicitly and explicitly reducing practicability to practicality. Practicability of theoria, with its own, intrinsic and self-contained, rational justification, is measured and limited, in Broadie’s scheme, by the practicality of practical beings and their practical form of rationality. For example, moral virtue is analyzed by Broadie as singularly a moral action, a form of practicality, for moral action intends to make changes in the world. And these changes aim to improve the economical and socio-political effectiveness of human life.

At the same time, Broadie insists that “the thought of theoretic activity does not grow out of” the Nicomachean Ethics before its Book 10 (36). In the Nicomachean Ethics minus Book 10, says Broadie, the central good is concerned with a specific mode of rationality – “being practical” – and this mode is nothing else but phronēsis: “The argument which shows that there is one ultimate good forces us to accept that this good consists in acting well in a practical way” (37). Happiness is simply “a well-lived practical life” (373), or “an active life of moral excellence informed by practical wisdom” (372). Accordingly, she states about an agent in his search for happiness:

This is a practical agent, since happiness is here considered above all as an end of practice. Something counts as happiness to an agent only so far as he or she subordinates other things to it by practical choice. Thus what counts as happiness to a person typifies that person as a practical agent of that kind (33). Not to care at any level about having ‘natural goods’ such as health, abilities, security, wealth, opportunities … is inhuman not only by ordinary standards but certainly by Aristotle’s since it implies the rejection of his starting point (53)⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ She adds: “If someone takes no interest in making a living, or in parents or children, or in his standing in the eyes of his peers, something is wrong…” (377).
Here, it is clear that not only does Broadie reduce practice (*praxis*) to practicality (practical doing), but she does not essentially undertake discrimination between πράξις, which she reduces to practicality as practical *doing* and *making*, and ποίησις, which is practicality as practical *making*. Broadie insists that practical virtue fails if it does not produce practical changes in the world, or, *utility*. The production of utility, according to Broadie, is inseparable from the utilitarian *practicality as making* which aims at the external changes in the world in the form of the production and manipulation of material circumstances, i.e., material utility. Along this line, she argues that areté as practical *doing* is impossible without a firm foundation of material wealth. Practical virtue is determined by material conditions, and *always* aims at their betterment, i.e., the better living. Because those who are poor do not have time even to think of ethics, they have impoverished morality correspondent to their impoverished material circumstances. More money buys more leisure and more virtue. Poor moralist is not Broadie’s ideal of a practically virtuous man. That is why it is impossible to separate, in her case, practicality as *doing* from practicality as *making*. In the parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where, as Broadie says, *theòria* does not yet make its appearance, she either identifies πράξις with ποίησις, or else makes it subordinate to ποίησις.

In comparison with Broadie, Kenny gives a more clear discrimination between πράξις “which marks the virtuous man” and ποίησις “which consists in the achievement of particular desirable goods” (1992, n57). According to Kenny’s discrimination, πράξις κατ’ ἀρετὴν can in principle consist not only in the *practicality* of virtuous action as virtuous *doing*, e.g., saving a drowning man, but it can also consist in the *practicability* of the virtuous activity of the soul without any external manifestations of action per se, i.e.,
any form of spiritual practice like compassion, meditation on the divine, prayer and the state of grace, etc.

Moreover, Broadie makes *phronēsis* a form of rationality *functionally* specific for humans: “Aristotle defines the distinctively human grade of life not merely as rational, but ‘as some sort of *practical life* of the part of the soul that has reason’ (1098a3-4). The qualification ‘practical’ implies that our happiness or central good is in practical functioning” (36)\(^{59}\). She insists: “The function is rational and practical” (37). Humans differ from brute animals not by “something called ‘rationality’”, she says, but by our practical wisdom in overcoming unfortunate conditions (409); she reiterates: “No doubt practical activity distinguishes human lives from the lives of other animals” (417). And, even more pointedly: “For [Aristotle] the virtue of practical wisdom is practical *reason* at its best, and so …, since we are practical, to be reason in *us* at its best” (397). Contrary to Cooper, Broadie specifically argues against even a possibility of a conflict between happiness and moral action in excess, which she construes as the excellent practicality: “It is not open to Aristotle to hold, as it might be to us under some different abstract conception of virtue, that a person can be actively virtuous (in conditions favouring the activity), yet not to that extent be happy” (371).

In the unified, practical, life, there is or must be no dualism or conflict between practical virtue and *theōria*. Broadie calls her solution “the celebration model”, in which “*theōria* … stands to active practical excellence as celebratory activity to what is celebrated”. “This model’s advantage”, continues Broadie, “is that it relates the two sides of the happy life without subordinating either to the other as means to end”, the gist of her argument being that one cannot separate celebration from what is celebrated, with the

\(^{59}\) Broadie is aware that “virtue of the nonrational part is a necessary dimension of practical reason” (415).
celebratory activity supervening upon practical excellence which it celebrates (413).

Making theoria a leisurely celebration of praxis, Broadie does not follow the recent Har-die in widening the scope of the constructive participation of theoria in the other activi-ties of the soul.

Broadie argues that even Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics has phronësis, and not theoria, as the focus of consideration. She formulates her objective in the following way:

If the best life is ‘political’…, the theoretic life, as some kind of competing op-tion, cannot be rated the best. Even so, it might still be reasonable to argue that theoretic activity should play some part in whatever life is best; and it might be possible to reconcile this claim with the claim that the best life is essentially prac-tical and political (372).

At the same time, Broadie argues that the life of practical virtue can maintain its claim to be the best only if it includes theoria -- something “higher” than the exercise of practical virtue (391). But to reconcile Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics with the rest of Aristo-telian ethical corpus, Broadie chooses a very specific interpretation of theoria, different from all the previous interpreters. Broadie aims to show that Aristotle felt obliged to “provide an ethical justification for theoria” (398):

Aristotle, I have suggested, is responding to the new perception, largely the result of his own analysis of the practical virtues, that theoria, once seen for what it is, fails to support the ethical weight placed upon it by Socrates and Plato. Hence it must either be shown to bear a different weight or lose out on special privileges (398)60.

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60 Broadie’s pragmatist position is so strong, that while admitting the crucial role of theoria in forming the moral virtue in the contexts of Plato and Socrates, she states that even for them, “theoretic wisdom sub-serves the practical virtues” -- a position which, nonetheless, is “not consciously framed in such terms” (399; emphasis added).
Broadie’s insistence on the impossibility of the conflict between *phronēsis* and *theōria* goes along two lines of argumentation: (1) the diminution of *theōria*¹ -- there can be or must be no conflict between *theōria* and *phronēsis*, because *theōria* is completely dependent on *phronēsis* and *praxis* for its very existence (389) -- with the parallel promotion of *phronēsis* to the role of the ultimate ruler of the soul, which “naturally determines when it makes sense to pursue [*theōria*] or not” (386); (2) the denial of the autonomy of *theōria* by making it focus on *praxis* as the object of its “celebration”.

Let me look closer at statement (1) on the diminution of *theōria*. Broadie states that *theōria* can develop only given material surplus (424-425). But more essential is, says Broadie, the other reason why *theōria* is impossible without *praxis*: had we not been already committed to practicality, we would not be capable of and even motivated in “taking steps … to close some practical gap between ourselves and [*theōria*]”. She emphasizes that *theōria* lacks any “physical or sensory mechanism” for such a motivation (392-393). And, of course, she continues, “*theōria* cannot motivate us towards practical goodness as such, since we are already motivated” (393).

Making *φρόνησις* a functional differentia of humans, Broadie even attributes to them the “natural tendency” to “accord *theōria* too little importance in human affairs”² (391). “*Theōria* never takes precedence … it seems to be served with leftovers” (388). *Theōria* is not causal in the life of humans -- it is “the leisure-activity of those whose

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¹ Broadie goes so far as to argue that “the only reason for taking [*theōria*] seriously at all requires that one take it so seriously” that one necessarily “overstates” its significance. This “overstatement” of *theōria*’s significance in the NE 10 is the only thing, says Broadie, that makes the NE differ from the EE (390), though, she argues, “these differences notwithstanding, Aristotle’s intention in the NE…is fundamentally the same as in the EE” (389). And: “The charge of exaggeration, if applicable at all, is applicable only within bounds set by a conceptual scenario in which considerations grounded in the intrinsic splendours of *theōria* are framed by other considerations more down to earth but no less crucial” (391).

² Broadie adds: “*Theōria* …would have a better chance of flourishing if it were not so truly itself and theoretic” (392).
practical excellence deserves no less” – an activity supervening upon practical excellence (419), “a beneficiary” of practical reason (404), “a kind of consequence” (410). Practical excellence does always come first and independently of speculative thinking, and has its intrinsic value prior to theoria: “Practice can make its way without reflection” (380); “The object celebrated is complete without being celebrated” (413). Natural goods are to be employed in the service of theoria “only when the claims of practical nobility have been satisfied”, and “the noble person takes care of noble practical deeds first” (388-389). Also, when there is a conflict between different noble activities, e.g., between theoria and practical excellences, “it is up to on-the-spot practical wisdom to decide” (388).

According to Broadie, theoria pursued for itself is “a kind of self-extinction,” “time spent on it is wasted humanly speaking”, “it should be rated insignificant” (403). Once “ethical connection is broken”, theoria is but an “eccentric hobby” (395). Pure reason, with “its exploded pretensions to generate practical virtues” has nothing to do “with being a good citizen in a real society” (396). Broadie insists that we cannot make the activity of God our own, and do not need to, for, without theoria, we, “like other animals”, are already “sufficiently endowed with divine eternity” by “propagating” (403-404). The harder one agues that theoria is divine, the harder it is to prove that theoria is “a life-shaping human objective” (408). Moreover, Broadie is convinced that theoria not subdued to phronēsis is dangerous: for us, “secular beings”, she says, “the call to theoria

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63 Broadie insists that though theoria is “nobler”, this does not imply “'better' in a sense that would justify granting it general practical priority” (389).
64 “If natural human activity is activity that intends effects on the physical or social environment, the theorizing subject might as well be asleep or a vegetable” (403).
65 Broadie argues that “from Aristotle’s point of view the issue is reversed in the case of Socratic intellectual inquiry” (397).
seems to voice a deathly contempt for human values” (406). Her argument is as follows: (1) given “the supposed divine affinity”, *theōria* “corrodes our sense of the worthy human ways”, and “a life centered on *theōria* would not be a human life at all” (402); (2) without “the supposed divine affinity” *theōria* “appears trivial, pointless and, so to say, contingently eccentric”; (3) therefore, the only way to justify *theōria* is to link it with our “worthy human ways,” which are essentially practical (406).

Broadie does categorically argue against the presumption that ethics is theoretical or *theōria*. Broadie categorically claims that knowing answers to moral questions “in a reflective speculative way” cannot in principle be of any “practical advantage” to “practical answers”, so that, “indeed, reflection might be positively harmful, for once we start to think and to discuss the good, we can make intellectual mistakes about it and be led off the right practical track. It may be”, she continues, “that for fallible human beings ethical self-reflection is a luxury which we cannot safely afford” (4). “Philosophical ethics is practical”, emphasizes Broadie (3). It is *not* *theōria*:

The activity of theorizers “does not reflect (so Aristotle believes) and is not limited by their external (in the sense of nonintellectual) circumstances. This is where ethics differs from theoretical philosophy, and the difference arises not from the fact that ethics develops, but from the fact that it is practical. A practical truth ... depends for its practicality on externals” (19; emphasis added).

Even though, qualifies Broadie, Aristotle’s ethics is based on a conception of human nature, and so works with universal and necessarily truths, “the practical character of the enterprise must colour our attitude to the invariant elements in the picture” and, thus, an agent must not pursue precision “even with regard to universal truths of ethics” (19).

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66 Broadie sides with Aristophanes in his ridicule of “the unworldly stargazer, the latest enemy in our midst” (406).
Broadie makes even more categorical her conclusion that “in any case for countless numbers of human beings it could never have made any personal difference what philosophers conclude about the best life”, for “countless masses” are “stuck” in solving dilemmas of practical life, and simply “lack leisure for even thinking about ethics” (4). While masses are locked out from theoria by practical problems, the leisurely classes, which, one would guess, have an opportunity for engaging in theoria, are interested in ethics only if it can make “a practical difference”, and this, insists Broadie, depends on practical conditions (19).

Now, let me take a closer look at statement (2) on the denial of the autonomy of theoria by making it focus on praxis as the object of its “celebration”, following statement (1) on the diminution of theoria (pp. 78-81). Not only is theoria “made possible by practical wisdom and virtue of character”, but, Broadie says, “we should … consider it not merely as engagement in that, but as an activity made possible by practical wisdom and virtue of character” (387). That is why the most important reason of why there can be or must be no conflict between theoria and phronēsis is that theoria does not even have its own teleological domain outside praxis: according to Broadie, theoria’s end is to contemplate practical virtues and its own dependence on them. Not only does she state, like Kenny, that in all the kinds of happy life, phronēsis is a ruling element of the soul (388), but Broadie makes theoria secondary to phronēsis intrinsically -- as the activity celebrating practical excellence. Phronēsis rules theoria not only from outside, weaving it into the texture of social life by weighing ends against one another, but also from inside – by determining its own intrinsic end. In this sense, theoria becomes a slice of the self-
same, homogeneous pie, contrary to being a second storey of a two-storey building in
Cooper’s interpretation, with two storeys being of a different structure and design.

Though, theōria is teleologically subdued to phronēsis, and is a slice in the self-
same homogeneous pie of the practical life, it can still be open for Broadie to interpret
theōria as an intellectual activity existentially different from phronēsis, while having
phronēsis as its object. Nonetheless, Broadie is inconclusive about whether to make
theōria existentially different from phronēsis, but dependent on it, or to make theōria ex-
sistentially congenial to phronēsis, as a quasi-practical, almost an entrepreneurial, activity.
In this second sense, theōria, says Broadie, is a completion or culmination of the self-
same life which is practical all through in the way as the flower will be the completion of
the vegetative development of a flowering plant (389). Ultimately, Broadie tends to find
an ethical justification for theōria via blending theōria into praxis in such a way that
erases the essential differences between them. By way of eliminating their crucial oppo-
sition which was so vital for both inclusivism and exclusivism, Broadie aims to “firmly
establish that happiness is good practical activity in some sense not contradicted by the
final theoretic equation, but carried over into it” (40):

… these two positions – the initial and the final accounts of happiness in the NE –
would be consistent if the theoretic happiness of the final chapters could be un-
derstood as somehow necessarily embedded in a context of good practical func-
tioning which … continues to deserve the name ‘happiness’ even though it is not
the same as theōria (40).

Remaining inconclusive about the nature of theōria, while carrying out her plan,
Broadie asserts both the following:

[A] that theōria is “a moral safeguard; it preserves practical nobility in superfluity
much as practical nobility preserves sheer basic goodness” (385). Contrary to the posi-
tion of Kenny, Kraut, and the recent Cooper, Broadie expressly argues that “a life untouched by theōria is defective in a way that matters” (377). Statement [A] makes theōria existentially different from practical nobility, and even gives theōria a status superior to the status of practical nobility. According to statement [A], theōria has its own object, different from the object of phronēsis. Broadie states that the divine objects of theōria are not restricted to God and God’s attributes within theology, but “include the eternal patterns of the universe”, “abstract mathematical relations and nonmathematisable forms of order and beauty found in plants and animals” (400), and “the intellectual or aesthetic exploration of some object” (401). Ultimately, there is “no limit on their possible range” (400), and thus, they cannot be limited to praxis. Here theōria preserves its status of the intellectual activity which is disinterested, non-practical and not liable to phronēsis in any way. Theōria creates a noble limit for material superfluity simply by forcing a practical agent to invest resources into theoretical science, as if by laying down some external boundary to material excess. Thus, [A] does at least tentatively allow for some essential differentiation between theōria and phronēsis. Broadie does indeed assert that “once the conditions for reflection take hold, the good status quo cannot survive in its original form, but is preserved only by becoming the basis of a life-style centered on an altogether different kind of good”, and “this becomes apparent (so as to be acted on) only through ethical reflection” (24; emphasis added);

[B] that theōria and phronēsis [B1] have the same object – praxis, and have the same telos – practical success; and [B2] are essentially the same energeia: “For Aristotle, choosing to spend leisure in a certain way [of theōria] is a sort of practical reflection on the value of all the thought and human effort that went into creating conditions for such
reflection” (419; emphasis added). Being “a sort of practical reflection”, theoria does not existentially differ from phronēsis.

Statement [B] emerges in Broadie’s argument, because arguing that the human life is practical all through, Broadie cannot consistently pursue statement [A], for if it is true that, with all its divine affinity, it is theoria that is responsible for working out the measure in superfluity, or ultimate practical success, then statement [A] appears to be in tension with Broadie’s central claim that it is phronēsis that rules the soul and works out the ultimate measure for all its activities. In her overall argument, we lack a clear account from Broadie of how to resolve this tension.

The [B1] line of Broadie’s [B] argument is more moderate than [B2]. In statement [B1], she argues that theoria is existentially different from phronēsis, though it has phronēsis as its object and aims at practical excellence. Theoria contemplates phronēsis from outside, in the same way as a research institute of applied science conducts research in the field of applied science. She explains: "Aristotle’s inquiry assumes that to make the best of the best which we already have [practical success], we must reflect on it philosophically” (23; emphasis added). Broadie claims that practical values cannot guide us efficiently unless they themselves are “guided in new practical directions by a more philosophical vision” (370; emphasis added). Broadie emphasizes: “True reflection may be necessary to protect a good status quo [of excellent praxis and phronēsis]” (24), for “a shared commitment to good upbringing in qualities standardly accepted as fundamental human excellences … is not by itself sufficiently knowledgeable or reflective to do itself full justice in a practical way” (369), and “mere goodness eventually degenerates unless safeguarded by noble natures who knowingly and articulately prize fine deeds for their
own sake” (381). Broadie adds: “To establish for theōria a firm basis of practical commitment” (391), Aristotle “views theōria not internally, so to speak, but as a practical objective: an objective within the educator’s general objective, which is the best kind of person leading and shaping for himself, through his practical choices, the best life” (387; emphasis added). And even more categorically:

If we are essentially practical, to support theōria will not enhance us if supporting theōria is an ornamental appendage to practice at its best, but only if supporting theōria is squarely required for our practical best to be realized (389).

Broadie is pragmatist to such a degree that she does not assess exclusivism as having foundations in theology [gods, whose only activity is contemplation, are supremely happy, and, so, humans should mimic gods to achieve happiness], but as “a schema of the classic utilitarian type”, according to which “practical decisions are correct if and only if they aim at theōria, or practical virtues and virtuous practices are worthwhile because they promote it” (392).

In statement [B1], it seems that the only difference between praxis and theōria is that, though both aim at the practical excellence, praxis values practical excellence for the issuing utility, while theōria values the practical excellence for its own sake. Here, though theōria is a “sort of practical reflection”, it remains in the domain of sophia (more specifically, philosophy).

In statement [B2], Broadie does radically erase the definitive difference between phronēsis and theōria, because, according to statement [B2], theōria is literally “a sort of practical reflection” (419). Theōria, says Broadie, is a derivation or development of practical wisdom: “Theōria should develop naturally out of practice”, so that “theōria is justi-

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67 To make sure, Broadie mentions, but only in passing, that Aristotle’s ethics has “religious dimension”, and, she adds, “has emerged as surprisingly unhumanistic” (408).
fied in terms of the self-same practical excellence which we already see to be our human good” (393; emphasis added). Theoria is “the culmination of the same life: the life of practical excellence at its best” (389) in the sense that it cultivates and excels the intrinsic value of praxis by becoming itself a quasi-practical activity:

Theoria endows “the life of essentially practical beings with a content required for it to approach the ideal of such a life at its best. The endowment does not logically convert it into a kind of life not essentially practical, but from good to best of the same type” (392; emphasis added).

Now it becomes clear that theoria formulates “new practical directions” for phronēsis, precisely because it itself is “a sort of practical reflection”. Theoria coincides with phronēsis in its object, its telos, and its immediate activity. Hence, here theoria does not simply contemplate phronēsis from outside, as a remote research institute of applied science, it is an applied science itself. In a sense, theoria is a more practical intellectual activity than phronēsis itself, for, according to Broadie, theoria yields more practical success. Not only does statement [B2] make theoria “embedded” in excellent praxis (410), but it makes theoria merge with phronēsis to be existentially identical with phronēsis with its practical deliberation (existential subjugation of theoria to phronēsis).

So, making a transition from [A] to [B1] and, finally, [B2], Broadie starts with saying that theoria, interpreted in a right way, is simply a development of nobility, and the highest form of nobility. What Broadie means is that phronēsis without the aid of theoria cannot essentially value excellence for its own sake (as it should be valued to be excellence), because phronēsis does always aim at utility. Only when phronēsis merges with theoria, does it become capable of valuing practical excellence for its own sake, and, henceforth, transform into nobility. All is good, but on this interpretation, theoria is al-
ready deprived of its own domain of [divine] objects, for, according to Broadie, it is not *phronēsis* that transforms into nobility, but *theōria* itself is nothing else but simply the nobility of action]. *Theōria* as nobility is simply a perfection of moral virtue. To make sure, on this stage, Broadie does still maintain that, being a perfection of moral virtue, *theōria* is nonetheless “not a species of practical wisdom”, for “nobility has an intellectual affinity”\(^68\), is disinterested, and so values practical excellence for its own sake (387). But, remarkably, *theōria* is already substituted here with *practical goodness and its reflective self-evaluation*: “Nobility is goodness reflectively valuing itself and its actions as they should be valued” (379). Now, there is only one step remains for Broadie towards the representation of *theōria* as not the disinterested rational activity, but as the practical rational activity of the *self-same* practical mind aiming at utility, and achieving more utility than a bare *phronēsis*. Thus Broadie does finally say *theōria* cannot value practical excellence for its own sake, while remaining uninvolved in this practical excellence.

The statement [A] admitting the relative autonomy of *theōria* is in tension with the statement [B], revealing some inconsistency in Broadie’s pragmatism. This reveals the difficulty which Broadie encounters in her attempt to argue that the human life for Aristotle is practical all through. Statement [A] undermines Broadie’s assertion that Aristotle’s ethics is centered exclusively on excellent *praxis*. Nonetheless, Broadie’s overall argument unmistakingly progresses from making *praxis* only one of *theōria*’s objects towards making *praxis* into its only object, and from denying *theōria* its own *telos* separate from *phronēsis* towards transforming it into a quasi-practical activity of the soul (a sort of practical reflection), growing out of practice and aiming at the further and most

\(^{68}\) “It is not possible to become courageous or temperate through argument, but perhaps it is possible to come to love excellent action for its own sake through being brought to see, by an inquiry such as Aristotle’s, that excellent human activity is what in essence the supreme human good must be” (387).
ultimate excelling of practice – from its teleological subjugation towards its existential subjugation. Broadie’s rejection of theoria’s own existential domain in [B2] does not allow theoria to oppose its values of disinterestedness to the practical values of utility, for theoria’s “altogether different kind of good” is still ultimately concerned with the preservation and betterment of excellent praxis. Broadie does expressly say that the real difference between practical nobility and theoria lies only in the degree of practical “safeguarding”. In Broadie’s context, theoria as nobility becomes simply the self-consciousness (the reflectiveness) of moral goodness excelled as the most final end.

To conclude, Broadie’s is a much more developed internalist mixism, than that one of Kenny. She argues in her own ways for the synergy of human energeia in all the endeavours by man. And she develops the synergy of human energeiai into the full-fledged synergy of ends in all the endeavours by man: all the human endeavours aim at practical excellence as the most final end, phronēsis being the entire superlative, as she says. At the same time, one cannot say that, in Broadie’s case, the ingredients in the mixed life lose their independent standing to such a degree that no ingredient can be intelligibly said to be mixed with praxis. Theoria does lose its external independent standing (statement [B]), but it never gets absolutely absorbed by phronēsis (statement [A]).

A.5 Kraut’s account

In Aristotle on the Human Good (Richard Kraut. Aristotle on the Human Good, Princeton Univ. Press: Princeton, 1991), Richard Kraut posits that his major concern, like that one of Broadie, is to argue that the Nicomachean Ethics does not contain the internal conflict between Book 10 and the rest of the treatise, and that no part of the Nicomachean Ethics can be fully understood in isolation from any other part and from the
whole (4-5). Kraut argues against the inclusivist rendering of happiness, because inclusivism, in his view, cannot give the consistent interpretation of the entire ethical corpus by Aristotle. Inclusivism, states Kraut, impedes our understanding of both Book 1 and Book 10, and prevents us from grasping the central role of virtuous activity (energeia) in Aristotelian ethics (8).

First of all, Kraut confronts a passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness:

The self-sufficient we posit as such that which when taken by itself makes life choiceworthy and in need of nothing. Such we think happiness to be. Furthermore, it is the most choiceworthy of all, without being counted in addition – being counted in addition, it is obviously more choiceworthy [when taken] with the least of goods. For what is added on is an increase of goods, and of goods the greater is always more choiceworthy (NE 1097b14-20).

Kraut says that this passage is taken by inclusivists “to mean that human happiness needs nothing because it already contains as components all of the intrinsic goods there are, or all that can be fit into a single life” (7), or, in other words, because of “its all-inclusive structure” (8). Kraut argues that inclusivism runs into trouble here not simply because of what Aristotle says about contemplation in Book 10, but also because the fundamental thesis of Book 1 is that happiness consists solely in virtuous activity (energeia), and is not a compound of goods. One good, continues Kraut, can be analyzed into several subdivisions, since Aristotle distinguishes different kinds of virtues exercised by the rational soul. But happiness is not a composite of all compossible intrinsic and extrinsic goods: it does not include physical pleasure, or honor, or friends. Since happiness consists in virtuous activity alone, no decrease or increase of other goods constitutes decrease of increase in happiness (8-9). Kraut claims that the advantage of his reading is that “it allows us to see how [Aristotle’s] observation in 1.7 that happiness is self-sufficient is compati-
ble with the thesis of X.7 that contemplation is the most self-sufficient good (1177a27-8). “That thesis”, continues Kraut, “is nonsense if the self-sufficiency of a good consists in its containing all others. Once we reject this way of interpreting self-sufficiency, we can see how a single noncomposite good, like contemplation, can be most self-sufficient” (14).

Kraut builds his entire interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology on the reinterpretation of two happy lives, and represents two happy lives as two different, incomparable and incompatible teleological paradigms. In opposition to Hardie, who considers the primary and secondary happiness to be the modes of one and the same life, and in opposition to Broadie, who argues that any kind of happiness does ultimately represent the self-same mode of practical life, Kraut makes secondary and primary happy lives two radically different careers. In his teleological argument, which gives an interpretation to the passage on the finality of the good in the light of two happy lives, Kraut argues that two modes of happy life (secondary and primary) are incompatible because they have each its own ultimate end, independent from the other ultimate end: “The two lives differ in that each assigns a certain primacy to a different good, a primacy that consists in being an ultimate end” (42); “different lives have different ultimate ends” (44). He insists: “An important ingredient of this interpretation is that every good of human life is to be located somewhere within a hierarchy that has a single end as its pinnacle” (5; emphasis added).

For Kraut, two happy lives each possess its own most final good as if instead of one teleological pyramid conventionally attributed to Aristotle, there are two pyramids of two ultimate ends in society:

Just as every good in the best life is desirable for the sake of contemplation, so every good in the second-best life is desirable for the sake of activity in accor-
dance with the practical virtues. Aristotle presents, in other words, two models of how one should lead one’s life: one should be either a philosopher (that is, someone who devotes himself above all to exercising the virtues of theoretical reason) or a statesman (that is, someone who devotes himself above all to the fullest exercise of moral virtue)” (5; emphasis added).

Moreover, the two ultimate ends of the NE 10 primary and secondary happy lives, according to Kenny and Kraut, are not simply perfect in-themselves independently of each other, but they are perfect only in the exclusion of each other. Kraut takes this position to a new level. While Kenny does still account for the mixed life of the Eudemian Ethics, Kraut argues that “there is no evidence in Nicomachean Ethics 10, 7-8 or in any of his other writings” that Aristotle advocates a dual career, “as Plato does in the Republic” (26; emphasis added). “I take Aristotle”, says Kraut, “to be saying that if one is trying to have the best life one can, then this mixture of goods [or two careers of theoría and praxis] is not the best target to aim at” (48). Kraut does literally offer two graphical images of pyramids representing two models of happy life, the secondary and the primary happy lives (6):

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B     A
   M   N   B
 X   Y   Z   M   N
   X   Y   Z
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The first pyramid represents the secondary happy life. B stands for ethical activity; M and N stand for the other goods that are desirable for themselves; and X, Y, Z stand for goods that are conditionally desirable. The second pyramid represents the primary happy life, in which A stands for contemplation.
Kraut interprets the two teleological pyramids as two different modes of human existence, *existentially* independent from each other. Two careers are mutually exclusive not only because they have different and mutually exclusive ends, but also because they are *existentially* exclusive of each other. The two competing careers are concentrating on two different virtuous *activities* — “competitors,” as Kraut says (53). He insists: one should be either a philosopher, or a statesman to be happy (5; 25): “Just as perfect happiness consists in contemplation alone, so the secondary form of happiness consists in ethical activity alone” (9; emphasis added). And when Kraut joins Kenny and the recent Cooper in the assertion that the secondary form of happiness is available only to those “who do not exercise the theoretical virtues” (11; emphasis added), he literally means that speculation *never* crosses the mind of a burgher: “It is not true that politicians contemplate more than pigs” (63). This can be called Kraut’s *existential argument against inclusivism*: *theēria* and *praxis* do not mix because they are so *existentially* different *energeiai* that they cannot be mixed.

Nonetheless, like in the case of Kenny, Kraut’s is a special case of exclusivism\(^6^9\) applied now not to the life of *theēria* excluding practical virtues, but to the life of practical virtues excluding *theēria*: “A statesman … never contemplates” (28). Before late, exclusivists argued that the primary happy life lacks moral virtues, while the secondary happy life includes or mixes together both theoretical and moral virtues. Kraut joins Kenny and the recent Cooper in reversing this position by saying that while the secondary happy life lacks *theēria*, the primary happy life does demonstrate moral virtues, though happiness in this life still consists *only* in *theēria*. The theorizer, posits Kraut, is neces-

\(^{69}\) Kenny’s and Kraut’s position regarding the *NE* 10 secondary happy life cannot be called exclusivism proper, because they do not reduce happiness to just *one* virtue, though they do still reduce happiness to only *one kind of* virtues (practical virtues).
sarily moral (25), and always forgoes theōria if moral duty demands (32). For example, a philosopher willingly forgoes his happiness which consists only in contemplation for the sake of helping his ailing father (10-11).

Kraut’s other argument against inclusivism is based on his interpretation of the NE ergon passage stating that human happiness consists in the excellent realization of human function (ergon). Kraut recognizes that happiness consists in the excellent realization of the function. Because, as Kraut argues, the two teleological pyramids of praxis and theōria (the competing careers) are the two different, mutually exclusive modes of human happiness, each one with its own most final telos and its own exclusive energeia, they do in fact represent each its own type of functioning. Thus, because, according to Kraut, a politikos and a theōrettikos do function in a radically different way, he does, like Kenny and the recent Cooper, commit himself to two human erga, independent from each other, instead of one ultimate ergon for all the types of men, conventionally ascribed to Aristotle. But Kraut is the most categorical in overstressing the difference between the secondary and the primary happy lives to such a degree that each life yields its own, specific brand of men being functionally different, even opposite to the brand of men yielded by another life.

Kraut opens his functional argument with saying that the attribution of theōria to a politician would commit us to the “low estimate of outstanding and successful statesmen” (54), thus categorically separating the function of theōria from the function of praxis. Like Kraut’s interpretation of the NE passage on the finality of the good, Kraut’s interpretation of the NE ergon passage is also based on his interpretation of the NE passage on two happy lives. In his attempt to elevate the life of politicians, Kraut argues
against the *traditional* exclusivist interpretation of two happy lives, which states that the difference between the primary and the secondary happiness lies in the fact that the primary happiness is happiness per se, or happiness *simpliciter*, which demonstrates the full or proper realization of human *ergon*, while the secondary happiness is the impaired happiness which only half-realizes the human *ergon*, i.e., realizes the human *ergon* only in the *secondary* degree.

Contrary to this interpretation and analogously to the recent Cooper, Kraut posits that it is the *secondary happy life* that is happiness *simpliciter*. Kraut founds his position upon the reinterpretation of the passage on the finality or the perfection of happiness. The primary happy life is not happiness *simpliciter*, because it is happiness in the perfect degree. Thus, according to Kraut, Kenny is wrong when he states that Aristotle refers to the contemplative happiness when in Book 1 he refers to happiness being perfect or final (*teleia*). It is this belief that commits Kenny to viewing the secondary happiness as the non-genuine kind of happiness. When Aristotle opposes the primary happy life to the secondary happy life, says Kraut, he simply separates *perfect* happiness, i.e., contemplative life, from happiness *simpliciter*, i.e., practical life (49). Nonetheless, the difference between the *perfect happiness* (contemplative happy life) and the *imperfect happiness* (practical happy life) is not *quantitative*, but a *qualitative* one, meaning that the perfect happiness is *not*, in Kraut’s interpretation, the perfect degree of the imperfect happiness. The imperfect happiness is a mode of happiness, completely different from the perfect happiness. Kraut says on Aristotle’s *ergon* passage of 1.7:

If Aristotle does think that the statesman and the philosopher both approximate the condition of gods, the latter being a closer approximation than the former, then he cannot be claiming, in the *[ergon]* passage, that when two lives are devoid of contemplative activity, they are equally removed from the divine. Rather, he
should be taken to mean that among contemplators, those who contemplate more are happier; and among noncontemplators, those who have more of the next-best approximation to the divine are happier (63-64).

Here Kraut argues that ethical activity is the second and independent way of the human approximation to the divine, *theōria* being the first way. “There is a way in which the ethical activity of human beings is godlike” (58), says Kraut, though he acknowledges that the lower animals fail to engage in moral activity (58). It is because *praxis* is a self-contained and self-sufficient way of being godlike, that practical men do not need *theōria*. Thus, Kraut’s statement that *theōria* and *praxis* are both god-like aims to separate the secondary and the primary happiness as two different types of functioning rather than to prove their close similarity, or their interrelatedness.

But Kraut’s functional argument goes further in the opposition of the two modes of happiness. Kraut defines *theōria* as divine-like activity, and the differences between those who contemplate more and less as “their differing proximity to the divine” (40). At the same time, he unites politicians and the lower animals as equally having the same mode of happiness, i.e., politicians having the mode of happiness which is identical with the one that the lower animals have, though elsewhere he acknowledged that the lower animals are incapable of moral virtues. Both politicians and lower animals have the secondary happiness in the same life-style: “Politicians and lower animals are happy in a secondary, imperfect way” (55); “[politicians] are like animals in their failure to engage in activity akin to divine contemplation” (55). Kraut is aware that Aristotle denies happiness to animals, but he overrides this Aristotelian statement by claiming that Aristotle has just omitted the predicate “perfect” when he denied happiness to animals (54-55). Be-

70 For example, pigs (63).
cause *theōria* is divine or divine-like, and *praxis* is bestial, *theōria* and *praxis* cannot in principle consist in the same *ergon*. Therefore, Kraut cannot reasonably be said to argue for one human *ergon*. He has two human *erga*.

Nonetheless, the other development of Kraut’s functional argument posits only one true human *ergon* – *praxis*. Because the practical life is happiness *simpliciter* or happiness *per se*, practical life is enough to realize the human *ergon*. It is precisely because happiness *simpliciter* is not *functionally* linked with *theōria*, that man can be happy even without ever engaging in *theōria*: “One can live well without being a philosopher” (6); “one can lead a happy life even if one never engages in philosophical activity” (49); “a life devoid of philosophical activity can still be happy” (51). Kraut echoes Broadie in saying: “Aristotle does not demand of those who lead happy lives that they have a perfect understanding of human well-being” (53).

But not only does Kraut argue that happiness *simpliciter* never demonstrates *theōria*, he also insists that the theorizer is necessarily moral (25). Man can function without *theōria* in the secondary happy life, but he cannot function without moral virtue in any kind of happy life. Like Kenny, Kraut does distinctly represent *theōria* and moral functioning as two antagonists in the contemplative life. Both Kenny and Kraut agree that, in the antagonism between *theōria* and moral excellence, theoretical activity of the theorizer is subordinated to his functioning as a moral agent when moral duty requires. That is, in the case of moral duty, the theorizer should *always* choose his moral function over his contemplative activity (32). When *theōria* interferes with the moral duty of a theorizer, he should categorically put theoretical activity aside. But Kraut’s interpretation of the antagonism between moral excellence and contemplation is quite different from the
one of Kenny. Kenny argues that the theorizer acts virtuously only when duty demands, but tries to avoid the situations when it happens (Auden immigrating to America to avoid moral action in fighting against fascism in Europe). Here, the theorizer is an unwilling moral agent. He will never willingly choose situations where he will be obliged to sacrifice his happiness (consisting only in contemplation) for the sake of satisfying the requirements of moral duty, though he will submit to moral duty when he is faced with its requirements. Because of the antagonism between contemplation and moral excellence, the theorizer is not genuinely moral.

On the contrary, in Kraut’s context, the morality of the theorizer goes beyond the call of duty. Kraut devotes Chapter 3 of his book to “argue that when Aristotle defends the philosophical ideal, in X, 7-8, he does not abandon the psychological or normative assumptions he has been making throughout the NE” (12):

[Aristotle] continues to believe that many different types of human ends (besides contemplation) are desirable in themselves, and he assumes that the philosopher will need them all … to lead a life that is regularly devoted to theoretical activity over a long period of time. He takes it for granted that all human beings need friends in order to live well, and that philosophers will be best equipped to achieve their ultimate end over the course of a lifetime if they carry out their activities with others who have both the practical and the theoretical virtues (12).

Analogously to the recent Cooper, Kraut represents the theorizer as a genuine and active moral agent: “The philosophical life is the life of a good person, that is, someone who has and exercises the ethical virtues” (6), such as “magnanimity, courage, justice, temperance, practical wisdom, and so on” (5). Kraut reaffirms: “Contemplation is not an alternative to the other goods (ethical virtue, friendship, pleasure) that are taken so seriously throughout the NE, rather, it is a way of organizing those subordinate ends into a coherent system” (12).
Kraut states that the important feature of his interpretation is that he does not take Aristotle to be “an egoist”. “I do not take him”, says Kraut, “to be assuming, implicitly or explicitly, that each human being must or should do whatever promotes the greatest amount of good for himself” (9-10). He continues: “[Aristotle] believes that what is best for one person can sometimes conflict with what is best for another, and he does not think that in these circumstances each should always give priority to his own optimal well-being” (12). The altruistic exercise of ethical virtues implies that the theorizer would not try to avoid social and political engagement, like Kenny’s theorizer, though he will not have a dual career, e.g., of a philosopher-king. His willing social and political engagement means that not only will the theorizer in Kraut’s context be much more open to the situations in which moral duty comes before contemplation than Kenny’s theorizer, but he will also try to morally excel consistently in the course of his life. That is why even a theōrētikos, according to Kraut, is, first of all, a moral agent, and he is a contemplator only after all the moral requirements are satisfied. Theōria is a divine or divine-like function, and even a theorizer is only a man.

Then, when a theorizer sets aside his theōria on every occasion of moral duty, this only underlines the fact that theōria is not a human function proper. Thus, contrary to Kenny, Kraut’s interpretation of the antagonism between theōria and moral excellence in the life of the theorizer promotes the significance of praxis, as the only proper ergon of man, rather than diminishes it. At the same time, it is because praxis is the only proper ergon of man, that the practical happiness is happiness simpliciter. Thus, in his making the secondary happy life happiness simpliciter, and in his interpretation of the primary happy life, much more practically charged than the one offered by Kenny, Kraut is much
closer to Cooper’s notion of mixed life than to Kenny’s exclusivism. Cooper offered a two-storey model of a happy contemplative, and, at the same time, mixed life in the *EE* and the central books of the *NE*, with a first storey of practical excellence as the foundation of a happy life, and, as it is especially evident in Kraut’s diagrams of two pyramidal happy lives, Kraut’s does also preserve moral excellence as a necessary first storey in the pyramid of a contemplative happy life. Also in its refurbishing human *ergon* in practical terms, Kraut’s position is also much closer to Broadie’s position than to Kenny’s.

However, all this said, there is the following internal tension with Kraut’s interpretation of primary happiness in the light of his interpretation of the human *ergon* passage. Kraut insists that the primary happiness consists *only in theôria*, which is a divine, not human function. If the primary happiness appears to be not rooted in the function of man, its position as a primary happiness becomes problematic. Kraut represents primary happiness as having nothing to do with the *primary* function of man, or *any* function of man, for that matter. The tension becomes even sharper when Kraut posits that primary happiness is the *perfect* happiness, and that secondary happiness is the *imperfect* happiness. It appears that, according to Kraut, perfect happiness has nothing to do with the function of man, while imperfect happiness has everything to do with the function of man. The other puzzle is that Kraut states that two careers are incompatible and incomparable, and, at the same time, compares them as imperfect and perfect happiness.

Kraut’s other argument against inclusivism is an *argument from causation*. Kraut rejects the interpretation of the “for-the-sake-of” relation by inclusivists who claim that “*B* is for the sake of *A* when *A* is a whole of which *B* is a part”, and interprets the “for-

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71 It is actually right after Kraut creates the graphical representations of two pyramidal happy lives, that he points out that the pyramid of a secondary happy life is the foundation of the pyramid of the contemplative happy life, so that a contemplator is necessarily moral (6).
the-sake-of” relation as the causal relation: “When $B$ (for example, a bridle) is for the sake of $A$ (for example, riding horses), then $B$ causally promotes $A$” (13; 200-201). In the same way he interprets the relation between *theoria* and moral virtue: “Ethical virtuous activity causally promotes contemplation” (215). Kraut’s causal argument is the development of Kraut’s teleological argument. His interpretation of the “for-the-sake-of” relation is his rendering of Aristotle’s teleology and his ultimate interpretation of the *NE* passage on the finality of the good. The most final good, for the sake of which everything is done, cannot be interpreted in the inclusivist way, because “for-the-sake-of-relation” is the causal, not inclusive relation. Because the relation between virtues and happiness is not inclusive but causal, inclusivism fails, concludes Kraut.

Another of Kraut’s arguments is the *hierarchy argument*, stressing the order imposed by reason upon the diversity of human goals (8-9). There are three variants of the hierarchy argument in Kraut. According to the first variant of the hierarchy argument, each row within the hierarchy cannot be understood without the understanding of the hierarchy as a whole and of each row in relation to another row, as Kraut demonstrates in his diagram of two pyramidal lives (5-6). Then, argues Kraut, one cannot represent a theorizer as a necessarily amoral person: “The philosophical life is the life of a good person” (6). Nonetheless, the second and third variants of the hierarchy argument by Kraut apply the hierarchical principle in quite a different, or rather opposite, way.

In the second variant of the hierarchy argument against inclusivism, Kraut purports to show why contemplation plays “no role” in the second-best life. This variant of the hierarchy argument argues for the incompatibility of *theoria* and *praxis* on the basis of the hierarchical superiority of *theoria* over *praxis*. In one case, Kraut argues that
“since contemplation is not desirable for the sake of any further good, it plays no role in the second-best life” (25). Here Kraut opposes theoria to praxis as being an activity indifferent to practical virtues because it is hierarchically superior to praxis. In the other case, he argues that because contemplation is desirable only for its own sake, everything else being desirable for its sake, contemplation cannot be combined with any other activities within the course of one’s life without transforming this life into the contemplative life (51-52). Here Krauts interprets the hierarchical superiority of theoria in the terms of domination and exclusion. Kraut’s second hierarchical argument is the development of Kraut’s teleological argument. It interprets the NE passage on the finality of the good in the hierarchically exclusivist terms: everything is done for the sake of the most final good in the sense that everything cannot at the same time be done for the sake of anything else; and if there is a life where everything is done for the sake of something else, then the most final good plays no role in this life. Kraut insists:

[Aristotle] thinks that, in order to lead our lives well, we need more than a list of intrinsic goods: we must determine which of them is most worthwhile, and how much each should be pursued. His way of imposing this kind of order on the diversity of human goals is to arrange ends in a hierarchy, and to place virtuous activity (whether practical or theoretical) at the top. Happiness is the end for the sake of which all others are desired; it consists solely in virtuous activity [at the top of a hierarchical pyramid], and is not a composite of all intrinsic goods (8-9; emphasis added).

In the third variant of the hierarchy argument, Kraut’s objective is to show why two modes of happy life are supposed to be two incompatible careers according to a maximization principle. Kraut posits that happiness is a virtuous activity (158), and that virtuous activity should be maximized: “The more such activity one engages in, the better off one is” (9, 27, 36). Kraut says about the maximization of the secondary happy life:
“The more ethical life is happier” (9); and about the maximization of the primary happy life: “The best way to improve a life is to add a greater amount of philosophical activity to it. In this sense, there is no limit to the value of theoretical activity; more is always better than less” (11). The maximization principle assesses the virtuous activity in the quantitative terms of the duration of time (37). Then, continues Kraut, if there are two different virtuous activities, and they are both maximized, they would necessarily be maximized in two different lives, for, otherwise, in the case of mixing, the two kinds of happy life will be almost identical. Therefore, according to Kraut’s maximization principle, the two kinds of happy life are irreducibly different, necessarily having each its own proper virtuous activity to maximize as an ultimate end (51).

The internal tension within Kraut’s second hierarchy argument (which states that contemplation is desirable only for its own sake, everything else being desirable for its sake, and, therefore, it cannot be combined with any other activities within the course of one’s life without transforming this life into the contemplative life (25-26, 51-52)) is as follows. Elsewhere Kraut does indeed state that a theōrētikos should always forgo theoria for the sake of moral duty. If theōrētikos forgoes theoria for the sake of moral duty, then it cannot be said that in his life everything is desired only for the sake of theoria. That is why Kraut does argue that moral duty can indeed be combined with theoria in the life of theōrētikos.

The internal tension within Kraut’s third hierarchy argument is as follows. According to Kraut’s maximization principle, two different lives have each its own proper virtuous activity to maximize as an ultimate end: otherwise, i.e., in the case of mixing, the two kinds of happy life will be almost identical (51). Nonetheless, Kraut does consis-
tently pursue the maximization principle only regarding moral virtues, but not regarding contemplation, for, when duty demands, a contemplator sacrifices his contemplation for the sake of his moral duty. In fact, Kraut claims both statements [A] and [B] which are in tension with each other. Statement [A] is as follows:

The more [contemplation] a life contains, the better a life it is. This is not the weak claim that it would always be desirable to increase theoretical activity provided that this brings no loss in other goods. Rather, Aristotle’s thesis is that it would always be desirable to change the mixture of goods in one’s life so that contemplation increases, even if the level of other goods decreases. The best way to improve a life is to add a greater amount of philosophical activity to it. In this sense, there is no limit to the value of theoretical activity; more is always better than less (11).

Kraut formulates statement [B], when he discusses the philosopher sacrificing his contemplative happiness for the sake of helping his ailing father: “Although [Aristotle] thinks that perfect happiness consists in contemplation, he is not claiming that this is a good that one must maximize” (11). The most categorical expression of statement [B] is as follows: Aristotle is not committed to “the view that, whatever one’s circumstances, one should maximize the amount of time one spends contemplating. For he nowhere assumes or claims that human beings should be devoted to their own maximal good” (12).

Moreover, like Kenny, Broadie, and the recent Cooper, Kraut posits that when, in the life of a theorizer, a conflict arises between theoria and moral virtues, it is up to phronēsis to decide how much contemplation to engage in: “Contemplate as much as a person of practical wisdom would” (37). If it is phronēsis that weighs the conflicting ends against each other, and dictates to theoria itself on how long and how intense it should be engaged in, phronēsis appears to be hierarchically superior to theoria, and, ultimately, a governing virtue in the soul even in the life of the theorizer. It appears that not only does
phronēsis give commands for the sake of sophia, as it is conventionally thought about the NE interrelation between sophia and phronēsis, but, here, it gives commands to sophia itself, initiating it on the call from phronēsis, and stopping its activity on the call from phronēsis. This line of Kraut’s argumentation is in tension with Kraut’s general view that, in the life of theorizer, theōria is hierarchically superior to phronēsis.

Finally, Kraut’s entire hierarchy argument has a difficulty of combining all the three of its variants into one consistent whole. The first variant of Kraut’s hierarchy argument argues for the wholeness of the soul and hierarchical inter-dependence of its virtuous activities, while the second and third variants of his hierarchy argument argue for the separation of different activities of the soul into incompatible and, thus, not combinable life-styles. Thus, the first variant is in tension with the second and the third variants. Because Kraut separates and opposes two modes of happy life (theoretical and practical) as two incompatible careers, he does not establish one overlapping hierarchy over different activities of the soul, and, thus, is in conflict with his own, initial, requirement of the hierarchical wholeness of the soul. In this sense, Kraut’s position (and for that matter, the ones of Cooper’s and Kenny’s) is weaker than Broadie’s who recognizes the necessary place of theōria in the practical life at least as a celebration of phronēsis. A teleological argument by Kraut, when it states the duality of ultimate ends in their incompatibility, does further weaken his first hierarchy argument for the wholeness of the soul.

Another of Kraut’s arguments is his anti-metron argument which rejects the metron (measure) as the principle of the proportionate wholeness of the soul with its different, and even opposite activities. This argument of Kraut is especially important in the context of my own interpretation of happiness as proportion. The activities cannot be
mixed, argues Kraut, because different goods are incomparable -- cannot essentially be
compared, and, hence, we cannot measure the right amount of different activities to mix
them properly:

[Aristotle] nowhere says that contemplation is related to some other good as one
number is to a second; nor does he assign numbers to any other pairs of goods in
an effort to represent how much more desirable one is than the other (30).

Nonetheless, when Kraut argues that contemplation is not an alternative to the other
goods (ethical virtue, friendship, pleasure) but is rather a way of organizing those subor-
dinate ends into a coherent system, he says referring to the concluding lines of the Eude-
mian Ethics:

The best amount of lower goods to have, from one’s own point of view, is the
amount that most fully contributes to one’s ultimate end. Of every other good be-
sides contemplation, there can be too much or too little for one’s own good. By
aiming at this ultimate end, we have a target which helps us determine how much
is too much, and how little too little. Similarly, if we do not lead a philosophical
life, but a political life instead, then ethical activity provides us with a guideline
for answering quantitative questions about subordinate goods: the best amount of
honor, the right number of friends, the appropriate amount of time spent on re-
lexation, is determined by looking to the effects differing quantities will have on
ethical activity (12).

Here, Kraut does evidently operate with the notion of measure within the systematic
whole of one’s life with all the subordinate goods being weighed against each other ac-
cording to their quantitative representation and, after that, united into the proportionate
unity (though he himself does not engage Aristotle’s notions of sustēma and metron, and
he does not weigh the two happy lives with each other).

Furthermore, there is the other internal tension in Kraut’s anti-metron argument.
Though Kraut does ardently argue against mixing the different activities of the soul and,
so, different life-styles, his requirement for non-mixing is evidently too strong even for
him. Kraut does not entirely reject the possibility of a happy mixed life, and accepts the possibility of a thoroughly mixed life even in the context of the secondary life:

The best any life can achieve is to have as much of one good, contemplation, as possible. The second-best kind of life similarly aims at one good, excellent ethical activity, and tries to achieve this as much as possible. But it is not part of my interpretation that, according to Aristotle, anyone who tries to mix these two goods, and proposes that as his target, is bound to lack happiness. In other words, I do not take Aristotle to be saying that we should in all circumstances choose one of these goods or the other as our target, and never some combination of them both (48; emphasis added).

This statement by Kraut makes his entire position puzzling. Kraut founds his entire interpretation upon the principle of non-mixing, offering the causation, the hierarchical, the teleological, the existential, and the anti-metron arguments against mixing or combining different activities of the soul and, so, different life-styles in one’s life. He does indeed say: “I take Aristotle to be saying that if one is trying to have the best life one can, then this mixture of goods is not the best target to aim at” (48). Nonetheless, he does finally accept the possibility of a happy life as a mixed life, in which an agent alternates between its different modes in Hardie’s sense. Evidently, Kraut starts with two happy lives, but finishes with an infinite number of lives in the sense of an infinite number of kinds of mixing, which one “should choose” according to circumstances. Kraut does finally admit of the infinite plurality of ultimate ends (including mixtures of ends) within one’s life, thus going against his own principle of hierarchy always culminating only in one most final end.

A.6 Hardie’s account

die’s interpretation over twelve years with a substantial change of view. This change comes out in an appendix attached to the 1980 edition of Hardie’s book, in which he criticizes Ackrill, Cooper and, especially, Kenny. Though Hardie’s book is earlier than the books by Broadie and Kraut, I will conclude this chapter of my dissertation with the explication of his book, for his mixist position constitutes a more complete transition from the former inclusivist / exclusivist debate to the functionalist position than Broadie’s and Kraut’s interpretations.

From the start, Hardie acknowledges that “it is disconcerting that there is no clear reference in 1 to the doctrine of X that the highest form of happiness is intellectual ‘contemplation’ (theôria)” (2), and in the main body of his book written in 1968, he agrees with Ackrill that there is an incongruity between Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics and the rest of the treatise, so that Aristotle’s view is “ambiguous and confused” (214), a dualism which is hard to understand (346). Nonetheless, in the appendix, Hardie assesses the dualism he finds in Aristotle from a positive standpoint. The activities of the soul are necessarily split between the entelechy (the activity of the soul as the form of the body, inseparable from the body) and the divine or divine-like activity of theôria engaged in by the separable nous. Consequently, the happy life on Aristotle’s view, says Hardie, is dualistic, containing both the excellent praxis and theôria as two indispensable sides of one truly fulfilled life.

In the appendix, Hardie brings praxis and theôria much closer together than any other contemporary interpreter before him. But, contrary to Broadie, he claims that praxis and theôria necessarily function on the separate planes within the soul. Theôria

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72 Nonetheless, Hardie acknowledges that “the later treatment of the theoretic life is promised in EN 1.5, and its superiority is suggested by the remarks made in depreciation of its rivals, the life of pleasure and the life of political activity” (337).
and *praxis* are mixed in the soul without losing their delineated distinctiveness from each other. They can be mixed precisely because one does not dissolve the other. In fact, Hardie stands up as an interpreter who has been first to formulate mixism: the secondary happiness of the excellent *praxis* and the primary happiness of *théôria* are simply two modes of one and the same life. In Hardie’s context, the concept of the mixed life is consistently applied to the entire ethical corpus by Aristotle, and not only to the *Eudemonic Ethics*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10. Moreover, for Hardie, the mixed life is not a rigid scheme which functions as a schedule: satisfy, first, moral obligations, and, only then, philosophize. As aesthetic appreciation, and as the contemplation of the invariable divine within the variable physical phenomena, *théôria* might accompany any single moment of human observation. As his final verdict, Hardie does categorically reject the division into inclusivism and exclusivism as irrelevant. Let me now look more closely at the development of Hardie’s view.

Because, from the start, Hardie insists that Aristotle position is dualistic, he finds it impossible to give one definitive interpretation to any of the crucial *NE* passages. The first passage he considers is the passage on the finality of the good. Conventionally, this passage is interpreted to mean that there is a teleological pyramid of ends terminating in one end (*telos*), which is the most final end. Hardie acknowledges that Aristotle states that if there are multiple final ends, the most final end should be chosen (*NE 1098a17-18*) with everything being desirable ultimately for the sake of the most final end. At the same time, Hardie points out that Aristotle allows a plurality of ends (*NE 1097a22-4*). Some of these ends are intrinsically valuable in themselves (valuable for the-sake-of-themselves) without the reference to the paramount end, which, on this reading, is considered to be
inclusive of them: “If right conduct is desired for its own sake, because it is itself fine or noble (hoti kalon), its rightness cannot be dependent on the fact that it leads to an end beyond itself” (217). Hardie adds that it is “questionable” that “a good planner will always give a paramount place to one dominant interest” (18).

Hardie argues that if we interpret the passage on the finality of the good as claiming that there is only one most final end, it is open to the criticism by Anscombe, who found a fallacy in the first sentence of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, concluding from “all chains must stop somewhere” to “there is somewhere where all chains must stop”. Analogously to Ackrill, Hardie says that he is “inclined to acquit Aristotle of this fallacy in view of the fact that the possibility of a plurality of ends is mentioned in chapter 7 (1097a22-4) and that [Aristotle] certainly knew that men enjoy and desire many different objects” (17). In the mixture of plural ends, according to the early Hardie, *different* ends come to the foreground at *different* times: “Even philosophers have pleasures outside philosophy, and many men are not philosophers. Any sense in which there is a single end for all actions must be one which allows for these obvious facts” (17). Hardie points to the fact that, according to Aristotle, there are many activities desired for themselves and not one only. If some activities other than theōria are desired for themselves, then theōria cannot eliminate their significance by its own significance. Beside theōria, there is supposed to be a place, in a happy life, for family and friends and active citizenship (22): “Self-development, as conceived by Aristotle, covers family life and friendship as well as intellectual pursuits” (18); “in X.8 he explicitly asserts that human happiness has these two main forms” (22).
Hardie supports his inclusivist interpretation by his analysis of the other important NE passage: on the self-sufficiency of happiness. Hardie argues that in the Nicomachean Ethics 1, 7 Aristotle himself admits that the “human good” must be an inclusive whole: it would not be self-sufficient and final if any addition would make it better (NE 1097b16-18; 22). Hardie continues: “In agreement with this he says that we must be ready to allow a plurality of ends” (22-23). Plurality of ends is essential for human nature. For example, argues Hardie, a solitary life is not self-sufficient, for it “will not satisfy nature”, pointing to Aristotle’s words: “Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship” (NE 1097b7-11; 19). Formulating the inclusivist interpretation of polis and, specifically, the irreducibility of social plurality to the totalitarian authority, Hardie continues: “Aristotle stresses the fact that men have social needs and interests, but he does not suggest that there is any reason for political institutions beyond the fact that they promote the ends and enjoyments of individuals” (19). Nonetheless, says Hardie, Aristotle’s endorsement of the plurality of ends is in tension with his stipulation that “if there is more than one end, the object of our search is the most final” (1097a28-30; 23): “Aristotle fails to keep steadily in view the fact that a process of working towards a planned terminus (peras) or end (telos) may itself be an end in the sense of being something desired for its own sake” (345).

Moreover, adds Hardie, when Aristotle says that happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete (1098a17-18; cf. 1099a30), the expression “most complete” in this pas-
sage does also offer the same puzzling alternatives between the inclusivist and the exclusivist interpretations. “Thus in speaking of the good for man”, concludes Hardie, “Aristotle hesitates between an inclusive and an exclusive formulation”: “What is unsatisfactory in Aristotle’s treatment is his failure to make explicit the distinction between the comprehensive plan and the paramount end… Aristotle tends to speak as if all that was needed was to set up a paramount end and then work out plans for attaining it” (23). He adds: “Aristotle’s language … straddles, as we have seen, between the concept of the best life generally as one lived according to a reasonable [comprehensive] plan and the more determinate idea of concentration on a paramount end” (25). Nonetheless, already in the early version of his view, Hardie insists that it is consistent to hold both that a wise man will plan his life so as to make room for many different enjoyments and that he will give a paramount place to one kind of activity or enjoyment (23) -- the point which he will more expressly formulate in his later view that the primary (contemplative) and the secondary (practical) happiness are simply two modes of one and the same life.

Hardie gives the same, dualistic, interpretation of the *ergon* passage. On the one hand, the *ergon* passage claims that the function of man consists in what is peculiar (*idion*) to man, says Hardie (24). But, on the other hand, “the ‘exclusion’ of the lower levels of soul is not to be taken as meaning more than that the distinctive nature of man does not lie in them taken by themselves. It does not mean that the lower levels are worthless or that they are not essential to the functioning of the higher” (25). Thus, Aristotle’s statement that the nutritive soul “has by its nature no share in human excellence” (1102b11-12) is not to be taken as meaning that the bodily desires and their satisfaction have no place in a happy life. Aristotle’s doctrine of ethical virtue is incompatible with asceti-
cism rejecting such pleasures. The ethical virtue of moderation (sōphrosunē) is concerned with desires originating in the nutritive soul (25). Hardie argues that, for Aristotle, the grades of soul are a series in which each term contains “potentially” its predecessor; and so the nutritive soul is contained in the perceptual soul, as the triangle in the quadrilateral: “On the same principle the functioning of the intellect, with the difficult and doubtful exception of the divine element in man’s nature, is based on sense-perception” (25). From this inclusiveness of human intellect, which contains “potentially” all the lower souls, Hardie concludes:

What is common and peculiar (idion) to men is rationality in a general sense, not theoretical insight, which is one specialized way of being rational. A man differs from other animals not primarily in being a natural metaphysician, or a natural artist, but rather in being capable of planning his own life (25-25).

This conclusion of Hardie’s anticipates Broadie’s position positing that man differs from the lower animals in having phronēsis (practical wisdom). Nonetheless, as Hardie acknowledges, there is the “difficult exception” of nous (intuitive reason), the divine element in man’s nature, and so the dualism remains as his final assessment of Aristotle’s doctrine.

Discussing “the difficult exception” of nous, Hardie calls Aristotle’s emphasis on the superior status of théoria “narrow,” “egoistic” and “exclusive” of other virtues (215). In his earlier view, Hardie is convinced that “the bliss” of théoria is narrow in its scope and is confined to meditation, “coloured perhaps by religious emotions, on theological or astronomical propositions and their proofs”73 (337-338). For the clarification of the role

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73 Nonetheless, Hardie argues that, in his mature years, Aristotle’s approach to contemplation is entirely rational, and “it cannot be claimed that the contemplative life, as conceived by Aristotle, included either religion as something on its own or religious emotion associated with non-scientific forms of experience”. “We cannot attribute to Aristotle in his maturity”, continues Hardie, “any mystical or supranatural interpre-
of theoria Hardie turns to the Metaphysics, where Aristotle distinguishes three “theoretical philosophies”: mathematics, physics, and theology (Met. E 1, 1026a18-19). “The position of physics in the scheme”, says Hardie, “is left unclear” (338-339), for theoretical intellect is said to deal with the invariable, while physics deals with the variable. Hardie criticizes Ross’ solution to this dilemma as “stretching Aristotle’s doctrine” (339), i.e., that physics is theoria as being “the study of the non-contingent element in contingent events” (Ross, Aristotle, 234). Hardie emphatically rejects the position of the other commentators who “do not think of [theoria] as confined to the study of theoretical science”, but think of it as the contemplation of the eternal in the performance of moral actions (Hardie, 340). Furthermore, together with Ross, Hardie claims that “there is nothing to show that aesthetic contemplation formed for Aristotle any part of the ideal life” (340; Ross, Principle of Individuality, 1912, 402). Hardie concludes:

Aristotle was not a democratic liberal, and did not shrink from the idea that happiness, at least in its best form, is for the fortunate few not the meritorious many (340).

This conclusion that happiness is only for the fortunate few engaged in theoria would have stood in obvious tension with what Hardie said elsewhere about happiness being an inclusive end of the meritorious many, had Hardie not insisted that Aristotle’s ethics is dualistic.

Because, continues Hardie, Aristotle “sometimes” ignores “that an object may be desired both for itself and for its results”, this leads “to his failure to specify adequately the architectonic function of the statesman” (14). Hardie argues that on Aristotle’s view, 

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tation of religious feelings” (341). According to Hardie, sophia with its activity of theoria is “the paramount theoretical science: as a universal science of being and as a science having for its subject-matter entities which are ‘separable and unmovable’” (342). Hardie tends to describe theoria as the academic life (355).
the authority of political power would be like that of “a bursar in a research institute” promoting theōria – the study of mathematics, physical science, and philosophy (15).

“The account is too simple”, concludes Hardie, “It is not easy to think of any political problem which is merely one of finding means to a fixed end… Aristotle tries to make means-finding cover too large a part of practical thinking, whether of the statesman or of the private citizens” (16; emphasis added).

Politics, a bursar in a research institute, is limited to praxis, and is a prerogative of phronēsis. Politics is not an exercise of the theoretical intellect. Hardie points out that Aristotle clearly states that political science and practical wisdom (phronēsis) are the same state of mind (NE 1141b23ff.): “This makes it clear that for Aristotle the Ethics itself, being a political treatise (NE 1094b11), is an exercise of the practical intellect” (30). Hardie emphasizes that phronēsis proceeds through deliberation, and “in all deliberation we are searching for means to ends” (231; emphasis added). Nonetheless, assessing the role of statesmanship in Aristotle’s ethics as the one of a bursar or a steward seeking for means to ends, Hardie does, at the same time, argue that, for Aristotle, statesmanship is a supreme art (14). Hardie states that “it is the job of practical reason to find … true conceptions of what ends are good” (226), or “a true understanding of an end” (213): “The capacity to think truly of ends is part of practical wisdom” (235). He emphasizes: “To have practical wisdom is to be able to envisage good ends and not only to be able to see how they can be attained” (236). Hardie continues that the major premiss of ethical reasoning in a practical syllogism is “a maxim of prudence, a rule to be followed in order to achieve an end” (231). Hardie points out that this understanding of ends concerns, first
of all, the understanding of happiness, the most final end. He says about the legislative wisdom which is the architectonic form of practical wisdom:

To have legislative wisdom is to understand the nature of human happiness, including above all the life of theoretical contemplation… This architectonic insight is, moreover, according to Aristotle’s theory, the intellectual quality exhibited by Aristotle himself in the composition of his political treatises, including the EN (212).

Hardie insists: “The legislator who has [practical] wisdom in its architectonic form (1141b25) is a man who understands the nature of happiness, the human end, and the conditions of its attainment” (226). Here, the understanding of ends and of happiness, the most final end, presupposes the formulation of ends by phronēsis (and not some other intellectual activity), and it is this formulation that constitutes a maxim of prudence, being totally within the domain of practical thinking. Because phronēsis defines in ethics and politics the ends of human life, Hardie calls ethics and politics the branches, “as one might say”, of “eudaimonics” (28). He emphasizes that phronēsis in ethics starts “from concepts of ends to be achieved”, and “concludes, or should conclude, with the formulation of rules for achieving ends” (31).

These two claims, i.e., that (1) phronēsis not simply “gets to know” the most final end, but actually “formulates” the most final end on its own; and (2) that phronēsis is not simply seeking for means to the most final end, but is in charge of the formulation of rules for its achieving, make phronēsis a ruler, rather than a steward of a ruler within a soul. These statements are in tension with Hardie’s statement that politics is concerned with means-finding by a bursar or a steward, so that the lord can have enough leisure to think of things eternal, among which is the eternally fixed telos of human existence. For a steward, “generalizations in ethics are not true without exceptions, but only roughly and
generally”, says Hardie (NE 1107a9-17; 32), so that ethical doctrine “always admits of exceptions” (33; emphasis added). Ethics is supposed to lack the precision of science, for, in political life, “the end is not knowledge but action”, says Aristotle (NE 1.3, 1095a5-6); “we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good” (1103b27-29; 30). Nonetheless, Hardie immediately mentions that this sounds paradoxical in the light of what Aristotle said in the Metaphysics – that “all men by nature desire to know” (Met. 980a21; 30).

Hardie collects the other statements of Aristotle, which sound paradoxical in the light of the view that politics is entirely empirical and practical, if they are not interpreted as the alleged dualism of Aristotle. Hardie acknowledges that Aristotle does use the word sophia or philosophia for ethical and political science (NE X, 9 1181b15), and that in the Politics, Aristotle speaks of “political theory” (Pol. 7, 2, 1324a20). For example, says Hardie, praxis “can be of theoretical interest to the student and gratify his desire for knowledge and clear thinking”. He continues: “There are passages in the Politics which admit a theoretical interest in practical topics” (31; Pol. 3, 8, 1279b12-15). He insists: “Aristotle admits that in the Politics, interest in political science may be theoretical, not merely practical, and, if so, will extend to details which have no practical relevance” (223). Hardie acknowledges Aristotle’s statement in the Politics that “to aim at utility everywhere is utterly unbecoming to high-minded and liberal spirits” (1338b2-4). Hardie adds: “Ethics is a special science and as such has its own ‘proper principles’” (40). This is perhaps the main issue on which Aristotle disagrees with Plato, argues Hardie: it was against Aristotle’s principles to found his Politics on his metaphysics, and he believed
that, to be an independent science, *Politics* should have its own “proper and ultimate first principles” (43).

Furthermore, Hardie states:

The suggestion that ethics as a whole, the science of politics, is a discipline which proceeds towards and not from principles is one which, so far as I can see, would to Aristotle seem to be not so much false as unintelligible. Politics, the supreme practical science, has its own ‘proper’ principles (οἰκείαι αρχαι) which are basic in an objective, and not merely relative, sense. In the nature of the case a systematic treatise on the subject would reason from these principles (35).

Hardie insists: Aristotle “does not deny that politics, as a special science, derives consequences from its own first principles” (36). He does specifically argue against Ross’ assertion that ethical reasoning proceeds towards the first principles. A student of ethics starts with sense perception and induction, because, for us, says Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*, but not in the natural order of knowledge, particulars come before universals (1.2, 71b33-72a5; 34). Nonetheless, the first principles are not given in sense perception and consequent inductive reasoning, but in intuitive reason (*nous*). The intuitive reason apprehends the first principles in induction (*apagōgē*), perception (*aisthēsis*), habituation (*ethismos*), and in other ways (1098b3-4; 37). Hardie acknowledges: “Theoretical wisdom includes or comprehends intuitive reason (*nous*), which apprehends first principles” (226).

The significance of the discussion about whether ethics proceeds towards or from first principles lies in the fact that, in the first case, ethics and politics are based on inductive reasoning and are branches of *phronēsis*. In this case, ethics and politics, in general, lack precision in the sense that happiness is the practical approximation to the maxims of prudence. In the second case, ethics and politics, in general, are based on the self-evident
intuitions of *nous*, and are branches of *sophia*. In this case the imprecision of ethics and politics will be limited by the postulations of ethical truths that never admit of exceptions, with happiness being the functional realization of the ends expressed by these, self-evident, truths (and not by the imprecise and fallible generalizations of induction). Har- drie explains that, though proceeding from the first principles in the major premiss, ethical reasoning would not have the deductive form of scientific demonstration: “It would start from the concept of a good and proceed to the detailed description of its elements and the elaboration of means for its attainment” (35-36).

Even more, Hardie insists that in the study of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it is necessary to refer to the *De Anima* “in order to understand Aristotle’s thought and the terms he uses”, because, says Hardie, the *De Anima* and *Nicomachean Ethics* “agree” on the specific nature of man (73; 337), and both treatises defend the doctrine about *nous* being “separable”, “imperishable”, and not the *entelechy* (*entelecheia*) of the body (72, 336, 348). “There is no evidence”, says Hardie, “that [Aristotle] ever maintained the *entelechy* doctrine without this important reservation” (72). Nonetheless, Hardie’s final judgment on Aristotle’s notion of the separable nature of *nous* is that “this doctrine presents itself as a puzzle and perhaps even as a scandal” (346). Hardie says it is difficult in particular to see how any human thinking could be separable from memory and imagination, which, as Aristotle himself proclaims, depend on physiological conditions (354). But, claims Hardie, the doctrine of the separable *nous* cannot be discarded as a Platonic rudiment, for it was never repudiated, as Plato’s theory of Forms had been. The doctrine on the separable and eternal, “divine” or “divine-like”, nature of *nous* is not confined to the Third
Book of the *De Anima* (Γ 4 and 5), continues Hardie, but is mentioned repeatedly in the other two ⁷⁴ (347).

Hardie concludes that the only way to make Aristotle’s doctrine consistent, with his physiological view on psychology and his view on a special non-physical status of *nous*, is to accept that Aristotle was a dualist: “Perhaps [these views] are not consistent, but prima facie Aristotle does defend both at once, and we have to see what we can make of any defense that he offers of his doctrine of *nous*” (347-348). The soul is a ruler in relation to the body, says Hardie (73), and Aristotle’s dualism in his doctrine of the soul does not “oblige him to contradict flatly” all that Plato had meant when he said that the soul rules the body, and *nous* rules the soul (83). Hardie states that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is based on the dichotomy between *entelechy* and *nous*, with a human being defined as a composite (*suntheton*) of body and soul, which contains *nous* as “thing apart” (76) ⁷⁵.

Meanwhile, Hardie does not agree that the *Nicomachean Ethics* has the distinction between the active intellect (causally efficacious, productive, immortal and eternal) and the passive intellect (destructible), as the *De Anima* (439a10-14) does (348): “This doctrine that there is differentiation within the unity of reason (*nous*) does not appear elsewhere in the *De Anima* nor in the *EN* nor elsewhere in Aristotle’s surviving works” (353). But he suggests that “the distinction between active and passive reason, although it gives rise to new problems in the interpretation of Aristotle, might, if developed, help us to make better sense than we can without it of the doctrine of theoretical reason in *EN X*”

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⁷⁴ Hardie says about the doctrine on the non-physical nature of *nous*: “It is defended in the first book (A 4, 408b18-29) and is mentioned in a number of other passages in both the first and second books (A 1, 403a3-12; B 1, 413a5-7; 2, 413b24-27; 3, 415a11-12) (72).

⁷⁵ Hardie says: “Psychophysical dualism is built into the convictions and language of ordinary men. Aristotle has no qualms about speaking in terms of dualism” (77).
(354-355). The concept of the active and the passive intellect is Aristotle’s way, says Hardie, to formulate a position that could allow him to claim both a special status for reason and maintain his *entelechy* doctrine as an account of intellectual activity as well as of perception, imagination, pleasure and pain, and emotional states (354).

Up to the very end of his book, Hardie hesitates about whether to define Aristotle’s ethics as inclusivist or exclusivist. On the same page, he says: “Aristotle certainly commits himself to the doctrine of an *inclusivist* end” (215; emphasis added), and continues describing the practical pursuit of one’s own happiness as being egoistic and *exclusivist*:

> Sometimes, in connection with this egoistic account of practical activity, the good life is narrowed to the life of theory. In both the *EE* and in the *MM* we find it stated that rules which prescribe conduct ethically virtuous have as their end and justification the contemplative activities of the agent. The end is *exclusive* of other goods as well as confined to the agent (215; emphasis added).

Hardie refers to the *Magna Moralia* (A34) and to the concluding sentences of the *Eudemian Ethics* (1249b16-23): “What choice, then, or possession, of the natural goods – whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things – will most effectively produce the contemplation of God, that choice or possession is best; this is the noblest standard, but any that through deficiency or excess hinders one from the contemplation and service of God is bad” (215). He also acknowledges Aristotle’s statement in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 that *phronēsis* does ultimately issue all its orders for the sake of *sophia* (1145a6-9; 216). But, emphasizes Hardie, returning to the inclusivist standpoint: “The egoistic asceticism of these passages does not fully represent Aristotle’s view” (216):

> Both in *EN VI* and in *EN X* Aristotle asserts without ambiguity that theoretical activity, although more highly desirable than any other human activity, is not the
only activity which is desirable for its own sake and does not by itself constitute the whole end for man (216).

Hardie points out to the ideal of the secondary happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7 and 8, interpreting it from the *mixist* standpoint as a *mode* of one and the same life containing also *theōria* in the form of the primary mode of happiness (and not as a separate kind of happy life): “[Aristotle] asserts in X.8 that activities which manifest *phronēsis* and moral virtue, although a lower form of happiness than theoretical activity, are desired for their own sake and thus constitute part of the human good or end” (216). The fact that the secondary mode of happiness remains a specific mode of happiness even combined with *theōria* as the higher mode of happiness does firmly establish in Hardie’s eyes the independent value of practical virtues. Hardie reasserts that Aristotle cannot be understood in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 as propounding an exclusivist account of happiness, though the contemplative happiness is consistently presented as the most desirable (see also 417): “In *EN* X [Aristotle] says that the life lived in society in accordance with ethical virtue is a form, though not the paramount form, of happiness (1178a9)” (356). When Aristotle suggests that *theōria* alone is loved for its own sake (1177b1-2), what he means is that it alone is loved for its sake alone (356). And Hardie adds: “But many quite trivial pleasures are pursued for their sake alone” (356).

Hardie does also refer to Aristotle’s treatment of love and friendship in Books 8 and 9, where, as he says, “Aristotle attempts to represent altruistic self-sacrifice, even in its most extreme forms, as consistent with his own theory” (216). A man cannot be fully happy if he were not liked and trusted, and even admired, by his friends and family (217). And he mentions the passage in the *NE* Book 6 where both practical and theoretical ex-
cellences are worthy of choice because “they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them produces anything” (1144a1-3; 216).

Nonetheless, notwithstanding his attempts to formulate a coherent account of Aristotle’s ethics, Hardie concludes his book by saying that Aristotle “fails” in his elevation of science and philosophy above other pursuits of man, that his account of intellectual activity is “distorted” by his theology, and that he gives us “no satisfying explanation” of the paradoxes presented to us by the doctrine of the special status of nous. Literally, the last words of Hardie’s book are the following:

…I dissented from the suggestion that Aristotle sees how to exhibit the life of theory, primary happiness, as continuous with the less exalted happiness of the non-theoretical. Nor did I find earlier in Aristotle’s account of phronēsis, practical wisdom, any sustained attempt to bridge the gulf, to show continuity, between the principles of justice which all men must respect and the contemplative activities without which no man can be truly happy. We do not find in Aristotle’s account of the nature and chief end of man acceptable answers to all the questions he asks (357; emphasis added).

This is a negativistic assessment of the alleged Aristotle’s dualism (dualism consisting in positing both inseparable entelechy and separable nous; and in positing both inclusivist and exclusivist standpoints in teleology). Assessed negatively, Aristotle’s dualism, as it is seen in this statement of Hardie’s, becomes a hindrance to the desired wholeness of the soul, to its possession of the primary and secondary kinds of happiness simply as two modes of one life, i.e., the components of the composite most final end. And, thus, this negative assessment of Aristotle’s dualism is in tension with Hardie’s overall position of mixism.

Nonetheless, Hardie qualifies his criticism by saying that it does not touch “the foundations of Aristotle’s doctrine” (356-357).
This evident tension prompted Hardie to write in 1980 an apologetic appendix, in which he accepts: “I may have expressed this negative opinion rather too strongly when I said that the doctrine of separable reason, as we find it in the De Anima and the Ethics, ‘presents itself as a puzzle and perhaps even as a scandal’ and confronts us with a ‘dualism and discontinuity’ which is ‘hard to understand’ (346)” (417). He has now spoken “for the defense, not the prosecution” of Aristotle (420). Hardie offers “a number of ways” to “file down” “this too sharp edge”, thus, drastically changing his view on Aristotle’s notion of theōria: (a) Hardie now includes physics into theōria (417); (b) as well as artistic and aesthetic activity, and even morality, arguing in (a) and (b) that all attributes of theōria – purity (kathareiotēs) and enduringness (bebaitēs) -- are applicable to any continuous intellectual and artistic activity (418).

Hardie insists that commentators should turn for further explanation of the separable nature of nous to the “similarly formulated doctrine in the De Anima and particularly to the treatment of nous in Π 4 and to remarks on active and passive nous in Π 5” (418). He suggests that the Nicomachean Ethics seems to imply that theōria is a different element of the soul than the elements of the soul involved in other human activities, namely, it is an active element, or, using the De Anima terminology, the active intellect (418). He adds that “this echoes phrases earlier in the De Anima: ‘a different kind of the soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable and alone capable of existence in isolation” (413b24-27; 418).

Expounding his view that the secondary and the primary happy lives are simply the secondary and the primary forms of happiness within the same life, Hardie criticizes Ackrill’s interpretation as “not wholly clear and convincing” (419). In the concluding
pages of his British Academy Lecture, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia” (1975), Ackrill claims that Aristotle fails even to attempt an answer of how *theoría* and virtuous action should be combined in the best possible human life. The reason, says Ackrill, is that Aristotle thinks *theoría* is an “incommensurably” more valuable activity (Ackrill, 21; Hardie, 418). Moreover, continues Ackrill, there can be no “trading relation” between the human and the divine: “Aristotle’s theology and anthropology make it inevitable that his answer to the question about *eudaimonia* should be broken-backed” (Ackrill, 22; Hardie, 419).

Hardie responds that “to deny commensurability is not to deny quantitative comparability”. Like the incommensurate things becoming comparable thanks to money as a medium of exchange when need arises, *theoría* and virtuous action become sufficiently comparable with reference to the need and desire of men for *eudaimonia* (419). Also, continues Hardie: “Aristotle may have said, and not only when speaking of *theoría*, that a man could be godlike, but not that he was or could become a god” (419).

Hardie argues that, contrary to Ackrill’s interpretation, *theoría* and virtuous action should be viewed not as *incompatible* interests, but as “mutually helpful and promotive”. Hardie says that Ackrill’s interpretation was made possible by treating the primary and the secondary forms of happiness as two competing careers (419). He specifically criticizes Ackrill’s assurance that one should do anything however seemingly monstrous if doing it has the slightest tendency to promote *theoría*:

Surely, if this had been said to Aristotle, his answer could only have been the one which he gave to ‘those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good’; he would have agreed that ‘those who say such a thing’ are, whether they mean it or not, ‘*talking nonsense*’ (*NE* 1153b19-21) (420; emphasis added).
Consequently, Hardie argues against “the Procrustean treatment” of the secondary form of happiness. He says that, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 10, there is no suggestion that for any man the possession of the primary happiness can make the secondary happiness unimportant (421). Philosophers, if human, are not excluded from the social life and moral excellence.

Ultimately, Hardie argues against the division of interpreters into the inclusivist and the exclusivist camps. He claims that the entire contemporary distinction between *dominant end* and *inclusive end* is but “the multiple ambiguity” of “confusing terminological invention” (427). In his attempt at transcending the dichotomy of inclusivism and exclusivism, Hardie applies the notions “exclusive / dominant” and “inclusive” to *one and the same* life:

There is another use of the terms in which every man, unless mad and / or bad, has both an “inclusive end” and at least one “dominant end”: he has a comprehensive plan which includes a number of objectives or interests and, *as part of what is included, one, or perhaps more than one, major interest* (428-429; emphasis added).

Hardie posits that his own terminology of “the comprehensive plan” and “the paramount end” relaxes the tension between *theōria* and virtuous activities being a means towards a dominant end of *theōria* and, thus, losing their independent intrinsic value (422). This interpretation, says Hardie, is a bridge over Ackrill’s “insurmountable chasm” between *theōria* and moral excellences, an attempt to vindicate the unity of Aristotle’s thought in the *Ethics* (423).

Hardie does also criticize the early Cooper for denying that the secondary happiness is a part of his philosopher’s human happiness, and, specifically, Cooper’s statement that philosophers only “perform” virtuous actions, staying aloof to the very core of moral
virtue (Cooper, 1975, 165). According to Aristotle, rebuts Hardie, these actions would not be virtuous acts \((NE\ 1105a23-33)\): “If Cooper’s interpretation were possible, we should be loth to accept it if the natural and generally accepted interpretation were possible, as it plainly is” \(422\).

Criticizing Kenny, Hardie points out that Kenny in his exclusivist interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 overly downgrades the secondary happiness of the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, as well as, in his inclusivist interpretation of the *Eudemian Ethics*, he overly downgrades the role of contemplation in the *Eudemian Ethics*. Kenny, says Hardie, does indeed make two admissions: (1) Aristotle asserts that ‘the life of practical wisdom and the moral virtues’ is a ‘kind of happiness’; (2) Aristotle asserts in the *Eudemian Ethics* that contemplation is ‘the highest’ of the ‘activities which constitute the happy life’

Expounding (1), Hardie emphasizes that Aristotle never seems to suggest that the secondary happiness is unimportant. He argues that Kenny ignores both Aristotle’s doctrine in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that secondary happiness is independently desirable, and that the theorizer should be necessarily moral, thus, misinterpreting the way in which two kinds of happiness offer alternative paths of one life \(427\). If these two lives are to be radically separated, as Kenny wants it, each one loses its intrinsic value. Primary happiness and secondary happiness represent both the alternative careers and different activities of one life \(428\). Expounding (2), Hardie claims that from the *Aristotelian Ethics* \((NE\ VI=EE\ V)\), it is clear that there are at least “two virtues of the rational soul,” and that *sophia* with its activity of *theoria*, is the more perfect. In conjunction with the doctrine of
the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, this entails even for the *Aristotelian Ethics* (*Eudemian Ethics* plus shared books) that *eudaimonia* is to be identified with theoretical activity (428).

Because Hardie argues for the wholeness of the soul, and, consequently, represents two happy lives as two modes of one and the same life, Hardie criticizes Kenny’s belief -- which echoes the belief of Ackrill -- that “a person who organized his life entirely with a view to the promotion of philosophic speculation” would be a vicious and ignoble character (Kenny, 1978, 24). “Is it Aristotle’s doctrine or a misinterpretation of his doctrine which is here reduced to absurdity?” – asks Hardie (428). The way Kenny is using terms “inclusive” and “exclusive,” stresses Hardie, “may induce temporary blindness to the fact that any man who really opted for either of these kinds of life-plan would have to be mad or bad or both” (428-429; emphasis added).

The considerable achievement of Hardie is that he made it possible to overcome the confusion of the inclusivist / exclusivist debate undermining the unity of the Aristotelian ethical corpus. Instead of looking for the on-going conflict between *theōria* and moral excellences, Hardie claimed the productive cooperation between *theōria* and *phronēsis*, comparing this cooperation to the cooperation between the active and the passive intellect in the *De Anima*. He has pinned down the objectives and sketched the plan of future research, namely, to define how exactly *theōria* and *praxis* cooperate. My dissertation is concerned with the functionalist interpretation that purports to implement Hardie’s plan.
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