

Chapter 6

The role of pleasure in making *eudaimonia* final and self-sufficient. The final reconsideration of the *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of *eudaimonia*

I postponed my final judgment on the passage of the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7 till I collect all the textual support. There are only a few passages left to clarify this issue. These passages appear in *NE* 10, 1-5 and deal with the finality of the good within the discussion of pleasure. Neither exclusivists nor inclusivists pay attention to these passages. Following Aspasius, Kenny argues that this discussion of pleasure in Book 10 is the evidence of the inconsistency of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, because there was already the discussion of pleasure in Book 7 (and this is actually Kenny's major argument)²³. Also he sides up with the view that the final chapters of *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 has nothing to do with the preceding discussion of pleasure or happiness (1992, 139). Nonetheless, as it will become clear in my explication of this set of passages, the issue at stake in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, 1-5 is very different from the discussion of pleasure in Book 7 where pleasure was considered within the discussion of virtues, i.e., the virtues of continence and temperance. Contrary to Book 7, the *NE* 10, 1-5 discussion of pleasure is directly linked with the consecutive discussion of happiness as contemplation in the remainder of Book 10, for here Aristotle gives his further consideration to the notion of finality / completeness and its criterion of isolation.

²³ "There was one strong reason against the view that Aristotle revised and moved the books [of his *Ethics*] himself. That is the existence of the treatment of pleasure, which duplicates, and is not cross-referenced to, the treatment in *NE* 10. This ... appeared to Aspasius to be a reason for considering the hypothesis that it might not be by Aristotle at all [though Aspasius did not think there was a conflict in doctrine]" (1992, 135).

As Aristotle pointed out in Book 1 and as he repeats here, similar to virtuous activities, pleasure has the property of finality (*teleion*) -- it is chosen for itself (even if no utility ensues). But there is a much more important correlation between virtuous activities and pleasure, says Aristotle. Here is the skeleton of his argument. Every virtuous activity should be accompanied by or supervened by pleasure to be a truly virtuous activity (done with the initiative and satisfaction). Pleasure in this sense is rather spiritual elevation, empathic ecstasy, or the state of grace than pleasure in the vulgar, bodily, sense of physical gratification. Essentially, it is pleasure that *completes* every virtuous activity (makes it *teleia*). And, even more generally, *any* activity is completed by its *own* pleasure. Aristotle gives his special consideration to whether it is unconditionally true that even without pleasure, virtuous activity is good in itself. Aristotle argues, seemingly sacrilegiously, against this Platonist (and, later, Kantian) moralist stand to prove that it is pleasure that makes virtuous activity good-in-itself (self-subsistent). He derives this conclusion from his argument that pleasure completes any activity in a functional sense, meaning that pleasure is simply the most efficient functional realization of an activity. Therefore, argues Aristotle, pleasure is *functionally* inseparable from the activity itself. It is pleasure of this, functional, kind that makes virtuous activity good-in-itself, i.e., functionally complete and, thus, teleologically valuable in-itself / self-sufficient in isolation from other goods.

Thus, the relation between the activity and its supervening pleasure is not the relation of addition (the addition of pleasure to the activity). Pleasure is *functionally* inseparable from the activity itself, implying that every *energeia* has its *own* qualitatively unique pleasure functionally inseparable from it. This explains the fact that pleasures do

existentially differ from each other. Every activity *is completed* (made *teleia*) by its *proper* pleasure, and *destroyed* by the *alien* pleasure. Pleasure *isolates* activity from other activities, i.e., every activity is pleasurable in its own unique way. Or, in other words, a specific activity cannot be completed -- made complete, *teleia* -- by alien pleasure(s). A specific pleasure cannot be achieved by adding up other, *incongruous*, pleasures (even on the bodily level, the pleasure of eating cannot be built up by the pleasure of sex and the pleasure of sleep, and the pleasure of sleep will definitely destroy the pleasure of sex). Thus, no activity can add to or substitute its pleasure for the pleasure of the other activity.

The superior, final, virtue should have the superior, *existentially specific*, pleasure inseparable from it – the kind of pleasure that makes an activity self-subsistent in the most isolation from other activities. The final virtue maximally intensified / fulfilled by its proper pleasure is the most intense realization of the species' function (and this is what finality ultimately means). Beasts have their proper pleasures, and humans have theirs. Human function is peculiar and radically different from the function of the beasts. Though humans share with the other animals many functions, the activity functionally *proper* to humans cannot be completed -- made complete, *teleia* -- by the pleasures of the beasts. It is completed by its own specific, *proper*, pleasure, and destroyed by the alien pleasure of the beasts. That is why the consideration of pleasure in this, *teleological and functional*, aspect is what Aristotle needs to conclude his discussion of all the virtuous activities and proceed to the discussion of the best one among them as happiness. The significance of the *NE* 10, 1-5 passages for the interpretation of the *NE* 1 passages on the finality of the good and the final virtue was camouflaged by the translation of *teleion* and

teleia in reference to happiness and pleasure in these passages not as “final”, but as either “complete” or “perfect”, which do not do justice to this text.

While all the previous interpreters fail to take notice that *NE* 10, 1-5 discusses the notion of finality (being *teleia*) and the notion of self-sufficiency in conjunction with the discussion of human *ergon*, these passages make evident that these notions are inseparable for Aristotle. Human *ergon* defines happiness or the most final end for humans in the sense of *peculiarity*, i.e., the peculiarity of human pleasure. Peculiarity of species is functional isolation, i.e., the incompatibility between the human pleasure and the bestial pleasure. Functional isolation is the self-sufficiency of species, i.e., the ability of finding pleasure in its own functioning. Self-sufficiency of species cannot possibly be achieved by adding up all the functions (with their proper pleasures) that humans share with other animals²⁴. Thus, these passages are also crucial for understanding the *NE* 1 passages on the human *ergon* and the self-sufficiency of happiness. Because of the extreme importance of this text, let me go slowly in explicating Aristotle’s argument.

At the very outset of his *NE* 10, 1-5 *teleological* consideration of pleasure, Aristotle immediately points out that pleasure is “most intimately connected with our human nature”, or, in other words, is *functionally* significant in a human life (*NE* 10, 1 1172a18-20). As he always does, Aristotle starts with the discussion of what others think of pleasure in *this*, teleological, sense. Eudoxus believes that the essential characteristics of pleasure is that pleasure is *teleia*: “That is most an object of choice which we choose not because or for the sake of something else, and pleasure is admittedly of this nature; for no

²⁴ Like pleasure of sleep and food cannot constitute the pleasure of sex, so the human function proper, which is active intellect, cannot be built up by the addition of, let’s say, the function of growth to the function of digestion. The statement that when the functions that humans share with other animals are done with reason then they belong to man’s proper function is not, in fact, what Aristotle says about the peculiarity of human function.

one asks to what end he is pleased...” (NE 10, 2 1172b20-23). On this, Aristotle agrees with Eudoxus, and disagrees with Plato who believes that pleasure is not *teleia*, and, so, not *The Good*. And he categorically disagrees with both Eudoxus and Plato that human happiness is to be interpreted in the inclusivist manner. In fact, Eudoxus and Plato use the inclusivist interpretation of the happy life to the opposite ends. Eudoxus argues that because adding pleasure makes everything better, pleasure *is* the good, while Plato argues that because pleasure is added to the other goods, it *cannot* be the good. Plato agrees with Eudoxus that human happiness is a mixture or compound, but contrary to Eudoxus he believes that, because it is a mixture, human happiness cannot achieve the status of the Good (*teleion*), which cannot be mixed (see *Philebus*):

[Eudoxus] argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g., to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that is only by itself that the good can be increased. *This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone.* And so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it (1172b23-33; emphasis added).

It is clear from this passage that Aristotle sides with Plato that The Good cannot be a mixture or a compound: “The good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it”. He continues reaffirming this important belief: “Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves. What, then, is there that satisfies this criterion, which at the same time we can participate in? It is something of this sort that we are looking for” (NE 1172b33-35). Thus, as Aristotle clearly indicates from the start, this

specific discussion of the nature of pleasure [i.e., its being *teleia*] directly bears on the discussion of the nature of The Good [i.e., its being *teleion*].

This passage has two textual parallelisms with the *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness: expression “one of the goods, and no more a good than any other” is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 expression “being counted as one good thing among others” (1097b17-18); and the statement “every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone” is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 “if it were so counted [as one good thing among others] it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b18-21). Aristotle unambiguously singles out this, inclusivist, account of human happiness by Plato and Eudoxus as “the argument of a specific kind” -- “*this* argument”. It is clear that Aristotle does not take this argument to be his own. First of all, as Aristotle insists, because this argument yields two opposite conclusions – the one by Plato (pleasure is *not* the good) and the one by Eudoxus (pleasure *is* the good). Evidently, the passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7 is an abrupt recording, as it might be in the compendium of notes, of the long argument developed in *NE* 10, 4. Therefore, *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness simply cannot be interpreted on its own. Let me look at the further development of Aristotle’s argument before making a final verdict on the passage of the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7.

Because Aristotle agrees with Eudoxus that pleasure is *teleia*, though he will give his qualification of this thesis further on into his argument, Aristotle does at this point concentrate on his critique of Plato’s belief that pleasure is not *teleia*. He emphasizes that

people avoid pain as evil, and choose pleasure as good, which is reflected in the common view (and “that which every one thinks really is so”, 1172b36-1173b17): “Those who object that that at which all things aim is not necessarily good are, we may surmise, talking nonsense” (1172b35-36). Aristotle’s objective is to find the relation between pleasure and the good, which is evidently different from the one envisaged by Plato who argued that pleasure is simply a part of the mixed happy life.

Aristotle argues against Platonist (and Eleatic) view according to which pleasure is indeterminate (admits of degrees), while the good is determinate. People can indeed be more or less just and brave, but if some pleasures are unmixed and others mixed, and admit of degrees, this does not mean that pleasure is *intermediate* or, in other words, not *teleia*: “Just as health admits of degrees without being intermediate, why should not pleasure?” (NE 1173a15-25). Aristotle also argues against the Platonist (and Eleatic) belief that pleasure cannot be the good because it is supposedly a movement (*κίνησις*) and a coming into being (the Becoming), while the good is perfect (the Being). Aristotle states that pleasure is *not* a movement and cannot be defined with the criteria of speed and slowness (1173a31-32): “We may *become* pleased quickly”, but “we cannot *be* pleased quickly” (1173a29-1173b1). *Pleasure is teleia notwithstanding the criteria of movement*. He continues by arguing against the Platonist (and Eleatic) view, according to which pleasure is replenishment while pain is lack. Aristotle says that these experiences are bodily, for replenishment takes place in the body, while that which feels pleasure is not the body, and, so, pleasure is not replenishment. Moreover, many pleasures [of learning, and even sensuous pleasures of smell, sight and hearing, etc.] do not presuppose pain

linked with lack. Thus, concludes Aristotle, pleasure cannot be defined as “the coming into being”, or *not teleia* (1173b8-19).

Though Platonists are definitely wrong about the interrelation between pleasure and the good, it nonetheless seems up front that pleasure does not always accompany the good and we ought to choose possessing the virtues even if no pleasure resulted (1174a1-8). It *seems*, continues Aristotle, pleasure per se, considered on its own, cannot be the good nor is all pleasure desirable. Nonetheless, he argues, that is true only of the specific pleasures – the ones that are not desirable in themselves. It is not true of those pleasures that “*are* desirable in themselves being different in kind or in their sources from the others” (1174a10-11)²⁵. And, so, contrary to this plausible and laudable position that pleasures are separable from virtuous activities, Aristotle goes on to argue that pleasures are inseparable from their virtuous activities, and virtuous activities are inseparable from their pleasures. It is because pleasures are inseparable from the activities they accompany that pleasures differ in kind: “One cannot get the pleasure of the just man without being just, not that of the musical man without being musical” (1173b29-30). Unlike Kantianism, Aristotle proceeds by showing that one cannot, in fact, be properly just without having the pleasure of the just man, and be properly musical without having the pleasure of the musical man. Aristotle proves this by arguing that every specific pleasure (among pleasures-in-themselves) is *teleia* and *functionally* finalizes or completes virtuous activity (makes it *teleia* or good-in-itself).

From this point in his argument, Aristotle concentrates on the notion of finality and its quality of isolation. He points out that “seeing seems to be at any moment complete (*teleion*), for it *does not lack anything* which coming into being later will complete

²⁵ “Those derived from noble sources are different from those derived from base sources”, 1173b29-30.

its form (*eidōs*); and pleasure also seems to be of this nature [i.e., *teleia*]. For *it is a whole and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form (eidōs) will be completed (τελειωθησεται) if the pleasure lasts longer*. For this reason, too, it is not a movement” (1174a14-18; emphasis added). It is clear from this passage that the finality of pleasure is understood as *self-contained* finality – it is an *eidōs* that lacks nothing. It is because pleasure is *eidōs* that it pertains to the realm of the Being, not the realm of the Becoming. It is because pleasure is *eidōs* or complete-in-itself / self-contained whole (*μοναδος*) that pleasure cannot be “completed” by the addition or subtraction of something that is not pleasure *itself* or by the pleasure of the other kind -- by something that is another *eidōs*. *Eidōs* is determinate (*the* determinate), meaning that it is monadic. For the reason that the finality of pleasure is the monadic finality of *eidōs*, the finality of pleasure (pleasure being *teleia*) is the finality of *isolation*. Good-in-itself means “final-in-itself” (*eidōs*) in isolation (*μοναδος*) and cannot be the sum of the elements incongruous or extraneous to it.

This formulation of pleasure by Aristotle as being *eidōs* (the good having its form in itself) is his crucial departure from Plato’s view on pleasure. It is evident that it is precisely because, for Aristotle, *eidōs* is inseparable from *hyle* in forming *existentially specific* (qualitatively unique) *ousia* that Aristotle contended Plato’s view on pleasure as being separable, indeterminate and, so, not *eidōs*, being simply added to other goods or mixed with them. And, so, consequently, he argued against Plato’s inclusivism, i.e., Plato’s belief that happiness is a mixed life. It is important to understand why Plato did believe both that The Good is *μοναδος* while happy human life is mixed -- not *μοναδος*. For Plato, a soul is corrupted by its descent into the realm of becoming, so that a human

is incapable of realizing the monadic unity of the good. Hence, follows Plato's pessimism about the soundness of human happiness, which is of a mixed kind. So, mixed happy life in Plato's rendering is not an ideal, but rather a compromise, a consequence of the corruption of the immortal *divine* soul by the mortal *bestly* body, and, definitely, not an end (*telos*) that this immortal soul has by its nature. In opposition to Plato, Aristotle's was a quest to retrieve the *eideic* unity denied to humans by Plato, and grant them the ability of full / final *human* happiness. In this context, to attribute to Aristotle Plato's inclusivist argument concerning goods that can be counted among others, so that in a mixed happy life, "every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone" is to miss the entire point. Contemporary inclusivism / mixism does fail from the start because it takes Aristotle's view on happiness out from the historical context, and, as a result, does not account for Aristotle's criticism of Plato's inclusivism given in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, 1-5.

Following is Aristotle's detailed refutation of the inclusivist belief that true wholeness (being a whole) can be achieved by the process of addition:

...Every movement (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made what it aims at. It is complete (*teleia*), therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other. For the fitting together of the stones is different from the flutting of the column, and these are both different from the making of the temple; and the making of the temple is complete (*teleia*) (for it lacks nothing with a view to the end proposed), but the making of the base or of the triglyph is incomplete; for each is the making of only a part... So, too, in the case of walking and all the other movements. For if locomotion is a movement from here to there, it, too, has differences in kind – flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only so, but in walking itself there are such differences; for the whence and whither are not the same in the whole racecourse and in a part of this line and that; for one traverses not only a line but one which is in a place, and this one is in a different place from that (1174a18-1174b2).

Movement and practical action (*praxis*) here are construed as the process of addition (fitting parts together). Aristotle concludes: "...it seems that [addition as movement] is not complete at any and every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form. But *of pleasure the form (eidos) is complete at any and every time (τελειον το ειδος)*. Plainly, then, pleasure and [addition as movement] must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete". He adds that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it *is* possible to be pleased, "for that which takes place in a moment is a whole". Pleasure is a whole (*μοναδος*), while addition as movement and a coming into being can be ascribed only to those things that are "*divisible and not wholes*" (1174b3-14; emphasis added). By making the human *telos* divisible, contemporary inclusivism fails to account for Aristotle's notion of the whole as *eideic / monadic indivisible* unity.

This passage is a solution to the paradox which is yielded by inclusivism and which Aristotle formulates in the *NE* 1, 9-10. A building is *teleion* only "in the whole time or at [the] final moment" of its completion, but not in every part of building process which is existentially different from any other part (parts "are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other"), says Aristotle in *NE* 10, 4. Had happiness been a compound of its parts, it would have never been achieved by man, for man lives in a moment (moment following moment), and a whole of his life, if considered as compound, is realized only "at the final moment" of its completion, that is, death. What complicates this paradox is that like the parts of the building process can fail and do fail, human life goes from ups to downs. This yields the consequent paradox that happiness

(time when a person is truly happy) is different from and is only a part of a happy life rendered in inclusivist terms and containing both success and failure:

...There is required, as we said, not only complete (*teleia*) virtue but also a complete life, since any changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy. Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay this doctrine, is it also the case that a man *is* happy when he is *dead*? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity (*energeia*)?... If we must see the end and only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them... (*NE* 1, 9-10, 1100a4-1100b1).

The only solution to the paradox is to render *teleion* as pertaining to a moment as such – indivisible and qualitatively unique.

According to this passage, Cooper is wrong in his inclusivist argument based on the analogy Aristotle draws between geometrical construction and deliberation [practical reasoning] which is, according to Cooper, responsible for the attainment of happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* minus Book 10: “A many-sided figure may have been analyzed into its constituent triangles, and then the first step in the construction, the drawing of a triangle, will be the construction of part of the many-sided figure itself. If deliberation is like this, then among the things done that ‘contribute to’ an end will be the production of some of its parts” (20; *NE* 3, 3 1112b20-24). The conceptual discrepancy between the *NE* 10, 4 1174a18-1174b2 passage and Cooper’s interpretation of *NE* 3, 3 1112b20-24 passage is so striking that it is worthy to look at the text Cooper interprets closer. The passage Cooper analyzes appears in the context of Aristotle’s analysis of deliberation and its limits. Cooper builds his inclusivist argument for the bi-partite (divisible) end upon

two premises: (1) he believes that it is deliberation that is responsible for the formulation of the end (*telos*); (2) he believes that Aristotle defines deliberation in the inclusivist terms (constructing a whole by the process of “fitting parts together” as in a complex geometrical figure). Hence, concludes Cooper, the end itself should be a divisible complex whole.

Nonetheless, in the context of the 1112b20-24 passage, Aristotle argues to the contrary that “we deliberate not about ends but about means”, and even more categorically: no one “deliberates about his end”. We, says Aristotle, “assume the end” via the *a priori* intuitions of the active intellect, “since moving principle is in ourselves”. In its search for means toward the end, deliberation triggers actions, and actions are always “for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only the means... If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity” (1112b15-1113a3). So, Cooper is wrong in his premiss (1) that it is deliberation by *phronēsis* that is responsible for the formulation of the end. It is clear that deliberation as a process of construction in 1112b15-1113a3 passage is similar to the building process or any movement / addition / construction in the 1174a18-1174b2 passage. And in both passages, the end – *telos* with its attendant *teleia* pleasure – is not achieved by the process of addition / construction. That the end is given in an immediate intuition means that it is an indivisible *monadic* whole, which cannot be a compound or a mixture.

Let me now return back to *NE* 10, 1-5 discussion of pleasure from the teleological and functional standpoint. After defining pleasure as *τελειον το ειδος*, Aristotle goes on to define *τελεια ενεργεια* with the same criterion of isolated wholeness (*μοναδος*):

Since every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense which is in good condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful of its objects (for perfect

activity [*τελεια ενεργεια*] seems to be ideally of this nature; whether we say that *it* is active, or the organ in which it resides, may be assumed to be immaterial), it follows that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. And this activity will be the most complete (*τελεια*) and pleasant. For, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense, and in respect of thought and contemplation no less, the most complete (*τελεια*) is pleasantest, and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete; and the pleasure completes the activity (*ενεργεια*). *But the pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the combination of object and sense, both good, just as health and the doctor are not in the same way the cause of man's being healthy* (NE 1174b15-27; emphasis added).

It is clear from this passage that the ability of *energeia* to be *teleia* or *τελειον το ειδος* is based upon the functional unity between organ and its object. In other words, *energeia* becomes complete in itself – when the organ becomes one with its proper object. Completeness of *energeia* (its being *teleia*) is impossible to achieve when organ has an improper object, i.e., via adding other *energeiai* with their specific objects. Furthermore, there is a hierarchical subordination between *energeiai*, which is based upon the subordination between organs and their objects. The *most τελεια* activity operates with the best organ, and has the finest of objects. Thus, its being *pleasantest* has functional foundation. Aristotle contends inclusivist belief that the correspondence between activity and its object is the one of combination or mixture, with its consequent belief that happy life is a mixed life in which separable goods are simply added to each other. Pleasure completes the activity only because it arises when there is the most intense functional, i.e., *indivisible*, unity between the organ and its object via the functionally proper *ενεργεια* (1174b27-1175a3). Pleasure and life as *ενεργεια* are so indivisibly bound together that they “do not admit of separation” (1175a19-20). Many times elsewhere Aristotle speaks

of the identity of sense and its object, mind and its object, and, more generally, *energeia* and its object.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, 5, Aristotle explains further what the indivisible functional unity of *ενεργεια* means. Because each pleasure is inseparable from its functionally proper *energeia*, pleasures differ in kind, for “things different in kind are, we think”, says Aristotle, “completed by different things”, i.e., “activities differing in kind are completed by things different in kind”. The activities of thought differ in kind from those of the senses, and among themselves, and, so, do the pleasures that complete them. Moreover, *ενεργεια* is intensified by its proper pleasure, but it is “injured by alien pleasures” (“hindered by pleasures arising from other sources”), for alien pleasures do pretty much what proper pains do, since activities are destroyed by their proper pains. What intensifies *ενεργεια* is proper to it, but “things different in kind have properties different in kind” (1175a22-1175b2):

People who are fond of playing the flute are incapable of attending to arguments if they overhear some one playing the flute, since they enjoy flute-playing more than the activity in hand; so the pleasure connected with flute-playing destroys the activity concerned with argument. This happens, similarly, in all other cases, when one is active about two things at once; the more pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it is much more pleasant does so all the more, so that one even ceases from the other. This is why when we enjoy anything very much we do not throw ourselves into anything else, and do one thing only... (1175b2-12).

It is apparent from this passage that the quality of being *teleia* designates the functional intensity and unity of *ενεργεια*. And *energeia* is *teleia only* in isolation from the other *energeiai*, for every *energeia* is made *teleia only* by its *own* properties. Not only cannot *energeia* be made *teleia* by the properties of another *energeia* or *energeiai*, but it will be,

insists Aristotle, eliminated by alien pleasure. That is why, contrary to inclusivism, *teleia energeia* cannot possibly be the compound of existentially different *energeiai*.

Aristotle concludes *NE* 10, 5 with specifying the functional distinctions and, hence, functional hierarchy between *energeiai*. Aristotle divides *energeiai* into worthy, neutral, and others to be avoided. The pleasure proper to a worthy *energeia* is good and that proper to an unworthy *energeia* is bad (1175b24-29). The hierarchy between *energeiai* is as follows: “Sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the pleasures, therefore, are similarly superior, and those of thought superior to these” (1176a1-3). Each animal has “a proper pleasure, as it has proper function, viz., that which corresponds to its activity”. The pleasures of creatures different in kind differ in kind, and, says Aristotle, “it is plausible to suppose that those of a single species do not differ” (though they vary). Horse, dog, and man have different pleasures, as Heraclitus says “asses would prefer sweepings to gold” (1176a3-10). And Aristotle’s last words in *NE* 10, 5, giving him the transition to the discussion of *theōria* as the most *teleia energeia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, 7 are as follows: “But of those that are thought to be good what kind of pleasure or what pleasure should be said to be that proper to man?”

It is absolutely clear from this passage that the most *teleia energeia* is defined by its peculiarity for human species. Humanly specific *energeia* cannot be made *teleia* by beastly pleasures. Peculiarity is the criterion of isolation applied to the *ergon* of species. In the light of this text, it becomes even more evident that inclusivists / mixists missed the point of the peculiarity of human *ergon* when they attempted to construe it as an inclusive whole consisting of all the *energeiai* that humans share with the other animals. But the more striking departure from this text is the attempt by the recent Cooper, Kenny

and Kraut to exclude from human life the *energeia* that does functionally make humans who they are: contemplation. This is especially striking with Kraut who argues that politicians do not contemplate more than pigs, and, so, their happiness is essentially the happiness of pigs (1991, 63) (“asses would prefer sweepings to gold”).

NE 10, 6 ties all the arguments of *NE* 10, 1-5 together by stating that happiness is *energeia* which is self-sufficient (lacks nothing), meaning that it is desirable in itself, so that “nothing is sought beyond this activity” (1176b2-8). Now it is evident that “lacks nothing” means that the most *teleia energeia* is *τελειον το ειδος* without qualification, or most unmixed. *Energeia*, in general, can be *teleia*, or, in other words, good-in-itself pursued for its own sake, only if man engages in one *energeia* at a time. Because the most *teleia energeia* produces its proper pleasure only within itself (unlike the practical pleasures of praise and gain, in general), it is most intense in its functional realization. The most *teleia energeia* is self-sufficient also for the reason that it is on its own determines in which sense humans differ from the other species. In other words, only this *energeia* is self-sufficient to make humans who they are supposed to be. And without *teleia energeia*, humans are not who they are supposed to be though they might have all the functions of the other species combined. Evidently, Aristotle renders the finality and self-sufficiency of *energeia* in terms of its functional peculiarity for the species. In addition, *teleia energeia* is the indivisible self-contained or self-sufficient whole (*monados*) in its every moment. Hence, monadic self-sufficiency as the qualification of finality means exclusivity.

NE 10, 1-5 passages provide the additional textual support to the belief that when in *NE* 1, 9, Aristotle defines happiness as “a virtuous *energeia* of soul, of a certain kind”

(1099b26-27; emphasis added), what he means is the existentially and functionally specific, i.e., existentially and functionally isolated, *energeia*. Happiness as *energeia* cannot be a compound consisting of other *energeiai* which are of other, also certain, kind simply because happiness is *energeia* different and isolated from these other *energeiai*. In the passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness in *NE* 1, 7, Aristotle does indeed define happiness as “that which when isolated makes life desirable” (1097b15).

Now, we can finally consider the *NE* 1, 7 1097b14-21 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness that follows Aristotle’s definition of the most final good:

The self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others – if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable (1097b14-21).

All the contemporary interpreters considered the statement “that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” as Aristotle’s own belief. Nonetheless, right before this passage, at 1097b8-13, Aristotle argues against the maximization of goods and excess. Moreover, as I show, Aristotle does *extensively* argue for the limit not only to the extrinsic, but also to the intrinsic goods or good-in-themselves, going as far as insisting on the destructive role of moral perfectionism for happiness. All this textual evidence makes it entirely clear that, for Aristotle, *eudaimonia* as the most final and self-sufficient *energeia* cannot be achieved by the maximization of virtuous activities, and, more generally, cannot in principle be a compound of all the virtuous *energeiai*. This means that the statement “that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” can in no way be Aristotle’s

own belief. All the passages considered so far prepare the student of ethics for the isolation / exclusivity argument in the *NE* 10, 1-5, which is, as it is evident, not a new development, but the reinforcement of the point made as early as the beginning of *NE* 1, and, then, developed in *NE* 7, 4, and throughout the *Ethics*.

Let me go back to the very beginning of this chapter where I analyzed the inclusivist argument by Plato and Eudoxus:

[Eudoxus] argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g., to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that is only by itself that the good can be increased. *This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone.* And so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it. Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves (1172b23-35; emphasis added).

As it is clear now, Aristotle starts with this passage a discussion which occupies the entire *NE* 10, 1-6 to explain why he sides with Plato that The Good cannot be mixed or inclusive, and, hence, why it is wrong to ascribe to him the inclusivist view of the Good. According to both Plato and Aristotle, The Good cannot be a mixture, i.e., subject to addition and subtraction. But, contrary to Plato, Aristotle believes that human happiness *is* the Good, i.e., *teleion*, and agrees with Eudoxus that pleasure is *teleia*. At the same time, Aristotle explains why he disagrees with Eudoxus that the nature of the good being *teleion* is of the inclusive nature. Contrary to Eudoxus, he argues that its property of being *teleion* is the *eideic* / *indivisible* / functional unity of *eidos* and *hyle* in a qualitatively / existentially unique *ousia*. As a whole, *NE* 10, 1-6 represents one long elaborate argument by Aristotle to prove that, because The Good is not a mixture (not inclusive), the

human happiness -- which *is* The Good for Aristotle -- cannot be a mixture (cannot be inclusive). It is evident now that, for Aristotle, pleasure *is* in fact the realization of the *eideic / indivisible / functional unity of eidos and hyle* in a qualitatively / existentially unique *ousia*. That is why he is so concerned with the status of pleasure. In other words, that is why he has this long discussion of pleasure as *teleia* – pleasure as *eidos / monados* -- before the very final chapters of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE* 10, 7-8) with their final consideration of the *teleia aretê* – the *energeia* of *aretê* as *eidos / monados*. It is because Aristotle wants to prove that human happiness *is* the good, or is *eidos / monados / teleion* in isolation from other goods that he so vehemently opposes “*this [inclusivist] argument*” for the inclusive nature of human happiness by Plato and Eudoxus, “the argument of a specific kind”, which yields two opposite conclusions – the one by Plato (pleasure is *not* the good) and the one by Eudoxus (pleasure *is* the good).

Let me look closer at two textual parallelisms this passage has with the *NE* 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of happiness -- expression “one of the goods, and no more a good than any other” which is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 expression “being counted as one good thing among others” (1097b17-18); and the statement “every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone” which is parallel to the *NE* 1, 7 “if it were so counted [as one good thing among others] it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” (1097b18-21). Now, after all the other passages that I reviewed, it is clear that *NE* 10, 1-5 passages on the self-sufficient / isolated most final good / most final *energeia* is the clue to deciphering 1097b14-21 passage in the *NE* 1, 7 on the self-sufficiency of happiness. In both of these

texts, Aristotle opposes “one of the goods, and no more a good than any other” “being counted as one good thing among others” (in Plato’s and Eudoxus’ view on human happiness) to the self-subsistent or self-sufficient good that “when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” “without being counted as one good thing among others” (his own view on human happiness). Aristotle’s words “that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” is simply the reference to the popular belief formulated by the hedonist Eudoxus. It is not even the reference to Plato’s inclusivist view on human happiness (Plato’s belief that human happiness is a mixed life with pleasure added to the good), for Plato, like Aristotle, imposed limit upon excess. This consideration adds to the realization that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is rather the notes taken by the student than Aristotle’s actual theoretical treatise. When Aristotle was giving his lectures, he kept repeating these two major standpoints – by Eudoxus and Plato – but not in order to express his concession with their inclusivist view, but, vice versa, in order to make his own view more distinct from theirs.

Thus, the concluding part of the 1097b14-21 passage “if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable” is the paraphrase of the hedonist theory by Eudoxus. And the concluding part of the 1172b23-35 passage “now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves” is the paraphrase of Plato’s theory who argued that what is added cannot be the good. As Aristotle stressed, these statements are opposite in its meaning to each other.

Let me summarize the opposition between Plato's inclusivist view on human happiness and Aristotle's functionalist exclusivist view. Modern inclusivists argue that the most final end (good-in-itself without qualification) is the compound of goods-in-themselves (final goods). Essentially, they do simply reinstate Plato's theory that human happiness is a mixed life. They ignore the fact that Plato did at the same time believe that The Good is *monados* and cannot be constructed via adding up the goods-in-themselves. For, had it been a compound, The Good would be made more desirable "by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves", but this is analytically wrong in virtue of definition of The Good (The Good is *teleion*). That is why the modern inclusivists fail to realize the repulsive pessimist nature of the inclusive happiness for Plato. There is nothing of an ideal in the inclusivist happiness. Plato believes that human happiness is of a mixed kind precisely because he does not believe in its soundness, i.e., that human happiness realizes *The Good*. Modern inclusivists do not notice that Aristotle does definitely agree with Plato that The Good is *teleion* in the sense that "nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good of themselves", meaning that he also does not believe in the ability of mixed life to be The Good. But contrary to Plato, he argues that humans can realize the nature of the good being *teleion* in the indivisible moments of their functionally peculiar *energeia* – contemplation, i.e., humans *can have* sound happiness. When inclusivists reinstate Plato's theory on happiness as a mixed life, they miss the point that the mixed life is never *teleion*. They say that nothing can be added to happiness in a mixed life to make a better good, because happiness already contains all goods, which could possibly be added to it. But, as Aristotle points out, the mixed life as a construct or compound can be con-

sidered *teleion* only in the moment of its completion, i.e., death; and this constitutes an *aporia* (the mixed life is never *teleion* when man is alive; and it is *teleion* only when man is dead).